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The objective of this thesis is to examine, through an 
analysis of mergers and acquisitions, the fundamental changes 
in the structure and operations of the U. K. financial system 
since 1966. The structural changes were greatly influenced 
by the external growth of banks and other financial institutions 
which featured a series of complementary and diversificatory 
acquisitions. These were undertaken for two major reasons. 
The first was to increase the capital bases of the institutions. 
The second was to diversify their product range and geographical 
spread. The extent of this merger activity was such that in 
1973, the total expenditure on acquisitions by financial 
companies equalled that by all manufacturing'-companies. In 
this part of the study an emRhasis is placed on the rapid 
expansion of the eurocurrency markets and the growth of the 
secondary banking system, and the effects that these had on 
official policy and the banks' competitive environment. 
In addition to their instrumental role in causing change 
in financial markets, acquisitions have been both engineered 
and regulated from within the financial sector. Thus, the 
second part of the study centres on the role played by financial 
institutions as advisers and supervisors in the market for 
corporate control. 
The final part of the study examines the period since 1973 
in which the characteristic optimism of the previous years 
suddenly disappeared and the secondary banking sector almost 
totally collapsed. The analysis attempts to explain the origins 
and effects of the factors which beset financial institutions 
in the short period from 1973 to 1975 and their implications. 
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(i) 
'INTRODUCTION 
In the last ten years merger activity in all sectors of the U. K. 
economy reached record levels. This prompted considerable research into 
the acquisition behaviour of manufacturing firms, and from the resulting 
stock of literature, our knowledge of the merger phenomenon has advanced 
enormously. With the exception of Franklin's interest in insurance 
and Channon's pre-occupation with banking, however, economists' attention 
bas been focused exclusively on the non-financial sectors. Thus financial 
institutions have a limited place in the merger knowledge inherited from 
economics. 
The objective of this research is to increase our knowledge of 
the role of financial intermediaries in merger activity. As an integral 
part of a wider study into the power of financial institutions, the study 
aims to examine the relationship of financial companies to merger activity 
in two respects. First, we wish to examine the incidence, influence, 
nature and consequences of acquisitions and mergers by financial companies 
over the period 1966-1973. Secondly, we wish to analyse the ways in 
which financial institutions, and especially merchant banks, can influence 
the behaviour. of other industrial firms in the market for corporate control - 
the so-called merger market. If evidence can be offered on these and 
other similar questions it will substitute knowledge for what some may 
regard as-an excess of supposition and will thus provide a new point of 
reference for merger discussions. 
Studies concerned with merger and acquisition activity of firms 
frequently confront the problem of explaining its causes. 
1 
Numerous 
approaches to an explanation are possible, -each consistent with a different 
level of aggregation. Three basic approaches are usually distinguished: 
one is concerned with the causes of aggregate merger activity, particularly 
the periodicity and amplitude of acquisition cycles; 
2 
a second with 
merger behaviour at the industry level; 
3 
a third with individual firms' 
-- (ii) - 
acquisitions policies and decisions. 
4 
As none of the approaches is 
mutually exclusive, and each is able to describe at least some of the 
macro- and micro-economic perspectives within which acquisition policies 
are formulated, there is no justification for abandoning fully any of the 
three approaches available. 
Explanations derived from any of these empirical approaches, 
however, and from 'a priori' analyses5 of merger behaviour must be 
treated with some caution. For reasons developed below therefore, I 
have eschewed a conventional approach employing the traditional micro- 
economic tools of industrial analysis. Instead, in the first part of 
the research, which investigates the causes of the merger and acquisition 
behaviour of financial institutions, the aims are limited to identifying 
the major influences affecting decision-makers' growth objectives, the 
speed and direction of expansion and the method of growth. 
6 
It is 
considered erroneous to intend to reach definitive conclusions about the 
causes of any group of mergers, or of any particular merger - even if 
objective observations and information about the rationale of decision- 
makers were made available. Accordingly, I am reluctant, at this stage, ' 
either to postulate and test causes of merger activity undertaken by 
financial institutions, or to infer generalised explanations of a particular 
group of mergers. Furthermore, because financial intermediaries 
operate in dynamic, volatile environments, in which institutional, 
official and competitive pressures are liable to frequent and unpredictable 
change, I feel reluctant to volunteer general reasons for the 
extensive merger activity undertaken by financial companies over the last 
1 
decade. 
- (iii) - 
Nonetheless, without attributing or imputing definitive 
causes for financial company acquisitions over the period, it is necessary 
to consider observations in a series of perspectives, referred to throughout 
under the head of "competitive environment". Under this general label 
the various pressures - institutional, official and competitive - which 
seem most likely to have affected the merger behaviour of financial 
companies are considered. 
It is necessary first to explain in detail the reasons for 
adopting the approach explained above which examines merger behaviour 
largely independently of theoretical considerations. The justification 
stems from the empirical problems. and theoretical issues which confronted 
the research. Had these been ignored and the analysis conducted on 
traditional lines, the findings would have been biased and, furthermore, 
based on naive assumptions. 
The methodological problems, moreover, seem to be of more general 
importance and significance than to this study. They involve, in particular, 
fundamental issues regarding the meaning of 'industry' and 'market': 
that is they involve economists' understanding of those innate 
characteristics of 'industry''and 'market' which differentiate one group 
of firms from another and thereby enable consistent boundaries to be 
delineated for empirical and theoretical analyses to proceed. Accordingly, 
although these problems are identified here by reference to the study of 
acquisitions in the financial sector, they should not be considered 
unique to the financial service industries nor to this particular type 
of analysis occurring in industrial economics. 
The rationale for a study of j 
the incidence and magnitude of merger activity is to provide an 
indication of resulting changes in industrial and market structure and 
possibly of changes in the concentration and loci of economic power. 
7 
(iv) - 
To satisfy these aims, however, a major methodological problem is confronted: 
that of classifying-acquiring and victim firms in a meaningful and 
consistent manner. This is essential if observers are to begin to 
understand and quantify the changing nature of acquisitions made by 
financial companies at a higher level of aggregation than that of 
the individual firm. 
In the event, the method adopted in this study was to extend 
the Bank of England's own, and sometimes inconsistent, method of 
classifying individual firms according to their "main activity". This 
approach does not, however, enable definitive conclusions to be drawn. 
Rather, it is fraught with substantial weaknesses. First, by forcing 
multi-product, multi-industry, multi-process firms into single industry/ 
market categories, the method understates the extent of product and 
process diversification experienced by individual financial firms 
and hence by any particular sector. Secondly, it requires the imposition 
of an almost implicit and artificial assumption that 'main activity' 
can and should be estimated by turnover -a market-, or product-, based 
measure which may not, in fact, reflect the firm's main process activity. 
Thirdly, it ignores the possibility that the notion of turnover may have 
little meaning, or indeed cannot even be measured, when applied to 
Iý financial multi-product firms. This compounds the difficult problem of 
analysing-the products and output of financial companies. Fourthly, 
it tends to invalidate statements about structural change resulting 
from empirical observations of firms' mergers and acquisition activity. 
These weaknesses cannot be immediately or easily resolved, 
for they are not merely problems arising from pigeon-holing multi-product 
firms into single industry/market categories. Rather they are symptoms, 
first of micro-economic theory's inability consistently to allocate 
products to particular markets or market segments, and secondly of the 
confusion and difficulty of distinguishing 'industry' and 'market'. 
- cvi- 
The first weakness is a specific failing of a much wider topic 
concerning the applicability of received theories of the firm. The 
second weakness stems from a reliance upon traditional definitions upon 
-which received theories were based. 
Thus, if a meaningful understanding of the extent of 
structural change consequent upon acquisition is to be formulated, 
-much will depend on the criteria used to determine which 
firms to include in any given industrial or market group. The criteria 
themselves are dependent upon an understanding of those characteristics 
of industry and market which enable one group of firms to be distinguished 
from another. 
Accordingly, in order that empirical studies become meaningful 
it is necessary to consider the meaning of industry. 
9 
Indeed, it is the 
absence of such fundamental considerations which question the validity 
of those empirical studies which'have concentrated on industrial structure. 
Since the structural approach to the explanation and prediction of firm 
behaviour and performance is not based on firm considerations regarding the 
meaning of industry,. it can seldom provide more than a superficial 
understanding of the extent and direction of change over time. 
Few economists have attempted to explore the economic meaning 
of industry. While two or three have tried to establish criteria to 
enable us to distinguish between behaviour concerning the 'market' from 
that concerning 'industry'10, fewer still have made the next step of 
considering those characteristics which classify firms to a particular 
industry. 
-_(vi) - 
One possible explanation for this failure is that the neat 
symmetry assumed by the marginalist theory of the firm rarely occurs in 
practice, The typical firm is multi-product and multi-process and hence 
belongs to more than one industry and sells in more than one market. 
The industry, as conventionally understood, produces a range of different 
products, all of which are not close substitutes, and uses different 
technical processes of production. 
In these circumstances the definition of the boundaries of 
that industry cannot be uniquely identified. Regardless of any particular 
imputed definition adopted (such as that chosen by a government department, 
trade association or wages council), it is clear that the 'industry' 
will normally include firms that are selling products which are not 
always close substitutes to buyers and/or purchasers belonging to 
different geographical markets. In these two senses the '. industry' will 
frequently be more broadly defined than the 'market'. On the other hand, 
the opposite can occur. Production activities may be linked to 
different industries because they use a different raw material or technical 
ll 
process although their products may be : close competitors in the same markets. 
The existence of major discrepancies between the conventional 
concept of the industry and the economist's concept of the market, led 
a number of economists to propose that the economic analysis of industrial 
12 behaviour-should be undertaken in terms of markets rather than industries. 
However, the use of the market concept is also confronted with problems. 
In an economic environment characterised by widespread product differentiation 
where substitutability is viewed differently by different consumers, 
it is not self-evident where one market ends and another begins. 
Traditional micro-economic theory unfortunately gives only inadequate 
assistance to resolving this problem; the empirical tools which it provides 
can rarely be applied in practical analysis. The simple traditional 
theories of consumer behaviour, for example, which do not explore the 
role and nature of the characteristics of products, do not provide 
tools 
- (vii) - 
which are empirically useful. Indeed, even if the techniques of own- 
price and cross-elasticity of demand were quite perfect and able to 
produce measures with unambiguous meanings, 
13 
there are no guide-lines 
or defined threshold-levels of cross elasticity which identify 
boundaries between markets and market segments. Thus in the last 
analysis the limits of the market must, like those of the industry, be 
arbitrarily drawn. Furthermore, any degree of sophistication in the 
definition of the market has often to be largely sacrificed on account 
of lack of data at the empirical stage of the investigation since such 
statistical information as exists usually relates to the 'conventionally' 
defined industry, 14 
Contemporary approaches to consumer behaviour are at present 
marginally more helpful to the problem. Whilst the 'characteristics 
approach' does have considerable virtues - particularly in dealing with 
-those objective properties of'goods which fulfil the underlying needs, 
drives and perceptions of consumers - it provides an incomplete, although 
potentially practical tool for the delimitation of market boundaries. 
The characteristics approach challenges acceptance of the traditional 
concept of 'product', upon which calculations of cross elasticity 
are supposed possible. Unfortunately, however, as Lancaster has pointed 
out, classical micro-economics has largely ignored the characteristics 
of products. Hence the practical application of theoretical concepts 
regarding products, markets and demand, appears seldom to have been 
questioned. As a result theoretical analyses tend to be in terms of 
abstract products and markets, and these have too easily become models 
affecting our understanding of real markets and products. 
lý 
By focusing 
attention on the perceived and real characteristics of products, which 
both distinguish them, and also invest them with attributes from which 
consumers derive utility, the theory of demand and concepts of market 
structure are considerably altered - that is, for example, market share, 
- (viii) - 
concentration ratios /ha monopoly - and are made redundant, changed 
or became invalid. /Clearly, in the absence of tools to define consistent 
market bounda 
power must be 
structural a 
as indica rs 
the use of concentration ratios to infer market 
stioned. It is similarly invalid to apply a traditional 
(based on interpretations of concentration ratios 
of the loci of economic power) to the analysis of mergers 
'and acgyLsitions. By virtue of the diversified product range and market 
spread 
of 
financial institutions , and due to the volatile nature of 
their competitive environment, acquisitions undertaken by financial 
companies tend to involve changes in market power which cannot be easily 
16 measured or proxied by traditional micro-economic measures* 
4,1 The reasons advanced above for treating the results of a market- 
orientated analysis with caution may be considered to be negative. 
These are, however, positive factors for using the industry concept for 
certain types of analysis. First, the fact that firms have bound 
themselves together in associations (for example, the Accepting Houses 
Committee or the Issuing Houses Association) or are regarded by others 
(including government departments and the Bank of England) as possessing 
an affinity of interest will usually mean that in certain respects at 
, least they behave alike, react alike or are treated alike. In studies 
Of collusive behaviour, of innovatory activity and of response to changes 
-, in firms'-Operating environment it may be that the use of an industry 
concept; based on an institutional or, statutory reality, is more helpful 
than a 'market' definition. Secondly, given the prevalence of the multi- 
product firm and the widespread practice of business growth through 
diversification, the concept of the single product market will be too 
-.: arrow to be useful for anything but short-run static analysis. 
'his phenomenon, especially as it relates to potential competition, as 
" for example from foreign banks entering international financial markets 
London, is better handled using a broader concept of industry. Even 
this however is not sufficient to analyse the conglomerate which has interests 
ýn. a number of disparate industries. 
- UX) - 
The growth of the multi-product firm has arguably been the most 
important feature of recent industrial development. The problems which 
this form of organisation poses for theoretical analyses, of industrial 
structure have already been mentioned. The proliferation of conglomerate 
or diversified firms also figures in the problem of defining both 
'industry' and 'market' boundaries and indeed in distinguishing between 
the two concepts. If conglomerates are viewed from the standpoint of 
the organisation of industry, then it may be observed that industrial 
interdependence, once effected through the market-place or by overt 
co-ordination of independent decision-making units,. has been replaced by 
an interdependence exercised within individual firms. This trend, 
which is particularly pronounced in the financial'sector, reflects the 
desire of firms, and their actual and potential competitors, to acquire 
knowledge and to extend technical and marketing skills. 
This conclusion leads to a particularly confusing problem in 
the analysis of financial companies' acquisition behaviour. That is 
whilst it is possible to think in terms of markets with strictly defined 
boundaries (such as that for trade financing by members of the Accepting 
Houses Committee, or that for motor underwriting or underwriting fire 
insurance) 17 it is much less easy to be sure whether to consider a single 
banking or a single general insurance industry. On the one hand, common 
skills should undoubtedly be applied in lending money or raising finance, 
or underwriting risks. On the. other, ' however, the industries may be 
considered as segmented; these segment boundaries being determined by the 
existence of unique knowledge and experience which are neither transferable 
nor common to different industry segments. 
CX, 
The operation of the theory developed by Andrews18 relies considerably 
on whether these skills, expertise, knowledge and experiences which firms' 
managements possess can be identified. If satisfactory tools are not 
available and different investigators choose different populations of 
. 
firms for their analysis of a "given" industry, then their empirical 
results are likely to be different, and argument as to their comparative 
validity, irrelevant. 
Penrose, 19 stresses that skills and knowledge are neither possessed 
nor acquired by firms per se. They are instead immured within individual 
decision-makers and the various coalitions of which they form part. 
Moreover, the acquisition of knowledge and the. extension of skills is 
a continuing process. At a given time a firm's product range and 
processes are determined by which of the skills and knowledge-available 
within a firm are being severally exploited. Thus, as Penrose makes 
clear, the firm is likely to move into and acquire technologies and 
markets to which it was originally quite alien. The implications are 
that industry boundaries can be continuously receding such that the number 
of industries in which any firm is a member is always tending to increase. 
At the same time, the market may not change in nature, unless the skilrs 
necessary to participate themselves change. 
is leaves then multi-industry, multi-product, multi-process 
firms competing in an environment in which, as skills are continuously 
acquired by different firms, industry boundaries are breaking down, 
becoming more apparent than real; matters of discretion for both the 
academic empiricist and for the manager who needs to identify his 
1 
potential competitors. 
- (xi) - 
The conclusion of this brief critique of industrial economics 
supports that of the earlier discussion of market analysis. Not only are 
we without tools to identify and measure skills and knowledge possessed 
and acquired by decision-makers - the so-called 'innate characteristics' 
of an industry20 - but analysis is greatly hindered by continual change 
of 'given' industries. The activities and markets of banks and insurers, 
for example, are increasingly becoming coincident and the skills of the 
latter, the property of the former. In the absence of artificial 
officially-created and - maintained market boundaries, what process and 
product boundaries that still exist seem likely to crumble. 
The normative conclusions are to question the validity of 
empirical analyses based on traditional methods or on received micro- 
economic theories. A particular doubt which arises is in respect of that 
approach to analysis which chooses the structure of industry as its 
focus - presuming industrial structure to be the predominant or determinate 
influence in firms' conduct and performance. Criticisms of the paradigm 
of industrial economics have been developed elsewhere; 
21 
in the preceding 
pages I have attempted to question whether the structural focus of much 
of the theoretical and empirical economic analysis of industry is 
acceptable, and to justify my particular approach to analysis of the merger 
activity of financial companies. 
To summarise, the inherited stock of'theoretical knowledge on merger 
and competition does not provide economists with consistent analytical 
techniques. The static frameworks of received theories of the firm were 
designed primarily to handle the determination of price and output of 
individual products. They are not well-equipped, however, to cope with 
firms which have a wide range of differentiated products, or with the 
acquisition and diversification strategies of oligopolistic competitors 
in a changing and uncertain world. The problem posed for empiricists is 
compounded by the difficulty of distinguishing between 'industry' and 
'market' and the resultant concentration by a majority of economists 
- (xii)- 
As a result, empirical studies of the relationship of 
mergers and the theory of the firm are often inconclusive and 
contradictory. Therefore, it was considered expedient, particularly 
in view of the unique mixture of interdependent markets and inter-firm 
relationships in the financial system, and the mixture of official and 
private control exercised in the financial service industries, not to 
adopt a traditional approach. 
The scope of the research has meant approaching different 
parts of the study in different ways. In examining the frequency of 
financial sector merger activity and in considering some of the causes 
and consequences of financial companies' acquisitions, it is necessary 
first to adopt a highly aggregative and essentially statistical approach. 
The task is complicated, however, because the forces which have induced 
financial intermediaries to become more integrated and/or more diversified 
have changed over the period. In so far as these pressures are likely 
to influence the nature of financial company acquisitions, the statistical 
analyses must recognise changes in the institutions' competitive 
environments. To achieve this, another approach is required. This relies 
upon information obtained from interviews with officers of financial . '..., 
institutions as well as from published sources, and details of effects 
of events upon the strength and extent of the inter-dependencies between 
financial intermediaries. Emphasis is placed on the impact of Competition 
and Credit Control, the growth of the eurocurrency markets, the entry 
of foreign banks into London and the change in attitude of the Bank of 
England, all of which radically altered the conditions in the financial 
system. They increased competition and encouraged co-operation, acquisitions 
and mergers. A behavioural approach is also adopted to analyse the role 
of financial companies in the corporate merger market and to evaluate 
the consequences of financial sector merger activity on domestic and 
international financial markets. 
- (xiii) - 
The breadth of the subject has necessitated some specialisation 
and therefore some omissions which are explained in the relevant chapters. 
It must be recognised that analyses of the financial service industries 
are likely to become quickly 'out-of-date' as contemporary events overtake 
recent history. Nevertheless a serious analysis must be undertaken 
within fixed time, boundaries; the choice of a terminal date was 
dictated by two factors. The first was practical, for when I started, 
1973 was the last complete year for which comprehensive data was available ; 
the second reason stems from the simultaneity of events in 1974 and the 
severity of their implications for the competitive environments of financial 
institutions. The abrupt end to the optimism which had been so apparent 
in previous years created an effective chronological watershed. 
The markets which are singled out for attention in the study 
are those in which banking institutions, especially wholesale banks, 
compete. These cover a wide spectrum extending across the financial 
system and into such non-financial markets as corporate control. Banks 
have not only dominated the merger activity within the financial sector 
but have also played a pre-eminent role in the 'engineering' and 
'regulation' of acquisitions in the corporate sector. The dissertation 
is divided into four parts. Part One consists of two chapters. The 
first provides the legislative background to the specific issues raised 
throughout the text by tracing the development of monopoly policy in the 
U. K. and analysing the current approach to the public control of mergers. 
In addition, some of the methodological problems connected with applying 
legislation to financial companies are noted. Chapter Twoicomprises 
a detailed statistical analysis of the aggregate acquisition activity of 
financial institutions. It clearly shows the increase in financial 
sector merger activity 
in 1966-1973 as an important phenomenon and one 
which merits more 
detailed investigation. 
- (xiv) - 
Part Two represents the bulk of the study and develops the theme 
that the primary rationale for mergers and acquisitions in the financial 
sector-stems from changes in the competitive environments within which 
financial companies operate. Chapters Three'and Four concentrate on 
domestic pressures and examine the acquisition behaviour of banks, 
insurance companies and investment companies, distinguishing between 
firms which market similar and different products within the same 
industry and across industrial boundaries. In Chapter Four the importance 
of the financial multi-product firm is assessed and the incidence and 
causes of merger activity in the stock broking industry are analysed. 
Chapter Five concentrates on the geographical expansion of U. K. banks and 
the internationalisation of banking business - the growth of the euromarkets, 
the migration of foreign banks, participations in consortia and syndicates, 
and other forms of quasi and full merger activity. 
Part Three, consisting of two chapters, begins with a digression 
which examines the behaviour and influence of financial companies in the 
mechanics of takeover bids. It-is justified by the importance of financial 
institutions in, first, arranging and negotiating acquisitions, and 
secondly, in attempting to control behaviour in the merger market. 
In Chapter Six, the influence of the merchant banks and City public 
relations-"consultants is examined with reference to particular examples. 
In Chapter Seven, the focus is on regulation. Thus the role of financial 
companies in the design of the Takeover Code and its execution is discussed; 
finally, the philosophy of the City's form of self-government is examined 
and its relationship with the legislation to control merger activity is 
assessed. It is not considered necessary to restrict the analysis 
in Part Three to the period 1966-73 and it is updated wherever it is 
appropriate and useful. 
t-ý 
- (xv) 
Part Four contains the eighth and final chapter, the purpose 
of which is to summarise the main findings of the dissertation, to analyse 
the current situation and the changes since 1973, and to examine possible 
solutions to the problems which have arisen. 
1 
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INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this brief section is to give a resume of 
the nature of the competitive environment in banking, and other 
credit markets in the period leading up to the spate of mergers and 
acquisitions at the end of the 1960s. The aim is to indicate how 
the changing climate in which financial institutions were operating 
provided the motivation to combine. This analysis is concerned with 
several markets which are segments of the aggregate market for credit, 
both domestic and international, located in the U. K. 
An appreciation of the relevant features requires initially 
an analysis of the prevailing institutional arrangements in the banking 
sector in the context of the objectives assigned to monetary policy, 
and the techniques of control adopted by policy makers. Comment on 
the competitive behaviour of the institutions can only be offered 
after an understanding of prevailing market conditions is secured. 
The analysis focuses in the first place upon the clearing 
banks and examines the pressures in their traditional, domestic markets, 
which encouraged amalgamation and diversification. We then assess 
the factors which led to the growth of the so-called secondary 
banking system which arose alongside the main banking system of the 
clearing banks. It is appropriate in this context to examine the 
rapid increase in the number of "near banks" which competed for 
deposits with the clearing banks' subsidiaries. The scope of this 
section also covers the diversification of traditional finance houses 
and the influx of U. S. banks. These developments were all assisted 
by, indeed dependent upon, the growth of parallel money markets - 
both Sterling and Eurocurrency, and in particular, Eurodollars. 
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In its report on "Bank Charged', the Prices and Incomes 
Board (PIB) denoted two main functions performed by the banks among 
their various activities. The clearing or deposit banks are predominant 
in the first of these functions - the operation of the country's 
main payments system. Indeed, this role has dominated their 
behaviour. The second main function of banks is to act as financial 
intermediaries between borrowers and lenders. This function assumed 
asubordinate position in the deposit banks' priorities however. 
The competition faced by the deposit banks in the performance 
of these duties was, as indicated by the PIII, quite different. Despite 
the existence of alternative means of making payments, as far as 
the transmission of money was concerned, the deposit banks dominated 
such institutional competitors as the Post Office Savings Bank (although 
the Post. Office Giro had not then been introduced). In their role as 
intermediaries, however, the-deposit banks were increasingly facing 
competition from other institutions, which offered liabilities that 
were close substitutes of bank deposits and yet paid a comparatively 
high interest rate. - 
It i! 'appropriate first to examine inter-clearing bank 
competition. In fact, competition between the clearers was inhibited 
by a number of-conventions and agreements, and by the oligopolistic 
structure of their main operating market which had not changed significantly 
since the Colwyn Committee report of 1918. In particular they had agreed 
upon the rates of interest offered on interest-bearing deposits and 
the general level of interest payable on advances. They offered only 
two main types of deposit - current accounts which bore no interest, 
used by customers drawing cheques as the principal means of payment, 
and deposit accounts which were interest bearing and withdrawable 
on 7 days' notice. Because their liabilities were short term, the 
banks preferred to make advances in the form of self-liquidating 
overdrafts, although in practice some of their assets were represented 
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4 
by fixed term loans and moreover, their overdraft facilities were often 
continuous. 
As -regard time deposits, a cartel existed between the 
deposit banks which limited the rate of interest paid to investors. 
f 
to 2% below Bank Rate. This agreement was characteristic of the 
oligopoly enjoyed by the deposit banks. In market structures where 
the number of competitors is small, it is usual to find a restriction 
on open "price" competition, and an emphasis on competition through 
service and innovation. This indeed was the case as will be indicated 
later. The decision not to bid competitively on rates, both with 
each other and other financial intermediaries, is attributable to 
the notion that the result of such competition would be the raising 
of costs for all banks while not necessarily substantially improving 
the position of one bank, "vis-a-vis another. 
With respect to deposit banks' assets, as noted, loans 
were normally on an overdraft basis and although nominally recallable 
on demand, tended to become "long-term" through a process of renewal. 
There were four main categories of borrowers under the arrangements 
that the banks agreed in 1951-52, on the revival of the monetary 
policy: nationalised industries at Bank Rate; "blue chip"'companies 
at "ICI terms" of % over Bank Rate; other commercial borrowers at 
1%. above Bank Rate; and personal and small business borrowers paying 
1-1ý% above Bank Rate. 
During 1964-65, borrowers were re-classified into five groups. 
The first two existing groups were retained; the third and fourth 
were amalgamated; a new group was formed comprising hire-purchase 
finance houses; and a fifth covering special arrangements for export 
credits was created. This last class encompassed two types of lending: 
short-term up to two years, at Bank Rate with a minimum of 4ý%; 
and longer terms at a fixed rate of 5ý%. The latter was chosen by 
the banks in 1962 under persuasion from the Sank of England, asa. reasonable 
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'average of expected future rates; in 1976, the arrangement was 
extended to domestic orders for shipbuilding. 
Apart from any innate tendency towards cartelisation, the 
acquiescence of deposit banks in restraint of competition can be 
explained as a function of official attitudes towards the banking 
system and in particular its role in the operation of monetary policy. 
First, there was long hostility to modification of the traditional 
compartmentalisation of financial activity. There was also official 
preoccupation with financing the public sector and repeated credit 
restraint on the private sector which restricted the volume and 
character and profitability of banks' assets. It oriented them 
towards a higher ratio of public sector to private sector debt than 
they might otherwise have preferred; and official concern for a stable 
Treasury bill rate under-pinned the relative'inflexibility of banks' 
lending rates. 
The specialisation mentioned above (as will be seen later) 
is particularly explicable by the pattern of monetary regulation to 
which the deposit banks were singularly subjected. The practices 
of the banks themselves were used by the monetary authorities. as 
a basis for control. For example, the cash held at the Bank of England 
to settle inter-clearing bank accounts and the need to maintain a 
proportion of assets in a'liquid form in order to be able to meet 
obligations to depositors. The deposit banks were actually required 
to hold 20% of total deposits in the form of specified liquid assets 
(bills, call money and refinanceable export credits) and a further 8% 
in the form of cash (in their tills and at the Bank of England). 
These minimum ratio requirements were supplemented by special 
deposits which were first introduced in 1960. In addition to these 
- (v) - 
quantitative restraints, control of bank lending also took the qualitative 
form of a 'package' of official measures. whenever the authorities 
felt restrictive action was' necessary. Selective controls over 
bank lending operated for more than one-half of the ten years 
1959-1969°and, save for a short period in 1967, quantitative 
restraints on lending were continuously in force from the end of 
1964. 
Official guidance followed a common pattern with advances 
related to home consumption, hire-purchase companies, property 
development and other speculative transactions marked out for special 
restraint. Selective controls, which involved some measure of restraint 
on total lending, were reinforced to a much greater extent after 
1965 by expressly indicated quantitative controls. These took-the 
form of an indicated ceiling for bank lending within which the total 
was to be constrained, and earned the description by the Radcliffe 
Committee of "the most drastic form of control of bank advances" 
(paragraph 527). 
" Further indications of the inextricable link between 
deposit bank behaviour and the conduct of monetary policy also exists. 
The banks' own agreements about the rates of interest they asked on 
"call" money (most of which was lent to the Discount Market) and 
on advances, and the rates offered on deposits - all of which bore a 
fixed relationship with Bank Rate, were, for example, features 
around which monetary policy was built. Similarly, the fact that 
-the banks agreed not to tender on Treasury Bills in their own right 
was a feature which necessarily conditioned the conduct of monetary policy. 
(v i) 
(The conclusion that is drawn from the nature of these 
arrangerýnts (which implicitly assumes that the banking mechanism was 
the. chcsen instrument of monetary control) is that it is hardly 
surpr sing that the deposit banks did not compete for deposits while 
their advances remained subject to direct controls. Indeed it could 
be'argued that while the banks were asked to operate under. a system 
of tight credit control which restricted their ability to compete in 
lending, it would have been improbable that they could have made 
significant use of the opportunities for greater competition 
that abolition of the cartel would theoretically have provided. 
A number of other aspects of the competitive environment 
in deposit banking markets must also be mentioned. In the absence of 
direct price competition, the deposit banks sought to compete vigorously 
through the opening of new branches, advertising and the provision 
of services. 'This was an-expensive form of competition and probably 
an inefficient way of transmitting pressure from the more to the less 
efficient banks: rising interest rates, in the context of the cartel 
automatically provided rising revenues which helped banks to absorb 
higher costs, whilst maintaining satisfactory profits (true profits 
were not disclosed anyway). 
.ý 
In the competitive environment in which the banks operated, 
however, their management of their branch networks was probably 
rational. The costs of extending branch networks were considerable 
nevertheless and should be examined in the following perspectives. 
First, in the competitive environment described above, the unrestricted 
competitive expansion of business could only be attempted by the 
extension of branches. The result was the imposition of costs upon 
one another through the duplication of branches. Secondly, profit 
-margins were threatened further, at the same time, by the upward 
movement of other operating costs, notably labour, and the heavy 
} 
investment'in data processing equipment.. As an illustration, 
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'. expenditure on premises more than doubled in the period 1961-1965 to 
more than £33 million; in the same period, the number of branches in 
the London clearing banks' network expanded by 9% - at a faster 
rate than the growth of the population. By the end of 1967, the 
clearing banks had nearly 14,000 branches; at the end of 1945 this 
figure was 9,600.. In those five years, the total cost of data 
processing equipment increased by 40% and in the seven years ended 
1967,, approximately E35-40 million was invested in automation equipment 
and computers. This investment was partly to provide the hardware 
to speed up and expand services to meet the competitive challenge 
posed by the National Giro which began business in late 1968. It 
was also undertaken as a means of reducing staff costs which 
accounted for 70% of the banks' operating costs. In aggregate, 
total costs rose by 42% in the case of London clearing banks between 
1961 and 1965. As the PIB pointed out "there is no unique indicator 
of output against which to set these increases" (paragraph 135), 
but it should be noted that inflation, combined with the growth of 
the banks' industrial customers (there was considerable industrial 
merger activity during the 1960s), had led to an increase in the value 
of advances of-39% between 1961-1965. 
To summarise then, the period preceding the inter-clearing 
bank mergers was characterised by steeply-rising costs, official 
restrictions on lending and an'agreement on interest rates paid 
to depositors. The clearing banks competed with each other only 
in non-price variables, particularly in the provision of services 
as evidenced by the growth-of branch networks. It should be remembered 
in addition that, the banks' adherence to the recommendations, of the 
Colwyn Committee (1918), had effectively prevented the reduction of 
the number of the large independent clearing banks. Thus pressures 
towards combination, such as the need to increase resources to cater 
for expanding industrial groupings, the need to eliminate overlapping 
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branch representation and the need to spread and share the high 
costs of computer- installation, were suppressed. 
During the 1960s moreover, a further development adversely 
affected the clearing banks and cast doubts as to their predominance. 
This development may be considered under the head of the "secondary 
banking system" which grew alongside the main banking system to such 
an extent that, by 1969 Britain had two banking systems, each with 
its own money market. The growth was visible in the tremendous 
expansion of secondary banks' deposits; in 1963 their total deposits 
were under 40% of those of deposit banks whereas by 1970, their 
total deposits were 2.2 times those of deposit banks. While deposit banks' 
deposits increased by 28% to £12,451 million from 1963-1970, those 
of secondary banks grew by 637% to reach E27,526 million. 
There were and are various types of secondary banks, 
i 
comprising this secondary system each conducting a variety of 
business activities. Four main classes may be distinguished however: 
U. K. banks, British overseas banks, consortium banks and foreign 
banks. They ranged in type from the traditional accepting houses 
and British banks, to new breeds of financial institutions which were 
also referred toýas merchant banks, to the branches of U. S. banks, 
to the subsidiaries of deposit banks. These banks had in common 
a fewness of branches (and thus did not compete in operating the 
payments mechanism). and concentrated on the financial intermediary 
role of banking. Both their deposits and advances were typically 
of fixed maturity ("term deposits" and "term loans") and quite 
often of several years' tenor. The balance sheets of the secondary 
-banks typically comprised a small number of large accounts, a large 
proportion of which was denominated in foreign currencies. Their 
operations may be described as being of a "wholesale" nature. 
f: vl 
This new banking system consisted, therefore, partly of 
banks which had existed for many years-and which continued to perform 
their traditional functions, and partly of newly-founded banks. 
These banks were welded into this separate banking system by certain 
new types of business and by the growth of "parallel" money markets. 
The most expansionary of these - the international money market, 
which principally comprises dollar-denominated deposits- is discussed 
later. First, however, domestic factors are considered. 
A period of innovation and change in financial markets 
commenced early in the 1950s. Several developments in the ensuing ten 
years or so provided greatly increased scope for the secondary banks: 
apart from the growth of the eurocurrency markets, there was the ending 
of the policy of "cheap money" and a rise in interest rates, local 
authority borrowing was substantially diverted into market channels 
and a market sprang up in short term borrowing by finance houses. 
The clearing banks were inhibited from taking a full share of the 
new business of these parallel money markets and consequently 
lost ground, as a group, in the face of keen and successful competition 
from both domestic and foreign institutions. Not only were they 
subject to repeated official requests for restraint and selectivity 
in their lending policies but they were hampered by the official 
requiremen . that they maintain fixed cash and liquidity ratios. 
These had the effect of limiting the earning capacity of the deposit 
banks and thus their ability to compete directly for high-cost deposits, 
whether in sterling or in foreign currencies. - The deposit banks' 
solution was to operate in these markets through separate, l 
specialist subsidiaries or associates which bid competitively for. 
fixed term deposits at short and medium-term in substantial amounts, 
and to engage in the sort of fixed term lending which is the conventional 
counterpart of such borrowing. 
J 
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The deposit banks' subsidiaries which engaged in 'money 
market' or 'wholesale' banking and 'near banking' were involved 
in three main lines of activity, hire purchase finance, international 
banking (the placing and taking of funds in the parallel markets 
such as the inter-bank market) and merchant banking (including 
advancing medium-term funds). The origin of the subsidiaries 
operating in the secondary banking system in 1964 and 1965 were of 
three distinct types: several were adapted retail foreign banking- 
subsidiaries, others were small deposit banking subsidiaries which 
were turned towards secondary banking and the remainder were specially 
formed for the purpose, often in association with overseas banks or 
with accepting houses. 
The deposit banks' interests in the provision of instalment' 
credit stemmed from 1958 when a number of the deposit banks acquired 
equity interests in hire purchase finance houses. Barclays acquired 
25% of United Dominions Trust; National Provincial and Midland bought 
1001 control of North Central Wagon and Forward Trust respectively; 
Martins and Westminster each took 20% of Mercantile Credit; and 
Lloyds 25% in towmaker. Their reasons then were probably only 
remotely associated with the need to provide their own customers with 
an additional type of service. The major impetus was provided by the 
desire to 'buy' into a business, 'hire purchase, 'at a time when freed 
from official restraints it was growing rapidly. The hire purchase 
companies for a time escaped the restrictions suffered by the banks 
and they were making substantial profits partly with the support 
I 
of bank finance. 
ý' 
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The banks insisted on keeping their finance house subsidiaries 
and associates separate from the main stream of their banking activities. 
The reasons put forward for the separation were as follows: first, 
the instalment credit business was a specialised activity requiring 
personnel with different training and qualities. Secondly, there 
was a notable difference in rates charged on hire purchase transactions 
and bank loans generally. This rate differential, with bank credit 
as much as 3-4% lower than hire purchase rates, would have caused 
problems to bank managers receiving requests from bank customers 
wanting instalment credit. Third, lending ceilings were imposed. 
more heavily on the hire purchase industry. Thus there were fears 
that the degree of flexibility allowed to banks in their advances 
may have been curtailed if the only way of curtailing instalment 
credit given directly by the banks had been to make the curbs on 
their lending more specific and less flexible. 
The squeeze on hire purchase had been more intensive for 
a number of reasons. In the first place, downpayments were increased 
and repayment periods shortened while, also, the companies' borrowings 
were limited. Secondly, it was difficult for finance houses to 
segregate from amongst their facilities those which were especially 
designed for, say, the finance of exports which would not therefore 
have been subject to restriction. 
Beginning in the early 1960s, the finance houses initiated 
a considerable transformation which had far-reaching implications 
for the institutions themselves and their relationships with the 
. clearing 
banks. Their business had traditionally been introduced 
through their dealer connections and associated with the finance of 
durable goods purchases - particularly motor cars - on the basis of 
a contract which ensured that at all times the outstanding debt 
was exceeded by the residual value of the goods. The combination 
of periodic recession in the motor trade, forcing the houses to look 
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more seriously at industrial busin(,:: s, and the 1965 Hire Purchase 
Act, which reduced the value of the security offered by a"hire 
purchase-contract, brought a steady development of the business 
being carried out. 
Probably the most important factor initiating far-reaching 
changes in instalment credit markets came in the early 1960s in the form 
of official measures aimed at restricting consumer credit. This 
followed a boom in the provision of consumer durable finance during 
the late 1950s: from 1958 to 1960, hire-purchase debt practically 
doubled from £480 millions to £950 millions. The introduction of 
term controls in 1960, the subsequent period of losses experienced 
by finance houses and 'ceiling' restrictions added to the desire 
to diversify out of the cyclical motor hire purchase business 
encouraged the finance houses to-expand their business activities. 
At first, most of the houses developed new activities closely related 
to their original areas of expertise; leasing, for example, and 
-personal loans 
(ihich. only differed from H. P. in that they afforded 
no security in the goods acquired). 
With the ability, after the 1967 Companies Act, to gain 
1' 
Section 123 
, 
exemption. from the Moneylenders Acts the trend became firmly 
established towards the use of the personal loan rather than the 
hire purchase contract. 
. The extent of this development is exemplified by UDT. 
As the largest finance house gained an increasing share of its profits 
from UK banking and lending activities. By 1972 this proportion 
reached 41%. 
r 
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Generally, their diversification led the finance companies 
into more profitable areas, so that when 'ceiling' controls were 
exerted over the whole range of their sterling lending, they 
were able to divert funds into their newer operations. By this 
means, and by entering activities such as second mortgages which fell 
outside the scope of official controls, they were able to off-set 
the adverse effect which stagnating instalment business would 
normally have upon profits in a period of rising interest rates, 
such as 1966-1969. In 1967, for instance, finance houses were subject 
to a 105% ceiling on their lending and by a double package of curbs on 
the hire purchase business they were underwriting, consisting of a 
40% downpayment and a comparatively short repayment period of two 
years for the balance. Nevertheless, over the bulk of their instalment 
lending, they were able to achieve no real growth in the latter 
part of the decade while a vast number of uncontrolled companies 
were able to take a large part of their potential business. 
In their moves towards the provision of a comprehensive 
banking service (UDT's efforts were emulated by Mercantile Credit, 
FNFC and Hodge. as well) the finance houses met competition from the 
clearing 'banks whose traditional approach to the lending business 
was undergoing a transformation. Use of the personal loan was 
being extended for example; and the banks were developing their 
subsidiaries in medium-term credit markets. Thus, these two types 
of institution were competing directly for funds with the banks 
increasingly reliant on raising money in the 'wholesale' money markets 
which were also providing the source of much of the finance house. 
resources. Indeed, in a period-in which total bank advances doubled, 
loans from banks to hire purchase companies from 1960-1967 declined 
from £137 million to E114 millions, reflecting the restrictions on 
°"bänk lending. For the finance 
houses, the main feature of the change 
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in their business, culminating in thu acquisition of banking status, 
was the substantial development of the parallel money markets. 
The subsidiaries of the clearing banks created specifically 
for the purpose of. partaking of 'wholesale' banking business were 
a significant force in the parallel markets. As noted, they were 
formed, since 1964 and 1965, to compete with accepting houses, 
British overseas banks and foreign banks in the market for large, 'term' 
deposits and loans. Separate subsidiaries were necessary for this 
purpose because the clearing banks themselves were subject to 
obligatory cash and liquid asset ratios and were thus required to 
hold high proportions of liquid assets. This meant the business 
was unprofitable for them for money market deposits are more expensive 
to attract than 'retail' deposits and must therefore be employed 
as assets which earn a higher yield than deposit bank assets. 
The subsidiaries which, with no other areas of business 
activity, were pure secondary banks became a very important force 
in the wholesale markets. By 1970, their deposits were exceeded 
only by those of the U. S. banks. They were formed, however, during 
the period in which quantitative limits on bank lending in sterling 
were imposed on all banks. -Thus, although the subsidiaries could 
attract deposits, their ability to make profitable, sterling-denominated 
loans was severely restricted. "Instead, a large part, indicated 
by Revell to be nearly two-thirds of their total assets, were employed 
in the parallel money markets. These markets have been noted for 
providing assets and liabilities of a much wider range of maturity 
than those of the discount market and with a higher level of yields. 
(YV) 
Although the maturity of :: one of these parallel market 
assets is'as much as several months, they yielded far more than 
Treasury Bills, commercial bills or money at call (traditional 
instruments in the discount market). They also have the advantage 
that they all appear fairly liquid when, listed in balance sheets. 
Secondary banks have depended to a very great extent on the parallel 
markets, and the inter-bank market in particular, for much of their 
liquidity. 
The remainder of this section concentrates on these 
markets and in so-doing examines the growth of the so-called 'fringe' 
banks and U. S. banks. These markets started first with the demand 
from local authorities for deposits with maturity of less than one 
year and extended to cover a similar demand from finance houses. 
As a result of a change of Government-policy (preventing Local 
Authorities (LA) the freedom to borrow at will from the Public Works 
Loan Board or the market) and historically high interest rates in 
1955, L. A. treasurers began to raise funds in the form of short- 
term deposits. An impetus to the growth of this market came from 
finance houses, anxious to fund a boom in instalment credit yet 
unable to borrow from banks (Government restrictions were imposed on 
bank credits to finance houses after 1947). The alternative source 
of funds came in the form of deposits, initially from the public and 
then through the parallel market'as it developed. They were able 
to attract deposits by offering comparatively high interest rates 
which appealed to secondary banks who themselves were borrowing in the 
market to on-lend. 
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It is important to mention, at this stage, a particular 
part of the 'inter-corporation' money market. This has been referred 
to by Revell as a 'grey' market in loans for companies unable to 
raise finance from their normal banking sources. In fact, like so 
many of the developments mentioned above, the inter-corporation 
market grew because of the Government-imposed credit squeeze and the 
resultant lending ceilings and other (qualitative) restrictive measures. 
These controls provided a major stimulus to the growth of institutions 
prepared to attract: deposits by offering high interest rates in order 
to finance loans to sectors of industry which the banks were constrained 
from doing. Quite often the institutions in question, so-called 
'fringe banks' were the creation of individual entrepreneurs such as 
Gerald Caplan (London and County Securities), -'Pat' Matthews'(FNFC) 
and Alexander Stone (British Bank of Commerce). Characteristic of 
the 'fringe banks' was their growth in a few years benefiting from 
the distortions in the competitive environment created by the long 
period of physical controls'on 'mainstream' lending. The emergent 
institutions had developed over the 1960s to the point whereby 
'they had acquired the Board of Trade exemption for banks. 
This exemption is indeed important. It stemmed initially 
from a court case in 1966 in which UDT sued Kirkwood for the repayment 
of debt. In-this case, a decision was finally given in favour of the 
plaintiff in the Court of Appeal. The challenge that UDT had to meet 
was the charge that as unlicensed moneylenders they were not entitled 
to recover the debt owed them by the defendant. Their answer was 
1 
that the Moneylenders Act exempts frorw the licensing requirement 'any 
person bona fide carrying on the business of banking', and UDT 
claimed to be bankers. Although UDT won the case, it was made clear 
by the Appeal Judges that it would not be safe to rely on the decision 
as a precedent. To meet the need disclosed in this case, Section*123 
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of the 1967 Companies Act made provision for the issue by the Board 
of Trade for the issue of certificates to aonroved applicants for 
Moneylenders Act exemption. 
The . 'fringe banks' had built up, through personal and 
professional connections, a deposit base and'their clientele 
generated growth in this also. Whilst there was an accent on 'banking' 
during their early growth, several of the 'fringe banks' also took 
equity participations in industrial companies. In both respects, 
these institutions were characterised by a specialisation in property. 
Small builders and property developers were. amongst the worst sufferers 
from the physical lending controls on 'mainstream' banking. The 
new banks responded to*their need and, in an age of inflation, 
believed that freehold land was the most desirable ultimate form 
of, security. Equity stakes followed lending at high interest rates; 
Dalton Barton had an association with Matlodge, a property dealing 
and development company; London and County Securities had a similar 
interest through Consolidated Securities. Some further aspects of 
the banks' activities were also property-related: second mortgages 
for example, in'which Cedar Holdings specialised, and in which FNFC 
and Hodge also participated. It was not until some years later that 
f 
the ' inextricable link between the property boom and the fortunes of 
these and some other secondary system banks was fully realised. 
-The final part of this section concentrates on the very 
rapid expansion of the international money market - that in which 
deposits and loans were made'in eurocurrencies, and especially in 
I 
eurodollars. In this connection we will also examine the growth of 
U. S. banking presence in London and the-rationale for their participation 
in the eurodollar money market. The influx of US banks was one of the 
major events of the 1960s. By 1970 their UK branches accounted for 
61% of the deposits of all overseas branches of US banks. 
- (xviii) -. 
They became by far the biggest operators in the London eurodollar 
market, having by 1970 just over Sub of all liabilities in non- 
sterling currencics, of banks in the U. K. 
The growth of the US banks is examined in Chapter Four. 
. Suffice 
it here to summarise the main factors in'this expansion in 
the-context of the eurocurrency system. 
The major motivation of the US commercial banks in their 
aggressive exploitation of the eurodollar market was the need to 
seek eurodollar balances for lending to head office because of the 
tight monetary conditions in the US in 1966 and 1969. The peak of 
such lending was in 1969 when dollar balances with US offices of the 
parent bank reached 47% of total assets. 
The origin of these dollar deposits which are held outside 
the US is popularly associated with the historic tendency of the US 
to run large annual balance of payments deficits leading to the 
accumulation of dollars in Europe. Such deficits do in the first 
instance provide European exporters with dollar claims on US banks. 
Although a necessary condition, it was the willingness of banks in 
Europe to pay higher interest rates on dollar deposits than those 
obtainable in the closely-regulated US financial markets which was a 
major factor contributing to the growth of eurodollar. liabilities. 
With. the*concept of dollar financing so readily accepted 
by borrowers outside the US and the rapid growth of demand for such 
finance during the early 1960s, the growth of the eurodollar market 
was consequent upon major-international holders of dollars placing 
their deposits where the return was highest. During 1960 and 1961, 
the interest-rate paid on 3-month bank deposits in the US averaged 2.5% 
per annum, whereas that paid on eurodollar deposits fluctuated 
between 3.5%-. and 4.0% per annum. The principal reason for this 
difference was the existence of Regulation Q imposed by the Federal 
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Reserve Board to limit the interest rates that commercial banks could. 
pay on deposits. 
As the market matured, US banks became able to fund their 
head offices at times when domeptic credit was not freely available. 
This was evident after 1965 when the escalating US involvement in 
Vietnam had the effect of causing domestic interest rates to rise 
steeply and of creating a drain on the banks' domestic deposit base 
on which interest payments were restricted (under Regulation 
to below prevailing market rates. 
The attraction to US banks, of developing a foreign branch 
network, apart from being able freely to obtain dollar deposits at 
market interest rates, were that no reserves were required to be 
held against borrowings from their foreign branches and that interest 
could be paid on deposits of less than 30 days (forbidden domestically 
by Regulation Q) so enabling the banks further to broaden their 
business base. 
The presence of US banks in London and the growth of the 
eurocurrency markets provided both greater potential competition to 
UK deposit and'secondary banks and wider opportunities for expansion. 
These developments stimulated the concept of consortium banking for 
example, in which the UK clearing and merchant banks participated. 
It also led to, the strengthening of the clearers' wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, such as International Westminster and Barclays 
International. 
/ 
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It is appropriate to close this section which has detailed 
period of despecialisation and of immense change in the competitive 
jý; s'':: environment of banking markets, with a table showing the growth of 
`='UK bank deposits from 1963-1970. The summary contained therein 
",. should prove a helpful guide-of reference for the remainder of this 
thesis. 
Growth of U. K. bank deposits by type of bank, 1963-70 
£ million Ratio 
1970/1963 
1963 1967 1970 
Deposit banks 
London clearing banks 8,337 10,262. 10,606 1.27 
Scottish clearing banks 879 1,070 1,119 1.27 
Northern Ireland banks 182 253 333 1.83 
National Giro ... .. 58 ... 
Other (300) (360) 335 1.12 
Total (9,706) (11,950) '12,451 1.28 
Secondary banks 
Accepting houses 844 1,464 3,006 3.56 
American banks. 671 3,283 11,567 17.24 
Subsidiaries of deposit 
banks ".. (800) 3,478 ... 
Other 2,219 4,050 9.475 4.27 
Total 3,734 9,597 27,526 7.37 
Source: J. R. S. Revell, The British Financial System, (Macmillan, 
1975), P. 118 
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PART ONE : THE EMERGENCE OF MERGER ACTIVITY IN 
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
_' 
i 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Legal Environment 
1.1 Attitudes to monopolies and mergers in the U. K. and the role 
of the state in controlling them 
In an unregulated private enterprise economy, it is possible for actual 
market performance to fall short of what is considered desirable from the 
community's view-point because of the self-interest of suppliers. 
A divergence of social and private interests is most frequently encountered, 
in practice, in markets where one seller monpolises or controls a 
substantial proportion of industry supply, or where a number of sellers, 
acting collusively, effectively form an oligopoly. The possession of such 
monopoly power affords sellers the opportunity to manipulate conditions 
to their advantage and to the detriment of the consumer. Accordingly, 
most advanced industrial economies have found it expedient to introduce 
legislation to limit and control the exercise of market power. 
The approach of U. K. antitrust policy has favoured the control of the 
conduct (behaviour) of those firms which possess market power (structurally 
defined by legislation) not its possession per se. Hence it has been 
concerned either with a specific abuse or, in particular, with non- 
competitive behaviour when it affects performance in a way considered to 
be against the public interest - where, for example, a dominant seller 
(or group of sellers in collusion)has used its market power to secure 
excessive monopoly profits, or where a merger threatens to create a situation 
where the merged entities gain a share of the market deemed sufficient to permit 
abuse of that achieved power. Government intervention in the private sector 
has therefore sought to encourage large scale enterprise where it appears 
efficient whilst making provision to guard against the potential dangers 
of a monopolistic situation. 
1% 
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Government control of, mergers, and, in fact antitrust in general 
are relatively recent phenomena in the UK. It was not until 1965 that 
the passage of the monopolies and Mergers Act subjected certain categories 
of mergers to a form of official scrutiny and control. But the economic 
philosophy which found expression in the Act, and in the subsequent Fair' 
Trading legislation of 1973, together with the institutions and procedures 
of enforcement, are much less recent and have their origins in the earlier, 
formative periods of, (British attitudes to mergers. 
Development to 1945 
During the inter-war years government intervention came to be regarded 
as a superior method of regulating markets than free competition. Thus 
activities inimical to competition, such as price fixing and rationing, 
and the unchecked growth of oligopolies and restrictive practices' became 
the dominant features of British industrial development. Unlike the 
Americans the British did not view the concentration of economic power 
with alarm. One observer suggests that this comparative disinterest is 
explained by the typically better, more socially-responsible behaviour of 
British combines and cartels. 
2 
This may also be explained by political 
changes and a new climate in economic theory. With the eclipse of the 
Liberal Party, the traditional proponents of. competition, the thrust of 
the economic reform movement, as represented by the Labour Party, shifted 
to socialism. 
3~ 
This was accompanied by dissatisfaction with the manifest 
inadequacies of static economic theory and the desire to produce sensible 
criteria for policy which combined to influence the theory of 'workable' 
k 
or 'effective' competition, most clearly associated with J. M. Clark. 
4 
This incorporated the essential notion that if any of the conditions of perfect 
competition were absent then it no longer followed that it would be beneficial 
to maintain the remaining conditions. Moreover, advocacy of competition 
assumed that an increase in supply would be followed by lower prices, 
whereas the new theories of the period demonstrated that, in imperfect 
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markets, supply increases would not result in lower prices. 
5 
In effect, 
these contributions showed that the higher prices in a monopolistically 
competitive market would not necessarily be lowered by an increase in 
competition, that is an infusion of new firms into an industry. 
In this context, competition was seen not as ensuring efficiency, 
but as creating excess capacity. Consequently, many traditional 'a priori' 
notions about the behaviour of firms and industries were rendered obsolete 
and gave way to thoroughgoing pragmatism. In varying degrees this attitude 
with its advocacy of a performance/conduct approach to mergers, has been 
the major influence on British policy ever since. 
1945-1948 : The 1948 Act 
The election of a Labour Government in 1945 gave restrictionism 
and cartelization a longer lease of life, for nationalization rather than 
antitrust remained the emphasis in economic reform. This explains why, 
with a single exception, postwar industry reports (the official mode of 
postwar private sector supervision) contained no sweeping denunciations of 
monopolies or restrictive practices. In contrast the Simon Committee 
Report6 revealed the building material industry to be riddled with restrictive 
agreements, and, furthermore, condemned the restrictions. 
Stirred by this report and frustrated in its attempts to implement 
a greater degree of centralized planning, the Labour Government turned 
its attention to the development of a monopolies and restrictive practices 
-policy as a means of supervising the private sector and stimulating 
productivity. The result was the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices 
(Inquiry and Control) Act 1948, the basis of government merger control today. 
1 
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Essentially the Act gave discretionary. power to the Government, 
acting through the Board of Tradej to require the Monopolies Commission 
to investigate statutorily defined monopolies or restrictive practices and 
to report whether these situations were consistent with the public interest. 
A monopoly situation existed where at least one-third of the goods 
specified were supplied by a single firm. or several firms acting in concert. 
The Commission's task was to investigate, report and recommend - the 
Government alone was enfdreed to seek remedial action through Parliament. 
Thus, an essential feature of the 1948 scheme was the power left to the 
Government over the administration of the Act, thereby creating the likelihood 
that application would be subject to the vicissitudes of politics. 
Substantively, the Act failed to define the public interest? and, 
reflecting the 
4iQlier pragmatism, contained no presumption that free 
competition was prima facie better or worse than restriction or monopoly. 
Instead, the premise of the Act was that monopoly was not good or bad in /' 
itself, but possessed the power to be good or bad. Accordingly, the 
Monopolies Commission, in its reports, -made the determination of 
the public 
interest turn on conduct and performance focusing, inter alia, on predatory 
10 
acts, 
8 
prices, profits, rates of returnon capital, 
9 unemployment effects 
and innovation performance. Structural factors, which alone determined 
ll 
the possibility of reference, appeared rarely in the reports. Indeed, 
although diminution'of competition was considered in every report, it 
was never treated as decisive. 
Not surprisingly, many aspects of the Act and its administration 
provoked criticism mainly from industry and universities. Complaints 
from the former were that the procedure was unfair - inasmuch as the 
Commission combined the roles of investigator, prosecutor and judge, with 
the consequence that the firms concerned were required to defend the 
practices in issue without knowledge of the views of the Commission on 
these issues. 
12 Similarly the Commission occasionally refused industry 
13 
the opportunity to see and rebut complaints. Other critics emphasized the 
excessive time required by part-time membership of the Commission for the 
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preparation of a report, 
14 
the lack of power of the commission both to 
select for itself suitable cases for investigation 
15 
and to act except in 
an advisory fashion, and finally, the tendency of the Commission to recommend, 
in the tradition of the inter-war period, government-industry consultation 
and agreement in place of flat prohibition. 
16 
The greatest disappointment was the failure of the Commission, in 
the course of its work, to develop broadly applicable criteria of public 
interest. 
17 
Only'-12 reports were published by 1955 and they offered 
little opportunity for generalization inasmuch as each report reflected 
a myopic preoccupation with the matter under investigation. This was 
justified by the pragmatic approach of the legislation which effectively 
precluded the application of general principles. 
Not until the 1955 Commission Report on Collective Discrimination18 
was this obstacle overcome. Focusing not on a single industry but on a 
specified set of practices wherever they occurred, this Report concluded 
that the detriments were clear and probable, while the benefits were rare, 
and recommended legislation generally proscribing the practices with exemptions 
for special circumstances. This Report furnished some of the impetus 
for the next major British antitrust legislation, the 1956 Act. 
ýý 
1 
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1956-1965 : The 1956 Act 
This period, the most active and innovative in the'development of 
British competition policy, began with the passage'of the Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act 1956. By past standards this was a bold measure for 
it abandoned the traditional neutrality with respect to restrictive agreements 
in favour of a presumption of illegality. The Act, which has remained in force 
without significant amendment, requires the registration of all such agreements. 
Parties wishing to continue the arrangement must appear before a newly 
created court of law, the Restrictive Practices Court, and there, against 
opposition from the Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements, the 
Government's advocate, attempt to overcome the presumption. To succeed 
the parties. must first satisfy the Court that each restriction at issue 
fits one or more of a number of less specific circumstances, which have 
become known as gateways. 
19 
Next, having successfully completed this stage, 
the parties must persuade the Court that on some ultimate 'weighing of the 
social harms and benefits, the benefits prevail. If the parties fail in 
one or more of these steps, the Court can require the abandonment of the 
restriction. 
There is a quite considerable difference both in substance and 
procedure between the 1948 and 1956 Acts. Procedurallythe adoption of 
a judicial solution with its adversary process and its separation of 
adjudicatory and prosecutory functions represents a sharp departure from, 
and at the same time, ameliorates` some of the shortcomings of the 
administrative process of the Monopolies Commission and its antecedents. 
And the judicial process seems to have escaped much of the criticism which 
attended Monopolies Commission procedure. 
20 
Another important 
I 
procedural 
change was the withdrawal from the Government of the virtually complete 
control over the investigation of restrictive practices which it had 
exercised under the-1948 Act. Unlike the 1948 scheme, under which the 
Government decided which restrictive practices to investigate, and which, 
-7- 
if any, of the Commission's recommendations to implement, the 1956 Act 
requires the Registrar to refer every registrable agreement to the Court, 
which is (as any law court) independent of the. Government. 
21 
Some contrast in substantive content-is also apparent. The 1948 
Act was essentially devoid of positive policy content whereas the 1956 
legislation with its Section 21 gateways, attempts to sketch the contour 
of public interest by listing a , range of relevant considerations. However, 
the role to be played by the promotion of competition remains unclear. 
The reports of the Court, like those of the monopolies Commision have 
often relied'heavily on various indices of performance, notably, the 
reasonableness of prices, profits and rates of technoligical progress. 
In general, structural considerations play relatively unimportant roles 
in the Court's decisions. 
Such assessment as can be made of the Act reveals a sharp contrast 
in effectiveness to the 1948 legislation. One undoubted effect of the 
operation of the Restrictive Practices Act has been the dismantling of 
numerous restrictive agreements. By 1969 approximately 90% of the total 
2,600 registered had been eliminated. 
22 
At this point, then, the British antitrust stage was occupied by 
the Court and the Monopolies Commission; the former with jurisdiction over 
restrictive agreements, and the latter over conditons of oligopoly 
and single dominating firms. For-all their differences, both have focused 
primarily on an industry's performance and not its structure in applying 
the public interest standard. Neither has viewed the public interest 
as invariably served. best by. the promotion of competition. This, then, 
was the history of policy and institutional developments which 
/ greeted 
and influenced the enactment of merger controls. 
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1.2 : Objectives and principles of UK mergers legislation 
Background to merger control 
Government control of mergers is a rather recent development despite 
the existence, long before 1965, of both significant merger activity23 
and some recognition of the need for merger control. 
24 
Although the 
previous section offered some reasons for the late development of 
competition policy in'general, it is worth considering here two explanations 
for the even later development of merger control. First, the early and 
continuing commitment to a pragmatic, conduct/performance approach in 
examining market power and restrictive practices virtually closed minds 
towards any possibility of ex ante control of mergers. Thus when an 
impending merger threatened to create a giant which, among other things, 
would have controlled 90% of the man-made fibre industry, the Government 
answered troubled members of Parliament first by reminding them that it 
had been the policy of successive governments not to prejudge the effects 
of monopoly, and then, by reassuring them that the public interest would 
be adequately safeguarded by the power to refer the merged entity to the 
Monopolies Commission if it later misbehaved. 
25 
The second reason was perhaps more influential as it concerned not 
the general philosophy of antitrust as it related to mergers, but the 
attitude towards the merger phenonmenon itself. It was a long-established 
view in Britain that mergers were an inevitable consequence of, and indeed 
a natural remedy for, economic stagnation and unrealised economies of 
scale. 
26 
As a result, the notion that some mergers were at best a mixed 
blessing was slow to. develop.. Eventually however, the merger movement 
27 
accelerated and was frequently accompanied by questionable tac4ics. 
Consequently, the subject attracted increasing public attention and provoked 
considerable controversy. 
28 
New calls for merger control appeared 
29 
and in the election campaign of 1964, both main parties promised merger 
legislation. 30 The passage of the 1965 Act confirmed the Labour Party's 
intention. 
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1965"1973_, 
_; 
'The ' 1965 "and ' 1973 'Acts 
Predictably the judicial machinery of the 1956 legislation was 
rejected as a model for the new Act and instead the mergers legislation was 
essentially an extension of the scheme of the 1948 Monopolies Act. In 
ýejsence, the 1965 Act makes certain classes of mergers subject to 
administrative investigation by the enlarged Monopolfes Commission which 
is in turn directed to report whether the merger 'may be expected to operate 
against the public interest. ' 
The objectives and philosophy of UK mergers legislation are illustrated 
by its definition of the public interest, 
31 
and the latter, by its 
continued adoption of a highly discretionary merger-by-merger approach to 
the evaluation of expected benefits and losses of proposed mergers. 
Accordingly, by exhibiting the belief that more competition is usually 
to be preferred to'less, 
32 
the legislation embodies the substantive results 
of the marginalist theories of competition; by creating a legislative 
framework which only disallows acquisitions where their expected consequences 
seem blatantly contrary to the public interest, the legislation contains 
the implicit presumption that merger activity is not, necessarily, 
inconsistent with the public interest, but a natural and satisfactory 
result of the 'competitive process'. 
Of course, the objectives of the control of mergers could be realised 
in any of several ways; an alternative presumption - and rule - could be 
that all mergers necessarily contradict the public interest and de facto 
are therefore illegal. 
33 
But as noted, the philosophy and framework of 
existing legislation follows precedents in. earlier public policy - in 
particular the pragmatic monopolies., legislation of 1948. Accordingly, 
the public interest provisions of the 1973 Act, which are concerned with 
the conduct and efficiency (performance) of firms, are made to appear 
distinct and quite separate from two simple economic/structural tests to 
which all merging parties are first subject: only if the proposed merger 
contravenes at least one of these-. tests 
is it possible for the antitrust 
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authorities to consider ex ante the likely effects on the public interest 
of the merger. 
In practice, the likely competitive effects of a merger can only 
be examined when assets equal to or more than £5 million are to be acquired, 
or if the market share of the acquiring firm is extended to or beyond the 
25% monopoly level. Even then, however, the public interest provisions 
34 
may be considered only briefly :a reference to Monopolies Commission is 
an infrequent event; 
35 
more usually other bodies review the public 
37 
interest considerations 'in camera' and less extensively. 
The framework of existing mergers legislation, however, is not 
influenced solely by historical precedent. Rather, the two-part structure 
of the legislation, wherein structural criteria have first to be invoked 
before the conduct and performance of firms can be formally considered, 
reflects the belief, based on positive economic theory, that the behaviour 
of firms is considerably affected - even determined by the structural 
characteristics of those markets and industries to which firms belong. 
The legislation, therefore illustrates the belief that structural measures 
provide some indication of the likely conduct and performance of firms. 
It affirms the particular belief that the nature and processes of competition 
are somehow affected by firms' market shares and sizes. It adopts these 
two apparently simple and effective criteria in the belief that they are 
meaningful per, se, and that they can be meaningfully applied to empirical 
situations. 
This notion is based on a traditional interpretation of the paradigm 
of industrial economics which attributes causal sequential relationships 
between market structure, conduct and performance. The imprecision of this 
interpretation and hence inadequacy of the notion is revealed in more 
recent economic literature. Phillips (197037 and 197638)* for example 
considers the metaphysical problems involved with the nature and processes 
of causation. Moreover received theory nowhere considers the difficulty 
that in practice, given types of behaviour for example, identical prices 
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may be consistent with very different forms of market structure for example, 
oligopoly and polyopoly. It is relevant to point out, at this stage, 
that even this simplest use of the paradigm entails a duplicity of prediction 
and a confusion of understanding on which no legislation should be founded; 
but upon which the present framework of the mergers (and monopolies) 
legislation is'apparently based. These reservations provide the initial 
doubts about the Acts which implement government merger control. 
1 
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1.3 : 'The 'operation 'Of ' UK"'morgers ' legislation 
Examination of the detail and operation of the legislation results 
in more concern. Whilst the pro-competitive bias of the legislation is 
founded in an extensive literature concerning the nature and welfare- 
advantages of competition there not only exists confusion about the nature 
and advantages of competition, 
39 but the awareness that the predictions 
of competitive theories are only as good as their assumptions. Additionally 
the literature on workable competition also illustrates the practical 
difficulties of identifying and applying competitive norms to real markets 
and firms. 
40, 
Possibly as a result, the meaning of competition as adopted 
in the legislation is largely permissive; in execution, the legislation 
involves an expediency and pragmatism which necessarily results in 
inconsistencies of interpretation as identified by other writers. 
41 
These worries are compounded by a number of further doubts. 
Firstly, the reliance on the two structural tests have been especially 
misleading and unsatisfactory in merger investigations, whether undertaken 
by the Monopolies Commission or independently. 
42 
It is now more than a 
decade since the first introduciton of merger legislation yet despite 
continued increases in market concentration the content of the referral 
criteria has remained largely unaltered.; The size of assets criterion 
for instance, which was designed to control the proliferation and growth 
of conglomerate' and vertical integration, is based on the notion that the 
acquisition of large firms may sometimes be detrimental to the public 
interest. Not only can this be criticised for its unchanged value of 
£5 million, but also for its naive understanding of size. 
43 These failings 
of the size of assets criterion, however, are much less significant than 
those, involving the monopoly criterion. 
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The monopoly test is founded on the belief that economists can 
consistently delineate definitive market boundaries and measure the extent 
of the market(s) in question. Examination of the reports of the-Monopolies 
Commission reveals the difficulties that have been experienced in defining 1 
the 'relevant' market which varies in breadth from one report to another. 
This failure is a manifestation of a more wide-ranging problem which relates 
to the theories of the firm and consumer behaviour, which are at the heart 
of micro economic theory. In particular, imperfections in the techniques 
of own-price and cross-elasticity of demand (the most readily applied 
method of estimating measures of substitutability and thereby identifying 
market boundaries) leave economists ill-equipped to produced measures of 
market extent which have unambiguous meanings; 
45 
furthermore, there are 
no guidelines or defined thresholds of cross-elasticity which identify 
boundaries between markets and market segments. 
Whether this signals the irrelevance of economic theory to industrial 
policy or merely its inapplicability, the result has been the implementation 
of the monopoly criterion of the legislation depending on a frequently 
arbitrary understanding of the market relevant to the antitrust authorities. 
This not only involves delimiting the product constiuents of a market, 
but also specifying its geographic extent. This was clearly not discerned 
as a problem by the authors of the early antitrust legislation. 
46 
However, 
recent emphasis placed upon 'freer trade' (the EEC. for example) and penetration 
of world markets indicate that a nationalistic approach is no'-longer applicable, 
and indeed, was recognised in the Fair Trading Act. 
47 
The reduction of the monopoly criterion from 331/3% to 25% in 1973, 
whilst reflecting the growing concern of economists and politicians at 
t 
the trend towards greater industrial concentration throughout the British 
economy, 
48 
barely confronts the problem of analysing market structure. The 
difficulties are accentuated by the profound structural change in the 
various sectors of the economy, which also reflects the ambivalence in 
official attitudes towards industrial policy and in particular towards mergers. 
49 
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1.4 : The paucity of interest in the financial sector 
Until 1965 service industries were omitted from the scope of 
antitrust legislation. Hence financial companies could not be subjected 
to a Monopolies Commission reference. The widening of the scope of the 
legislation by the 1965 Act to include mergers and monopolies of service 
companies was thus an important development. The general distrust of behaviour 
in the City, fear of widespread restrictive practices within the financial 
sector and criticism of the clearing banks' interest rate cartel and lack 
of competition provided an eminently suitable background for a Monopolies 
commission investigation. 
50 
To date, however, all. financial services have 
largely escaped scrutiny. Apart from the reference of the proposed 
Barclays/Martins/Lloyds clearing bank merger in 1968 and that of Eagle Star's 
proposed acquisition of Grovewood Securities and Bernard Sunley Investment 
Trust in 1973, financial companies' acquisitions and their conduct and 
performance have not been the subject of a Commission inquiry. 
Thus consideration of financial companies, and their acquisitions, 
highlights an inconsistency in the execution of the legislation. 
More importantly however, it serves to illustrate methodological problems 
which confront the analysis of. the financial sector, and the limited 
applicability of public merger policy. 
The latter is most apparent where acquiring the acquired firms produce 
dissimilar products, and is accentuated where firms' output comprises 
a differentiated range of products which is sold in a number of international 
markets. The diversification of-financial intermediaries across industrial 
and national frontiers has provided, for many financial companies a broad 
product base upon which operations are conducted on an international scale. 
This inevitably obstructs the application of-public merger policy to 
financial institutions. In addition, the 'monopolies criterion' of the 
legislation utilises measures of 
market power which refer to a firm's main 
activity as measured by turnover. In practice, turnover may not be an 
accurate assessment of a firm's main process and, moreover, the dynamic 
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competitive environments in which financial intermediaries operate 
signal the need for caution when considering static estimates of market 
power. 
The measurement of market power in the financial sector, generally 
frustrated by the problem of defining consistent market boundaries, is 
further hindered by the nature of financial companies themselves. Factors 
such as goodwill and reputation are of considerable import and may actually 
increase market dominance; they are, however, intangible and their approximation 
must be confined to subjective assessment. 
The application of mergers legislation and indeed any analysis of 
this sector is impeded in one further respect - by the very character 
of the financial system, which comprises a series of distinct yet inter- 
related markets'. In consequence, confusion arises from decisions regarding 
'product sameness'. This led Richards and Colenutt51 for example, to find 
that it is quite possible to come to contrary views about market concentration 
in the life assurance industry depending upon whether one considers the 
'market' in its entirety or believes a more accurate interpretation of 
the group of firms selling life assurance is made by distinguishing two 
or more market segments. Although the segments over-lap and some 
substitutability exists, it is not perfect. The banking industry can be 
similarly examined with respect to a series of over-lapping yet different markets 
and market segments with products and services ranging from overdraft facilities 
to medium-term eurocurrency syndications, but also including advice on 
investment management and corporate finance. ' The incursion of banks into 
the insurance industry also means that'they are equipped to offer various 
broking facilities as well. The fact that financial companiesiare diversified 
across such a breadth of the financial system, ' selling different products 
in 
a variety of markets, makes it misleading to assert, on the 
basis of a 
single concentration ratio, that a bank or insurance company possesses 
'market power' let alone that they abuse it. 
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-These 'observations, although illustrating the limited applicability 
of existing legislation to contemporary conditions in the financial sector, 
cannot be considered as an explanation of the paucity of interest. 
Firsts diversification has not been restricted to the financial service 
sectors. Gribbin (1976) has demonstrated that the extent of industry 
diversification increased from 1963 to 1968 in all but two of the S. I. C. 
orders covering manufacturing industry. 
52 
Furthermore in common with 
diversification in the financial sector diversification of manufacturing 
companies has also largely featured 'acquisition'. Thus Gribbin concluded: 
" ... 'conglomerate merger' is part of a more general movement 
towards increased diversification in the UK economy and is more 
properly considered within this wider framework" 
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Unlike diversifying financial mergers, however, a number of industrial 
conglomerate mergers have been the subject of Monopolies commission 
investigations. 54 In the financial sector, the opposite has been the case. 
Indeed, with the exception of Bank of England, there has been no apparent 
scrutiny of the banks' diversificatory acquisitions. This failure may well 
have contributed to their profusion. The lack of official scepticism 
about certain acquisitions, such as that of B. O. L. S. A. by Lloyds Bank, 
and that of Montagu Trust by Midland Bank, may indeed have influenced 
banks and other-financial intermediaries, in the choice of acquisitions 
within their overall diversification strategy. 
Thus an explanation of the lack of official attention paid to financial 
company acquisitions must lie elsewhere. Several suggestions can be adduced, 
some positive, others speculative. They can be considered, however, in 
three broad categories: first) the conceptual and methodological problems 
associated with an industrial analysis of the financial services referred 
to above; secondly, an historical pre-occupation with manufacturing industry; 
and, thirdly, the effect of Bank of England intervention on the structure 
of the banking industry. 
- 17 - 
Conceptual and methodological problems of"analysing financial companies 
The consistent application of mergers legislation to financial 
intermediaries would require the financial services sector to be treated in 
the same way as any other industrial sector. The financial system cannot, 
however in strict logic, be considered in this way because of the special 
characteristics that distinguish its products fromthose of other private 
enterprises - especially those in manufacturing industry. The crucial 
difference-between the banking industry, for example, and other industries 
is that whereas manufacturing firms generally supply real goods and provide 
after-sales service that the public demand, banks provide nominal money - 
funds denominated in various currencies, and services associated with the 
means of payment, while the public demand real balances - stocks of purchasing 
power. There is then a clear conceptual distinction between the financial 
service industries and the rest of economic activity. 
These difficulties are compounded by the diverisfication of financial 
institutions across industrial frontiers which has resulted in single 
organizations marketing services in several distinct financial sectors. 
Thus the processes and output of the institution will vary according to its 
degree of diversification. The diversity of markets within each financial 
sector accentuates the problem of analysis. In the markets for merchant 
banking services, for example, a number of differentiated products are sold, 
which are often tailor-made, and span a wide range of dissimiliar demands 
and activities. 
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Within the market for corporate finance, where the product 
is 'financial advice' relating to a firm's longer-term finance requirements - 
merger and acquisition negotiations, public flotations and new capital issues - 
the advice provided utilises experience and skills which are unique to the 
advising institution and, because the advice itself is unique and tailored 
to the needs and situation of the particular customer(s), the corporate 
financial products of merchant banks cannot be considered 
identical. 
56 
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Moreover, in practice merchant banks tend to differentiate their products 
in 
this area and develop expertiese appropriate to different market. segments 
and different market demands. 
This pattern of wide-ranging and differentiated activity is mirrored 
throughout the financial system. Insurance institutions, for instance, 
operate in highly dynamic environments in which one of the only constants 
is the existence of risk and uncertainty - and where, at any given moment 
composite insurance companies are diversified geographically, and across 
insurance markets, often to different degrees. They similarly tend to 
specialise in the provision of ancillary services and may be in competition 
with a merchant bank in such areas as the management of unit trust portfolios. 
In summary, most of the markets within the financial sectors are 
fragmented in different ways. Many financial intermediaries of all types 
specialise in different parts of different markets where the product of a 
clearing bank will be similar to that of an investment trust management 
company. Furthermore a number of financial markets are very widely defined 
so that institutions that operate. in, for example, the medium-term lending 
market, may well only come into competition at the margin, and although 
ostensibly marketing a similar product are, in fact, selling quite distinct 
commodities to different borrowers. 
The implication is that each institution will supply a different 
product in each of the markets in which it operates, ýand in some markets 
may provide more than one. In consequence, 'it is very difficult to define 
the output variable for a financial institution; the one basic commodity 
being sold is funds and attempts that have been made to indicate the extent 
of market share have chosen an asset figure as an indicator of the funds 
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over which each firm has some control. In the broader context of 
diversified financial companies selling differentiated products in very 
different markets, it is clear that such estimates should be, treated with 
caution. It follows that the monopoly criterion of the mergers legislation 
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cannot accommodate. the'developments. that have brought-such far-reaching 
institutional, structural and environmental change to the financial sectors. 
Indeed Professor G. C. Allen, an original member of the Monopolies Commission, 
offered the opinion that methodological problems posed by these developments 
contributed, to the preclusion of financial services from legislation until 
1965.58 
In essence, this unsystematic methodology seems to originate from 
a combination of factors - some specific to financial companies, others 
concerned with the nature of the existing mergers legislation. Thus 
problems of definition and classification of financial products and markets 
are compounded by two major weaknesses found in the legislation but which 
originate from received economic theory. One involves the difficulty of 
allocating products to particular markets and segments; the second arises 
from traditional interpretations of the paradigm of industrial economics 
which has influenced the framework of the legislation, wherein structural 
criteria (market share or firm size) have first. to be invoked before the 
conduct and performance of-firms can be investigated. 
Indeed, adoption of a method which classifies and considers multi- 
product firms according-only to their, -'main activity', and attempts to 
condemn them or their acquisition activity on this 'structural' basis, 
reveals several substantive failings... Firstly, by forcing multi-product, 
multi-industry, multi-process firms into. single-industry/market categories, 
the method understates the extent of product and process diversification 
experienced by individual firms. Secondly, as noted, such an approach 
requires an implicit and artificial assumption that 'main activity' 
can and should be measured by turnover. Thirdly, it ignores the incomparability 
of the products of multi-product financial companies, which as stated, 
are conceptually difficult to assess anyway. Finally, and with special 
relevance for the application of legislation, this approach questions the 
validity of statements about structural change resulting from empirical 
observations about firms' merger and acquisition activity. 
59 
-20- 
'Traditional pre=occupation'with . 'manufacturing-industry 
As noted, antitrust policy has been almost totally concerned with 
concentration in the manufacturing sector of the economy. Indeed U. K. 
industrial policy in general has been confined to structural problems 
and reorganization in the private industrial sector. This became particularly 
apparent , recently with the evolution of a positive approach 
to rationali- 
zation during the term of the 1964-70 Labour Government. Their policy was 
broadly-based and ambivalent; on the one hand, it recognised that it was 
desirable to promote mergers and rationalization within manufacturing 
industry in the interests of efficiency. and international competitiveness, 
and on the other, that there was some need to control 'potentially harmful' 
structural arrangements. 
The, most important aspect of this,. policy was the Industrial 
Reorganization Corporation (I. R. C. ), created in 1966, with the purpose of 
fostering the development of larger, more viable units in British manufacturing 
industry, partly through the selective encouragement of mergers. Its 
activities were concentrated in specific manufacturing industries: 
principally in the electrical and electronics industries, the heavy and 
mechanical"engineering, industries, the machine tools industry, the 
scientific instruments industry and the motor-car industry. 
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As noted, 
the agencies responsible for the control of mergers have assumed a similarly 
narrow approach, and the majority of references to the Monopolies Commission 
has,. involved proposed mergers in similar fields: motor-car manufacture, 
suspension_cables,. engineering - in general, manufacturing industry. 
Whilst understandable, given the evidence presented above, this 
discrimination should be considered further in the following cpntext. 
Firstly, the manufacturing and financial sectors are inter-dependent, and 
their merger activity is both characteristically similar and subject to 
the same influences - being subject to cyclical patterns and involving 
similar methods and patterns of finance, for example. Moreover the natural 
day-to-day inter-relationships are manifest in the various services which 
- 21 - 
are offered by financial intermediares: loan and overdraft facilities, 
deposit-taking and money transmission functions, advice on'new issues 
and corporate finance, the provision of risk advice, cover and management, 
and the management of pension funds. 
The financial sector is similarly dependent upon manufacturing industry- 
technology, investment, innovation and performance of industrial companies 
inevitably affect the operation of financial institutions. The introduction 
of computers and automated money-transmission mechanisms was attendant upon 
technological innovation in the industrial sector. Moreover the growth of 
manufacturing companies during the merger boom periods of the last ten 
years was fuelled by merchant banks and created enterprises of a size 
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that demanded larger units in other areas of the financial sector, notably 
clearing banking and insurance underwriting. 
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Thus one can postulate 
that the behaviour of the two broadly-defined manufacturing and financial 
sectors is inter-related and that their merger activity and performance should 
not be considered separately. 
Furthermore, the danger of monopoly or market power, as traditionally 
perceived, is that it leads to the development of unaccountable concentrations 
of economic power which may utilise these positions in the pursuit of 
monopolistic practices, -such as the charging of excess prices to recover 
large profit margins. In the context of unprecedented merger activity in 
the financial service industries and the recognition of a high positive 
correlation between merger and increasing concentration, 
63 
the omission 
of the financial sector from the purview of public merger policy should be 
question ed. 
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Unwritten rules and control by the Bank of England 
The critique should, however be considered in the wider framework 
of the comprehensive system of supervision enacted by the Bank of England, 
which offers a probable explanation for the neglect described above. In 
the U. K., control over bank mergers-of an 'informal' but nevertheless effective 
sort, designed to prevent acquisitions in restraint of competition, was 
introduced after the wave of mergers that occurred at the end of the first 
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world war. As a result of the Report of the Colwyn Committee in 1918 
clearing banks were forbidden to merge without prior consultation with the 
Bank of England, which in turn had to consult the Treasury. The implicit 
acceptance by the banks of the strictures laid down by the Central Bank 
meant that recourse to legislation was averted, but, nevertheless, 
banking mergers initiated by the major-clearing banks were effectively 
regulated. Indeed, it was not until the Report of the Prices and Incomes 
Board in 196766 that wholesale structural change was contemplated. In its 
attack on the lack of price competition and the profuse spread of branch 
networks, the P. I. B. suggested that "amalgamations could permit some 
rationalization of existing networks". As a result a number of clearing 
bank links were effected. The subsequent reference of the proposed amalgama- 
tion between Barclays/Lloyds/Martins to the Monopolies Commission, its 
adverse majority report and consequent Government prohibition, appears 
to have halted once again structural change in the retail clearing bank 
market. 
The Bank of England's influence over banking merger activity extends 
beyond its unwritten rules regarding horizontal clearing bank links. Its 
I 
role has remained undefined, however, and is often clearly visible only 
when a ruling which has hitherto been upheld, is relaxed. For example, 
it controlled the acquisition of acceptance houses by clearing banks and E. E. C. 
banks by an unwritten, yet largely observed regulation, which gained 
publicity only when it was relaxed in 1972. This signalled the acquisition 
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of Montagu Trust by Midland Bank67 and the Warburgs-Paribas joint-venture. 
68 
Bank of England permission is still required, however, for acquisitions if 
more than 15% of a bank's capital. 
69 
This mode of regulation - by suasion rather than by statute - has 
been particularly prevalent in the banking sector, and as a consequence, 
has not always been recognised. With respect to public policy, Bank of 
England intervention remains vague but represents yet another barrier to 
be crossed by financial institutions proposing acquisitions. 
-. 
n 
1 
NOTES 
For a description of this growth upto 1929, spe the 'Report of the 
Treasury Committee (Colwyn Committee) on Bank Amalgamations' (1918: 
Cmnd 9052) and the Balfour Committee, 'Final Report of the Committee 
on Industry and Trade' (1929: Cmnd 3282). See also C. K. Rowley, 
The British Monopolies Commission (Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 39-48 
2: E. Rostow, 'British and American Experience with Legislation against 
restraints of competition', Modern Law Review, Vol. 23,1960, p. 489 
See also H. W. Macrosty, The Trust Movement in British Industry, 
(Longmans Green, 1906)", p. 335. 
3 See 'Labour and the new Social Order', (1918), manifesto of the 
Labour Party 
4: J. M. Clark, 'Towards a Concept of Workable Competion, American Economic 
Review, June 1940 
5: E. H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, (Harvard U. P. 
1932), and J. Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition' 
, 
(Macmillan, 1933) 
6 Distribution of Building Materials and Components, Report of the 
Committee of Enquiry appointed by. the Minister of Works (1948), HMSO No. 70.553 
7: S 14 of the 1948 Act gave the following vague guidance to the 
assessment of the public interest: 
"all matters which appear in the particular circumstances to be 
relevant shall be taken into account and ... regard be had to the need ... 
to achieve 
(a) the production, treatment and distribution by the most efficient 
and economical means-of goods of such types and qualities, in such 
volume and at such prices as still best meet the requirements of home 
and overseas markets; 
(b) the organization of industry and trade in such a way that their 
efficiency is progressively increased and new enterprise is encouraged; 
Cc) the fullest use and best distribution of men materials and industrial 
capacity in the UK; and 
(d) the development of technical improvements and the expansion of 
existing markets and the opening up of new markets. " 
8: See the Report on the Supply of Electric Lamps, Session 1951, HC 287, 
HMSO 
9: Every report contains a consideration of these factors 
10 : See the Report on the Process of Calico Printing, Session 1954, HC 140, 
HMSO 
11 See the Report on the Supply of Insulin, Session 1951-1952, HC 296, 
HMSO 
12 : In P. Guenault and J. Jackson, The Control of Monopoly in the United Kingdom, 
(Longmans, 1960), the authors argue that this criticism was unfounded 
since the Commission's findings carried no legal force and thus the 
prosecutor or judge analogy did not exist, p. 125. This overlooks 
the fact that, under certain circumstances, the Monopolies Commission's 
recommendations could be given legal force. Moreover, the industrialists' 
criticism in the 1950s is closely akin to that expressed of the City's 
Takeover Panel which has no statutory powers at all (see Chapters 6 
and 7). 
(ii) 
13 : See Guenault and Jackson, op. cit., pp. 126-127 and Rowley, op. cit., 
pp. 84-86 
14 : A. Crosland, Monopoly Legislation (19511'Socialist Commentary 
10 
15 : See G. C. Allen, Monopoly and Restrictive Practices, (Allen and Unwin, 
1966), p. 64. A more serious shortcoming results from the failure of 
the responsible ministry to make avilable its reasons for selecting 
cases for referral. 
16 : See the Report on the Supply of Cast Iron Rainwater Goods, Session 1951, 
BC 18, BMSO 
17 : The hope that the Monopolies Commission would do this was expressed 
during the debates on the bill, 449 B. C. debs., cols, 2046 et seq., 1948 
18 : Collective Discrimination : A'Report on Exclusive Dealing, Collective 
'Boycotts, Aggregate Rebates and'Other Discriminatory Trade Practices 
(1955 : Cmnd 9504) 
19 :S 21 of the 1956 Act 
20 : See B. Stevens and B. S. Yamey, The Restrictive Practices' Court, 
(Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1965), pp. 23-153. 
21 : Amendments contained in the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1968, 
restored considerable power to the Government. 
22 : Report of the Registrar of Restrictive Practices, 1966-1969 (1970 : 
Cmnd 4303) 
23 : Macrosty, op. cit., gives an indication that some sections of 
British industry underwent a fundamental change at the turn of the 
century due to mergers; for a discussion of the effects of mergers 
in the inter-war period, see L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate 
Economy, (Methuen, 1976). A useful summary of merger activity in these 
periods appears in M. A. Utton, 'Some features of the early merger 
movements in British Manufacturing Industry', University of Reading 
Discussion Paper, No. 27, September 1970. 
24 One of the first calls for merger control was the recommendation in the 
Colwyn Committee Report that there should be no further mergers of 
joint-stock banks without the consent of the Government. 
25 : See the remarks of the Rt. Hon. F. J. Errol, then President of the BoT, 
on the proposed merger between ICI and Courtaulds in 651 H. C., debs, 
cols, 1546-2548 (1961), and 625 H. C. debs, cols, 895-904 (1962) 
26 : Many of the notable manufacturing stalwarts of today were formed as 
a result of the earlier periods of merger activity; for example, 
WPM (1900), Imperial Tobacco (1901), Tate & Lyle (1921), 
Distillers 
(1925), ICI (1926) and Unilever (1930). More recently the Industrial 
Reorganization Corporation (1966-70) was established because the 
size of ißß firms was considered too small to achieve scale economies 
or to keep pace with growing competition in world markets. Mergers 
played an important role in the IRC's brief history of rationalization. 
See also the quote attributed to the then prime minister Harold Wilson 
that mergers were influential in dragging Britain 'kicking and screaming 
into the twentieth century. ' (quoted in W. Davis, Merger Mania 
/Constable, 19707 
(iii) 
27 : Especially the so-called 'Aluminium War' in 1958 (see chapter six) 
28 : The ICI/Courtaulds contest (1961) probably provoked the greatest 
controversy and dispelled the belief, if only temporarily, that 
merger and rationalization went hand-in-hand. 
29 : For example, the Report of the Royal Commission on the Press (1962 : 
Cmnd 1811), See also the Monopolies Commission Report on the Supply 
of Wallpaper, in which the Commission recommended that the dominant 
firm should not further acquire its competitors without prior consent 
30 : 'Monopolies mergers and Restrictive Practices', White Paper (1964 : 
Cmnd 2299); Bow Group, 'Monopolies and Mergers' (Conservative Political 
Centre, No. 270,1963); Poole Committee, 'Monopolies and the Public 
Interest' (Conservative Political Centre, No. 273,1963) 
31 : The Public Interest provisions of S 84 of the Fair Trading Act 1973 state: 
"In determining for any purposes to which this section applies whether 
any particular matter operates, or may be expected to operate, against 
the public interest, the Commission shall take into account all matters 
which appear to them in the particular circumstances to be relevant 
and, among other things, shall have regard to the desirability - 
(a) of maintaining and promoting effective competition between persons 
supplying goods and services in the UK; 
(b) of promoting the interests of consumers, purchasers and other users 
of goods and services in the UK in respect of the prices charged for 
them and in respect of their quality and the variety of goods and 
services supplied; 
(c) of promoting, through competition, the reduction of costs and the 
development and use of new techniques and new products, and of 
facilitating the entry of new competitors into existing markets; 
(d) of maintaining and promoting the balanced distribution of industry 
and employment in the UK, and 
(e) of maintaining and promoting competitive activity in markets 
outside the UK on the part of producers of goods, and of suppliers of 
goods and services in the UK" 
32 : Clauses (a) and (e) of S 84 uphold competition per se to be desirable, 
for the first time in the history of competition policy 
33 : Restrictive practices are considered by the R. P. Court, to be contrary 
to the public interest unless proven otherwise 
34 : The pioneering Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965, chose the market share 
level of 331/3% articulated in the 1948 legislation 
35 : Of 1038 mergers falling under the legislation from 1965-1974 only 
35 were referred to the Monopolies Commission 
36 : For example, the office-of Fair Trading and the Inter-Departmental 
Mergers Panel. In 1975,315 mergers occurred. In the same year, 
whilst 157 proposals came under the two criteria of the mergers 
legislation, only four were actually referred to the Commission. 
Where the proposal is not referred, "unless unusually difficult 
circumstances arise, (the OFT) give advice on mergers ... within 
about three weeks of the proposals becoming known to this office. " 
OFT, The First Report, Nov 1973 - December 1974, (Session 1973-1974, 
HMSO, 1975). 
(iv) 
37 : A. Phillips, 'Structure, Conduct and Performance - and Performance, 
Conduct and Structure', in J. W. Markham & C. F. Papanek, Industrial 
Organization and Economic Development - Essays in honour of E. S. Mason, 
(Houghton Mifflin, 1970) 
38 : A. Phillips, 'A critique of empirical studies of relations between 
market structure and profitability', Journal of Industrial Economics, 
June, 1976: ' ... Bette#y theory, better data, and above all, 
better econometrics are needed before policy can be based on 
anything other than in-depth institutional studies of particular 
markets', p. 248 
39 :A brief discussion of these difficulties appears in J. F. Pickering, 
Industrial Structure and Market Conduct, (Martin Robertson, 1974) 
pp 275-6 
40 : J. M. Clark, op. cit. Also, his Competition as a Dynamic Process, 
(Brookings Institute, '1961) 
41 : For example, C. K. Rowley, 'Mergers and Public Policy in Great Britain', 
Journal of Law and Economics, April 1968, and A. Sutherland, 
The Monopolies Commission in Action, (C. U. P., 1969) 
42 : Several writers have been interested in measuring changes in 
concentration due to merger; most recently, S. Aaronovitch and 
M. Sawyer, 'Mergers Growth and Concentration', Oxford Economic Papers, 
March 1975. Others, including the Monopolies Commission and 
Government Departments also think in terms of mergers being 
'horizontal', 'vertical' and 'conglomerate'. The critique 
developed in P. J. Franklin & K. R. Harris, 'A critique of UK 
policy towards acquisitions and mergers from an examination of 
its micro economic foundations' City of London Polytechnic, 
Working Paper No. 19, December 1976, challenges those views which 
presume it possible or meaningful, to identify mergers in this way, 
and those which make inferences about concentration changes from 
a naive analysis of mergers and acquisitions which have been 
ordered into these three categories. 
43 : This is only one measure of size - and an absolute measure which 
is particularly relevant to non-financial companies. Possibly 
a relative-measure would be more appropriate: assets/turnover 
for example. In any case, the value will change with the type 
of products and processes employed; and also alter according to 
the different valuation principles used. 
44 : BICC/Pyrotenax, Session 1966-1967, HC 490, HMSO; Ross Group/ 
Associated Fisheries, Session 1966-1967, HC 42, HMSO; UDS/ 
Montague Burton (1967 : Cmnd 3397); and Boots/House of Fraser, 
Session 1974, HC 174, HMSO 
45 : See R. L. Bishop, 'Elasticities, Cross-Elasticities and; Market 
Relationships' American Economic Review, December 1952 and 
J. S. Bain, 'Chamberlain's Impact on Microeconomic Theory', 
in R. E. Keunne (ed), Monopolistic Competition Theory: Studies 
in Impact, (Wiley, 1967). 
- (v) - 
46: For example, the 1948 Act emphasised that domestic markets alone, 
should be considered for reference. 
47: Fair Trading Act 1973, S 84, clause (e) 
48: See M. A. Utton, 'The effects of mergers on concentration: 
UK manufacturing industry, 1954-65', Journal of Industrial Economics 
Nov, 1971 ; K. D. George, 'The changing structure of competitive 
industry', Economic Journal March, 1972, Supplement 
49: Rowley has referred to "the monstrosity that is British industrial 
policy", C. K. Rowley, 'Industrial Structure, Competition and 
Efficiency :A Review Article', Scottish Journal of the Political 
Economy, June 1975 , p. 199. Also c. f. philosophy of the IRC 
and the Monopolies Commission. 
50: See for example, the-attacks by J. M. Samuels, C. S. Goddard and 
R. E. V. Groves (and ripostes by I. Fraser) in the Banker 1976 
(February, May, June and September editions). 
51: K. Richards & D. Colenutt, 'Concentration in the U. K. ordinary life 
assurance market', Journal of Industrial Economics, December 1975 
52: J. D. Gribbin, 'The conglomerate merger', Applied Economics, 
March, 1976 
53: Gribbin, op. cit., p. 35 
54: For example, Unilever/Allied Breweries, Session 1968-1969, BC 297, 
HMSO; and Rank/De la Rue, Session 1968-1969, BC 298, HMSO 
55: Merchant banking services can be considered as the provision of 
finance and advice to private and institutional clients. The 
range of products sold by merchant banks is normally considered 
with respect to four quite different areas: corporate financial 
advice; investment/portfolio management; banking (including 
acceptance credits); and, 'international' services (including 
foreign exchange dealing). In addition merchant banks tend to 
specialise in activities not covered above, for example, bullion 
dealing, leasing, factoring and the provision of venture capital. 
56: Examination of the acquisition advice offered by merchant banks 
apparently confirms this. In 1972, for example, Samuel Montagu 
managed 44 mergers valued on average at £5 million; in contrast 
the corporate finance department of the Drayton Corporation 
handled only 12 mergers in the same year, valued at an average 
consideration of £26 million. Similarly, in terms of expenditure 
on acquisitions managed by the banks, 90% of those arranged by 
the Drayton Corporation were on behalf of the acquired; firm, 
whereas Samuel Montagu acted mainly for acquiring firms, 
representing the offeror company in 75% (by consideration) of the 
acquisitions it arranged. (Calculations from data in The Times 
1000,1974-75). 
57: S. Aaronovitch & M. C. Sawyer, Big Business, (Macmillan, 1975), 
p. 110 
- (vi) - 
58: Discussion with the author, October 1975 
59: R. M. Cyert & E. Grunberg, 'Assumption, Prediction and Explanation 
in Economics', in R. M. Cyert & J. G. March, A'BehaYioural'Theory of 
the Firm, (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1973) 
60: For a comment on the structural change brought about by the I. R. C. 
see C. L. Pass, 'The Industrial Reorganization Corporation -A 
positive approach to the structure of industry', Journal of 
Long-Range Planning, September, 1971 _ 
61: See Chapter 6 
62: See Chapters 3 and 4 respectively 
63: See Utton (1971), op. cit. 
64: see Joseph Sykes, The Amalgamation*Movementin English'Banking 1825-1924, 
(P. S. King & Son, 1926) 
65: Onnd 9052, op. cit. 
66: National Board for Prices and Incomes, Report No. 34, ''Bank'Charges' 
(1967: Ound 32921 
67: See Chapter 3 
68: See Chapter 5 
69: Prudential Regulation of Banks in the EEC: Summary, Prepared by 
I. B. R. O. for the British Bankers' Association, October 1975, p. 15 
i 
- 24 - 
CHAPTER TWO 
The Emergence of Merger Activity in the Financial Sector,: Industry Analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the scale, incidence and nature of 
acquisition activity by U. K. financial institutions for the period 
1966-73. The analyses are conducted at high levels of aggregation. 
Inevitably, therefore, the results are limited in scope, for the data 
on acquiring firms does not distinguish different types of bank - 
deposit and secondary, nor different insurance institutions - 
underwriting companies and brokers. Similarly the data gives no indication 
of the market activities of acquired firms. These failings are 
circumvented in subsequent chapters which examine in detail, the 
acquisitions effected by financial intermediaries engaged in different 
market operations. Nevertheless, the contents give an insight into 
the pronounced increases in financial sector merger activity, and 
provide a useful statistical background to the more comprehensive 
investigations which follow. 
The analyses utilise raw data made available by the Bank of England, 
but also examine statistics compiled and presented in the Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin. Unfortunately discrepancies appear between the Bank's 
calculations and the data themselves, and a note to that effect is 
included under Table 2.3; this reservation applies equally to other 
tables and comments which are drawn directly from the raw data. 
Furthermore, the names of financial institutions involved in 'contested 
bids' are not published but the values are aggregated; where possible, i 
searches of the financial press (the primary data source) reveal the 
identity of the firms in question. 
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As implied, the major stimulus to the present study was the apparent 
neglect of the merger and acquisition activity of financial companies, 
due in part to the parallel merger movement in manufacturing industry. 
To the extent that the innate characteristics of the financial and 
industrial sectors are different it is probably justifiable not to 
aggregate studies of merger activity in the two sectors. However in the 
analysis of merger activity, it would seem to make as little sense to 
undertake studies of the mergers of dissimilar manufacturing 
industries, as it does to exclude financial companies from examinations 
concerned with the aggregate merger behaviour of the company sector 
per se. The interdependence between the two sectors, noted in chapter 
one, reinforces this view; as does Figure 2.1 below which clearly shows 
the cycles of acquisitions of financial and non-financial companies to 
be closely related. 
Moreover, closer examination and comparison of the increase in 
expenditure on acquisitions by financial and manufacturing companies 
confirms the relative importance of the former. The comparison 
presented in Figure 2.2 is in index form with 1966 as base year. 
-. 
I 
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Figure 2.1 : Mergers and Acquisitions by financial and non-financial 
companies 1966-1973 
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Figure 2.2 : Indices of acquisition expenditure, financial and 
manufacturing sectors 1966-1973 
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The focus on the acquisitions of financial companies can be justified on 
several grounds: the pronounced increase in the scale of acquisition 
activity in the financial sector; the causes and effects of financial 
companies' mergers on the behaviour of the financial system of the economy; 
and the absence of any substantive systematic analysis of the merger 
activity of financial institutions. Indeed a clue to the significance 
of acquisition activity in the financial sector, is given in the 
introductory note to the Bank of England's statistical series: 
" ... there has been a marked increase in recent years in 
the numbers and importance of takeovers and mergers by banks 
and other financial companies. " 1 
2.2 Measuring merger activity 
There are two main ways of measuring merger activity, first by number, 
and second by value of acquisitions. Assuming the information is available, 
the 'number of firms acquired' has some clear advantages as a measure 
of merger activity. First they can be aggregated over time without the 
problem of the valuation of the asset size or market valuation of firms. 
This is especially acute when firms are acquired by way of share exchange. 
Second, since every acquisition is treated as equally important the 
measure avoids the swamping which value measures generate whenever there 
are occasional but very large acquisitions. On the other hand, while the 
number of firms acquired indicates the number of independent decision 
centres which have been extinguished, it gives no information about 
the resources involved. 
The value of acquisitions and mergers provides information which 
numbers alone cannot provide. They measure (albeit in an imperfect way) 
the scale of the resources involved and permit a distinction to be drawn 
between insignificant and substantial mergers. Moreover they enable 
studies of the relation of size and growth of firms to important aspects 
of their behaviour. The contribution of merger activity to changes in 
concentration cannot be estimated without value measurement. 
-29- 
Clearly the measures chosen will reflect in some way the hypothesis 
and aim of the analysis. If, for instance, the importance of increasing' 
market power is one of the factors in the analysis, the size of the 
acquiring and acquired firms and the total and sectoral scale of the 
acquisitions will be more relevant than the number of firms acquired. 
It remains true. )however)that in absolute terms such a series is affected 
by occasional large acquisitions, and extreme observations pose difficult 
statistical problems. In the series for financial sector acquisitions, 
reference is made wherever distortions are pronounced, as for example 
in 1968. 
The terms' acquisition' and 'merger' will be used interchangeably 
throughout this study. The latter generally defined as amalgamations 
effected by arrangement between companies, are valued as if the larger 
(or largest) company has acquired the smaller. Values recorded refer 
to the consideration paid in respect of acquisitions and mergers, 
whether in cash or in some form of securities. So far as possible, 
the latter are included at the date at which a bid is declared 
unconditional or a contract to purchase is signed; this measure therefore 
reflects the valuation placed by the acquiring institution on the acquired 
firm. Clearly, however, since share exchange has been a major method of 
financing acquisition and merger, values will vary with share movements 
as well as with the relative importance of share exchange in any given 
purchase and overall for any given time period. 
1 
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2.3 Merger activity in the financial sector 
The Bank of England's statistical series classify acquiring and 
acquired firms according to their main activity. The former are categorised 
into six classes: Banks; B. P. (finance) houses; insurance companies; 
investment trust companies; unit trust management companies; and miscellaneous 
financial companies. Acquired companies are classified similarly, 
but with an additional category for non-financial companies. 
The following analyses give an indication of the nature of 
acquisitions initiated by financial companies; the tables classify 
acquisition activity with respect to level; size; direction; methods of 
finance and sector. In order to consider the changing patterns which 
emerge, the period is divided into halves, the first from 1966-69, 
and the second, from 1970-73. 
2.3.1 The level of takeover activity in the financial sector 
Table 2.1 indicates the numbers of financial companies that were 
engaged in acquisitions in the U. K. from 1966-73. 
Table 2.1: Acquisitions and Mergers by Financial Companies within 
the U. K., 1966-73 
Total No. Total No. 
Acquiring Acquired 
1966 36 38 
1967 -31 38 
1968 62 73 
1969 80 98 
1970 86 100 
1971 63 77 
1972 102 121 
1973 91 108 
551 653 
Source : BEQB 
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The incidence of acquisitions and mergers by financial companies 
appears to have increased significantly with 247 companies being 
acquired over the period 1966-69, whereas 406 were acquired during the 
second four years. 
These trends are also repeated in terms of financial institutions' 
expenditure on acquisitions as measured. by 'value of mergers and 
acquisitions' (Table 2.2). From these, total expenditure increased 
from £1027 million in the first four years, to £1382 million over the 
second period. 
Table 2.2: The value of acquisitions and mergers by financial companies, 
1966-73 
"- Value 
£m 
1966 42 
1967 68 
1968 590 
1969 327 
1970 284 
1971 254 
1972 406 
1973 438 
2409 
Source: - BEQB 
But these dimensions conceal other information about the incidence 
of financial company acquisitions, particularly in respect of the temporal 
distribution of the acquisitions, and of the discrepancy between the two 
measures of acquisition activity. The uneven spread of mmrgers and 
acquisitions is shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 
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Possibly most interesting, however, is the very high level of 
expenditure on acquisitions recorded in 1968. Indeed total considerations 
in the second quarter of that year alone exceeded those in the previous 
nine quarters. 
The marked increases in expenditure from 1967 (£68 million) to 
1968 (E590 million) can be largely attributed to four very large mergers. 
Three of these involved major deposit banks - Barclays/Martins (E105 million), 
Royal Bank of Scotland/National and Commercial Bank of Scotland (£49 
million), National Provincial/Westminster (£178 million) - and the fourth 
amalgamated two leading life assurance companies - Guardian/Royal Exchange 
(E64 million). It is not surprising therefore that this trend in 
expenditure was not reflected in the number of companies acquired. 
By this measure, 1968 figures showed a large increase on 1966 and 1967 but 
were well below those for subsequent years. 
Any description of the pattern of merger activity throughout the 
period must therefore take into account both indicators of the value 
and number of acquisitions, for quite different trends emerge, 
depending upon which measure is employed. For instance, in terms of 
numbers of companies acquired, 1972 and 1973 were the peaks of a 
gradually increasing trend; in terms of value of total considerations, 
however, the end of the period marked the emergence from a three-year 
plateau, following the earlier peak in 1968. 
I 
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2.3.2 Takeover activity by size category 
The classification in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 is by size category of the 
victim firm based upon the consideration paid for the equity. 
Table 2.3 : Size Distribution of Acquisition Expenditure 1966-69 
Size 
Category 
£m 
1966 
N., No. Val. 
£m 
1967 
No. Val. 
£m 
1968 
No. Val. 
£m 
1969 
No. Val. 
£m 
No. 
1966-1969 
% Val. 
£m 
0- - 27 3.9 22 3.7 31 6.7 36 7.2 116 52 21.5 2 
0.5-. 5 3.8 6 3.8 8 5.8 13 9.7 32 14 23.1 2 
1.0- 3 8.6 6 12.0 15 38.4 18 40.9 42 19 99.9 10 
5.0- 1 8.9 - - 2 10.8 5 34.2 8 4 53.9 5 
10.0- 1 16.9 3 47.5 11 523.7 8 205.3 23 10 793.4 80 
37 42.1 37 67.0 67 585.4 80 297.3 221 100 991.8 100 
Note: Occasionally the figures in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin and those 
from the raw data cannot be perfectly reconciled; percentages have been 
rounded and do not add to 100 
Table 2.4 : Size Distribution of Acquisition Expenditure 1970-73 
Size 
Category 
Em 
1970 
No. Val. 
Em 
No. 
1971 
Val. 
£m 
1972 
No. Val. 
Em 
1973 
No. Val. 
Em 
No. 
1970-1973 
% Val. 
£m 
% 
0- 37 7.7 20 4.2 45 9.3 41 8.9 143 40 30.1 2 
0.5- 13 8.5 11 7.8 11 7.7 10 6.9 45 13 30.9 2 
1.0- 25 48.5 22 58.2 36 80.5 22 49.0 105 30 236.2 17 
5.0- 6 38.7 8 58.3 11 71.4 5 37.0 30 8 205.4 15 
10.0- 8 172.6 4 114.3 8 237.2 11 326.1 31 9 650.2 63 
89 276.0 65 242.8 111 406.1 89 427.9 354 100 1352.8 100 
Note: Percentages have been rounded and do not add to 100 
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It is clear that throughout the entire period smaller acquisitions have 
been more numerous. The modal observation of acquisitions occurs in the 
smallest class for both four-year periods. For 1966-69 52% of acquisitions 
involved expenditure of less than £/ million; while the largest number of 
acquisitions also occurred in this class for the second period, the proportion 
dropped to 40%. This was specifically due to a shift in the distribution 
with a much less pronounced skew in favour of small acquisitions. In 
particular this is apparent if one considers the £m 1.0- class, where 30% 
of acquisitions occurred in the second period compared with 19% during the 
first four years. 
In value terms, the modal observation is at the top rather than the 
bottom of the range, with acquisitions in the Em 10.0- class accounting 
for 80% and 63% of total expenditure in the respective periods. The difference 
between the first and second periods is probably exaggerated by the artificiallý,,. -- 
high value for 1966-69 itself caused by the few unique large mergers in 
1968. 
Detailed examination of the relationships between each category and the 
whole is facilitated by Table 2.5 which covers the whole period 1966-73 in 
percentage form. 
The trend reflects a steady increase in the number and importance of 
acquisitions and mergers valued in excess of £5 million, and a similar 
decline for those acquisitions under Eli million. The latter accounted for 
72% by number and 10% by value of acquisitions in 1966, yet only 46% and 2% 
respectively in 1973; whereas the former which accounted for 6% and 61% of 
number and value in 1966 were responsible for 18% and 85% in 1973. 
It is also interesting that large mergers were predominant in those 
years when total expenditure was highest. Hence in 1968, when £585 million 
was spent, acquisitions in the Em 10.0 class contributed 89% of expenditure. 
Similarly, in 1973 76% of the total expenditure of £427 million was 
represented by that category. 
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In summary, a feature of the all-inclusive data on the size structure 
of merger activity in the U. K. financial sector is the involvement of very 
large institutions, for while all sizes of firms were taken over, the firms 
for which at least £lO million was paid, accounted for some 70% of the total 
expenditure in the period. 
The tendency for acquisitions to become larger which also indicates 
the participation of large firms in merger activity is reflected as well 
in the analysis of annual average considerations, contained in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 : Average Consideration paid by Financial Companies 1966-73 
Average 
Consideration 
£m. 
1966 1.1 
1967 1.8 
1968 8.7 
1969 3.7 
1970 3.0 
1971 3.7 
1972 3.7 
1973 4.8 
These trends have not received the attention nor the study that they 
merit, for economists and legislators have been traditionally concerned 
with another trend in the economy - that towards increasing seller 
concentration in one or more markets. As noted earlier, the financial 
sector has also been relatively neglected. In the context of the 
generally increasing size of firms and rising aggregate concentration, it 
is surprising that acquisition behaviour in this sector has apparently gone 
unnoticed although the trend points towards bigger mergers and the 
involvement of bigger financial institutions in financial sector merger 
activity. 
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2.3.3 Direction of Takeover Activity 
Any detailed satisfactory analysis of the nature/direction of financial 
institutions' acquisitions, and hence analysis of their effects on industrial 
and market structure confronts us with several problems. Some of these 
were raised in Chapter 1. Briefly they involve the a priori difficulties 
of identifying and measuring market boundaries, and problems of definition 
which impede estimation of the population of firms in a market. Moreover, 
the relevant Minimum List Headings of the S. I. C. - 860: Other financial 
institutions - are too broad to be of analytical use. 
Thus, although one hesitates to order acquisitions into the traditional 
categories2 and does not want to prejudice subsequent analyses, examination 
and comparison of the leading diagonals in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 is probably 
sufficiently valid for the purposes of this part of the study and for this 
stage of the research. Accordingly like other studies which have attempted 
to determine and examine the changing types of integration chosen by 
acquiring firms, 
3 
consideration of Table 2.7 and 2.8 does imply that financial 
institutions' acquisitions have tended to be increasingly diversificatory. 
Of 255 acquisitions recorded for 1966-69 costing £1024 million, some 40% 
by number and 82% by expenditure appear in the leading diagonal; whereas 
for the second period, of 412 acquisitions (£1378 million) only 27% 
by number and 33% by expenditure involved firms in the same financial industry. 
The apparent move towards diversification is confirmed by examination 
of the business of acquired firms. The proportion of non-financial firms, 
for example, in the population of acquired firms shows a significant 
increase from 34% in period one to 48% in period two. Indeed, particularly 
in terms of expenditure, these results are substantially confirmed: 
expenditure on acquiring non-financial companies increased from 6% of all 
expenditure on acquisitions for 1966-69 to 34% for 1970-73. 
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Of particular relevance to those interested in changes in market 
structure and seller concentration specifically, is the relative concentra- 
tion of acquisitions of firms in the same industry. This information can 
be extracted from Table 2.9 which classifies acquisitions involving 
expenditure of at least El million, according to different types of 
integration. 
While other types of integration show no violent fluctuations 
in year-on-year changes, of £1237.8 million spent on financing acquisitions 
between firms in the same industry, some 65% took place before 1970. 
This implies that major consolidations and rationalization and any 
material increases in seller concentration occurred in a relatively 
brief period, whereas diversification has been a more gradual process. 
Because of the caution expressed above, no definitive conclusions 
can be drawn at this stage regarding the direction of financial sector 
merger activity. However, quite clearly cumulative evidence now indicates 
that financial companies' acquisitions merit more detailed surveillance. 
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2.3.4 Takeover activity - methods of finance 
In the past the attention of economists has been focused on how 
efficiently U. K. capital markets have performed their role of channelling 
personal savings into industrial investment4 The functions of financial 
institutions in this process have also been the subject of considerable 
research. 
5 
In theory, the capital markets should also perform a 
disciplinary function as a mechanism which punishes poor corporate 
performance with a low stock value enhancing the probability of takeover. 
Although there is not a consensus regarding the effectiveness of this 
discipline6, there is wide agreement that a very close relationship 
exists between merger activity and stock market conditions. 
7 
It is 
probable that stock market phenomena are superficial influences affecting 
the timing of merger activity rather than the basic or underlying causes 
of mergers. 
8 
Even cursory observation of industrial merger trends confirms the 
importance of the capital market as an important factor in merger movements. 
The prolonged bull markets of 1968 and 1969 were accompanied by high 
levels of acquisition activity; similarly the rise in share prices in 1971- 
1972, when the Financial Times ordinary share index reached an all-time 
high, signalled an historically unprecedented level of acquisition expenditure. 
For financial companies' acquisitions, a similar trend is discernible. 
A much closer relationship, however, is observed between those acquisitions 
financed by securities and stock market conditions. Table 2.10 analyses 
methods of financing acquisitions by financial institutions, and these 
data are plotted against movements in the F. T. index in Figure 2.5.. 
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Table 2.10 : Methods of payment for acquisitions by 
Financial companies 
Cash Securities Total 
£m $ £m % £m 
1966 - 20.8 49 21.5 51 42.3 100 
1967 25.4 38 41.7 62 67.1 100 
1968 31.3 5 555.1 95 586.4 100 
1969 29.4 9 297.0 91 326.4 100 
1970 26.1 9 254.6 91 280.7 100 
1971 30.4 12 223.1 88 253.5 100 
1972 59.6 15 346.4 85 406.0 100 
1973 193.9 44 244.0 56 437.9 100 
416.8 17 1983.4 83 2400.2 100 
SowocE s ýo«ý1L . c1j%C%. O oývoýFe. 
From Figure 2.5 it can be seen that the fall in share prices after 
mid-1972 which became pronounced in 1973 was not accompanied by a fall 
in the level of expenditure on financial sector acquisitions. Indeed this 
index showed a rise from 1972 to 1973. Those acquisitions financed by 
securities did however show a corresponding fall. Further, from Table 2.10, 
this marked a departure from the most usual method of effecting acquisitions 
in the financial sector - by share exchange, for over the previous five years, 
at least 85% of all acquisitions by financial institutions were financed by 
equity or loan stock. 
Thus the rise in the level of acquisition expenditure in 1973 may be 
attributed to 'cash financing'. In fact some 44% of acquisitions effected 
in that year were financed in this way -a strategy facilitated by the 
considerable and rapid monetary growth which created excess liquidity 
amongst the financial intermediaries. 
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2.3.5 Takeover activity_- the active sectors 
A further step in the analysis of merger activity in the financial 
sector is to classify the acquiring firms to the industry or area in which 
they-operate. Problems of definition have been noted above and although 
banking, for example, now covers a wide range of services, the broad 
categorization below serves to illustrate the relatively concentrated 
pattern of acquisitions. Firms are classified by main activity. 
Acquisitions and mergers initiated by banks and insurance companies 
are seen to account for 58% of all financial sector amalgamations by value. 
By number, however, they represent less than one quarter of the total (23%), 
indicating the large size of mergers and acquisitions in these sectors. 
The validity of the results of the statistical investigation into the 
acquisitions and mergers of financial intermediaries, however, depends 
almost entirely on the method of industry classification used - how 
accurate it is and how realistic it is. Further comment requires a more 
detailed analysis - one which takes into account the different market 
structures and competitive environments within the financial sector. 
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NOTES 
1: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, September 1971, p. 349 
2: i. e. horizontal, vertical and diversified (conglomerate) mergers 
3: See for example, Department of Trade and Industry, A Survey of Mergers, 
(H. M. S. O., 1970); J. D. Gribbin, "The Operation of the Mergers Panel", 
Trade and Industry, January 17,1974; B. Hindley, Industrial Merger 
and Public Policy, (I. E. A. Hobart Paper 50,1970); and J. F. Pickering, 
Industrial Structure and Market Conduct, (Robertson, 1974) 
4: See for example, K. Midgley and G. Burns, Business Finance and the 
Capital Market, (Macmillan, 1969) and K. Midgley and R. Burns 
The Capital Market: its nature and significance, (Macmillan, 1977) 
5: See J. R. S. Revell, The Wealth of the Nation, (C. U. P., 1967) and Royal 
Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth (Diamond Report), 
Cmnd 6172, (H. M. S. O., 1975) 
6: Cf. R. Marris, The Economic Theory of Managerialism Capitalism, 
(Macmillan, 1967), A. Singh, Take-overs, (C. U. P., 1971) and D. A. Kuehn, 
Takeovers and the Theory of the Firm, (Macmillan, 1975) 
7: Cf. R. L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry, 1895-1956, 
(National Bureau of Economic Research General Series 66, Princeton 
U. P., 1959), pp. 116-124 and R. L. Nelson, 'Business Cycle Factors in 
the Choice between Internal and External Growth' in The Corporate 
Merger, eds W. Alberts and J. Segall (University of Chicago Press, 1966) 
8: Nelson (1959), op. cit., p. 125. 
PART TWO : THE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT AND MERGER ACTIVITY 
+ý~ IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
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Throughout their history, the financial institutions in the City of 
London hive been shrouded in mystery. This was partly the creation of the 
institutions which conducted their activities with great secrecy, but 
also stemmed from a general lack of understanding of their activities and 
their modus operandi. In the last twenty years much has been done to further 
understanding of the workings of the financial system. The Report of the 
Radcliffe Committee in 1959 uncovered some secrets, especially unpublished 
statistics. Since then various other bodies have investigated the 
financial markets and monetary system, and different aspects of the role 
and operation of the financial sector have been studied by individual 
commentators. Indeed, at the time of writing, the Wilson Committee has 
barely started its report on the workings of the financial service 
industries, and the efficiency with which they supply and channel funds 
into productive investment. 
Examination of the reports and texts on the financial sector, reveals 
continual change in the environments within which financial institutions 
have competed. In the late 1960s changes began to take place in the structure 
of banking and other financial markets; in the 1970s the continuation of 
this process blurred many of the demarcation lines between and within the 
financial service industries. There has been in particular, an erosion of 
the cartels and restrictions - both self-imposed and the government- 
inflicted - which had previously divided the City's institutions into 
fairly autonomous compartments, separated according to function. New 
markets have developed and old ones have declined. There has been, moreover, 
considerable expansion of the ranges of products and services supplied by 
financial companies and substantial geographical extension of the markets 
in which they are sold. 
Acquisitions and mergers have facilitated an increase in the scale 
of operations and a diversification of business. The stresses of change and 
the long and sometimes hesitating process of corporate adaptation should not 
be confused, however, with a series of relatively isolated occurrences - 
important as these may have been as symptoms of some aspects of that process. 
Rather the development and structural change is to be seen in the details 
of business procedure, organisation and decisions of the companies involved. 
But these can only be effectively appraised in the context of an industry as 
a whole: strengths and weaknesses of one firm, or indeed its merger behaviour, 
are after all only relative matters. Hence a large part of the explanation 
of the merger activity of banks and other financial companies is concerned 
with the changing environment within which the firms operate, as well as 
the firms' strategic responses to it, and the patterns and problems of 
industrial change and corporate modernisation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Acquisitions and Mergers by Banking Institutions 
Detailed analysis of the nature and direction of banking institutions' 
acquisitions can be made by an examination of the leading diagonals of 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2. These give some indication of the direction of merger 
activity, and in particular show the extent to which acquisition and mergers. 
were 'horizontal' and diversified. 
The reduction in the proportion of 'horizontal' amalgamations between 
all financial institutions, noted in Chapter Two, is substantially reflected 
in the banking sector. Of 31 acquisitions initiated by banks during 
1966-69,23% appear in the leading diagonal; whereas, of the 35 acquisitions 
effected during the second period, only 14% were 'horizontal'. The trend 
towards increasing diversification becomes more pronounced in terms of 
acquisition expenditure: expenditure on 'horizontal' acquisitions fell 
from 80% of total expenditure for the first period, to 14% for the second. 
The apparent tendency towards increasingly diversified mergers, 
identified for the banking sector as a whole, is not however, a common 
feature of all three groups of indigenous banks. 
This description does hold for the clearing banks but, in contrast 
the acquisitions undertaken by merchant banks were diversified throughout 
the 8-year period and B. O. Bs expended some 65% of total acquisition 
expenditure on 'horizontal' integration, in the 1970-73 period. 
More pronounced differences in the banks' acquisition behaviour 
may be discerned by examination of the average size of amalgamations that 
each undertook: the clearing banks', for example, expended on average £41 million 
on each acquisition; whereas the B. O. B's average expenditure was £14.9 
million, and that of the merchant banks, £4.5 million. These figures, 
in turn, given an indication of the relative sizes of banks in various 
sectors of the banking industry. 
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3.1 : Deposit banks' acquisitions 1966-73 
The most striking feature of the data reproduced in Tables 3.1 and 
3.2 is the high level and concentration of the clearing banks' expenditure on 
'horizontal' acquisitions. During the eight-year period, the clearing banks 
expended a total of £533.3 million on acquisitions. Some 69% of this was 
recorded in the first period and was represented by the acquisition of other 
clearing banks. In fact, the banks' 'horizontal' merger activity was even more 
concentrated. In 1968 alone, three vergers, involving expenditure in 
excess of £320 million brought about fundamental changes in the structure 
of the U. K. retail banking market. 
3.1.1 : Horizontal Integration 
3.1.1.1 1968 Bank Mergers 
The merger proposals were announced in the first two months of the year; 
two related to English clearing banks, the third mainly to Scottish banks. 
The first announcement was the merger of the National Provincial and Westminster 
Banks, an amalgamation valued at £177 million which resulted in the formation of 
the National Westminster Bank. The second, amalgamated the Royal Bank of Scotland 
with the National Commercial Bank of Scotland, creating the National and Commercial 
Banking Group which also owned the capital of Williams Deacon's, Glyn Mills and 
National Bank, from which Williams and Glyn's was formed in 1970. 
Both mergers appear to have been the product of some months of 
consideration and deliberation. The same cannot, however, be claimed for the 
third proposal. Talk of the acquisition of Martins Bank first arose in 
December 1967 with the bank's announcement that it was studying proposals to merge 
or associate itself with another bank. An affirmative conclusion, reached in 
January, led to the Bank of England organizing an 'auction' for Martins. 
Following this procedure, Barclays and Lloyds made separate bid proposals, but 
before either bank had made 'final' revised offers, the National Provincial - 
Westminster proposal was announced. 
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The proposed formation of National Westminster created a new situation 
whereby Barclays would have been displaced as Britain's largest bank, in 
all aspects except gross deposits, as Table 3.3. reveals: 
Table 3.3 : National Provincial/Westminster: Barclays Bank 
A Comparison, End-1967 
Barclays NP/West 
Gross Deposits (E million) 4049 3447 
Total Branches in British Isles (approx) 2850 3610 
No. of staff (approx) 38000 42500 
No. of current accounts (000s) 3250-3500 4000-4500 
No. of current accounts on computer (000s) 700 
2600 
No. of branches on computer 200 918 
Source: The Banker 
Shortly afterwards, Barclays and Lloyds, the sole bidders for Martins, 
announcedtheir intention to effect a tripartite merger. The former shared 
similar approaches to decentralised administration and overseas business, but 
it was the National Provincial/Westminster announcement that precipitated the 
Barclays-Lloyds move, as both banks acknowledged. 
1 
The third merger proposal inevitably provoked considerably more 
comment than the prior intention of either Barclays of Lloyds to acquire 
Martins. This would have been regarded as the acquisition by a major clearing 
bank of the last independent regional bank2 -a natural step in the absorption 
or coalescing of the regional banks. Instead, the creation of a mammoth bank 
3 
was envisaged whose sheer size alone invoked questions of public concern. 
For example, the group would have handled 48% of total clearing bank deposits 
and supplied approximately 25% of all call money to the discount market. It 
represented, moreover, a reduction in the number of independent suppliers of 
credit and was considered by the Treasury and Bank of England to create pressures 
that would lead to a duopoly in the provision of retail banking services. 
4 
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Official concern was reflected in the referral of the proposed merger 
to the Monopolies Commission which submitted a majority report against the 
merger. 
5 
The Board of Trade accepted the majority recommendation, that the 
merger would produce a less competitive banking system, and did not allow the 
merger. No objection was raised, however, to either Barclays or Lloyds 
acquiring Martins. In the event the former, effected the acquisition by virtue 
of their higher bid during the Bank of England's auction. 
6 
As a result, by mid-1968 the broad structure of U. K. retail banking was 
determined. It was dominated by four independent clearing banks - Barclays, 
National Westminster, Midland and Lloyds. 
3.1.1.2 : Rationale/Competitive Environment 
Several factors influenced the nature and timing of the 1968 mergers. 
Some were intrinsic to the development of the banking industry and considerably 
affected the nature and direction of the amalgamations. The concentration of 
activity in 1968, however, owes more to the official environment within which 
the banks had operated, in particular, the method by which the Bank of England 
had exercised its control over the banking sector. 
The system, based on suasion rather than statute, has two essential aspects 
good communications between the Central Bank and commercial banks, and sanctions 
which are never actually applied. The Monopolies Commission report exposed 
serious flaws in the relationship between the authorities and the banks and 
confirmed that the government itself had been an obstacle to structural 
development of the banking industry. Indeed for 50 years there had been an 
almost total absence of acquisitions by clearing banks. This was caused initially 
by the authorities' acceptance of the doctrines laid down in the Colwyn Committee 
of 1918.7 The report observed that the larger British banks considered it 
necessary to match each important merger by another, in order to preserve an 
approximate balance of resources and competitive power. The Committee did not 
specifically ban amalgamations between banks but recommended that some measure 
of Government control was essential because of the strategic importance to the 
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economy of the banking sector. 
a 
The resort to legislation proved unnecessary, 
however; instead the banks gave an undertaking that they would submit any merger 
proposals for official approval. 
The procedure whereby the banks would approach the Bank of England, 
which would consult the Treasury before conveying the authorities' decision, 
led to the notion, in the absence of a clear policy, that the authorities 
were opposed in general to further mergers. This view persisted until the 
enquiry by the Prices and Incomes Board, in 1967, which revealed, for the first 
time, that the authorities were prepared to question the attitude to bank mergers 
which underlay the recommendations of the Colwyn Committee: 
'Further amalgamations among the banks carried through 
to the appropriate point, could permit some rational- 
isation of existing networks. The Bank of England and 
the Treasury have made it plain to us that they would 
not obstruct some further amalgamations if the banks 
were willing to contemplate such a development'9 
Notwithstanding this development, the apparent inadequacy of 
I t7- 
communications between the au#horities and the banks, in spite of their close 
working relationships, fostered considerable misunderstanding in the intervening 
period. A similar view was expressed by the Monopolies Commission: 
'The evidence ... suggested that, over the years those banks 
which believed mergers would be beneficial to the public 
interest did not seriously attempt to convert the authorities 
or public opinion to their point of view'10 
In a number of respects then, official attitudes, an important aspect 
of the bank§ competitive environment, influenced their merger activity. 
The acceptance by the authorities of the doctrines of the Colwyn Committee 
and the subsequent informality of communications constrained the clearing 
banks from effecting major amalgamations. The report of the Prices and Incomes 
Board, some 50 years later, acted as a catalyst to the spate of 'horizontal' 
mergers in 1968. Finally, the Government, acting on the Report of the 
Monopolies Commission has apparently terminated, once again, further links 
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between the clearing banks. 
It is in the context of changes in other aspects of the banks' competitive 
environment that those motives, intrinsic to the retail banking market, should 
be examined. For example, the advent of computer technology and the approach 
of decimalization, encouraged the banks to plan the installation of computers 
and ancillary equipment. The banks considered it prudent to carry out some major 
reorganisations, implied by the proposed mergers, before incurring the costs 
of investment in mergers - estimated for 1968 at £60 million. 
11 
The rationale 
of this argument originates from the belief that there are significant economies 
of large scale in banking to be gained by increasing the number of accounts 
handled by one computer. Apart from the expense of the computerisation, this 
does not by itself establish that merger would reduce the cost per average 
account appreciably. 
A second motive related to the considerable merger activity in 
manufacturing and other industrial sectors during the twentieth century 
whilst the growth of banking units, as noted, had been effectively restricted. 
Thus customers' borrowing requirements, previously small, became large relative 
to the banks' lending capacities, which were also subject to official control. 
A prima facie case existed therefore for larger deposit and capital bases for the 
clearing banks. The difficulty posed by the considerable borrowing 
requirements of a number of major customers was one of the reasons given by 
Martins Bank when proposing association/merger with another bank. 
12 
Similarly, 
when District Bank was acquired by National Provincial in 1962,10% of its outstand 
ing advances were to one company, Leyland Motors; 
13 
and at the time of its 
merger with Westminster it also had B. P. and Ford ammong its corporate clients. 
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A third general rationale for the mergers can be considered under the 
heading of 'competition'. Indeed the merger proposals were a sequel to the 
report of the Prices and Incomes Board which recommended more competition among 
the banks. But they reflected the banks' interpretation of the call for more 
competition (rather than the P. I, B's suggestion) which stressed the competitive 
advantages of size in banking. The competitive reasons given for the mergers 
should not, however, be confused with their competitive effects - these are 
another complex and contentious issue. 
The most notable characteristic of the banks' competitive environment 
was the absence of direct price competition between the clearing banks. 
This was the product of two factors: firstly, non-disclosure of profits had 
prevented 'informed comparison of performance and profitability' that might have 
stimulated efficiency and competition; secondly, the banks' interest-rate 
cartel agreement inhibited competition in seeking deposits. Competition 
between the clearing banks was therefore concentrated on non-price variables, 
with particular emphasis on 'service'. The costs of rivalry incurred by 
extensive branch expansion were, however, high. Mergers provided an opportunity 
for the rationalisation of the structure of the retail banking market by 
facilitating the elimination of overlapping branch networks. This was 
envisaged by National Provincial and Westminster, and by 1974 some 400 branches 
had been closed. 
14 
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The operation of a cartel agreement on interest rates which 
restricted inter-clearing bank competition also encouraged competition for 
personal banking services from public sector banking intermediaries - 
notably the Post Office Savings Bank and the Trustee Savings Banks. Moreover, 
increased competition for retail deposits was threatened by the establishment 
of a National Giro in 1968. This additional spur of competition apparently 
encouraged the banks to think in terms of amalgamation. 
15 
It was considered 
that a re-grouping of banks into a smaller number of larger banks would be an 
effective way of meeting this challenge. 
A similar rationale was applied to the need for large size in order to 
compete in the provision of large loans to international customers, in 
competition with U. S. and Continental banks. 
3.1.2 : Diversification 
3.1.2.1 Expansion into secondary banking markets to 1971 
The maintenance of the deposit rate cartel in a period of rising interest 
rates undoubtedly helped the banks to absorb rising costs by automatically 
providing increasing revenues. Moreover, as the P. I. B. report argued, the cartel 
system of bank service pricing was a source of inefficiency which inhibited 
price competition for personal banking business. The banking industry did not 
consider this to be the case however. The apparently irreconcilable views on 
the subject of competition and mergers arise from the failure to recognise that 
banks are multiproduct firms, marketing a variety of products and services both 
on the deposit and lending side. 
The clearing banks were operating in separate and separable markets, 
in which they faced competition from different financial institutions. 
The rapid growth of the secondary banking markets in the 1960s and the relative 
decline of the clearing banks in relation to the banking system as a whole 
(illustrated in'Täble 3.4) suggest that competition from non-clearing bank 
intermediaries had been successful. 
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Table 3.4 : Banking Institutions - Market Share of Deposits, 
1958-1966 
Deposit Banks 
London Clearing Banks 
Scottish Banks 
Northern Ireland Banks 
Other 
Total 
Secondary Banks 
Accepting Houses 
British Overseas Banks 
American Banks 
Other* 
Total 
Em 8 of total deposits 
1958 1966 1958 1966 
7,199 9,501 73.3 53.2 
791 982 8.0 5.5 
143 222 1.5 1.2 
311 350 3.2 2.0 
8,444 11,055 (86%) (62%) 
212 1,135 2.2 6.4 
573 1,811 5.8 10.1 
129 2,215 1.3 12.4 
460 1,646 4.7 9.2 
1,374 6,807 (14%) (38%) 
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 
*Including Clearing Bank subsidiaries 
In spite of double-counting faults with the data, especially for the 
secondary system banks, 
16 
the table clearly indicates that between 1958 and 1968 
the proportion of deposits in the hands of the clearing banks declined signi- 
ficantly. The clearing banks were initially handicapped in their attempts to 
tap the wholesale deposit market by their reluctance to offer separate rates 
for wholesale and retail deposits. 
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Zane issue of diversification of clearing bank lending was a direct 
response. Indeed it was recognised as a pre-requisite for the competitive 
bidding for money market deposits. According to Nevin and Davis: 
'Most bankers argue that it would not be feasible for them 
to offer higher rates for deposits unless they were also able, 
in turn, to engage in new types of lending at higher rates - 
for example, hire purchase finance, factoring and so on. '17 
As a result, specialist subsidiaries were either acquired or established 
for the specific purpose of competing in the secondary markets. The 
subsidiaries afforded the clearing banks the opportunity to channel funds into 
the profitable instalment credit market and to provide medium-term credit at 
higher rates. Moreover, these forms of lending were separable from the banks' 
primary activities and their subsidiaries, in common with other secondary banks, 
were outside the Bank of England's prohibitive liquid assets requirement. 
Thus the clearing banks were able to increase their lending beyond their own 
restricted limits. 
The movement towards participation in the wholesale money markets 
I 
began in 1958 when the clearers acquired either controlling interests 
or substantial minority holdings in all but two of the largest finance houses. 
18 
By 1968, the London clearing banks had the following interests in instalment 
credit companies: 
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Table 3.5 : London Clearing Banks/H. P. Interests 
Bank 
Barclays 
Martins 
Westminster 
National Provincial* 
District 
Midland 
Lloyds 
Hire Purchase Company % of equit' held 
by bank 
U. D. T. 28% 
Mercantile Credit 17&j% 
Mercantile Credit 1712% 
North Central Finance 100% 
Astley Industrial Trust 331//3% 
Forward Trust 100% 
Bowmaker 25% 
Lloyds and Scottish 50% 
*In 1970, National Westminster acquired Lombard Banking which was later 
merged with North Central Finance to form Lombard North Central. 
Growing concern at the 'loss' of deposits to the secondary banks in the 
1960s encouraged the clearing banks to re-establish their presence in the 
secondary markets. The subsidiaries differed considerably in form and range of 
activities, but concentrated, in general, on instalment credit or international 
medium-term corporate loans. Many of the subsidiaries were already existing - 
Barclays Bank (France), Lloyds Bank Europe, the Midland Bank Finance Corporation, 
International Westminster and County Bank - and were re-designed to bid for 
wholesale deposits. On the other hand, several institutions were created - 
Midland and International Banks (M. A. I. B. L. ); National Provincial and Rothschilds 
(International), for example. 
In further attempts to compete with the secondary banks and particularly 
with the accepting houses, which had been especially successful, 
19 
three of the 
London clearing banks developed specialised merchant banking subsidiaries. 
Barclays, for example, extended the activities of its main money market subsidiary, 
Barclays Bank (London and International) to include corporate advice services, 
including new issues, underwriting and acquisition advice; 
20 
in September 1969, 
National Westminster merged its capital issues department with County Bank, an 
issuing house which concentrated in. providing advisory services, marketing short 
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and medium term corporate credit, and taking Sterling deposits; in 1967, having 
formed Midland Bank Finance Corporation to accept deposits and lend at term, 
Midland acquired a 1/3 interest in Montagu Trust, the owner, inter alia, of 
Samuel Montagu a long-established merchant bank and member of the Accepting Houses 
Committee; finally, in 1970, Lloyds Bank formed a sterling money market 
subsidiary, Lloyds Associated Banking Company (L. A. B. C. O. ), with the intention 
of building a full-scale merchant bank. 
In the late 1960s, the clearing banks also diversified into the market 
for specific investment advice. In 1966, Lloyds Bank Unit Trust Managers 
was established as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lloyds Bank. Westminster Bank, 
in association with Hambros Bank, followed, with the formation of Westminster 
Hambros Trust Managers. owned 50% by Westminster and 25% each by Hambros and 
Commercial Union. Similarly Martins Bank acauired a controllinc interest in the 
Unicorn Unit Trust Grouo which was absorbed by Barclavs after the 1968 mercer 
and re-named Barclays Unicorn. Barclays involvement in fund management was 
extended by its purchase of Southern Cross in 1973. 
The diversification of the London clearing banks was not emulated by the 
Scottish banks, however. During the year 1969-70, the Bank of Scotland merged 
with the British Linen Bank, reducing the number of Scottish banks to three, 
and extending the rationalisation, which had begun in 1968 . Finally, 
in 1970, 
Williams and Glyn's was established as a subsidiary of the National and Commercial 
Banking Group, in order to incorporate the business of Glyn, Mills, William's 
Deacons and the National Bank. 
To summarise developments until 1970, the clearing banks having effected 
a series of 'horizontal' mergers, particularly in 1969, began to concentrate 
on acquisition and establishment of subsidiaries to compete with secondary and 
'near' banks in the wholesale money markets. Thus by 1971, the banks were 
equipped to offer a range of products in the secondary banking markets to 
complement their main activity of providing retail banking services. 
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3.1.2.2 : Diversification/Competition and Credit Control 1971 
In September 1971, the authorities' new policy on credit restriction caused 
a radical change in the banks' competitive environment. It was introduced at 
a time when competition for wholesale, sterling and eurocurrency, deposits was 
steadily increasing and was mainly stimulated by the growth of American 
banks in the euromarkets and the plethora of indigenous 'fringe' banks. 
Rivalry for international and domestic banking business had encouraged the 
clearing banks to devote considerable resources to the formation of money 
market subsidiaries. The resulting structural changes, noted above, also 
had their own. momentum and encouraged the new generation of fringe and 'near' 
banks to extend their product range - whether in property financing, consumer 
finance or stock market operations. The clearing banks remained at a competitive 
disadvantage, however. The interest rate cartel, described as 'soporific' by 
the monopolies Commission, and the quantitative lending ceiling obliged the 
banks to restrict competition among themselves yet exposed them to competition 
from non-clearing bank financial intermediaries. 
21 
Following the publication by the clearing banks of their true profits in 
February 1970, new measures to control the credit system were introduced in 
September 1971. They followed discussions based upon the Bank of England's 
consultative document, issued in May of that year, entitled 'Competition 
and Credit Control'. The Bank considered: 
'that the impediments to competition arising from the 
existing liquidity and quantitative credit controls 
should be replaced by other means of influencing bank 
and finance house lending in sterling, including the 
application of a reserve ratio across the whole banking 
system'. 
22 
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The emphasis of the new controls23 was on treating all financial 
institutions alike. The intention being to create a competitive banking 
environment, with credit allocated by the price mechanism of interest 
rates rather than by direct controls on lending. To this end, the 
quantitative ceiling on lending was removed and the clearing banks were 
required to abandon their collective agreement on interest rates. From 
October 1971, the banks were able to lend money in areas which had previously 
been restricted, notably consumer finance. The Bank of England specifically 
retained the right to provide the banks with such qualitative guidance 
as was seen appropriate. 
It has been noted that during the late 1960s, the clearing banks 
came under increasing criticism for alleged lack of competitiveness, 
because of their interest rate cartel. It was often overlooked that the 
banks began to compete with other financial institutions through the 
formation of special subsidiaries which were flexible in their operation 
and could bid for deposits in competition with other secondary banks. 
In effect the clearers were operating a divided structure, the main 
deposit-taking function and relatively traditional forms of lending 
(for example, overdrafts) being done through the parent institutions, 
with their widespread branch systems; and the competitive taking of large 
deposits at higher rates for less orthodox and more varied forms of lending 
being undertaken by subsidiaries. Thus a varied and diversified banking 
structure developed and was perpetuated. 
In spite of the structural changes, the retention of the interest 
rate cartel still represented a hindrance to 'free' competition. 
Thus it was intended that the discriminatory relationship between 
the Central Bank, and the clearing banks and discount houses, should be 
abolished. The new system required all banks to observe, day-by-day, 
a uniform minimum reserve requirement; similarly all banks were required, 
if called upon, to place special deposits with the Bank of England. 
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With the abaondonment of the cartel and rel}oval of the quantitative 
lending ceiling, the justification for separate subsidiaries to operate 
hire purchase and money market deposit taking and lending ceased. Initially, 
the clearing banks retained the pre-cartel habit of moving off new and 
rapidly-growing activities to subsidiaries. During 1972, however, the 
first steps were taken to merge subsidiaries with the parent banks - or 
sell them. 
In 1973, Lloyds Bank acquired the whole of the equity of Lloyds 
and Bolsa International, itself formed from the merger of Lloyds Bank 
Europe and Bank of London and South America in 1971. Similarly, Barclays 
Bank acquired full control of Barclays DCO, its former Dominion and 
Commonwealth based bank, which it re-named Barclays Bank International 
and whose capital it doubled to £lO million. Barclays sold its 28% stake 
in U. D. T., but retained an 18% holding of the equity of Mercantile Credit 
which it increased to 100% in 1975. National Westminster effected further 
product diversification with the purchase of Lombard Banking. 
24 
Midland Bank's further diversification was more extensive. In 
1972 it led a consortium in the purchase of Thomas Cook Travel Agents of 
which it acquired 70%. The majority stake was the first to be taken 
by a clearing bank in a major organisation whose principal operations were 
outside banking or finance. 
25 
For Cooks, Midland Bank's branch network 
and the A. A. 's large membership offered considerable potential. For 
Midland, though, the motivation was probably linked to potential increases 
in its travellers cheques business -a highly profitable aspect of a 
clearing bank's activities. Furthermore, Midland would receive the benefit 
of deposits made in advance (of the holiday) by Cooks' clients. 
-" (1, - 
in addition, each of the clearing banks extended their product range 
by acquiring or establishing subsidiaries offering 'near. -banking' services. 
For example, National Westminster fcunde: 1 Credit Factoring in 1970; 
Midland Bank established 50% cwnership of Midland-Citibank Factors in 
1970, and acquired a 50% interest in Shield Factors in 1970 which became 
a wholly-owned subsidiary, Griffin Factors; Barclays established Barclays 
E: port and Finance Company in 1971 to provide, inter alia, a factoring 
serv. ce; Lloyds had an existing interest in International Factors, formed 
in 1960, through Lloyds and Scottish Finance which owned 75% of the factoring 
company. 
A similar trend is discernible in the provision of leasing services, 
which are now dominated by the clearing banks. Barclays, through Barclays 
Export and Finance Company owns the largest leasing company in the U. K.; 
National Westminster, through the acquisition of Lombard Banking and subsequent 
formation of Lombard North Central, owns the second largest. Midland Bank's 
presence is through Forward Leasing, a wholly-owned subsidiary and Midland 
Montagu Leasing which was a product of the acquisition of Montagu Trust 
in 1973. Lloyds Bank also has two leasing vehicles. Firstly, Lloyds and 
Scottish, the fourth largest U. K. leasing company and secondly, Lloyds 
Leasing Limited, a wholly-owned subsidiary formed in-1973. 
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3.1.2.3. : Diversification and official regulations on banking 
mergers and Participations 1972 
Even before 1971 the major clearing banks had established or acquired 
specialised merchant banking subsidiaries. An announcement made by the 
Bank of England in 1972 clarified its standpoint on links between independent. 
accepting houses and clearing or foreign banks. In the context of entry 
into the E. E. C., the Bank announced modifications to existing rules on 
the acquisition of merchant banks. The measures, which were subject to the 
provisions of the Monopolies and Mergers Act and Bank of England approval, 
were in principle that: 
1. Clearing Banks were entitled to take participations 
in accepting houses of more than 25%. 
2. E. E. C. banks, though not other foreign banks, were to be 
treated in the same way as indigenous banks for the purpose 
of equity participations in British banks; hence, in comparable 
cases, they were allowed to take participations exceeding 15% in 
accepting houses as well as in other U. K. merchant banks and 
in British overseas banks. 
26 
The Bank has followed a pragmatic line by considering, within the 
e 
above guidelines, all proposlas for mergers on their individual merits. 
Thus mergers, in this context, are interpreted as all participations 
of more than 15%. The Bank stressed the desirability of amicable agreement 
between the parties concerned and the importance of tests relating to 
capital, management, reputation and future intentions. Proposed acquisitions 
of accepting houses are expected by the Bank to give 'proper weight to 
the skills and talents on each side'. 
27 
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With the announcement, however, it became apparent that the Bank's 
previously unpublished rules had been honoured in the breach as well as 
the observance. Midland Bank already held 331/3% of the share capital 
of Montagu Trust; Citibank had owned 40% of National and Grindlays since 
1969, and Lloyds Banks had a 41% stake in National and Grindlays Holdings 
which owned the other 60% of the bank - furthermore, Grindlays had acquired 
2/3 
of Wm. Brandts in the early 1960s, a merchant bank and member of the 
Accepting Houses Committee until 1975. 
In 1973, however, following the change in the Bank of England rules, 
Midland Bank acquired the outstanding share capital of Montagu Trust. 
Although Montagu Trust was a diversified financial company, which held 
the capital of a merchant bank /accepting house (Samuel Montagu), two 
international wholesale insurance brokers (E. W. Payne and Bland Welch 
& Co. ) and the international bank(Guyerzeller Zurmont), banking business 
accounted for 83% of the holding company's assets and 60% of fully-disclosed 
pre-tax profits. Samuel Montagu, a long-established merchant bank and 
member of the influential Accepting Houses Committee, thus provided 
Midland with an immediate and distinguished vehicle for extension of its 
merchant banking activities. 
This diversification was reinforced by the subsequent purchase of 
the Drayton Group, a "miscellaneous financial company" which in earlier 
years had specialised in the market for unit trusts, but latterly was 
developing a fast-growing merchant banking subsidiary, the Drayton Corporation. 
Both acquisitions therefore, broadened and deepened the range of merchant 
banking services previously offered by the Midland Bank Group. The 
acquisition of the Drayton Corporation following that of Samuel Montagu, 
however, should not be seen as one duplicating an existing range of services. 
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Rather because of the heterogeneity of merchant banking activities, the 
amalgamations should be considered as complementary. Samuel Montagu, 
for example, specialised in offering money trading facilities and was 
also active in the precious-metal, gold and silver markets. By contrast, 
the Drayton Corporation, a relatively young organisation, had a developing 
corporate finance department which was deriving fee income from providing 
merger and acquisition advice. 
In summary, the acquisition activity of the clearing banks in the 
period 1966-73 appears to have become increasingly diversificatory. 
Indeed in retrospect, the 1968 horizontal amalgamations seem a single 
and unique event. The emphasis on diversification coupled with the alternative 
internal expansion of secondary system subsidiaries resulted in each of 
the major clearing banks possessing a comprehensive network of wholly- 
owned and associate companies in the U. K. The most important of these 
and their main area of operation are illustrated in Figure 3.1 
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NOTES: 
1. Drayton Group acquired February 1974 
2. Excluding shareholdings in consortium banks 
3. Through Montagu Trust 
4. Barclays acquired Mercantile Credit in 1975 
5. Drayton Montagu Portfolio Management formed 1974 
6. Through Lloyds & Scottish 
41 
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3.2 : Merchant banks' acquisitions 1966-73 
Unlike the clearing banks, the acquisition and merger activity of 
merchant banks has been almost entirely concentrated in non-banking sectors. 
Indeed with the exception of two examples of 'horizontal' integration in 
the 1970-73 period, all the acquisitions initiated by merchant banks were 
either of insurance institutions, miscellaneous financial companies or non- 
financial companies. It is not appropriate therefore to consider their 
acquisition activity in terms of 'horizontal' and 'diversificatory' integration. 
3.2.1 : Competitive environment. 
The motives for the merchant banks' product extension are largely 
defensive, stemming from the growing aggressiveness of the big continental 
and American commercial banks and the competition from the merchant banking 
subsidiaries of the clearing banks. A further challenge, originating from 
the growth of the secondary banking system came from a range of new 
banks, many of which adopted the title 'merchant bank'. 
28 
The nature of the merchant banks' competitive environment is dictated 
by their origins and historical development. Located in London and mainly 
concerned with financing and advising, firstly international business and 
secondly the British corporate sector, they existed for many years on a 
minimal deposit base. In particular, their deposit banking facilities were 
characterised by dependence upon acceptance credits. 29 Other merchant 
banking services emphasised the importance of the specialist in advising 
and arranging finance rather than actually providing the funds. Such 
services which did not employ the bank's own capital notably included 
corporate financial advice,. including advice on mergers and acquisitions. 
In addition, they specialised in the management of unit trust and investment 
trust portfolios. 
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The growth of secondary money markets encouraged the banks to rely 
upon wholesale deposits as their major source of funds. 
30 
In the late 
1950s, moreover, a number of events gave an impetus to the development of 
a vast new international. money market concentrated in London. 
31 
Although 
dominated by American Banks, Ellis attributes the origin of the eurocurrency 
markets to the U. K. accepting house, Brown Shipley which enticed the dollar 
deposits of British insurance companies away from the London clearing banks. 
32 
Ü. R. merchant banks, notably Warburgs and Rothschilds further developed 
the long-term international bond market. The merchant banks, further 
encouraged by the convertibility of major currencies, also began to amass foreign 
currency deposits which were increasing in supply in the international 
credit markets. 
The other main activities of the merchant banks also developed during 
the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s. There was, in particular, a rapid 
growth of corporate finance business, as industrial merger activity accelerated. 
London accepting houses developed or acquired corporate financial expertise, 
appropriate for the negotiation and arrangement of acquisitions, new issues 
and flotations, and assumed an almost total monopoly of these lucrative 
fee-earning activities. 
33 
In addition, the banks also specialised in the 
sponsoring of international issues and the management of syndicated euro- 
currency credits. Finally, they increased their involvement in fund manage- 
ment, gaining shares of the expanding pension funds and raising the volume 
of unit trusts and investment portfolios under their management. 
As the secondary banking system has developed over the last twenty 
years the functions of the accepting houses have become characterised by 
the provision of 'tailor-made' services, by utilising expertise in a number 
of different techniques and through an extensive network of contacts in the 
City. 
- 74 - 
In the period 1966-73, however, the merchant banks faced growing 
competition in different activities, from London clearing banks and international 
commercial banks. Despite their concentration on wholesale financial business, 
the merchant banks remained small organisations, particularly in terms of 
capital resources, which restricted their deposit-taking activities. 
34 
Competing in the provision of loans with large commercial banks, therefore, 
produced an impasse. For whereas the latter were able to advance their own 
resources, the merchant banks' traditional skill had been the mobilisation 
of other people's funds rather than the use of their own. 
3.2.1.1 : Foreign Banking Competition 
This relative competitive disadvantage is reflected in Table 3.6, 
which compares the foreign currency business of U. S. and merchant banks. 
Since 1971, furthermore, with the abandonment of the ceiling on sterling 
lending, foreign banks began to establish links with indigenous U. K. companies, 
through aggressive marketing methods, 
35 
in direct competition with indigenous 
merchant and deposit banks. 
36 
Table 3.6 : Foreign Currency De; 
1966-73 
(£m) 
1966 19 
Dep Adv Deg 
Accepting Houses 449 296 900 
U. S. Banks 1820 1601 4763 
posits and Advances 
68 1973 
Adv Dep Adv 
639 3035 2211 
4265 22555 16487 
Ratio AH: US 1: 4 1: 6 1: 5 1: 7 1: 7 1: 8 
Source: Bank of England data 
Further competition came from wholly - or majority-owned merchant 
banking subsidiaries of major U. S. commercial banks. These were established 
to provide a range of services in which the U. K. merchant banks had specialised 
eurocurrency loan syndications, eurobond underwriting, dealing and corporate 
finance. At the end of 1973, there were eleven such merchant banking 
subsidiaries in London, nine of which were established from 1970-73 (See Table 3.7) 
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In addition to the American challenge, the merchant banks also faced 
competition from a range of commercial and investment banks whose raison 
d'etre was medium-term eurocurrency transactions. The Continental and 
Japanese banks particularly expanded their eurocurrency deposits towards 
the end of the 1966-73 period and several developed expertise in the manage- 
ment of eurobond syndicates. The major German and Swiss banks, Krediethank 
of Luxembourg and the U. S. investment banks threatened to relegate the U. K. 
merchant banks to relatively minor underwriting roles. Similarly, the 
specialisation of several consortium banks in the provision of investment 
banking services poses a further threat, which has developed considerably 
since 1973.37 
Table 3.7 : U. S. Merchant Banks in London 
US Merchant Bank Est. Parent 
First International Bancshares 1973 First International Bancshares 
International Marine Bankinq Co. 1971 Marine Midland Bank 
Chase Manhattan Ltd. .. 1973 Chase Manhattan Bank 
Manufacturers Hanover Ltd. 1968 
Bank of America International 1971 
Wells Fargo Ltd. 1972 
Citicorp International Bank Ltd. 1973 
Continental Illinois Ltd. 1972 
Man. Hanover Trust (75%); 
NM Rothschild (10%); Riunione 
Adriatica di Silcurita (10%); 
Long Term Credit Bank Japan (5%) 
Bank of America (75%); 
Kleinwort Benson (25%) 
Wells Fargo Bank 
First National City Corporation 
Continental Illinois Corporation 
Bankers Trust International Ltd. 1860 
First Chicago Ltd. 1970 
First National Boston Ltd. 1972 
Bankers Trust Co. 
First National Bank Chicago 
First National Bank Boston 
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3.2.1.2 : Clearing Bank Competition 
The clearing banks' incursion into the market for merchant banking 
services is a microcosm of the wider topical debate on the virtue of 
"specialist" and "generalist" banking organisations. The former, traditionally 
. characterised by the independent merchant banks, and important in the 
development of London as a leading financial centre, has recently been 
challenged by the clearing banks' merchant banking subsidiaries which have 
access to the huge resources of their parent clearing banking groups, 
to support lending activities. The argument is centred on an unresolved 
question: whether or not the merchant banks' entrepreneurial role can be 
effectively assumed within the institutionalised framework of a clearing bank. 
The converse is whether or not independent merchant banks with small capital 
bases and resources can compete effectively when they are unable , 
to lend 
directly a large proportion of a particulat syndicated credit. 
The competition from the clearing banks was relatively undeveloped in 
1973. However, in attempts to exploit external economies of scale originating 
from close contacts established through retail links with corporate customers, 
the clearing banks had shown signs of encroaching on the domestic activities 
conducted by the specialist merchant banks. 
3.2.2 : Acquisition for Growth 
The response to the competitive pressures which developed from 1966-73 
highlighted a dichotomy amongst the independent merchant banks. The 
predominant view was epitomised by Sir Kenneth Keith, chairman of Hill 
Samuel who consistently and frequently stressed that merchant banks needed 
to achieve much greater size quickly in order to be able to develop more 
effective geographic and product coverage. 
38 
At risk, however, is the loss 
of flexibility and innovatory style of banking by which the merchant banks 
have become identified. 
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The retention of independence by the merchant banks even if they 
become part of a large financial company was more or less assured by the 
Bank of England which has continued to take a protective view of the merchant 
banking sector: 
'When, in 1973, it relaxed the rules which had prevented the 
takeover of top merchant banks by big commercial banks /clearing 
the way for Midland's full acquisition of Samuel Montagu/, it 
continued, for example, to insist on the independence of merchant 
banking activities even when accommodated within a big group. '39 
The acquisition activity of the merchant banks was intended to achieve 
two aims: first, to increase the size of the capital base, and secondly, 
to achieve a diversity of financial services within one organisation. 
A number of 'horizontal' merchant banking mergers occurred before 196640 but, 
as noted, only two such amalgamations were recorded during the ensuing eight 
year period. In 1971, Henry Ansbacher was acquired by Robert Fraser, 
forming Fraser Ansbacher; and in 1972, E. D. S, soon amalgamated with 
Wallace Bros. Both appear to have been prompted by the need to increase 
capital resources. 
41 
A similar rationale prompted the ill-fated proposals by Hill Samuel 
to merge with Metropolitan Estate and Property Company (M. E. P. C. ) 
and then with Slater, Walker Securities, in 1970 and 1973 respectively. 
Despite Hill Samuel's failure to acquire a property company, expenditure 
on the acquisition of non-financial companies represents 45% of total merchant 
bank acquisition expenditure for 1966-73. In the first four-year period 
apart from Hill Samuel's acquisition of shipping company, Lambert Bros., 
a series of relatively small, on average £1.6 million, takeovers of non- 
financial companies were predominant. In the second period, however, the 
acquisition by Keyser Ullmann of Central and District Properties (62.8 million) 
accounted for 88% of the expenditure on acquiring 'commercial' companies. 
78 
The achievement of a large yet diverse capital base motivated the merger, 
in 1972, between Guinness Mahon and Lewis & Peat, an old-established 
commodity merchant. 
42 
The nerdy-formed holding company, Guinness Peat, 
was indeed broadly-based - in merchant banking, insurance broking and 
merchanting. Sir Charles Villiers, then chairman of the group, displayed 
the ambivalent attitude of the traditional merchant banker towards growth: 
' ... the creation of financial conglomerates which 
are notoriously subject to instability. That is a 
danger to be watched as banks diversify. The most precious asset 
of the merchant bank, their nucleus of highly specialised, 
enterprising staffs, could be diluted if spread too thinly over too 
wide a business expanse. ' 
43 
The acquisition and achievement of a multi-product base was also 
apparent in the series of acquisitions by merchant banks of insurance 
institutions. Indicative of this trend towards a banking/insurance interface 
were several takeovers: for example Hill Samuel/Noble Lowndes; Edward Bates/ 
Welfare; Keyser Ullmann/International Life; and Schroder Wagg/Dominion Lincoln. 
The acquisition of "miscellaneous" financial companies confirmed the 
emphasis being placed upon investment management. For instance Keyser Ullmann/ 
Dalton Barton Securities; Keyser Ullmann/Hocroft Trusty Hambros/British 
Empire Trust: Hambros/Hereditaments and Kleinwort Benson/European Market 
Investment Trust. 
3.3 : British Overseas Banks' Acquisitions 1966-73 
The acquisitions and mergers initiated by the British overseas banks 
(B. O. Bs) were largely 'horizontal'. Of total acquisition expenditure of 
£150 million in the 1966-73 period, same 71% represented amalgamations 
between the banks. in the latter half of the period, however, they began 
to undertake diversifying acquisitions, expenditure on which accounted 
for 35% of total expenditure in 1970-73. In common with the clearing banks 
and accepting houses the composition of the B. O. Bs deposit bases was 
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instrumental in their acquisition strategy. Changes in their international 
competitive environment particularly influenced the nature of their acquisitions. 
3.3.1 : Competitive Environment 
The deposit banking activities of the B. O. Bs evolved as a result of 
Britain's imperial traditions. By financing trade and investment in areas 
of colonial domination and British influence, such as South America, the 
Middle and Far East, and Africa they were able to establish retail branch 
services for the countries concerned. 
The traditional retail operations of the banks were based on the freedom 
to move funds around the world. In the 1966-73 period, however, their 
old-established activities became increasingly circumscribed. Growing 
nationalism in the countries concerned and the achievement of independence 
by the old colonial territories brought new pressures on banks operating 
out of London. In particular they had to face nationalisation of the branch 
networks which fifteen years ago formed the basis of their business. 
At the same time, the gradual extension of exchange controls between members 
of the sterling area, culminating in June 1972 with the floating of the pound 
and the final end of the sterling area concept, limited their freedom of 
action. 
While in many countries the London overseas banks continued their 
retail business, they had to treat each area as a separate entity, raising 
its own deposits and using them for local purposes. In some places, 
nationalisation resulted in the banks losing their business altogether. 
In a number of countries the banks were obliged to go into partnership 
with the Government and sometimes with other local interests; the pattern 
has tended to be for the banks to retain a large minority interest and, 
because the banks had the necessary skills to run the local operations, to 
keep effective management control. The problems were illustrated by the 
1973 Franzen Commission Report on the banking system in South Africa, which 
implied that the South African authorities might insist on foreign holdings 
in local banks being cut over the long term to just 10%. 
44 
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In the face of mounting pressures to adapt their traditional 
operations, the banks announced their intention to transform themselves 
into international banks. In order to survive the vicissitudes of political 
and economic uncertainties in their traditional spheres of interest the 
banks have had to diversify both functionally and geographically. Lord Seebohm 
of Barclays Bank described their changes in policy, in the face of immobility 
of sterling-based funds: 
'One was to become still more international and to extend our 
operations to anywhere in the world where we could use our 
banking expertise profitably; and the second was to move 
deliberately from the system of branch operations to the formation 
of local companies in order to meet the natural desire of 
developing countries to have a financial interest in, and greater 
control over, their banking systems. ' 
45 
The alternative policy adopted by each of the B. O. Bs was participation 
in the wholesale money markets, and in particular competition for eurocurrency 
deposits. The eurodollar market, especially, afforded the banks a source 
of funds that was growing rapidly, in contrast to the localised retail 
banking deposits which, as noted, were becoming circumscribed. Moreover, 
wholesale banking business, centred in London, gave the banks a source of 
income which was independent of the various territories in which they operated. 
The growing importance attached to eurocurrency deposits is illustrated 
in Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8 : Analysis of Deposits of British Overseas Banks, 1966-73 
Em (percentage of total in brackets) 
Total Sterling other 
1966 1,811 1,044 (58%) 767 (40%) 
1970 4,797 1,654 (29%) 4,143 (71%) 
1973 12,766 3,215 (25%) 9,551 (75%) 
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Furthermore, the profitability of foreign trade and investment financed 
by eurodGllar deposits began to exceed those generated by the traditional 
mode of business. This was largely because of the banks' dilatoriness 
in converting their overseas branches to provide the sophisticated wholesale 
. 
banking services required by international companies. Indicative of this 
trend is the contribution to total profits, of profits generated in London 
by National and Grindlays which rose from 35% in 1965 to over 55% in 1971. 
These attempts at functional diversification, which reflect the B. O. Bs' 
efforts to develop international commercial banking services, brought them 
into competition with established British, U. S. and Continental banks. 
The B. O. Bs' geographical expansion also proved difficult. Attempts to build 
up the banking representation in the major financial centres of the world, 
which is necessary to provide a comprehensive international service have 
been frustrated by foreign 'nationalism'. The rejection of Barclays Bank's 
proposed acquisition of Long Island Trust bore witness to the sensitivity 
with which foreign takeovers could be treated in the U. S. There have neverthe- 
less been successful international acquisitions by the B. O. Bs, which are not 
recorded in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin. Barclays, for example, 
acquired First Westchester Bank in 1973 providing access to the New York 
retail banking market; and Lloyds Bank's acquisition of First Western Bank 
and Trust Company, also in 1973 gave the bank ownership of 95 branches in 
California. 
3.3.2 : Rationale for Acquisition 
Notwithstanding the relative increase in diversificatory acquisitions 
over the 1966-73 period, the majority of merger activity initiated by the 
B. O. Bs involved 'horizontal' integration, or the forging of closer links 
with the London clearing banks. Both appear to have been motivated by the 
forms of expansion the banks were obliged to pursue and the difficulties 
encountered therein. 
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The increased dependence on eurocurrency deposits, for example, 
proved an imperfect substitute for retail deposits collected through branch 
networks across the world. During the latter part of the eight year period, 
interest rates rose steadily, but rates paid for eurodollars, for instance, 
were particularly volatile. Furthermore, in contrast to the widespread 
system of branches required for a retail banking service, money market 
banking, centralised in London and other major financial capitals required 
only a head office. The simultaneous spatial expansion, however, required 
the obverse. In this respect, organic growth could provide the nucleus 
for expansion. It was however, a lengthy and expensive way of establishing 
the base for fulfilling the world-wide role sought by the banks. 
In conjunction, these factors required consolidation, widening of 
asset backing, in particular immediate increases in world coverage, and the 
recourse if necessary to substantial group funds. The 'horizontal' integration 
demonstrates this rationale. 
46 
Australia and New Zealand acquired English 
Scottish and Australian Bank in 1969 to form the Australian and New Zealand 
Banking Group; Bank of London and South America (B. O. L. S. A. ) acquired Bank 
of London and Montreal in 1970 and merged with Lloyds Bank Europe the next year. 
The largest merger between B. O. B's occurred in 1970 when the Standard Bank 
and Chartered Bank formed the Standard and Chartered Banking Group. The 
amalgamation, at a time when the clearing banks were beginning to rationalise 
their overseas subsidiaries, protected both banks against bids from Midland 
Bank or National Westminster which both maintained shareholdings in this 
Group. The merger also combined Standard Bank's superior administration 
and branch network throughout Africa, with Chartered's Middle - and Far- 
Eastern branches. Integration, however, occurred slowly. In 1973, the 
banks still operated from separate London offices and retained competing 
money market departments. Similarly their overseas branches did not reflect 
the merger, working under their original names. 
47 
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The associations with clearing banks were largely initiated by the 
latter rather than by the B. O. Bs. Barclays, for instance, had a 56.5% 
ct7 
stake in Dofi ion Colonial and overseas, which operated independently. 
In 1971, Barclays acquired the minority interest of the re-titled D. C. O. 
and then re-named the bank Barclays International. As noted earlier Lloyds 
Bank has interests in two B. O. B's. In 1971, Lloyds held 55.4% of Lloyds 
and Bolsa International which provided branch coverage of Europe, Latin 
America and New York. 
In 1973, the parent acquired the remainder of the equity of Lloyds 
and Bolsa from Mellon Bank and developed the re-named Lloyds Bank International 
into its principal international banking subsidiary. Lloyds' second 
substantial connection with overseas banking is through its 41% holding in 
National & Grindlay Holdings which owns a majority stake in National and 
Grindlays Bank48 - which specialises in India and Pakistan. 
Standard and Chartered Bank therefore remained the only B. O. B. to 
be independent of the clearing bank groups. 
49 
It was also the bank which 
undertook, in 1966-73, the greatest functional diversification. In 1972 
and 1973 it increased its interest in the bullion, other metal and security 
dealing markets with the acquisition of 90% of the equity of London and 
Dominion Trust and 55% of Mocatta and Goldsmith, respectively. Also in 
1973, the Group acquired the Hodge Group, a diversified financial company, 
offering services in the consumer finance, leasing and life assurance markets. 
(i) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Acquisitions by Other Financial Institutions 
4.1 : Insurance institutions' acquisitions 1966-73 
Following the approach of chapter three, which classified U. K. 
indigenous banks into three classes, insurance institutions are categorised 
according to their main function, into two groups : insurance companies and 
insurance brokers. There is a clear conceptual distinction between the 
companies, which as 'principals' underwrite risks, and the brokers which 
perform an 'intermediary' function, providing advice to clients and 
receiving commission income from the companies. 
The inclusion under one head, of underwriting companies is prima facie 
not satisfactory, however. Although all insurance business consists of a 
spreading of risks, a dichotomy is apparent between life assurance and 
general insurance. The former, which is based on actuarial calculations of 
mortality and provides cover for the eventual death of the policy-holder, 
also offers a channel for saving which is comparable to the business of a 
unit trust. It is split into two branches - ordinary and industrial. 
In contrast, general insurance in which Lloyd's specialises covers a range of 
insurance risks, the probability of whose occurrence is less certain, 
and the amount of the eventual claim unknown in advance. For statistical 
convenience only, grouping usually distinguishes three broad branches of 
general insurance: fire and accident (non-motor); motor; marine, aviation 
and transport. 
l 
The justification for considering insurance companies as one group 
lies in the contemporary predominance of composite companies. 
2 
These 
write long-term (life) and short- or medium-term (general) business, but tend 
to specialise in different markets. 
3 
At the end of 1972, the ten largest 
insurance companies, measured by premium income, all of which were composite, 
underwrote 80% of all non-life company business and earned 58% of ordinary 
life assurance premiums. 
4 
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The aggregation of life and non-life business, nevertheless, poses 
problems of analysis. These are circumvented by detailed examination of 
the companies' competitive environments, in respect of their separate 
insurance markets. 
Comparison of Table 4.1 and 4.2 reveals a number of differences between 
the acquisition activity of insurance companies and brokers. Taken together, 
the tendency towards increasing diversification, observed for banks, is 
confirmed. In 1966-69,76% of insurance institutions' acquisitions were 
'horizontal' and accounted for 71% of total expenditure in that period. 
During the second period, however, the respective proportions fell to 53% 
and 27% Thus from 1970 to 1973, nearly ' of all expenditure on acquisitions 
was represented by mergers which diversified the primum mobile firm's range 
of activities. 
ýtt+hýf" nýý+-'v 
While the acquisitions by insurance companies corresponded to this 
overall trend, those by brokers did not. Furthermore, their merger behaviour 
also differed markedly with respect to areas chosen for diversification, 
and the average size of companies acquired. There were only three mergers 
between insurance companies and brokers, all initiated by brokers; similarly, 
insurance companies did not acquire any banks or H. P. finance houses, whereas 
the 'victim' firms of takeovers effected by insurance brokers were spread 
across the range of acquired companies. 
In the following sections, an explanation of these differences is 
sought, as part of the wider objective of examining the causes of the 
merger behaviour of insurance institutions. The analysis is similar to 
that undertaken in the previous chapter, and considers both general trends 
and particular acquisitions in the context of the changing conditions within 
which companies and brokers have competed. 
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4.1.1 : Insurance companies'- acquisitions 1966-73 
As noted, the direction of insurance companies' acquisitions in the 
period 1966-73 conformed to the general trend for insurance institutions and 
all financial intermediaries. Thus in the period to 1969, some 80% of their 
acquisitions involved 'horizontal' integration, whereas during the second 
four-year period, only 25% were 'horizontal'. In terms of expenditure, the 
fall is more pronounced, from 92% to 16%. The increased expenditure on 
diversificatory acquisitions was in fact heavily concentrated in the 
acquisition of non-financial companies, or more specifically, property 
companies; of the seven non-financial companies acquired in the 1970-73 
period, all were property companies, and one of the 'miscellaneous 
financial companies' acquired - Metropolitan Railway Estates - was also 
concerned with property investment. 
Closer examination of the mergers between insurance companies in the 
first four-year period, reveals a concentration of activity in 1968, 
when eight 'horizontal' mergers were undertaken. 
4.1.1.1 : Acquisitions and the competitive environment (i) : General Insurance 
One of the continuing factors which has influenced insurance companies' 
merger behaviour and which has thoroughly affected their general insurance 
business, has been the frequency and extent of price and wage change. Indeed, 
inflation has caused and emphasised several immediate and longer-term problems. 
These became particularly evident during the period under consideration, in 
which all three categories of non-life insurance suffered underwriting losses 
with varying regularity. The experience of insurers in the U. K. motor 
market illustrates the problems raised by inflation. These occur because 
the real value of premium rates is eroded by inflation of claims which are 
often settled several years in the future. For example, between 1963 and 
1972, the basic rates for motor cover rose by 114%6, while, in the same 
period, the cost of motor repairs rose by 150%. 
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Insurance companies have traditionally relied upon investment income 
to offset underwriting losses, and to produce trading profits.? Investment 
income has not been sufficient, however, to improve the companies' real net 
worth. The capital adequacy of insurance companies has indeed been crucially 
affected, in that general companies are legally required to keep a minimum 
margin between the value of their assets and their liabilities -a margin 
arithmetically determined by the size of general premium income received. 
8 
Thus, even where premium income has risen solely because of increases in 
premium rates9, intended to offset expected ex post changes in the cost of 
claims, it became necessary to attempt to increase proportionately the value 
of shareholders' funds, that is, the firms' solvency. 
Shareholders' funds can be increased in a number of ways; the retention 
of profits10, and the issue of new equityll have been methods often favoured 
by insurance companies. A third, the acquisition of another company, 
financed by share issue or cash was prominent in the period 1966-73. 
To summarise, inflationary pressures have been an important source 
of insurance companies demands for increases in own-capital. To an extent, 
these demands were satisfied by a series of mergers between companies 
underwriting life and/or general insurance: for example, General Accident/ 
Yorkshire (1967); Commercial Union/Northern & Employers (1968); and 
Guardian/Royal Exchange (1968). These had been preceded, moreover, by 
several other horizontal amalgamations, for instance, Royal Exchange/Atlas 
(1959); Commercial Union/North British & Mercantile (1959); Sun/Alliance 
(1960); and Royal/London and Lancashire (1962). 
The concentration of mergers in 1968 suggests also that there was 
some 'matching' in the companies' behaviour, reflecting the growth in 
corporate uncertainty and indicating that problems of size were accentuated 
by changes in relative positions. The largest composite companies, Commercial 
Union, Royal and the Prudential had grown quickly, through merger, relative 
to the Guardian and Royal Exchange, which had previously largely ignored 
external growth. The quest to maintain relative growth position is therefore 
demonstrated by the Guardian/R. E. A. merger in 1968. 
89 
However, whilst the underwriting capacity of individual firms can 
and has been increased in this way, any 'horizontal' acquisition is in 
itself unable to extend the overall capacity of the industry; it merely 
achieves a redistribution of existing capacity. Hence other measures have 
. 
been adopted. Apart from extensive recourse to the capital market, increases 
in shareholders' funds have been partly achieved by the acquisition of property 
companies: for example, Commercial Union/Holloway Sackville (1971); 
Prudential/Edger Investments (1973); and Legal & General/Cavendish (1973). - 
Indeed one of the arguments used by Eagle Star in their evidence to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission in supprt of their proposed acquisition 
of Grovewoöd Securities and Bernard Sunley Investment Trust, was that the 
amalgamations would significantly increase its solvency margin, and 
counteract the effects of inflation. 
12 
Thus Eagle Star's primary motive was 
effectively to increase its capital base and hence effectively increase 
its solvency margin from 35% (1973) to 44% of net premium income following 
the mergers13 which would, in turn, support the expansion of its motor and 
liability business, its fire account and its international position. 
Eagle Star argued that the prevailing conditions precluded the possibility 
of a rights issue and that merger was the best means of increasing its 
capital base. 
Inflationary pressures, however, have not been the only reason for 
general insurance companies to attempt to increase the size of their share- 
holders' funds. They had also to increase the size of their actual solvency 
margin in order to be able to meet new and increased demands which have 
continuously been made on them by those manufacturers seeking to insure 
their inventions and innovations. The second feature of the environment 
which has affected insurance companies' behaviour is characterised by 
uncertainty and technological change. These have led to changes in the 
demand confronting insurers and have induced them to modify their products. 
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Indeed, possibly owing to the relatively competitive structure of 
the various parts of the insurance industry, 
14 
- particularly the relative 
freedom to enter and exit - underwriters have usually tried to meet manufacturers' 
demands to insure larger and more costly risks, sometimes irrespective of 
any knowledge about the inherent risks involved, and often despite the 
complete absence of dependable ex post information, enabling a probability 
distribution of expected losses to be estimated. An indication of the 
uncertainty arising from the newly-created risks of innovation in the ship 
building and tanker industry, is given by P. Dixey, Chairman of Lloyd's 
management committee: 
"In all previous developments in shipbuilding, and in underwriting, 
it has been possible to proceed gradually from one design to another 
slightly larger, but the demands of the oil industry have been so 
pressing that ships were being built without the builders, the classi- 
fication societies or the underwriters having gained service experience. 
And it is the underwriter who pays for everybody else's mistakes 
or inexperience and he has to fix his rates without any records 
or previous experience of similar types of ship to guide him. " 
15 
Accordingly, new insurance products have been supplied for risky 
innovations whose sheer size, even possibly in real terms, have been 
historically unsurpassed. Thus the capital base of the insurance industry 
has had to be expanded in order to provide new insurance goods such as the 
underwriting of target risks like massive oil tankers, jumbo jets, North 
Sea oil rigs, nuclear power stations and complex industrial plants. 
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Traditionally, insurance companies have met the challenges posed by 
technological innovation and new risks, by various forms of co-operation. 
For example, they have established information and research bureaux, 
created and joined cartels, merged with or acquired other companies with 
similar interests, and developed an extensive reinsurance network. 
16 
Thus insofar as amalgamations of insurance companies increase a 
firm's individual capacity to underwrite risks and reduce competition, 
then acquisitions can be considered as a rational response to technological 
change and uncertainty. 
A third aspect of the companies' environment regarding non-life 
underwriting, relates to pressures emanating from the geographical diversi- 
fication of their business and the uncertainty that has resulted. In 1974, 
65% of general insurance premiums were earned overseas, 30% of which were in 
North America. 
17 
Indeed, the U. S. market has been more important than the 
domestic market for Commercial Union, the Royal, General Accident and Phoenix, 
and produced, in 1973, approximately So% and 40% respectively18 of short- 
term premium income earned by Royal and Commercial Union. Moreover, the 
assets of U. K. insurers in the U. S. exceed 1/3 of all U. K. investments 
there, and are valued at fifty times the U. S. insurance companies' 
investments in Britain. 
The problems experienced in the U. S. general insurance market 
which emphasised the need for larger capital bases were of two types. 
Firstly, composite companies experienced consistent underwriting losses in 
the U. S. during the 1966-73 period. Commercial Union, for example, 
suffered losses averaging E4.6 million for six consecutive years from 1966; 
similarly, the Royal showed losses in all but two of the eight years, 
which averaged £3 million. 
19 
For member companies of the B. I. A., underwriting 
losses totalling £44.6 million were sustained between 1969 and 1973.20 
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Combined with these recurrent losses, U. K. insurance companies had 
to reckon with the vagaries of the U. S. courts. Liability Claims in 
particular resulted in interminable law suits and general settlements, 
with the result that British insurers became reluctant to undertake liability 
insurance in the U. S. Furthermore, insurers had to work in a tangled 
regulatory framework of state and federal laws with premium rates in a 
large though decreasing number of states actually fixed by law. The 
main compensation -a generally high level of investment income in the U. S. 
21 
has already been questioned as a viable cushion for heavy underwriting losses. 
The U. S. market was sui generis; its attraction to U. K. insurers 
lay in its potential profitability, particularly with respect to investment 
income. Aspirations of profitable investment, reinforced by considerations 
of prestige, precluded the withdrawal of U. K. insurance companies from the 
market, but also emphasised the "indispensable strategic advantage of large 
22 
scale operations". 
The acquisition of insurance companies with similar international 
interests, whilst strengtheninig the capital base of the primum mobile 
firm, also enabled a reduction in operating expenses to be made and created 
the opportunity to achieve a stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis the 
independent and powerful U. S. agents. 
23 
This encouraged the Royal Exchange 
to acquire the Atlas in 1959 - the culmination of co-operation between the 
companies (and the Sun), whereby all U. S. business was placed under a single 
24 
manager. 
The wave of mergers in 1968, referred to above, similarly demonstrated 
implicit acknowledgement of changed conditions in the general insurance 
market, manifest in the requirement of large scale activity. 
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4.1.1.2: Acquisitions and the competitive environment (ii): Life Assurance 
Life assurance business, in contrast to the unprofitability of general 
underwriting, was extremely profitable in the period 1966-73. Because the 
life offices offer an outlet for savings, rather than cover against risks, 
they suffered none of the underwriting losses of the general insurance 
companies. Indeed, British life offices derive a substantial proportion of 
their income from investment of their life funds. For reference, Table 4.3 
ranks the ten largest life funds with respect to size, in 1972: 
Table 4.3 : The 10 Largest Life Funds 1972 
Size of Fund Type of Fund Type of Office Company (£m) 
Prudential 1691.4 Proprietary Composite 
Legal & General 1299.0 Proprietary Composite 
Standard Life 1005.3 Mutual Independent 
Norwich Union 798.7 Mutual Composite 
Commercial Union 710.8 Proprietary Composite 
G. R. E. 607.5 Proprietary Composite 
Eagle Star 514.3 Proprietary Composite 
Sun Life 483.9 Proprietary Independent 
Scottish Widows' 477.6 Mutual Independent 
Royal 382.2 Proprietary Composite 
Source: Life Offices Association 
Notes: Mutual companies are those whose capital is supplied 
by policy-holders, amongst whom profits are shared; 
c. f. proprietary companies which are joint-stock and owned by 
: shareholders 
The structure of the life assurance market in the period 1966-73 was 
considerably affected by the high levels of profit of existing firms, and 
the rapid expansion of the market itself. Thus, distribution to shareholders 
by ordinary life companies increased by 444% from 1962 to 1968, reaching 
£17.4 million. 
25 
With respect to the increase in market extent, from 1956-68, 
the rates of growth of sums assured - "with profits" and "without profits", 
were 265% and 469% respectively. 
26 In the period 1970-73, moreover, new sums 
assured increased 87% to £19.4 billion. 
27 
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These conditions encouraged a number of new firms to enter the market 
and compete for the expanding business. Entry was facilitated by the absence 
of legal barriers and helped by the spread of suburban insurance brokers 
during the 1960s which afforded new entrants widespread geographical 
penetration without the expense of establishing branches throughout the U. K. 
The successful entry of new firms was mainly threatened by buyer loyalty, 
enjoyed by long-established companies which offered traditional forms of life 
assurance, such as industrial life and endowment policies. The advent of new 
insurance products 'linked' to industrial sectors like property, or to 
particular' indices like unit trusts, provided the opportunity for innovative 
new companies to transform the market and create a number of new market 
segments. For example, the expansion of the single-premium market - 
characterized by a single-premium payment, the promise of large (often 
guaranteed) yields and surrender values, certain tax advantages and life 
assurance itself - enabled less conservative companies to meet the needs 
and aspirations of modern savers who were concerned not merely with death- 
benefits, but also with the real existing - and future - value of their 
capital. 
An indication of the increased scale of entry into the life assurance 
market is given in Table 4.4 which shows that more. companies entered between 
1966 and 1968 than during the previous five years: 
Table 4.4 : New entrants to the life assurance market, 1960-68 
Year No. of entrants Cumulative total 
1961 4 4 
1962 4 8 
1963 7 15 
1964 9 24 
1965 9 33 
1966 13 46 
1967 9 55 
1968 12 67 
Source: D. T. I., Insurance Business Statistics 
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The new insurance products - equity - and property - linked, annual 
and single-premium contracts - enjoyed considerable popularity in the early 
1970s. For example, the value of new single premium business (which almost 
entirely comprises linked-life assurance policies) rose from £55 million 
in 1970 to£353 million in 1973.28 The public's receptiveness was largely 
a function of tax concessions pertaining to the new products29 and the boom 
in equities and property in the 1960s. 
Those companies specialising in the new policies made their immediate 
impact in respect of 'new business' figures; this is shown in Table 4.5 which 
ranks companies according to total premium income and new business premiums. 
Rankings according to total premium income contain only two new entrants. 
With respect to new business, however, and to single-premiums, in particular, 
considerable penetration by new companies is evident. Abbey Life, gained the 
largest share of new single premium business and by 1971 was writing more than 
half of all property-linked and equity-linked life assurance. It was 
established by Mr. Mark Weinberg and was acquired in 1964 by I. T. T., in 
conjunction with Georgia International Life Co. Its subsequent growth was 
based on an annual premium contract (Unit-Linked Planned Investments Endowment), 
launched in 1963, and two single-premium contracts - Abbey Bonds and Abbey 
Property Bonds. The former were launched in 1966 and consisted of a life 
policy linked to an equity fund, managed by Hambros Bank; the latter, 
which were initiated in 1967 were linked to investments in commercial and 
industrial property. 
Other successful entrants included, International Life, a subsidiary 
of Investors Overseas Services. Its incursion into the market was mainly 
achieved through the annual premium equity-linked "Dover" plan. In 1972, 
following the failure of I. O. S., Keyser Ullmann acquired International Life, 
and it subsequently became Cannon Insurance. 
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The success of Save and Prosper (S & P), an established unit trust group, 
was based on its unit-linked life assurance policies, and particularly 
benefited from available tax concessions. The whole of the annual premium 
paid was eligible for tax relief, khspite of the fact that only a fraction 
of the premium was used to provide life cover. Thus, unit trusts were 
effectively being bought at a discount. 
In 1968, the Finance Act removed the taxation advantages of single- 
premium policies, and sales fell in 1969.30 However, despite the imposition 
of stricter barriers to entry 
31 
companies continued to enter the market, as 
Table 4.6 indicates. 
Table 4.6 : Number of Authorizations Issued to 
Conduct Ordinary Long-Term Business 
1968-73 
Year Number 
1968 12 
1969 12 
1970 23 
1971 15 
1972 11 
1973 14 
Source: D. T. I. : Various 'Insurance Business Annual Reports' 
Note: These totals include some companies registered 
overseas and are not therefore strictly comparable 
with those in Table 4.4 
In common with new entrants before 1968, those companies successfully 
entering the market after 1968, owed their positions primarily to single 
premium business. This is clear from Table 4.7. 
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Among the most notable entrants was Hambro Life, the most significant 
in terms of impact on the market. By 1972, having been established only 
in the previous year, it captured the largest share of the total new 
business premiums in that year. Hambro Life was created by Weinberg 
(who left Abbey Life in 1970), as a subsidiary of Hambros Bank. In 
1972 its life insurance and annuity fund amounted to £135 million, based 
mainly on single-premium business (E104 million) and ranked fourth in 
terms of total premium income less annuities which reached £106 million, 
compared with the Prudential's £193 million. 
The overall effect of this increased competition compounded the 
problems experienced by composite insurance companies in the general 
insurance market, and directly challenged the traditional life offices. 
32 
Thus for different reasons, the conditions in which insurers competed 
during the period, 1966-73, were characterised by uncertainty. The 
pressures to increase the capital base of the industry and the solvency 
margins of particular companies by acquisition and merger, appear to have 
emanated from the various difficulites experienced in the underwriting 
of general risks. It is interesting to note, however, that, of a total 
of 26 insurance company mergers between 1968 and 1973,17 (65% of the total) 
were initiated by either specialist life offices or by composite companies 
whose life fund was among the ten largest as ranked by Table 4.3. 
Moreover, Table 4.5 shows that only three established companies improved 
their new business premium rankings since 1968. Two of these, G. R. E. 
and General Accident had undergone mergers in 1968. The Table also shows 
that three groups besides Abbey Life improved their total premium income 
ranking, and in this case, all had undergone acquisitions. 
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The second aspect of the life assurance market which has influenced 
the acquisition behaviour of insurance companies relates to their investment 
policy. Investment income has been a cushion against which general 
underwriters have offset underwriting losses, and a major source of life 
assurers' profitability. The structure of the portfolios of insurance 
companies tends to vary according to the particular underwriting specialization 
of each company, and is usually differentiated according to the liquidity 
of the investment assets. 
Regardless of the different weights attached to the components 
of the insurers' funds, composites companies' portfolios share a number of 
common features, which reflect the multi-product nature of contemporary 
insurance business. For example, investments are diversified across 
numerous industrial and public sectors; the widely spread asset base 
affords a diversification of investment risks and maximizes policyholder 
and shareholder security. The increasing diversification exhibited by 
insurance companies in their acquisition policies from 1970-73 is only 
an extension of the commercial logic underlying insurance companies' 
operations, achieved by a series of acquisitions of property companies 
and investment companies in the second four-year period considered. 
The reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission of Eagle 
Star's proposed acquisition of Grovewood and Bernard Sunley in 1973 indicates 
official concern about these developments. Although Eagle Star's principal 
motive was to increase its capital base and improve its solvency margin, 
the timing of the proposed merger was apparently influenced by legislation 
introduced in 1973 which restricted dealings with 'associate' companies. 
34 
In particular, Section 10 of the 1973 Act provides that the aggregate of 
certain transactions between a life fund and 'connected persons' should 
not exceed a level equal to 5% of the total assets of the life fund. 
A 'connected person' was defined so as to include any company in which the 
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insurer owns at least 1/3 of the voting shares but excludes a 
'subordinate company' in which the life fund holds more than ý of the 
voting shares. Insurance companies were therefore encouraged to convert 
associated companies in which they had minority shareholdings, into wholly- 
or majority-owned subordinates, which were not subject to the controls. 
Eagle Star owned 33.4% of Bernard Sunley, and 28.6% of Grovewood. 
It appears that the Office of Fair Trading had two reservations 
about the acquisitions which related to the question of an insurance 
company becoming involved in the management of a wide range of manufacturing 
interests owned by Grovewood. The Commission's final consideration, and 
potentially the most important for the incidence of future acquisitions 
by insurance companies, was: 
" ... whether the merger might be regarded as a precedent 
leading to the acquisition by ... insurance companies of 35 
other manufacturing or trading companies. " 
Clearly there was a fear that insurance companies would become more 
involved with companies which were unconnected with the specialist activities 
of the insuring of life and general activities. However, the continuous 
and close relationship between the boards of Eagle Star and Grovewood, 
and the peculiar nature of Grovewood itself (essentially a 'supervisory 
firm' of a group of small manufacturing and trading companies, each of which 
was very small relative to the size of Eagle Star) meant that this reference 
was unique. 
Although many insurance companies own small manufacturing and trading 
companies, most have been too small to be of any significance. Insurance 
companies did however hold substantial holdings in finance companies such as 
United Dominions Trust, the Charterhouse Group and Mercantile Credit which 
in turn owned manufacturing and trading companies. 
36 
In none of these 
cases did insurance company have a controlling interest in the parent 
company and therefore the acquisition of Grovewood with its wide portfolio 
of investments was considered to be without precise parallel and so created 
a precedent. Nevertheless, regarding the proposed merger as the acquisition 
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by an insurance company of a large number of separate enterprises, which 
was more realistic, led the Commission to conclude that the acquisition 
by Eagle Star of Grovewood should not be construed as a precedent. 
It is more important to consider, though, not whether it should be 
construed as a precedent, but whether it will be. Persistent inflation 
in particular places a growing strain on insurance companies. Thus an 
increasing capital base is necessary, indeed essential, if insurance 
business is to be expanded in real terms. Hence a recurring motive to 
pursue mergers exists. Insurance companies seem likely to continue to 
spread their interests both functionally and geographically, as the 
Monopolies Commission admitted: 
" ... the principle of spreading the risk 
is cardinal 
for successful underwriting and it is natural that 
this same philosophy should also inspire insurance 
companies' conduct as investors and cause them to 
0039 avoid large concentrations of their capital resources. 
4.1.2 : Insurance Brokers' acquisitions 1966-73 
The nature and direction of insurance brokers' acquisition activity 
contrasts with that of insurance companies and other financial institutions. 
In the 1966-69 period, 71% of acquisitions by brokers occurred in the leading 
diagonal. 'Horizontal' amalgamations, however, accounted for only 6% of 
total expenditure on acquisitions. In the second four year period, the 
number of 'horizontal' acquisitions as a proportion of total merger activity, 
fell to 68% while expenditure on 'horizontal' integration increased to 
47% of total acquisition expenditure. 
More detailed examination of brokers' merger behaviour reveals that 
the average size of 'horizontal' amalgamations was £2 million for the whole 
eight year period, compared to £8.3 million for diversificatory acquisitions. 
Indeed, estimates of the latter were also influenced by two very large 
acquisitions undertaken by C. T. Bowring. In 1969 it acquired Bowmaker, 
an instalment credit finance house for £44.9 million; and in 1971 it 
acquired the merchant bank Singer and Friedlander at a cost of £27.7 million. 
- 103 - 
Similarly the mean size of 'horizontal' mergers was aritifically high, owing 
to the amalgamation of Sedqwick Collins and Price Forbes, creating Sedgwick 
Forbes and costing £36.9 million. 
4.1.2.1 Competitive environment/Rationale for acquisition 
In common with insurance companies, insurance brokers have competed 
within rapidly-changing environments. The factors which appear to have 
affected their merger behaviour can be considered under two heads. 
As intermediaries in the market, brokers were subjected to the same 
inflationary pressures which caused problems for general underwriters. The 
losses experienced by general companies which led them to seek acquisitions 
in order to expand their capital bases, also encouraged them to attempt to 
achieve administrative and operating economies. Inevitably, the companies 
sought to reduce the real and absolute value of commission payments 
made to brokers. Thus they attempted to restrict an additional source of 
brokers' income - derived by investing premiums, collected from clients, 
before they were required to remit them to the underwriter - by pressurising 
the broker to shorten this intervening period. 
In particular, a policy of direct billing developed as competition 
in the marketing of insurance products intensified. Thus in the late 
1960s, Commercial Union instituted a policy of direct selling, by 
encouraging its industrial clients to dispense with a braking service, 
by buying 'direct. ' 40 In ordinary life assurance, 
41 braking mushroomed 
during the period in which the various investment packages, referred to 
above, enjoyed sudden rises in popularity. However, the tightening of tax 
legislation and new commission structures served to reduce the profitability 
of life braking towards the end of the period. 
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The cumulative effects of these developments encouraged brokers to 
seek profits from sources, other than insurance braking, and induced 
diversificatory acquisitions such as those undertaken by C. T. Bowring. 
Bowring's acquisition strategy also included the purchase of three smaller 
broking firms and a unit trust. As a result, by 1973, the parent derived 
less than half its profits from traditional insurance broking business. 
The other large brokers diversified in general to a lesser extent. 
Indeed, notwithstanding the pressures to extend their range of activities, 
insurance broking remained an important part of the insurance industry. 
For example, insurance may still be placed at Lloyd's only through the 
medium of some 250 firms of Lloyd's brokers. In addition, according to 
a report by the Economist Intelligence Unit in the early 1970s, brokers 
sold 90% of all marine business (owing to their connections with Lloyd's), 
90% of all U. K. pension business, and 74% of all commercial and industrial 
insurance. 
42 
The high number of small 'horizontal' amalgamations were indicative 
of the structure of the broking market, which apart from seven dominant firms 
of Lloyd's brokers - C. T. Bowring; Willis, Faber & Dumas; C. E. Heath; 
Bland Payne; Bray Gibb Wrightson; Hogg Robinson & Gardner Mountain; and 
Sedgwick Forbes - mainly consisted of relatively small firms. The amalgamation 
of braking firms was encouraged by a defensive rationale caused by the 
incursion of banks into the market for insurance broking services. The 
clearing banks, in particular extended their range of services relating to 
insurance advice. By 1973, such was the extent of their rationalization 
of insurance advisory services that,, collectively, they represented a 
considerable if largely potential threat to traditional brokers. 
Even before the rationalization of the 1960s, branch managers, 
following the lead of the Westminster Bank, had already established the 
basis for personal insurance services. This entailed the further 
development of the traditional customer relationships which arose through 
routine banking business. By utilising the marketing potential of their 
branch networks, the rationalization of the banks' insurance broking 
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interests represents a logical 'spilling over' into a complementary 
financial advisory activity. 
Up to 1973, the banks' impact was confined to the personal sector; 
their incursion into the market segment for corporate clients was 
negligible. Nevertheless, the diversification of banks into insurance 
broking provoked much debate within the insurance industry and gave rise 
to considerable criticism from traditional insurance brokers. The latter 
apparently feared the banks' unparalleled advantages of access to customers 
and their facilities for marketing of insurance services. In particular, 
the potential capacity of the banks to extend services to small- and medium- 
sized commercial companies caused uncertainty. This was emphasised by 
Midland Bank's acquisition of Montagu Trust which brought a leading Lloyd's 
broker, Bland Payne into the clearing bank group. At the end of 1973, 
the other clearing banks relied upon 'in house' broking departments and 
subsidiaries, as follows: 
National Westminster - National Westminster Insurance Services 
Barclays - Barclays Insurance Services Company 
Lloyds - Insurance Division of the Executor and Trustee Department 
Each of these competed especially for advisory business pertaining to 
personal life assurance. 
The result of this expansion was evident in the increased concern 
of established broking firms and exemplified by Mr. E. Orbell, a director 
of Leslie & Godwin (Holdings), who forecast the implications of the 
banks' incursion into the broking market as: 
" ... vicious competition which can only have the effect 
ultimately of removing from the business of insurance the 43 intermediary as we know it today. " 
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As noted, this produced a spate of 'horizontal' acquisitions. 
For example, Leslie & Godwin, among the larger brokers undertook several 
amalgamations with other brokers, as did Fenchurch Insurance Holdings, 
Staplegreen Insurance Holdings, and Stenhouse Holdings. 
4.2 : Investment Trust and Portfolio Management 
Investment trust companies, unit trusts and other similar bodies 
have portfolios which consist very largely of ordinary shares. They 
are means whereby investors can obtain a share in a portfolio very much larger 
and more diversified than their individual portfolios could be. 
They represent, therefore, the pooling of a number of different economic units, 
which enables holdings to be diversified, risks to be spread and professional' 
management to be secured. They are distinguished from other financial 
institutions - which differentiate between the nature of the claims 
issued and the assets they hold - because the major type of financial 
claim which they issue is formally almost identical with the major assets 
which they hold. 
Under the laws of the UK the only two forms which a pooled portfolio 
can take are the investment trust company and the unit trust. An investment 
trust company is an investment-holding company, incorporated under the 
Companies Acts and having the same type of capital structure as an industrial 
or commercial company. 
44 
Thus it is an entity which is separate from its 
shareholders, who have no direct legal or beneficial interest in the assets 
of the company. In contrast, the holders of units of a unit trust are, 
collectively, the beneficial owners of the deposited property: a unit trust 
is a trust at law. 
45 
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The rationale for mergers between trust management companies 
appears to centre on the expected benefits to be accrued from large-scale 
operations. Because the costs of buying securities, decline with the size 
of the purchase, it is possible for a large portfolio to have a much wider 
spread of assets than a small one. Diversification of assets, moreover, 
enables and facilitates diversification of risks. In addition, professional 
management of individual portfolios can be secured by using the services 
of a stockbroker or portfolio management company, although it is not 
considered economic to provide individual attention to portfolios of less 
than £50,000. 
The data provided by the Bank of England and analysed in Chapter 2, 
supports this contention. A total of 218 acquisitions by investment and 
unit trusts were recorded by the Bank in the period 1966-73, involving 
the expenditure of £601 million; the average of £2.8 million, is relatively 
low in comparison with all financial institutions' acquisitions. Further 
examination of mergers and acquisitions initiated by investment companies 
confirms that amalgamations were undertaken in order to achieve growth and 
portfolio diversification. Thus, many of the larger mergers were between 
trusts in the same group; for example, the £23 million amalgamation of 
the 2nd Scottish Northern and 3rd Scottish Northern Investment Trusts (1968); 
the acquisition by First Scottish American Investment Trust of the 2nd and 
3rd Scottish American Investment Trusts, involving £18.7 million (1970); 
and the largest merger, between London Scottish American and 2nd London 
Scottish American in 1972 which was valued at £52.5 million. Furthermore, 
as Revell has noted: 
" ... some investment trusts have used mergers to augment their 
portfolios in certain directions, notably to acquire dollar 
portfolios by the issue of sterling securities to finance 
the merger ... " 46 
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This section is not, however, primarily concerned with the acquisition 
behaviour of investment trusts or unit trusts. Rather its purpose is to 
concentrate on the role of banks and other financial institutions as 
portfolio managers. This is one aspect of the banks' recent diversification 
and is a potential source of power, for it affords them control over a 
proportion of the country's investment resources. 
The management functions of companies which administer investment- 
and unit trusts are slightly different but involve similar duties and skills: 
Investment Trust Companies : Management Functions 
To take the investment decisions; to buy and sell securities; to 
register the holders of the shares and debentures of the company and the 
payment of dividends and interest; to carry out the duties of company 
secretary. 
Many investment trust companies are under common management; the 
whole management is often contracted out to a single management company; 
Unit Trusts : Management Functions 
To initiate the unit trust; to conduct day-to-day business 
connected with administration, including the investment decisions. 
Some functions can be contracted out to other bodies; many of the 
management companies are under common management. 
The most easily recognisable investment trust management companies 
are the merchant banks. Indeed, the origins of the investment trust company 
are closely connected with Robert Fleming which founded several of the first 
sixteen trusts in the 1870s, in Scotland. Flemings, which has since 
become a merchant bank, has maintained a specialisation in portfolio and 
investment management. Of the investment trusts covered by L. Messel & Co 
in 197547,29% by number and 22.5% by value of assets were managed by 
20 merchant banks, 
48 
either independently or in conjunction with one another; 
for example Drayton Montagu and Schroder Wagg jointly managed the City 
and Commercial Investment Trust. 
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These figures understate the true merchant bank involvement in fund 
management, however. Baring Bros. owns 26% of the Save & Prosper Group 
which administers a large number of unit trusts and manages the Save-and-Prosper 
Linked Investment Trust; similarly Kleinwort Benson, through its interest 
in M&G Securities, one of the largest UK unit trust groups, is involved 
in the three investment trusts run by M&G, as well as its direct presence 
as a manager for eight investment trusts together valued at £87.7 million 
in 1974. 
The movement of banks into unit trust management has been more 
pronounced. Merchant banks, clearing banks and insurance companies are 
now in competition in this market. The various types of financial institution 
were attracted for several reasons - the deposit banks because of their 
extensive retail branch networks; the merchant banks because of their previous 
specialization in portfolio management; and the insurance companies owing 
to the growth in assurance-linked units. 
For largely historical reasons, clearing bank involvement in unit 
trust management did not begin until late 1966. For many years before that 
it was the recognised function of the banks to act as trustee for all kinds 
of trust funds. On the other hand, they were content until the mid-sixties, 
to act as an agent and intermediary, obtaining information and giving advice 
when required to help their customers, and carrying out transactions on 
their instructions. When therefore, the first unit trusts were set up in 
the early 1930s and trustees were required to safeguard the interests of 
unit holders, it was natural that the banks should assume the role. 
In 1969, it was reported that the clearing banks still acted as trustee of 
more that k of all authorised unit trusts. 
49 
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The importance of the clearing banks' diversification into unit trust 
management, described in Chapter three, lay in its principal aim: to meet 
the demand of private customers of moderate means whose individual 
portfolios were too small for the merchant banks. To provide effective 
management for the small sums involved proportionately high charges. 
Thus the small investor with perhaps £2,500 to invest fell into an unserviced 
category. It was largely to provide a convenient service for potential 
equity investors in this bracket that Lloyds Bank formed its own unit trust. 
It was anticipated that customers of the bank would welcome the opportunity 
to invest in a trust actually managed by the bank. 
The significance of clearing bank expansion into this area may be 
seen from the nature of unit trusts as an investment medium - they represent 
one of the first attempts by the banks to provide a savings service for 
medium- and long-term money. The importance also arises from the links 
formed between the banks and insurance companies in stressing the savings 
aspect of life policies. The most popular medium (because of tax reliefs) 
was the unit linked life assurance policy and schemes were set up by 
Lloyds with Royal Assurance, and by Westminster Hambro with Commercial Union. 
When Midland entered the market in 1976, it announced that it was launching 
a joint operation with the Prudential in the unit-linked field. The 
Prudential was to form a wholly-owned subsidiary to market life policies 
linked to one or more of the Midland Drayton unit trusts. Midland undertook 
to sell these policies across-the-counter of its UK branches. The early 
success achieved by the bank/insurance links is evident from data presented 
in Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8 : Bank Unit-Linked Assurance Policies : Early Years 
Martins Unicorn/ 
Griffin Assurance 
Lloyds/Royal - 
commenced Apr. '68 
Westminster-Hambro/ 
C. U. - commenced 
July '67 
Growth (%) 
Source: The Banker 
No. of Pols. 
end '67 end '68 
2598 5493 
- 2655 
Anl. Prms. 
end end 
'67 '68 
(£000) 
208 400 
- 262 
Sums Assured 
end end 
'67 '68 
(£000) 
3034 6164 
- 3365 
403 1306 45 140 827"- 2577 
3001 9454 253 802 3861 12106 
215 217 214 
Note: Martins Unicorn is now Barclays Unicorn 
Although the banks are now concerned with the management of unit 
trusts, they still continue to perform their function as trustee for the 
majority of other trusts. 
50 
The likelihood of conflict of interest therefore 
arises, for the Department of Trade maintains that the manager and trustee 
should be independent. When the regulations requiring an independent trustee 
were first framed by the Board of Trade it was probably not envisaged that 
trust corporations themselves would take over the role of fund managers. 
Suggestions that acting in both capacities might cause a conflict of interests 
have since been voiced, 
51 
but such problems do not appear to have arisen in 
practice. Indeed Midland's venture some nine years after the first clearing 
bank moves, shows that separation of potentially-conflicting interest areas 
can be avoided. Drayton Montagu Portfolio Management continued to manage 
the investment portfolios of the new trusts to dispel fears of the trustee/ 
manager relationship. However, a potentially greater conflict was threatened 
by the link with Prudential Assurance. Firstly, the assurance company already 
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had a life subsidiary, marketing unit-linked policies - Vanburgh Life 
(formerly Vavasseur Life). However, this company was broker-orientated 
so that the sales outlet of the two companies was not expected to overlap. 
Secondly, Midland already had a 50% interest in a linked-life company - 
Individual Life (through the Drayton Group). But rather than being involvgd 
in the management and underwriting of a life company, Midland preferred 
to join force with an established life company and Individual Life was 
sold to Schroder Wagg. Finally the fear that the combination of principal 
and broking function might prove tenuous was dismissed by the manager of 
the Midland Bank Insurance Service, the Group's insurance broking arm, 
in the following statement: 
52 
" ... the Midland Bank trusts and the linked life policies 
will be treated as any other product and will not be 
recommended to clients if there is a better contract on the 
market". 
Apart from a very few obvious exceptions - Hill Samuel, Slater, 
Walker and Hambros - merchant banks have not been a powerful force in 
unit trust ownership. Their specialisation has been in managing funds 
for clients rather than operating their own portfolios. 
At the end of 1973 Hambros controlled some £212 million, Hill Samuel 
£73 million , Schroder Wagg--£60 million3 and Slater Walker -E53 million 
Together with Barclays -E268 million , these banks accounted for almost 
95% of those unit trust funds which are owned and managed by merchant banks. 
In total some £700 million, or the equivalent of 28% of the unit trust 
industry, is managed by banks; although the exclusion of Barclays reduces 
this share to 17%. 
Merchant banking influence is more extensive than these observations 
suggest, however. The largest unit trust management group, Save & Prosper, 
with funds o . over 
£700 million (1973), employs Robert Fleming (also a 
shareholder) to manage most of its trusts, in conjunction with Ivory & Sime. 
Moreover Baring Bros. which manages the Stratton Trust also owns 26% 
of Save & Prosper. Another example of indirect presence is that of 
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Kleinwort Benson which owns 33% of White Drummond, the parent company of 
M&G Securities which controlled funds valued at £220 million, at the end 
of 1973. 
The strategy of merchant banking participation reflects, at least 
in part, the changes in the savings market in the years preceding 1973. 
One of the fundamental moves was the emphasis placed on insurance packages, 
mentioned earlier. Hill Samuel, recognising the attraction of unit trusts 
for the 'wealthier' investor, launched personal portfolio trusts (Personal 
Finance Service) aimed at clients with a minimum of £20,000 to invest. 
Such private portfolios are geared for the clients of Noble Lowndes, the 
insurance broking subsidiary of the Hill Samuel Group. To overcome the 
major problem facing merchant banks - their lack of retail outlets - Hill 
Samuel formed Hill Samuel Professional Adviser Services to cater for the 
needs of advisers such as accountants, solicitors, stockbrokers, insurance 
brokers and bank managers who, in turn, advise the public. 
Moreover, and in response to the popularity of unit-linked life 
assurance packages, several merchant banks established or acquired existing 
insurance companies, and therefore became able to offer a range of new 
insurance products - managed bonds, property bonds and guaranteed income bonds. 
Thus acquisitions were undertaken by Hill Samuel (Noble Lowndes); 
Schroder Wagg (Dominion Lincoln); Keyser Ullmann (International Life which 
became Cannon Assurance); Samuel Montagu (Stronghold Insurance) and 
Edward Bates (Welfare). In addition, Hambros established Hambro Life, and 
Warburgs held a minority interest in Tyndall. Examination of Tables 4.5 and 
4.7 in the previous section of this chapter shows that several of these 
subsidiaries were initially among the most successful entrants to the life 
assurance market from 1966-73. 
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The emphasis placed on 'management' rather than 'ownership' of 
unit trusts, is clearly revealed if the proportion of all funds invested 
in unit trusts managed by large groups is examined. Recent figures indicate 
that the five largest groups, Save & Prosper (E755 million), M&G (E300 million), 
Barclays Unicorn (£258 million), Slater Walker (£175 million) and Allied 
Hambro (£175 million), controlled 65% of all funds invested in unit trusts in 
. 1975.53 
Some of the larger groups have also figured in the limited merger 
activity in this sector. Hambros acquired Hereditaments in 1969; Save and 
Prosper took over Ebor Securities also in 1969; in 1972, Dawnay Day acquired 
Target (the eighth largest group in 1975); in 1973 Barclays acquisition of 
Southern Cross brought nine authorized unit trusts under the bank's control 
and represented a complement to the Unicorn funds as well as providing an 
entree into international markets; and Slater, Walker acquired Jessel and 
National and Oceanic in 1974 and 1975 respectively. 
4.3 : Financial Multiproduct Companies 
The preceding discussion suggests that the financial system will 
become increasingly dominated by companies whose products and services are 
sold in a wide range of markets. The process towards all-purpose financial 
companies has encouraged commentators and journalists, in particular, to 
christen contemporary financial institutions as 'financial conglomerates'. 
The term has no precise definition, however, and lends itself to wide 
interpretation. Its use has tended to arouse official interest because it 
is immediately associated with 'massive financial power and influence'. 
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The purpose of this section is three-fold; first, to review the 
implications of financial comglomerates; secondly, to discuss the various 
forms which conglomerates can take; and thirdly, to assess the role of 
diversificatory acquisitions in the process towards multiproduct financial 
organisations. 
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4.3.1 : Meaning of financial comglomerate/constraints 
The 'pure' financial conglomerate is perhaps best explained as a 
limiting case at one end of a spectrum, represented by a holding company 
with a number of 'principal' and 'intermediary' functions under its control. 
It would own, therefore, the equity of: a major retail banking function, 
a wholesale banking function, an insurance operation (either broking or 
principal), money transmission and investment services and a hire-purchase 
function. In addition it might include a stock broking or jobbing function, 
operate subsidiaries in different industrial areas and would probably 
contain a property company. Thus the component parts would operate in all 
the major areas associated with financial sector activities in short, 
medium and long-term markets, in the corporate and personal sector. 
It is not envisaged that such specialist functions as building societies 
and discount houses, would operate under the umbrella. 
There are no financial institutions which at present approximate 
to that description and specification, although some go part of the way. 
The eventual attainment of a structure such as this requires a breakdown 
of traditional demarcation lines and perhaps more importantly, a favourable 
attitude from official bodies, such as the Treasury, the Bank of England, 
the Department of Trade and the Monopolies Commission. Nevertheless progress 
towards the provision of a multitude of services by one institution had been 
made by December, 1973. Banks had become increasingly involved in the 
insurance broking market, insurance companies and brokers had acquired shares 
in banks and both traditionally owned stakes in hire-purchase finance houses; 
furthermore links had been established between banks and insurance companies 
in the unit trust industry. 
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An assessment of the financial services industries should recognise, 
at the outset that financial ccmpanies sell widely differentiated products, 
including corporate and personal advice. Moreover, they may embrace a 
complicated concept such as insurance-linked unit trust investment and 
may therefore be difficult to describe and understand. Not only are funds 
heterogeneous, and differentiated with respect to source, term and uses, 
but the other products of financial institutions, notably financial advice 
are often tailored to a specific situation or client. 
Partly because: of the non-standard and technical nature of these 
products and services,. emphasis may not be. on the sellers' integrity, but 
on the buyers' . confidence 
in the. sellers' recommendation (although the two 
will possibly be related). Despite criticisms of. a lack of competition 
among financial intermediaries in well-demarcated markets, the non-standard 
nature of products, reinforced by the ability of. certain financial 
institutions to make undisclosed allocations to inner reserves, makes 
comparison between competitors very-difficult. In. the market for retail 
banking services, 'there is a. low propensity to 'shop-around', and a 
high 
degree of buyer loyalty. The same used to be: the case for. the merchant 
banks' corporate clients. However, as wholesale banking business has 
become more price-elastic and competitive, corporations have become more 
discerning. Thus it is-now quite usual for industrial clients to select, 
a merchant bank on an ad hoc basis depending on their particular requirement. 
Thus, in spite of the diversification of financial institutions 
across industry and market boundaries, which might suggest a breakdown of 
entry barriers, there are few signs. of the markets. themselves overlapping. 
In other words, assuming the facilities to be available and subject to 
legal constraints, clients appear to differentiate between the insurance 
products offered by a composite insurer and a'clearing bank, and between 
the banking services offered by the same institutions. 
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The dichotomy between the main activities of insurers and banks which 
is well illustrated by early, mainly historical and descriptive texts and 
studies, is indicated by the nature and role of different financial 
intermediaries. These in turn emphasise that each has its own special 
function to perform in the financial system. 
Evolutionary pressures have, nevertheless, resulted in financial 
institutions aspiring to a greater degree of expertise in a wider variety 
of markets, and they have therefore crossed the traditional demarcations 
between activities. The juxtaposition of financial sectors provides a 
framework within which attention can be focused on the behaviour of 
intermediaries and, in particular, on the relationships between companies 
in different parts of the financial system. 
The diversification undertaken by banks and insurance companies 
has two important implications. First, the behaviour of institutions 
whose main activity is in different markets, cannot be examined in isolation. 
Secondly, changes in one part of the system have repercussions in other parts. 
't'hey should be considered as influences affecting the interrelationships 
between financial companies and causing disequilibria throughout the 
financial system. Development, therefore, whether for a single institution 
or for a financial industry such as banking or insurance, or for the financial 
sector as a whole, should be considered in the round. As changes occur they 
spill over into each of the other areas. Because changes in different 
sectors occur for a number of reasons they do so at different times and 
at different rates - hence motion throughout the system as a whole is 
virtually continual. At the same time the 'aggregate' environment is 
changing: in particular, the market for funds, the employment situation, 
the state of technology and the framework of technology; as noted the changing 
environment creates the opportunity or imposes the need for further change. 
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4.3.2 : Vehicles for all-purpose financial companies 
The process towards financial comglomeracy has created a number of 
different forms of diversified financial company. The first to be considered, 
however, is yet to appear in the U. K: 
Financial Supermarkets 
The setting up of financial centres where banks, insurance companies, 
building societies, finance houses and others would have their counters, and 
in this way retain their own identities. 
In contrast, many financial institutions are organised on the basis 
of a multiproduct financial company or a financial holding company. 
The former is most readily identifiable with a group, whose parent is 
well-established in a particular market and whose wholly- or majority- 
owned subsidiaries operate in a range of different and/or overlapping markets. 
Diversification of the parent, after whom the group is named (and sometimes 
the subsidiaries as well), is usually achieved by the acquisition of going- 
concerns in those aspects of the financial system selected for expansion. 
The clearing banks, in particular, adopt this form of organisation. 
Financial holding companies are typically associated with the term 
'financial conglomerate'. It comprises a holding company, owning the equity 
of a major bank, an insurance institution and various other financial 
intermediaries. This one group comprises companies which are well-established 
in their own particular market each of which retains their own independent 
identity. The various arms of the company are therefore capable of supplying 
a range of financial services. Examples of this form of organisation are 
C. T. Bowring, which includes a major insurance broker, a member of the 
Accepting Houses Committee, and a leading finance house; and Guinness Peat, 
which owns an accepting house, a commodity broker and various insurance 
broking intersts. 
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4.3.3 : Financial services : Competitive or complementary? 
In 1959, the Radcliffe Committee's report on the working of the 
Monetary System, considered the following institutions in the private sector: 
London clearing banks; Scottish banks; Overseas and Foreign banks; Finance 
houses; Discount houses; Accepting houses; Issuing houses; Insurance companies; 
Pension funds; Investment trusts; Unit trusts; Building societies. 
The Committee said: 
"We have included all these groups of institutions in one 
chapter, despite the great differences in the activities 
which they undertake and the type of credit they offer, 
because we have been impressed in hearing evidence not 
by differences but by the fact that the market is a single 
market. Though each type of institution has its special type 
of business and may, by tradition or as a matter of commercial 
arrangement, state a preference for one form of lending rather 
than another, it does not seem that any hard and fast lines 
are drawn, for instance between the supply of short finance and 
the supply of long finance; borrowers seem to be ready to switch 
to some extent from one to another if difficulties are put in the 
way of their obtaining finance from the source upon which they 
are accustomed to draw. " 
The importance of this pronouncement lies in its consideration of 
financial institutions as competitive, not complementary intermediaries. 
The following analysis examines this hypothesis by considering the competitive 
and complementary aspects of the inter-relationships between financial 
companies and, in particular, the interface between banks and insurance 
institutions which is widely recognised as being the initial stage in the 
process towards multiproduct financial intermediaries. 56 
Historically, there has been a natural affinity between the banking 
and insurance industries, which were considered as complementary businesses. 
Banks were primarily concerned with the taking of deposits, lending of 
their own funds and the provision of a money transfer service. The basic 
business of insurers was that of providing cover against a variety of risks. 
Various aspects of the banking-insurance interface can be examined in respect 
of the sources of their funds and the destination of their investment. 
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Sources of Funds : Savings 
Banks and insurance companies, in common with other financial 
institutions, seek to attract the savings of their respective clients. 
They then perform an intermediary function - channeling these savings into 
investment. With respect to the source of their funds, however, banks are 
accustomed to accepting deposits on demand, whereas insurers attract 
premiums for a potentially longer term, from their policyholders. Both 
are therefore in competition with building socieites and other savings media 
in the market for the savings of the personal sector. 
However, savings must be grouped into various categories according 
to their maturity, because investors have varying requirements - the most 
obvious distinction being between short-term savings (probably invested 
for emergencies or income purposes) and those invested for a longer period, 
possibly for capital growth. Funds accruing to banks from the personal 
sector are generally of a short-term nature and take the form of current 
and deposit accounts. On the other hand, funds accruing to insurance 
companies in the form of premiums are generally the longer term contractual 
savings of investors designed to be of much longer maturity. 
The managing director of National Westminster Insurance 
Services attributed the insurance sector's success in attracting savings 
largely to environmental conditions, reinforced by innovations in respect 
of new products designed to take advantage of tax concessions. 
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The 
banks, in contrast, suffered because of the rise in interest rates in 1973, 
after which the Bank of England imposed restrictions on rates payable for 
deposits wndtt £10,000 to 9h$. 
These contrasting, yet simultaneous, fortunes suggest that the market 
for funds is extremely diverse, and that participants have not competed 
on equal te=s. Banks and insurance companies, in particular, operate in 
different segments of the market which indicates that they should not be 
considered as savings vehicles which are perfect substitutes. 
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Application of funds : Investment 
An examination of banks' and insurers' respective investment portfolios, 
reveals a difference in emphasis which is determined by the nature of their 
liabilities. Banks, for example, have traditionally put an emphasis on 
liquidity which has encouraged short-term advances. They have, moreover 
been subject to restrictive official requirements such as special deposits 
and reserve asset ratios. 
In contrast, insurance companies have tended to employ funds of longer 
maturities. Revell has estimated that in 1970, some 31% of insurance 
companies' investments was in the form of U. K. equities. 
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Rather than 
competing, therefore, insurers and banks - which have occupied the position 
of secured creditor - have provided complementary forms of finance. 
This distinction became blurred during the early 1970s when the 
banks began to offer medium-term credit facilities and to compete in the 
money markets for deposits over longer-terms, they have not, however, except 
in a few instances, provided equity capital. 
4.3.4 : The process towards financial 'conglomeracy' 
These comments are, furthermore, abstractions from the factual 
basis of the banking-insurance interface and the other inter-relationships 
which are evident within the financial system. Structural and operational 
changes have created financial groups which are capable of providing 
services fora diversity of financial interests. The banking industry, 
in particular, has undergone a transition in which the traditional 
'specialist' banking institutions have been superseded by banks of a 
'generalist' nature. The latter are characterised by organisations 
providing products and services in a wide range of markets, including 
corporate financial and investment management advice. 
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The initiative for this diversification has mainly come clearing 
banks which have competed effectively in the markets for wholesale deposits, 
whilst maintaining their traditional and reliable source of short-term, 
comparatively-cheap, retail deposits. Their widespread branch networks 
have proved an effective barrier to the entry of secondary banks to retail 
markets. All categories of bank, however, have ventured into the market 
for insurance broking services, and to an extent, that for life underwriting. 
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There are occasional instances where insurance institutions 
have extended their interests to include the provision of banking services, 
either by way of trade investments, or as a suitable method of employing 
their premium income. In 1972, for example, Norwich Union established 
Norwich General Trust to provide corporate credit through the group's 
branch network; and Commercial Union owned 25% of Mercantile Credit 
until its acquisition by Barclays in 1975. 
The innovation in the development of the insurance-banking 
interface and in the process towards multiproduct financial institutions, 
has demonstrably come from the banking sector. Indeed, the process 
might be considered as a spilling-over of banking into insurance. The 
acquisition behaviour of banks and insurers into the respective industries 
confirms this: 
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Table 4.9 : Mergers between banks and insurance institutions, 1966-73 
BKK INSURANCE INSTITUTION % HOLDING 
1967 Martins Bank Unicorn Securities 75 
Dillow Walker and Co 
1968 Arbuthnot Latham Adams Bros (Insurance) n, a. 
& Co. Ltd., 
Ditto E. E. Golding & Co. n. a. 
1969 Hill Samuel Group Noble Lowndes Securities n. a. 
1970 Samuel Montagu Stronghold Insurance Co. n. a. 
1972 Keyser Ullmann Holdings International Life Ins. Co. n. a. 
1973 Antony Gibbs & Sons Ltd. Mothercare Ins. Co. 100 
Edward Bates & Sons Ltd. Welfare Insurance Co. 100 
Arbuthnot Latham Holdings A. J. Collins & Co. 100 
Schroders Ltd., Dominion Lincoln Assurance 100 
INSURANCE BANK MERGERS 
1966-1973 
INSURANCE INSTITUTION BANK % HOLDING 
1971 C. T. Bowring and Co. Ltd. Singer & Friedlander n. a. 
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4.4 : Mergers of Stock Broking Companies 1966-1974 
Adaptation to innovation and change has also been evident in the 
U. K. securities industry. Since the war, there has been a trend towards 
larger units; relatively few stock brokers and jobbers continue to operate 
successfully on a small scale. In response to changing demands, moreover, 
many London firms have installed computers, extended their free advisory 
services to clients, and improved the range of statistical and economic 
information produced in their research departments. 
These and other changes have taken place against a background 
of a shift in share ownership in favour of the institutional investor and 
declines in the membership of the Stock Exchange and in the population of 
stock braking firms. In the period from 1966 to 1972,79 firms left the 
industry thereby reducing the population by approximately one-third. 
Table 4.10 shows the extent of firm disappearance and accounts for the 
reasons for exit. 
Table 4.10 : The number of causes of disappearances 
--------------------- 
from the U. K_ stockbrokingindustry-1966_1974----- 
---- --- - -- ----- -- ------ - -- - 
Year end Number of firms Number and cases of disappearance Totals 
Total 
Merger/ Creased 
Defaulted 
Acquisition Trading 
25.3.1966 248 
1966 231 17 9 6 2 
1967 199 32 23 9 - 
1968 196 3 1 2 - 
1969 192 4 1 3 - 
1970 177 15 13 1 1 
1971 167 10 7 1 2 
1972 
--------------- 
168 
--------------- - -------------- - ------------ - ------------ 
- 
--------- 
25.3.1973 372 
1973 360 15 12 1 2 
1974 297 69 25 40 4 
165 91 63 11 
Source: Stock Exchange data. 
Notes: (1) The stock exchange financial year ends 25th March, 1973. 
(2) Discrepancies between changes in year end totals and the number 
of disappearances are caused by firms entering the market. 
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Notes-continued: (3) The change in population in March 1973 reflects 
the amalgamation of the various stock exchanges 
into one body; up to March 25,1973, figures relate 
to the London stock exchange only. 
The predominant cause of exit, throughout the period, was merger or 
acquisition which accounted for 55% of all firm disappearances; 38% of 
brokers 'ceased trading', and 7¬ defaulted and were "hammered". 
Closer examination of the data reveals two interesting features. 
The first concerns changes in the incidence of merger and acquisition. 
In 1966 and 1967, amalgamations accounted for 65% of disappearance from the 
industry; -whereas, in the next seven years, only 51% of firms disappeared 
as a result of acquisition. 
The second feature is the very close inverse relationship between the 
rate of disappearance and stock market conditions which is portrayed in 
Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 : The rate of disappearance from the U. K. 
stock broking industry 1966-1974 
- 
--- Ord rY , -; - -- Disap pearance 
-- Shan 4 index 1- 
IA- 
IOD 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1 1971 1972 197k :.: - 1974 I 
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Notes: /ýý` = F. T. ordinary share index 
= Rate of disappearance; calculated as follows: 
Number of disappearances 'year x' % 
Total number of firms at end of 'year x-1' 
= Movements in the F. T. ordinary share index are 
closely related to changes in the volume of business 
transacted (see Appendix 7). 
The inverse relationship suggests that exits from the broking industry, 
and hence mergers between stock brokers, tend to be more numerous when 
stock market conditions are depressed. This pattern of behaviour which is 
in sharp contrast to that of other financial institutions, is particularly 
noticeable after 1967. Before then mergers and acquisitions were not only 
more numerous but also occurred in spite of the 'bull' market which began 
in 1967. Thus an explanation of merger activity in this sector must account 
for two periods in which the nature of acquisitions differed markedly. 
The spate of mergers in 1966 and 1967 was a response to pressures which 
obliged stock broking firms to operate in larger units. These pressures, 
in turn, arose due to several factors. The growing complexity and widening 
scope of industry required much greater research effort on the part of stock 
brokers in order to provide the comprehensive investment advice which 
managers of institutional funds required. Thus, brokers were obliged to 
expand their specialist staffs which added to their overhead costs. These 
were already rising due to firms' attempts to modernise systems by investing 
in computers, and due to increases in rents. 
Internal growth was constrained, furthermore, by a shortage of skilled 
manpower and the 1967 Companies Act which imposed a statutory maximum of 20 
partners on the size of stock exchange firms. Thus mergers in 1966 and 1967 
were the result of attempts by firms to increase the scale of their operations. 
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In the period since 1967, the pattern of firm disappearance has followed 
inversely fluctuations in the F. T. ordinary share index. Thus acquisitions 
have been particularly pronounced in periods of falling share prices, and 
less pronounced during 'bull' markets. The extremes of this pattern of 
behaviour occurred in 1972 and 1974. There were no disappearances during 
1972 - the year in which the F. T. index peaked at an all-time high of 543.6; 
whereas, during the severe 'bear' market of 1973-1974,69 firms were either 
acquired or 'ceased operations'. 
In depressed market conditions, stock brokers have found it necessary 
to effect cost reduction programmes. These have inevitably been aimed at 
the major components of the brokers' costs - salaries and rent. Mergers 
have proved to be one method of achieving both objectives. In the period 
from 1968 to 1974, mergers accounted for approximately one-half of firm 
disappearances. This suggests that many were undertaken for defensive 
reasons in order to avoid being forced out of business. As a result of the 
extensive merger activity, the securities market is now serviced by a smaller, 
more streamlined broking industry in which larger firms are predominant. 
NOTES 
Practical evidence of this separation of activities is provided by 
the existence of independent trade associations, such as the Industrial 
Life Offices Association, the Life Offices Association, the Fire Offices 
Committee, the Accident Offices Association, the Motor Insurers Conference 
and the Institute of London Underwriters. 
2: The origins of the composite insurance companies lay in a series of 
mergers in the early 1900s. These were of several different types, 
for example: between large fire offices - Atlas/Manchester (1904), 
Law, Fire/County Fire (1906); between fire and accident offices - of the 
24 largest accident offices in 1899,15 were acquired by fire or fire 
and life offices by 1914; between diversified insurance companies and 
specialist marine companies - of 16 marine insurers in 1899,8 had been 
absorbed into composites by 1914; and finally, between general and life 
insurers - of 29 specialist proprietary life companies in 1899,16 
had been acquired before 1919. 
See H. E. Raynes, A History of British Insurance, (Pitman, 2nd Ed, 1964); 
B. Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance -A History of British Insurance 
1720-1970, (C. U. P., 1970); P. L. Payne, "The Emergence of the Large-Scale 
Company in Great Britain, 1870-1914", Economic History Review, December 
1967. 
Composite insurance companies were also predominant amongst acquiring 
insurers in 1966-73 
3: For example, Prudential specialises in ordinary and industrial life 
assurance; General Accident is the U. K's largest motor insurer; and 
Sun Alliance specialises in household insurance 
4: Specialists are more important in the life market. Indeed, in 1972, 
three of the largest life offices were specialist companies - Standard 
Life, Sun Life and Scottish Widows. 
5: Cf P. J. Franklin, "Motor : An unsuccessful Six Years", Insurance, 
Sept/Oct 1974; Inflation Study, British Insurance Association, 1971 
6: Drivers with full no-claims bonus (two-thirds of all British motorists) 
experienced a real increase of under 50%. 
7: This has recently proved an unsuccessful strategy - in 1973-74 simultaneous 
falls in the value of property and securities caused a fall in asset 
values and brought pressure on solvency margins 
8: For companies writing general insurance with premium income in excess 
of £2.5m, the statutory minimum solvency margin is presently the 
aggregate of £O. 5m + (Premium Income - £2.5m) 
10 
Solvency in life assurance is actuarily based, the actuary stating 
after his triennial valuation of assets and liabilities whether or not 
the life company's liabilities exceed the amount shown in the balance 
sheet. See Scott Report, Linked Life Assurance : Report of the Committee 
on Property Bonds and Equity Linked Policies in the Life Assurance 
Industry, Cmnd. 5281, (H. M. S. O., 1973); Insurance Companies Act, 1974. 
9: Under the Counter Inflation Act, 1973, these have been controlled by 
the Secretary of State for Trade 
10 : Profits on underwriting general insurance are notoriously volatile 
worldwide motor insurance made a loss in each of the years 1969-1974; 
fire and accident insurance for the same period made a small profit of 
£90 million; see British Insurance Association, Facts and figures, 1974. 
(ii) 
11 In 1975, of the 20 largest rights issues, 6 were made by insurance 
companies The Banker , February 1976, p. 159 
12 : Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Eagle Star Insurance Co, Ltd., and 
Bernard Sunley Investment Trust Ltd., and Grovewood Securities Ltd. 
a Report_on the_Proposed Merger, Cmnd, 5641, (H, M, S, O  1974) 
13 ibid, para. 37 
14 : See R. L. Carter, Competition in the British Fire and Accident Insurance 
Market, (University of Sussex, Ph. D. thesis, 1968) 
15 Quoted from H. McRae & F. Cairncross, Capital City, (Eyre Methuen, 1974), 
pp 158-159 
16 See G. Clayton, British Insurance, (Elek, 1971); NB also the extensive 
reinsurance network in London, see F. T. Survey, Reinsurance, June 10 1975 
17 : B. I. A., Facts and Figures, 1974 
18 : Annual Report and Accounts : Royal (1973), Commercial Union (1974) 
19 : Ibid. 
20 : B. I. A., Facts and Figures, 1974 
21 : Commercial Union, for example, generated greater investment income from 
the U. S. than from the U. K. in every year from 1966-73, except 1973. 
Moreover, throughout the period, U. S. investment income exceeded that 
derived from the rest of C. U's world markets taken together. For the 
Royal, US investment income was approximately twice that earned in the 
U. K. from 1966-73. Sources: Annual Reports and Accounts, op. cit. 
22 : Cf. Supple, op. cit., p. 534 
23 : ibid. 
24 : Several other acquisitions were apparently also motivated partly by 
this rationale, for example, Guardian/Licenses & General (1956); / 
Caledonian (1957) and Commercial Union/North British & Mercantile (1959). 
25 : Source: D. T. I., Insurance Business Statistics; also see Clayton, op. cit., 
ch. 13. 
26 : Annual Abstract of Statistics 
27 : Life Offices Association, Life Assurance in the United Kingdom 1970-74, 
(L. O. A., 1975), p. 6 
28 : ibid., p. 7 
29 : Until the 1968 Finance Act, single as well as annual premium bond- 
holders could escape surtax on the proceeds of their investments, 
as well. as obtaining tax relief on the premiums. 
(iii) 
30 : In its evidence to the Scott Committee, op. cit., the Law Society 
argued that single-premium bonds should be treated as investment rather 
than insurances and thus be subject to the same controls as unit trusts; 
see also K. Ricahrds & D. Colenutt, "Concentration in the U. K. Ordinary 
Life Assurance Market", J. I. E., December 1975 
31 For an assessment of the details of the 1968 Finance Act, see R. L. Carter, 
Economics and Insurance, (Policy Holder Press, 1972), p. 15; see also 
K. Richards & D. Colenutt, "Plenty of action in life assurance", 
The Banker, February 1975, p. 171 
32 : The reaction of traditional life assurers was varied : London & Manchester, 
for example, acquired Welfare, which had gained initial successes 
in the marketing of single-premium policies; for other reactions, 
see Richards & Colenutt (1975), op. cit., pp. 175-177 
33 : See P. J. Franklin, "Insurance into property", The Banker, October 1976 
34 : Insurance Companies Amendment Act, 1973 
35 : Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Cmnd. 5641, op. cit., para. 232 
36 : For example, Eagle Star owned 10% of U. D. T. at December, 31,1973 and 
Commercial Union had a 24% holding in Mercantile Credit until the 
Barclays acquisition of the finance house in 1975 
37 : Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Cmnd. 5641, para 236 
38 : Where it expands insurance business in money terms, without a 
corresponding increase in the money value of the capital base that is 
available as reserve backing for that business 
39 : Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Cmnd. 5641, para 236 
40 : Commercial Union subsequently reversed its policy when direct selling 
was not commonly applied by other large underwriters 
41 : In industrial life assurance, premiums are payable at intervals of 
less than two months and are collected by agents who call at the home 
of the policyholders 
42 : Conducted on behalf of the Corporation of Insurance Brokers 
43 : Quoted in F. T. Survey, Insurance Broking, February 10,1975 
44 : The distinction between investment trust company and miscellaneous 
financial company is often a fine one, and has caused some confusion 
in the Bank of England's classification of acquiring and acquired 
financial companies 
45 : Further distinctions are made by J. R. S. Revell, The British Financial 
System, (Macmillan, 1973), pp. 444-446; and M. Day & P. Harris, Unit 
Trusts - the law and practice, (Oyez, 1974), ch. 2 
46 : Revell, op. cit., p. 449 and pp. 451-459 
(iv) 
47 : L. Messel & Co., Investment Commies, September 1975 
48 : Of 255 investment trusts covered in L. Mossel & Co': annual 
booklet (September, 1975), with total value of £4037.4 million, 74 
(£907 million) involved merchant banks 
49 : The Banker, April 1969 
50 According to the Unit Trust Year Book, (1972), deposit banks were 
trustees for 85% of all uni t trusts, and insurance companies for 11% 
51 For example, in The Banker, April 1969 
52 Financial Times, September 20,1975 
53 See The Observer, November, 17,1975 
54 : The Times, April 5,1972 
55 : Radcliffe Report, Report of the Committee on the Working of 
the Monetary System, Cmnd. 827, (H. M. S. O. 1959), para. 125 
56 : See J. Maycock, "Banking and Insurance - The Interface", Institute 
of European Finance, U. C. of North Wales, 1975 
57 : B. C. Crittenden, 'Banking and Insurance - Competitive or Complementary? ', 
Banking and Insurance - The Interface, Conference, November 5 and 6,1974. 
58 : Revell, op. cit., p. 346, Table 15.9 
59 : See Appendices 3 and 4 
C1i1T'TFR FTVF 
The Internationalisation of Banking 
'It could be said that banking has always been an 
international. business. And in the sense that it has 
always been concerned with trade and payments, and that 
the banks themselves have long shown a disposition to 
follow their customers to the back of beyond, that would 
be true. It is also true that some of the recent moves are 
no more than a continuation of that trend. 
However, there is more to it. Banking has become international 
in the further senses that there are international corporations 
for the banks to serve and there are international money markets 
for them to operate in. ' 
(The Economist, November 15,1969, p. 14) 
5.1 : Introduction 
The aims of this chapter are to analyse the causes and nature of 
U. K. banks' international expansion. An analysis of geographical diversifi- 
cation must take into account foreign banks and foreign banking systems; 
to circumvent problems of definition and classification, and legal restric- 
tions, 
1 
the examination is focused on the market. 
Several commentators have attached considerable importance to U. K. 
entry to the E. E. C. The Treaty of Rome envisaged the complete freedom for 
the establishment of banks and the provision of services throughout Europe. 
It also foresaw the liberalization of capital movements and the harmoniza- 
tion of national banking regulations. On these grounds there have been 
optimistic forecasts of larger banking markets, culminating in a single 
European market. National sovereignty, and economic and monetary crises 
have so far prevented the achievement of this ideal. Indeed, at present, 
European banking systems tend to be non-integrated and characterised by 
cUfferent forms of regulation, different types of bank and varying degrees 
of state intervention. 
- 129 - 
The fact that, in spite of numerous obstacles, considerable 
internationalization has been achieved, owes much to the banks themselves. 
For the U. K., entry to the E. E. C. came too late to affect this analysis. 
Thus, although it remains potentially an important influence it is not 
analysed in detail. Instead, the stimuli to U. K. banks' international 
growth are considered with respect to the competition they have faced in 
wholesale banking business. 
5.2 : International competitive environment 
5.2.1 : Foreign banks in London 
5.2.1.1 Quantitative Impact 
The Bank of England classifies foreign banks in London into three 
groups: American banks; Foreign banks and affiliates (mainly European) 
and Other foreign banks. The extent and growth of their entry to London 
is shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 : Foreign Banks in London 1966-1974 
£m. 
Total u. s, Jap. Eur. Other For. Total Deposits 
1966 103 14 12 34 43 3,503 
1967 109 15 12 37 45 4,955 
1968 125 23 12 39 51 7,426 
1969 144 32 12 - 45 55 12,508 
1970 159 37 13 50 59 15,145 
1971 172 40 15 53 64 17,904 
1972 202 50 19 60 73 25,429 
1973 226 53 21 76 76 40,863 
1974 248 61 23 84 80 49,257 
Source: The Banker 
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The draw of London to those banks arriving before the abolition 
of ceiling controls in 1971, lay in its pre-eminence as a financial centre. 
The City remains the focus of the world's major banking (and other financial) 
markets, whether measured by volume of financing or by the extent of foreign 
bank representation. The assets and liabilities of U. S. banks' foreign 
branches in London exceed those of U. S. banks in the rest of Europe, in 
Latin America and in Asia and Africa taken together. Moreover in 1975, 
there were 449 branches, representative offices, subsidiaries or affiliates 
of foreign banks in London, compared with 179 in New York and 149 in Hong 
Kong. In 1977 only seven of the world's largest 100 banks had no direct 
or indirect representation in the City. 
2 
London's reputation owes much to the traditional competitive 
environment characterised by a relative freedom from regulation which is 
encouraged by the Bank of England. Flexibility and the development of 
specialist skills still remain a priority with the Bank of England. At a 
seminar of the Institute of European Finance in March 1976, Mr. Galpin, 
Deputy Chief Cashier of the Bank, insisted that flexibility was still an 
important factor in the regulation of banks operating in Britain. 
3 
A 
letter from the Director of the Committee on Invisible Exports to an 
American journalist, of which the following is an extract, summarises 
London's strategic importance: 
'The City has foreign exchange earnings which have 
doubled in the last five years and are bigger than 
New York's. It is the centre of the world's euro- 
dollar market, has the largest international 
insurance markets, the largest international commodity 
market, the world's leading bullion centre, the biggest 
shipping and air freight market and boasts more 
international security quotations than any other 
centre. It also has more American banks than New York. ' 
4 
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Apart from its highly developed financial infra-structure and its 
supremacy as a financial centre, the main attraction of London to foreign 
banks has been the growth of the euromarkets which decisively consolidated 
the position of London as an international centre of finance. As noted, 
this was further enhanced by the liberal establishment provisions and the 
fact that the markets have been largely free of restrictions. 
The importance of the foreign banks is shown not only by their 
ever-growing number, but also by their rapidly expanding volume of 
business. At this aggregate level, the various categories of foreign 
banks are considered collectively. The business activity of the foreign 
banks in London is oriented primarily towards euromarket business, but 
also towards the financing of trade and investment, and the performance 
of related financial services. They take little part in transferring payments 
from one person or organisation to another, which is the main function of 
deposit banks. Instead they concentrate on the financial intermediary 
function of banks, acting as takers of deposits and givers of loans. 
In the U. K., deposit banking is overwhelmingly domestic in character and 
conducted in sterling; more than one half of all deposits is on current 
account and the greater part of the advances is in the form of overdrafts. 
By contrast, more than one half of the business of the wholesale (secondary) 
banking system is with overseas residents, and more than one half is 
expressed in currencies other than sterling. In 1973,86% of foreign bank 
loans were to overseas residents (85% of the total in foreign currency); 
for acceptance houses and British overseas banks, corresponding figures 
were 71% and 69% respectively; nearly all the deposits bear interest and 
the typical loan is for a fixed term. 
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The activity of foreign banks is therefore almost exclusively 
wholesale and their impact is best measured and assessed in comparison 
with the wholesale banking activities of competing indigenous banks. 
Before 1971, comparison is restricted to the secondary banks (accepting 
houses etc., ); after C. C. C. in 1971, Bank of England statistics were 
published in a uniform manner covering the main assets and liabilities 
of all banks subject to reserve ratios. Previously, statistics for the 
London and Scottish banks and the Northern Ireland banks were arranged 
differently from those of other banks. The reason for this was partly 
historical in that the clearing banks' figures were based on monthly 
balance sheet statements published by the banks themselves, while the other 
banks' figures were derived from specially compiled statistical returns. 
The distinction also recognised the operational differences between the 
two types of bank, largely due to the clearing banks' concentration on 
domestic branch banking. The introduction of a minimum reserve ratio for 
all banks in 1971 made this distinction less relevant. Moreover, the 
clearing banks, in their own name, began to transact business which had 
previously been left to their secondary subsidiaries. 
Thus, since 1971, it has been legitimate to consider the foreign 
banks as being in competition with the clearing banks, if not for current 
account deposits, then for wholesale loan business and for inter-bank 
money market deposits. In the analysis, comparison is made with the 
London clearing banks alone - the other deposit banks are excluded, as 
are 'other UK banks', an extremely varied selection of banks from overseas 
and the UK, including consortia, first listed in the Bank's Quarterly 
Bulletin, December 1973, p. 540. 
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The impact of foreign banks on domestic banking institutions 
can be measured in a number of ways. Firstly,. one may record the 
continuing upsurge in the number of foreign banks' branches in London 
(Table 5.1). Indeed, this has been well-documented and receives regular 
attention. 
5 
This, however, gives no indication of their importance, which 
may be obtained instead, by examining the rapid expansion in their volume 
of business transacted. In this respect, both the total deposits and 
advances of foreign banks have shown large increases, especially since 
1971. It has to be taken into account that the bulk of deposits and advances 
are in foreign currencies, reflecting the share these banks enjoy in 
eurocurrency business. Since 1971, foreign currency lending to U. K. residents 
has constantly exceeded that by London clearing banks and accepting houses 
taken together. In 1973, the relative figures were: 
Clearing banks + Accepting Houses £735 million 
Foreign banks £1748 million 
Of more significance, the foreign banks have expanded their sterling 
advances to indigenous British customers. From 1971 to 1973, the level of 
this category of advance increased 1ý times to £2125 million. In general, 
the foreign banks as a group have concentrated their sterling business in 
a combination of pure money market activity, advances to U. K. subsidiaries 
and affiliates of home office customers and in financing the movement 
of goods, principally between the scheduled territories and the home country 
of the bank concerned. Following sterling devaluation in 1967 and the 
ensuing period of credit restraint, more and more of this financing came 
to be denominated in dollars or other foreign currencies. Hence the growth 
in sterling lending to U. K. residents from the end of 1966 to the end of 1970 
was less than 50%; for the corresponding period, foreign currency advances 
to U. K. and overseas residents increased by more than 370%. The abolition 
of ceiling controls in September 1971 released a large quantity of resources 
for domestic lending and the result has been a particularly marked increase 
in sterling advances vis-a-vis foreign currency loans. From the end of 
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1970 to the end of 1973, the former increased nearly three-fold and the 
latter by just 1ý times. 
The most important indication of the impact of foreign banks is 
a comparision of certain of their business activities with the corresponding 
growth in British indigenous banks' activity. An increased share in deposits 
or advances would indicate a threat to domestic banks. 
Relative growth rates have not been used as an indicator or 
'relative shares'. Instead a series of ratios has been chosen as the most 
appropriate measure. They are not exhaustive, but they do provide evidence 
that the relative positions of foreign banks vis-a-vis domestic banks 
have changed, and particularly since 1971, in favour of the former, which 
have made continued inroads into areas of banking business once dominated 
by U. K. institutions. 
These measures will be considered in 3 groups: - 
1. Foreign banks' share in the total credit volume of 
business; 
2. The emphasis placed by foreign banks on domestic U. K. 
business; 
3. Ratios of foreign banks to indigenous banks in terms 
of shares of business. 
The data were collated from various issues of the Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin; they are presented in Appendix 1. 
a) Foreign banks' shares in the total credit volume of business 
Table 5.2 shows details of the relative shares enjoyed by various 
categories of wholesale bank (i); this is supplemented by part (ii) which 
gives a wider comparison for October 1971-1973, by including London 
clearing banks 
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Table 5.2 : Relative Sh; 7arf's or Credit Rosiness (Advancer, 
502 M: Wholesale Banks Only 1966-1973 
a. All Business (%) 1966 Oct 1971 1973 
Foreign banks 63 63 62 
Accepting houses 13 9 7 
B. O. banks, 20 17 17 
Other banks 5 10 1.5 
l O0 t Q'0 l29Y 
b. Loans to UK Residents 
(all currencies) 
Foreign banks 42 36 36 
Accepting houses 22 18 12 
B. O. banks 24 27 16 
Other banks 13 19 35 
lCD lý lý 
C. Loans to UK Residents 
(sterling) 
Foreign banks 40 38 30 
Accepting houses 23 20 12 
B. O. banks 23 20 10 
Other banks 14 22 48 
1' a`ß l ca 1-0--u 
5.2 (ii) : All Banks 1971-1973 
a. All Business ($) Oct 1971 1973 
Foreign banks 48 47 
Accepting houses 7 5 
B. O. banks 13 13 
Other banks 8 11 
London clearing banks 24 23 
b. Loans to UK Residents 
lob 100 
(all currencies) 
Foreign banks 13 17 
Accepting houses 7 6 
. B. O., Banks 
10 8 
Other banks 7 17 
London clearing banks 63 52 
c. Loans to UK Residents 
(sterling) 
Foreign banks 10 12 
Accepting houses 5 5 
B. O. banks 5 4 
Other banks 5 18 
London clearing banks 75 62 
tOC 1a' 
Note: These figures are for advance s; deposits show identical trends. 
The appropriate statistics are available from the author. 
S S. a. (i6 doge Nat ' at L S'coEKstA ow&d * 1M fr4(D(A4 lO a*i s 
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The overwhelming conclusion with respect to all categories of 
business is the continuing dominance of the foreign banks, They have 
accounted for over 60% of all loans made by wholesale banks since 1966 and 
even including the London clearing banks increased their share to 47% in 
1973 (1972: 46%) o 
b) Foreign Bank Incursion into Traditional Domestic Bank Business 
As noted, most of the City's apprehension has been caused by the 
increased penetration by foreign banks of the UK market. Deposit figures 
tend to overstate the importance of foreign banks, and in particular 
those from the US. Over 85% of foreign bank deposits are expressed in 
currencies other than sterling. By contrast, however, they understate 
the impact that the foreign banks have made on UK corporate business. 
Like the merchant banks, foreign banks are engaged in wholesale banking 
and do not have the catchment area of a network of branches which 
characterises the retail emphasis of the clearing banks. For this 
reason comparisons are made on the basis of advances (assets). A first i" 
indication of foreign bank interest in domestic banking is derived from 
Table 5.2 (ii) b, which shows a rise in the foreign banks' share of UK 
loan business at the expense of the three British categories. 'Other 
Banks' also increased their share, and foreign banks are well represented 
in that category as well. 
6 
If sterling lending is isolated (Table 5.2 
(ii) c. ) the increased importance of foreign banks is confirmed. 
The inference is that foreign banks, either as branches, merchant 
banking subsidiaries or shareholders in consortia, have had a considerable 
impact on the credit business transacted in London. A majority of their 
activities is connected with multinational corporations whose multiplicity 
of banking requirements have provided a potentially profitable yet very 
highly competitive outlet for, and source of, bank funds. The traditional 
British banking attitude of allowing the customer to come to the bank 
showed signs of breaking up in 1958, when world currencies became externally 
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convertible. From then on, banks have increasingly come to accept the idea 
that they can satisfy the needs of the multinationals, and they can, indeed 
must, compete for business by offering their customers a well-planned 
and comprehensive package of services. 
7 
The results lead to the conclusion that the British banks did not 
meet with the success of the foreign banks. Before 1967, the main contenders 
for multinational banking business were the US and other foreign banks. 
Since then British banks begun to look beyond the simple provision of 
domestic banking services, utilising eurodollar finance and increasingly 
providing medium-term credit; they are therefore better placed to compete 
with their foreign counterparts. However, it remains clear that foreign 
banks are still a significant force. Indeed the twin concepts of the 
multinational corporation and bank servicing on an international scale 
originated in the US - the broadeping of traditional banking methods was 
an inevitable consequence, but it did not augur well for British banks, as 
the manager of the Bank of Credit and Commerce indicated: 
"A considerable section of American industry is now 
multinational - as, indeed are her banks - and the 
panoply of services being offered by American banks 
to the multinationals all over the world has made any 
British infiltration a formidable task" 
8 
This sentiment is supported by the following ratios of foreign 
bank : British bank lending, which substantiate the claims made earlier 
in the chapter. Firsts foreign banks have progressively increased their 
loans to UK residents as a proportion of total advances since September 1971, 
thus: 
Oct 1971 : UK resident loans as % total loans : 9% 
End 1971 :": 11% 
End 1973 : 14% 
The proportion of loans in sterling to the total also increased from 6% 
to 7% to 8% at the end of 1973. This increased emphasis brought considerable 
success, as Table 5.3 shows: 
- 1.1,13 - 
Table 5.3 : Loans to U. K. Residents, Foreign Banks and 
British Banks, Ratios, 1971-73 - 
Oct. End 
5"3 (i) All LQndt 1971 1973 
Foreign banks as % London clearing banks 21 33 
Accepting houses as % foreign banks 
49 33 
British wholesale banks as % foreign banks 125 79 
5.3 (ii) : Sterling only 
Foreign banks as % London clearing banks 13 20 
Accepting houses as % foreign banks 53 40 
British wholesale banks as % foreign banks 111 71 
Note: British wholesale banks = Accepting houses + British overseas 
banks (B. O. banks) 
Whether gauged by loans in currencies of all denominations or by 
loans in sterling alone, the foreign banks have increased their share of 
the UK credit market at the expense of indigenous British banks in the 
period October 1971 to the end of 1973. Further proof comes from considera- 
tion of foreign banks' lending to UK residents, as a proportion of British 
banks' total advances (in sterling and other currencies) to the UK sector. 
Table 5.4 : Foreign Banks' Sterling Loans to UK 
Residents as a proportion of British Banks' Total 
Loans, 1971-1973 
Oct. End 
1971 1973 
Foreign banks as % London clearing banks 13 18 
Foreign banks as % London clearing banks 10 14k + British wholesale banks 
Once again the data confirm the considerable impact of the foreign 
banks. In October 1971, the clearing banks' sterling advances to UK 
residents were eight times greater than those of the foriegn banks; at the 
end of 1973 the margin had been cut to five times in October 1971, the 
foreign banks advanced less than twice as much in sterling as the accepting 
houses; by the end of 1973, they were lending 21j times as =uch; finally 
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in October 1971, loans in sterling to UK residents from wholesale British 
banks exceeded those from the foreign banks; at the end of 1973, the 
foreign-banks loaned 1/ times as much as the accepting houses and overseas 
banks together. 
5.2.1.2 : Qualitative Impact 
What has emerged clearly from the preceding analysis is the concentration 
of foreign banks on the wholesale banking markets and their relative success 
in them. The major growth area of foreign banks' resources has been foreign 
currencies, which accords with their professed traditional purpose of 
corporate business related to their country of origin. More recent attempts 
to secure sterling deposits may be seen as a reflection of these banks' 
attempts to increase their ability to meet the needs of their customers. 
Hence, it is not inconceivable that the major growth in foreign banks' 
resources should be in foreign currencies, while their impact has been most 
significant in the capture of larger shares of U. K. domestic markets. 
The attempts to achieve this followed their arrival in London as 
the banks sought access to the wide range of facilities that the City 
offered. The spread of foreign bank services is explained by 
Pringle: 
... nowadays, perhaps their biggest role is to act as full 
international bankers to companies, and individuals - an activity 
involving a range of services which might be organised and 
co-ordinated from London rather than from the head office 
of the bank concerned. " 
10 
i 
These services (finance for, and advice on, international operations; 
economic and market research; establishment of contacts, etc. ) which were 
primarily for a bank's existing clients, have also appealed to UK corporations, 
as the increase in sterling business indicates. 
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Any assessment of the relative importance of the foreign banks in 
London and their British-owned competitors must of necessity be crude. 
This is mainly because the only way of comparing the size of an changes in 
banking business ignores other aspects of banking activity. Without wishing 
to underestimate or understate the many activities of other foreign banks- 
in London, it is reasonable, simply from the point of view of volume to 
concentrate on the activities and impact of the US banks in London. 
US banks represent the largest single contingent of foreign banks 
in London, accounting for nearly 2/3 of deposits and advances of these 
groups. The majority of the banks arrived as a result of the meteoric growth 
of US international banking in which lending from foreign offices funded 
with eurocurrencies replaced lending from head offices with 'on shore' 
funds. During this period of mushroom growth, the number of American 
participants in international banking rose sharply, expanding both 
geographically and functionally. The extent of this growth is worth 
stressing: 
No. US banks 
with for. offices 
1964 11 
1974 125 
Source: The Banker 
No. for. Assets 
branches $bnM_ 
181 8.9 
700 152 
The strategy of expansion has depended upon the size of the bank in 
question. For long-established banks, the opening of the London branch 
was a function of various factors which collectively brought about 
migration abroad. For the newer arrivals, and indeed for the majority of 
other foreign banks, presence in the City was perhaps due to its eminence 
as a financial centre and its position as the centre of the eurocurrency 
markets. 
- 1. "11. - 
The period since the end of World War II has seen a resurgence 
of international trade and business and in particular the extension of 
US overseas investment. During the 1960s, the business environment 
became dominated by the growth of the multinational corporation, 
the majority of which were of American origin. 
Initially, only the largest US banks ventured abroad, encouraged 
by the level of overseas investment by native US companies and thus 
strengthened the close associations between bank and customer. The 
rationale of following one's client was reinforced by the persistent 
balance of payments deficits experienced since 1960 in the US. These 
deficits were financed by the issue of more dollars and an increase 
in short-term liquid liabilities with foreigners. Simultaneously, 
US foreign economic policy was aimed at alleviating the deficits, 
and measures were implemented to restrict money and capital market flows. 
The Interest Equalization Tax (1963-1974) taxed portfolios of foreign 
investment by Americans; the voluntary foreign credit restraint 
programme (VFCR) of 1965 and the mandatory controls programme decreed 
by executive order in 1968, limited direct foreign investment in most 
areas of the world and precluded new capital flows for such investments 
in Western Europe. The WCR was the most specific government programme 
affecting the international operations of US banks. By limiting the 
flow of funds from the banks directly to their customers, the programme 
forced these banks to establish branches overseas. 
-; ' At the end of the decade, US monetary policy (aimed at stemming 
inflation) placed a severe liquidity squeeze on American banks. The 
interest rate ceiling imposed by Regulation Q in particular made bank 
deposits and CDs in America unattractive as savings media. This resulted 
in the steady outflow of domestic funds from the banking system, forcing 
US banks to rely on their overseas branches' eurodollar deposits to make 
good their liquidity loss. Consequently the late 1960s saw US banks 
flocking overseas, partly due to the expansion in international trade 
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and partly as a consequence of domestic regulations. 
Several factors explain the incursion of migrant US banks into 
London. The initial arrivals were a reflection of the large share of 
US direct overseas investment which had come to Britain. Indeed it 
was estimated by Revell in 1968 that 75% of the sterling business of 
the London branches of US banks was accounted for by subsidiaries of 
US companies. 
11 
A second important influence was the degree of international 
competition and lack of restriction encouraged by the Bank of England. 
The flexibility of the Bank stook in contrast to the legalistic and 
bureaucratic approach to banking shown on the continent. The General 
Manager of Bankers Trust Company UK saw London's importance in the following 
way : 
' ... there is a large supply of highly skilled technical 
specialists and administrative staff who speak the world's 
main business language ... 
12 
a) Eurocurrency Markets 
13 
The development of London as a centre for euromarket transactions 
has been well documented. However, it has a special relevance for 
the subject of this chapter for the rapid expansion of the euromarkets, 
more than anything else, has attracted foreign banks to London and 
encouraged the co-operation and joint-ventures to be discussed later. 
While there is no universal agreement as to why this pool of 
funds developed, most experts trace its origin to a culmination of 
factors, particularly the substantial US balance of payments deficits 
during the 1960s, the interest rate premium over US-held dollars which 
eurodollars have offered to depositors and the US exchange control 
regulations. It is certain, however, that the first influx of American 
banks were instrumental in the growth of the markets and especially 
the eurodollar market. 
14 
London branches were initially required to 
borrow eurodollars on a substantial scale to supplement loanable funds 
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at home. Thus rather than relying on head office for resources, they 
were forced into aggressively tapping the eurodollar market and 
effectively transferred domestic banking competition into the international 
arena where US banks were not bound by restrictions or constraints on 
the rate of interest payable and the period for which funds could be 
advanced. The real onslaught began in 1968 with the credit squeeze in 
the US economy and, due largely to the investment made by the US banks, 
the eurocurrency pool more than tripled in the next four years. 
Table 5.5 : Estimated size of the eurocurrency market and 
number of authorised non-sterling banks in the 
UK, 1966-72 
Size ($bn) No. banks 
Beginning 1966 17 157 
1967 22 168 
" 1968 31 177 
" 1969 44 187 
" 1970 57 193 
1971 71 204 
1972 95 213 
Source: B. I. S. and Bankers Trust Co. 
Note: Throughout the period, eurodollars accounted for approximately 
75% of the total eurocurrency pool 
The US balance of payments programme caused US companies to turn 
to European markets to finance their development abroad while the same 
measures effectively cut off New York as a capital market for foreign 
borrowers who also turned to London for short- medium- and long- term 
credits. This further stimulated the demand for eurodollars. In 1970 
official statistics for overseas spending by US-affiliated companies 
showed a 20% rise during 1969 to $12.7 billion. To avoid a steep 
increase in eurodollar rates, US monetary strategists eased domestic 
credit restrictions (the restraint on foreign investment outflows 
meant that,: inevitably, a large proportion of these funds were being 
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raised outside the US) and thus the eruodollar activities of overseas 
banks assumed the prime objective of lending to US overseas corporate 
affiliates direct, in order to finance their operations which, it will 
be remembered were still expanding. 
London, as the world's major eurocurrency centre therefore 
became a necessary link in the development of US banks' overseas 
business. The continuing upsurge in the extent of foreign bank presence 
placed the City in a 'feed-back' situation where its eminence attracted 
more banks, which in turn added to its eminence. Thus whereas in the 
past only the larger US banks had moved overseas, during the late 1960s 
US banks arrived in London at an increasing rate, as international 
business expanded and as the penalty for not being there increased. 
The primary reason was the expanding needs of corporate customers. 
The growing diversity and complexity of multinational operations 
demanded local expertise and in turn local representation. The choice 
of London has also had a secondary origin however, for the requirements 
of servicing international corporations demands a presence in London 
if only for access to the euromarkets. The scale of corporate borrowing 
had become such that no domestic market would have been capable of 
providing the funds. This rationale for US bank expansion is described 
by Baker and Bradford: 
"Since the Eurocurrency and Eurobond markets 
15 
were 
centred in Europe, American banks found it necessary to 
expand branching and subsidiary operations in that area 
in order to participate in this form of financing if they 
were to retain their international firm customers. " 
16 
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The eurocurrency markets then, provided the funds 
11 
which 
could be repatriated to supplement on-shore loanable funds or could 
be loaned direct to companies which had come to London to raise finance, 
an aspect which has become increasingly important. Although not widely 
published, one expects that the dealing operations of foreign banks, 
especially in the inter-bank and foreign exchange markets provided a 
profitable justification in themselves. - 
In summary, the expansion of banks' foreign operations was a 
function of the growth of world trade and investment and was facilitated 
by the development of an efficient market mechanism which put at the 
disposal of borrowers the pool of funds resulting from persistent 
payments deficits in the US. London became the centre of the eurocurrency 
markets partly because of the liberal attitude of the Bank of England 
and partly because of its highly-developed inter-organisational 
communications network. The dollar-based US banks became the predominant 
force in euromarket business, and in turn the lure of the markets and 
prestige of being represented in London attracted smaller US banks 
and gave an impetus to the migration plans of other foreign banks, 
notably those from Japan and the EEC. The attraction of the eurodollar 
market to a commercial bank lay in the opportunities through 
participation in syndicated loans18 of building an international loan 
portfolio with the added advantage of a guaranteed fixed interest spread. 
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b) Intensity of US Bank Entry to London 
It was remarked earlier that the US banks have concentrated 
on the wholesale banking markets. The first challenge therefore, 
to British banks comes in the provision of finance and service to 
international corporate customers. The mass of eurodollar repatriations 
obviously overstates the impact of US banks, but they tend to under- 
state their impact in UK corporate business. The type of business 
transacted and accordingly the impact varies from bank to bank. 
The function of a representative office, for example, is to attract 
potential customers and generate business for the parent bank. On 
the other hand, bank branches are primarily geared towards interna- 
tional money market, operations. The aggressive move towards international 
banking which was characteristic of the US banks in recent years has 
brought about a more competitive operating environment for international 
banks. One response has been to search for additional types of business 
to supplement their earlier reliance on money market operations. 
Although the early US arrivals confined themselves to servicing 
US companies, and their associates and subsidiaries in Britain and Europe, 
it was to be expected that in time they would make inroads into the 
traditional business of British banks. Until 1971, their impact was 
cushioned by two restraints: 
1. The official lending ceiling which blocked the growth 
of sterling loans for recent arrivals; 
2. The concentration of most foreign banks on the 
eurocurrency markets. 
In 1971 the demand for eurodollars fell and foreign banks began to 
look for new lines of business; this coincided with the new freedom 
to lend introduced by Competition and Credit Control. In the fourth 
quarter of 1971, there was a sudden upturn in sterling deposits and 
advances by foreign banks. However, foreign bank competition became 
serious only when British banks' liquidity came under pressure in 
June 1972. The liquidity squeeze was accompanied by a slowly changing 
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attitude in Britain that loyalty to banks was perhaps not essential. 
American banks could not offer the advantages of a big branch network but 
they could offer cut rates on both domestic and foreign business. As a 
result, many, companies formerly wedded to one British bank also employed 
a foreign bank, as R. Fry of The Banker has explained: 
" ... big companies sometimes need more credit than any 
one clearing bank or even two of them combined can 
provide; some companies find it convenient to use a foreign 
bank with a strong overseas network for their international 
business. " 19 
The prime target for US banks became the external business of 
British international companies offering a package of financial services- 
the plan being to use eurocurrency financing as a way of introduction 
to the companies and participate in sterling financing where margins 
were still wider than in the eurodollar market. It was stressed 
nevertheless that foreign exchange'deiling would still have a valuable 
function, providing the resource base for wholesale lending activities 
which were to be the extension of connections made and cemented through 
euromarket dealings. 
2O. 
To an extent the US challenge in this area 
has been helped by British banking attitudes and relative lack of 
development. Since 1971, the active solicitation of business among 
medium-sized customers, including British companies, by aggressive 
marketing methods, has brought a great deal of sterling business to US 
banks. This was reinforced by borrowers beginning to look beyond the 
overdraft facilities traditionally offered by clearing banks to term 
loans which the secondary banks, including the clearing banks subsidiaries 
were advancing. Fry again summarises this point: 
t 
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"Although the British clearing banks have developed 
their international. resources, ... their experience, 
in most cases, is still rather recent. The American 
banks, as well as ... other foreign banks, are making 
much of their special skill in offering an all-round financial 
service overseas. " 
21 
This relative lack of expertise was coupled with the traditional 
tacit agreement among British banks that direct solicitation was to 
be avoided; hence, despite the clearing and merchant banks' 'domination' 
of the British financial scene, the early 1970s saw the 'middle ground' 
falling to the more forceful US banks. 
The form of the American challenge has varied widely. After 
1970, the most notable changes in entry strategy were moves to take 
interests in British financial institutions and multinational consortia. 
Moreover, those banks already in London, increased their presence by 
taking shareholdings in a similar way; Bankers Trust, for example 
acquired Rodo International and re-named it Bankers Trust International. 
Table 5.6 shows those minority interest held by foreign banks in UK 
banks, the majority of whose capital is British-owned. 
22 
Table 5.6 : US Banks' Minority Interests in UK Banks, 1973 
Shareholding Date 
% Taken 
Chase Manhattan 12 
Citibank 40 
F. N. B. Chicago 20 
F. N. B. Maryland 25 
Franklin Nat Bank* 7 
Int. Bank Washington 50 
J. P. Morgan 32 
Philadelphia 
National Bank 8 
Texas Commerce Bank 35 
1965 
1969 
1972 
1970 
1970 
1964 
1936 
1965 
1968 Burston & Texas 
Commercial Bk 
Bank Other main 
Shareholders 
Midland (4) 
Standard Chartered Nat. West. (8) 
National & Grindlay N&G Hodgs (60) 
Commercial Bank 
of Wales 
Hodge Group (60) 
1st Maryland Stern Family (75) 
Sterling Indl. Crown Agents (32) 
Securities NM Rothschild (7) 
Eagle Star (10) 
Security Tst. Interests of A5) 5) Co. Birmingham Sir Isaac Watsorl 
Morgan Grenfell - 
Arbuthnot Latham ICFC (21) 
Chartered Bk '(8) 
Pearl Assnce (8) 
Burston & Texas Burston Gp. (65) 
*In liquidation Source: The Banker 
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c) Breadth of US Bank Entry to London 
The recent attempts by US banks to expand their services in 
Europe and particularly in the UY. by establishing subsidiaries and 
affiliates have sometimes, but not always, interlocked with their 
commercial branch banking base. Most of the early consortia set up 
with US participation have since been superseded by the setting up of 
US merchant bank subsidiaries. Thus the growth of US international 
banking has manifested itself in more than the mere geographical 
expansion of branch and subsidiary networks. A comcomitant of the 
increased size of international company activities is the demand for 
more complex requirements and larger financial packages. Apart from 
the formation of specific consortia, US banks have become established 
through subsidiaries in merchant banking and near-banking activities. 
The setting-up of subsidiaries has its origin in the strict 
limitations on the scope of branching activities and types of business 
which banks can practice in the US. 
23 
The most important restraints 
are those imposed by the Edge Act which permits bank branches abroad 
to carry on only those activities they could in the US; hence the original 
concentration on domestic commercial banking activities, and recent 
diversification achieved by subsidiary or joint-venture operations. 
It is also important to distinguish between investment and commercial 
banking, as it is perceived in America. Mist of the activities 
referred to so far have been in the commercial banking sphere; 
investment banking on the other hand, may be loosely described as 
'merchant banking'; its most important activity is the underwriting 
of (euro) bond issues, which US commercial banks are forbidden to 
do by law. Thus to an extent, the wholly owned merchant banking 
subsidiaries are a vehicle for US commercial banks to participate in 
investment banking operations. 
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Merchant Banking 
Since their inception, US merchant bank subsidiaries have 
stressed the international aspects of merchant banking. They have 
specialised in both primary (issuing and underwriting) and secondary 
(dealing) eurobond business; the granting of higher risk medium-term 
credits in several forms and in various currencies; and project 
financing. Perhaps more than any other area, these vaguely defined 
international merchant banking services offer scope for competition. 
Of particular relevance to British banks is the fact that these 
activities were being carried out mainly by the UK accepting houses 
before the US incursion. The sophisticated techniques, flexibility as 
autonomous specialist subsidiaries and world-wide links of their parents, 
have increasingly favoured the US merchant banks. To date, however 
the traditional London merchant banks have maintained their 'monopoly' 
in domestic corporate finance, which, in view of the dearth of new 
issues and takeover bids since 1974 has been critical to their existence. 
24 
Near Banking 
The breadth of US banking expansion also includes an attempt to 
break into the provision of such near-banking activities as factoring, 
leasing, instalment credit, insurance broking and money shops. The 
extent of this challenge is recorded in Table 5.7. Quite frequently 
these ventures have been in conjunction with British financial 
intermediaries: for example, the link between F. N. B. of Boston and 
Lloyds and Scottish to provide a factoring service. 
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Table 5.7 : 
-ý 
U3 Banks with Interest in UK Non-Bank 
I'ý. n ýncLa 1 Vrn t_ur'? s 19/4 
Shareholding Date Financial Business Other Main 
% Taken Institution Description Partners % 
American Express 25 1968 Crusader Insurance C. T. Bowring (75) 
Insurance 
American Express 50 1971 LB/AMEX Agency* Lazards (50) 
Bank of America 51 1971 B. of A/11m. Factoring Wm & Glyn's (31) 
Glyn's Fact. 
Chase Manhattan 42 1967 Equipment Leasing Hambros (29) 
Leasing 
Chemical Bank 100 1973 Chemco Fin. Leasing - -- 
Services 
Continental 10 1964 H&H FactorsFactoring Hambros (25) 
Illinois 
F. N. B. Boston 25 1961 Intl Factors Factoring Lloyds & (75) 
Scottish 
F. N. B. Boston 100 1972 Boston Tst Consumer 
- - 
& Savings Finance 
Citibank 100 1970 Citibank Consumer 
Fin. Tst. Finance 
Citibank 100 1970 Citicorp Leasing - - 
Leasing 
Grand Trust 100 1971 Penn Invs. Holding Co. - - 
Manuf. Hanover 100 1963- Commercial Export 
- - 1970 Expt. Credit Finance 
Manuf. Hanover 100 1973 Ocean H. P. - - 
Acceptances 
J. P. Morgan 25 1973 HFC Trust Consumer Household (75) 
Finance Fin. Corp 
J. P. Morgan 100 1974 Morgan Gnty Inv. 
- - Inv. Services Management 
14. Carolina as 1974 Carolina Leasing - - N. Bank Leasing 
Philadelphia N. 78 1972 Phil. Credit Finance Arbuthnot (22) 
Bank Holdings Company Latham 
Union Bank of 1971 Unionamerica Reinsurance - - California - - Insurance 
*Set up to co-ordinate the activities of these two banks in eurocurrency loan trans- 
actions 
Source: The Banker 
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The penetration of British domestic business has also been achieved 
by the provision of consumer credit. Citibank, for example, bought an 
existing finance house, Campbell Discount and planned to sell the service 
through its money shops. The latter were an attempt to capture some of 
the 55% of the UK working population without a banking account. These 
moves marked a departure from the US banks' concentration on wholesale 
banking activities and within two years of the establishment of the 
first money shop (by Citibank in 1970) there was speculation about a 
major threat to traditional retail banking. 
25 
The speculation was given 
some support by the fact that 40-50% of new customers already had 
clearing bank accounts. 
The money shop movement involved the leading US banks: 
notably, Citibank, Chase Manhattan and F. N. B. Boston (through Boston 
Trust and Savings). Since 1973, however the expansion has tailed off 
owing largely to the straitened economic circumstances. 
Banking Techniques 
Inevitably the US banks have imported a number of banking techniques 
from their domestic markets. Some of the new ideas have been adopted by 
British banks. For example, negotiable CDs and, more importantly, 
term loans and project financing. The profound influence of the growth 
of foreign banks in London has been partly reflected in the techniques 
adopted by City banks - and because medium term eurocurrency lending is 
an aspect of international corporate banking, it is associated with the 
'internationalisation' of British banking. Beyond this, the growth 
of foreign banks is one facet of the transformation of the structure 
of London's banking business in the 1960s, especially with respect 
to servicing large international corporations. However, new techniques 
are only one side of the foreign banking influence. The other side is 
the weight these banks have had in shaping the direction of British banking 
development. 
- 153 - 
nccnccmnnt 
A tentative conclusion at this stage would be that while US banks 
have had little impact on domestic retail banking (witness the limited 
effect of money shops) which is relatively over-banked, their position in 
the City's wholesale and international markets has been formidable. 
Since competition and credit control in 1971, they have also gained a 
sizeable portion of UK domestic business. As UK corporations began to 
expand internationally through the 1960s and early 1970s, a situation 
threatened where foreign banks would be preferred for international 
banking requirements. Thus US banks found that by concentrating their 
activities in this area they could develop a large portion of business 
controlled from London. Herein lies the importance for indigenous banks, 
of the loss of domestic business to the Americans. 
The phenomenal growth of the eurodollar market brought to the City 
a new era of international prestige and renewed competition, in the 
merchant banking sector, for the business of large international corporations. 
It also had a considerable impact on the City's traditional institu- 
tions giving a new impetus to the British merchant banks and providing 
the key attraction to the host of foreign banks which came to London. 
During the 1960s the foreign banks, and to a lesser extent the accepting 
houses, began to cross the demarcation lines which the clearing banks 
had created for themselves. This dispelled the clearers' complacency 
and perhaps invoked a positive response by inducing the acceptance of US 
banking techniques including aggressive marketing policies and the competitive 
bidding for commercial wholesale business. The salutary lesson went 
further, however; the breadth of foreign bank entry, especially the strength 
of the trend towards expanding international merchant banking activity 
stressed the profit opportunities and impression that retail banking was 
full to capacity. In addition the diversity may have impressed the need 
for universal banking structures as a precursor to international expansion, 
in order to compete with the one-stop banking services offered by, for 
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example, the German banks. 
5.3 : U. K. banks' response 
The creation of such institutions as the IMF, GATT and the World 
Bank, while indicating the misalignment of political and economic 
power throughout the world, also demonstrates the growing emphasis on 
certain types of international co-operation alongside the re-emergence 
of nationalism. The principal emerging trend in the international 
financial environment has been the multinational company. Its emergence 
has been described as: 
" ... the most important institutional change in 
international business during the next quarter 
century ... the international production of goods 
and services, rather than traditional export/import 
trade, will be the main focus of these world businesses. " 
26 
U. K. banks' internationalization has taken many varied forms. 
Barclays Bank's network, for example, is multinational in the sense 
that its branches are far-flung; the same may be said of the British 
overseas banks whose rationale was originally wide-spread retail coverage. 
In orientation the British accepting houses may make similar claims. 
The Earl of Cromer, in his foreword to the most recent book on merchant 
banking, characterises the members of the Accepting Houses Committee, 
as follows: 
" ... the international experience, the international expertise 
and the international approach are of particular importance. 
These houses have experience in trade and investment througout 
the world in all the varying political, economic and market 
conditions that have occurred since the beginning of the last 
century and the clients that they have served have included the 
governments of probably every country in the world. " 
27 
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Wh i-10 possessirnq the repot t: ion of the azchctyrial l: uylisnn institution, 
paradoxically, nearly all. the originators were foreigners. The Rothschilds 
came from Frankfurt; the Barings from Bremen; the Warburgs, and the 
Schroders from Hamburg; the Lazards from Alsace and the Brandts from 
St. Petersburg. 
28 
The discussion of the previous section has highlighted four main 
causes for the internationalisation of world banking; a fifth one 
applies to British banks, in particular: 
1. The growing financial requirements and diversity of 
services demanded by industrial corporations which have 
outrun conventional banking sources; 
2. The development of the multinational corporation; 
3. The rapid growth of the eurodollar market, followed 
by the establishment and subsequent growth of the 
eurobond market; 
4. In a European context, the prospect of an 'integrated' 
economic and political unit, embracing most of Western Europe; 
5. The increase in competition for wholesale banking 
business experienced since the end of 1971 in both 
domestic and eurocurrency markets, in London. 
Internationalisation has been accompanied and influenced by merger 
and diversification. Functional expansion and the assumption of multi- 
product status achieved by a majority of British banks may be seen as 
a prelude to international expansion. Here, various degrees of co-operation 
have been the rule rather than the exception in achieving some form of 
geographical expansion. Three ways can be discerned in which a bank can 
develop its international business: 
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1. Independent action - acquisition of subsidiaries or 
extension of branch networks; extension of inter- 
national banking operations, including corporate advice; 
2. Co-operation to varying degrees with foreign banks. 
This can be institutional, involving common participations 
in each other's capital, or the establishment of a subsidiary 
in which a number of banks have shareholdings (consortia); 
or, operational, which includes temporary ad hoc groupings 
for particular international financings, involving 
syndicates or agreements. Evidence of the widespread participa- 
tion in syndications is seen from 'tombstone' advertisements 
in the financial press; 
3. Transnational merger - this option has not yet been taken 
up. Some of the more formal relationships concluded in 
recent years have advanced towards full amalgamations, but, 
further links are likely to be dependent on progress in 
harmonization and integration in the EEC, more especially 
in the fiscal company law field. 
5.3.1 : Independent Action 
5.3.1.1 : Breaking with Tradition 
The growth attained and sustained by British clearing banks 
through their overseas bank subsidiaries acquired for British banks 
a considerable world standing, as Nevin & Davis remark: 
"For nearly a generation British joint-stock banks remained 
in terms of deposits, the largest in the world, and the 
international network of their subsidiaries dominated finance 
in many areas, especially in the British Dominions and Colonies. " 
30 
In the 1960s however, British banks lagged behind their US counter- 
parts in organising operations on a world-wide scale. This was for 
a number of reasons. First, they had been operating in a controlled 
domestic environment. Secondly, they had not developed the same aggressive 
approach to seeking out new business. Thirdly, at the start of the 1960s 
most British banks were relatively small and not until 1968, did banks 
emerge that were capable of competing internationally. Fourth, the clients 
of European banks had expanded abroad less than US firms. Finally the 
overseas banking experience of British banks was limited to retail 
operations in colonial and ex-colonial territories and had tended to 
be kept quite separate from domestic activities. 
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With the growth of international trade after the second world war, 
the traditional reliance on correspondent relationships, which had been 
the main way of servicing international commercial requirements, began 
to prove inadequate. The advent of international investment brought 
forth an unprecedented growth of multinational companies and with it a 
new era of international banking, centred on the eurocurrency markets. 
New competitors began to compete for the custom of European corporate 
business. In the 1960s the largest US banks, restrained from widespread 
branch expansion at home, emerged as active competitors in many overseas 
territories (including Britain) where the subsidiaries and affiliates 
of the British clearing banks had long enjoyed a privileged position. 
Perhaps the magnitude of the threat was emphasised by the stakes taken 
in the British overseas banks by the Americans: for example, Citibank's 
40% holding in National & Grindlays, and Chase Manhattan's 14% interest 
in Standard Chartered. 
31 
The reality of the challenge was manifest in 
the US banks' achievements in the sterling money markets, especially 
since the loss of the clearers' competitive advantage (cheap deposits) 
after the mid-1972 credit crisis and the rapid rise in interest rates in 
the preceding year. Moreover, the challenge extended beyond wholesale 
deposit taking; in the retail market they set up money shops and, of 
more significance, the establishment of US merchant bank subsidiaries 
threatened the dominance of London merchant banks in the arrangement of 
corporate financial services. 
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This section will consider the British banks' independent response. 
in an international context, the 1968 bank mergers may be seen as an 
essential. pre-requisite for independent geographical expansion. Two 
factors crucially affect the success of directly extending a wholesale 
branch network, without recourse to consortia or groupings. First, 
size, often cited as a reason for linking with other banks in eurocurrency 
operations; second, a world-wide branch network. The links effected in 
1968 were the realisation that, despite their dominance in the domestic 
retail markets, the clearing banks' international aspirations were inhibited 
by their relatively small size. 
32 
Similar moves by many merchant and 
British overseas banks also indicate that size had become a valuable asset. 
In terms of assets and deposits the clearing banks remain the strongest 
contenders; this is also true on the second point - mainly through their 
subsidiaries, the clearing banks had achieved world-wide representation, 
as indeed the British overseas banks had done. However, the location 
of their branches in the Commonwealth and Colonies, and their emphasis 
on retail banking which had suited the traditional needs of trade finance 
were quickly becoming anachronistic. As international business grew in 
size, its complexity also increased and while local expertise remained 
essential and therefore local representation desirable, the need was 
to concentrate on the provision of wholesale services. Requirements 
were two-fold: firstly, a positive break with the geographical legacies 
of the past, with a new focus on America/Japan/Europe; seoncdly, a 
shift in the mix of business -a decline in retail banking (transferring 
traditional activities to local institutions) and a new accent on 
activities associated with international commercial and investment banking. 
This would represent therefore recognition of the prime objective of 
increasing their international coverage and service to customers for 
whom retail services were already adequately provided.,. 
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The need for rationalization became apparent with 
the growth of the European multinational corporation 
which by the end of the 1960s was challenging the dominant Americans in 
world foreign investment. 
33 
Given the existing US banking networks, 
the wider operating scale and growing demands for a broad banking service 
that characterised the expansion of European business, meant that if 
facilities were not forthcoming from their domestic banks, they would turn 
to the Americans, and once the connection had been made it might be 
extended. 
Thus one motive for British and European banks to expand abroad 
was defensive - to forestall their clients turning to their international 
and particularly U. S. competitors. Moreover, the Monopolies Commission 
report of 1968 effectively erected a barrier against further inter- 
clearing bank mergers; the expansion and progressive breaking down of 
institutional demarcations improved competitive capabilities by providing 
the base from which to offer a comprehensive range of services. In 
addition as banks reached their national growth limits, a natural response 
was to turn abroad. Nevertheless, the incursion of foreign banks into 
their own territory was probably the catalyst, for without an active 
extension of their international activities, the threat remained that 
the City of London would become increasingly dominated by foreign-owned 
institutions, remitting their profits overseas. 
Thus one would expect direct participation in international 
banking activities to be centred around wholesale aspects (due to the 
importance of large companies) which reflected the foreign bank activities 
in London and the need to exploit international capabilities. The require- 
ments of sophisticated advice on international finance and exchange controls, 
also stressed, the significance of expertise and experience. In this respect, 
the UK accepting houses were well-placed, but lacked the resources to develop 
an extensive branch network since their business focus did not require 
a widespread deposit-taking capability. In terms of size and branch networks, 
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the clearing banks were the only British institutions which, acting 
independently, could challenge the dominance of the US banks and the 
impending threat of the Japanese. 
5.3.1.2 : Clearing Banking/British Overseas Banking 
The experience of commercial banks in international wholesale 
banking markets has emphasised the importance of large size -- both in terms 
of a substantial capital base and a large deposit base. With respect to 
the U. K., this premium on size immediately focuses attention on the deposit 
banks, and in particular, the 'Big Four'. 
Without acting in concert, smaller banks have been virtually 
precluded from direct participation (on a large scale) in the new era of 
international barking competition. The immense sums required for project 
financing (for example, North Sea oil exploration) tend to be beyond 
even the largest banks' capacity. More than one bank, then, may be 
approached. This is unavoidable and is dictated by circumstances. The 
danger facing the clearing banks, however has been that while they may 
remain a company's 'domestic banker', a foreign bank, probably from the 
US, with a wide-spread branch network would be chosen as the 'international 
banker'. Both the clearing banks and overseas banks have developed the 
capacity and expertise backed by research in attempts to retain and/or 
improve their opportunities. 
34 
Beyond doubt British banking mentality 
has been stimulated by the efforts of the foreign banks operating in 
London, and one reaction has been to adopt some of the techniques 
introduced by the US banks such as medium-term eurocurrency lending 
and the issue of certificates of deposit. 
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The traditional demarcation in the British financial sector, with 
intermediaries anchored in particular markets would have hindered development. 
The provision of international wholesale services by a clearing bank 
which had domestic retail banking experience but limited knowledge of 
merchant banking and a tenuous link with an overseas bank would clearly 
be untenable. 
35 
Moreover, even with the rationalization of structure, 
the integration of a far-flung overseas network, still left the problem 
of transforming correspondent relationships, designed to accommodate 
retail demand, to comply with the growing demand from international 
companies for eurocurrency finance on an international scale. 
The debate has centred around the most appropriate methods of 
extending international coverage and adapting inherited structures in 
order to reflect the predominant feature - the growth in international 
wholesale banking business. In this section the analysis is confied 
to direct representation and will attempt to answer two main questions : 
1. Should international representation be restricted to 
an extensive coverage of wholesale banking activities, 
indicating the most important services provided for 
multinational companies, or should it include the retention 
(or creation) of retail business, if only to provide a stable 
deposit base in foreign currencies? 
2. Should development abroad be approached by building a new 
operation, or acquiring an existing one? 
a) Clearing Bank experience 
It is accepted that comprehensive direct representation is the 
preserve of the largest banks, but there is little consensus on the methods 
employed nor on how merchant banking capabilities should. be accommodated 
within a large group, and whether or not international services should 
be supplied by departments, branches or integrated subsidiaries under 
the control of the group's central management. The clearing and overseas 
banks are considered, jointly, for, they share to some exT 'LQ 
ý 
the problems (? 
noted above and are quite different in orientation from the UK merchant 
banks. Moreover, where a clearing bank has opted for independent action 
a significant proportion of its overseas development has been through its 
,.,,,, _,,. _ _ overseas banking subsidiary. 
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The extent to which direct action, as opposed to some form of 
co-operation has figured in a bank's strategy, has quite clearly been 
a legacy of their evolution. Barclays and Lloyds had the most extensive 
overseas banking links, and they have been most dependent on an extended 
and rationalized branch coverage. National Westminster which lacked a 
constituent overseas bank concentrated on establishing a representation 
in the world's major financial centres. In contrast, Midland has concentrated 
on co-operation with its European partners in EBIC. This is a path which 
only Lloyds has rejected. 
Barclays 
Barclays can boast the largest geographical representation of 
any of the 4 clearing banks. At 30 September, 1973, the offices of 
Barclays International and its subsidiaries numbered 1650 in 50 countries. 
The spread of branches reflecting the bank's extensive retail network was 
largely concentrated in France, South Africa and California. Over 870 
offices in the Republic of South Africa and South-West Africa produced 
27% of total deposits and 43% of deposits from outside the UK. The 
retail network in France involved 22 offices and yielded 18% of total 
international deposits. Both these networks were long-standing but the 
more recent development in the US is a reflection of contemporary 
pressures to expand. Barclays Bank of California was established with 
29 branches in 1973 and an existing business was acquired and re-named 
Barclays Bank of New York. The full network of branches is reproduced 
in Appendix 8. 
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To signify the end of colonial banking and dawning of international 
banking, Barclays integrated DCO with the parent, merging the foreign 
business of the domestic bank into the wholly--owned subsidiary. The 
result, Barclays International, has since become the vehicle for international 
expansion, opening new offices throughout the Par East and in Europe; 
Frankfurt (1971); Milan (1972); Amsterdam (1972); and Brussels (1972). 
Although B. B. I. still carried on domestic retail banking business in 
several traditional territories, the new branches and offices were for 
wholesale business. 
L1. oyds 
Lloyd's approach has understandably centred around the rationalization 
of the extensive overseas branch network of its subsidiaries. It has 
pursued a policy of direct expansion by merger, takeover and new branch 
formation. The base was provided by the long-standing expertise of 
B. O. L. S. A., with experience in the eurocurrency and eurobond markets and 
well-established connections in Latin America. In 1971, Lloyds Bank Europe, 
a retail deposit bank, was merged into B. O. L. S. A. forming Lloyds and BOLSA 
International. Full ownership was acquired in 1973, and the wholly- 
owned subsidiary was re-named Lloyds Bank International in April 1974. 
The combined group's strength involved 43 banking offices in Europe, 
123 in Latin America and representative offices in Caracas, Hongkong, 
Mexico City, Singapore, Sydney and Tokyo. The gap in North America was 
filled by the acquisition of First Western Bank and Trust Company which 
had 95 branches in California. In September 1974, the bank was re-named 
Lloyds Bank California. Its presence in the US was recently increased 
by the purchase of the failed First State Bank of Northern California. 
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In addition Lloyds' acquisition of the National Bank of New Zealand in 1966 
provided the parent with 204 offices in New Zealand. 
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National Westminster 
The creation of National Westminster brought together constituents 
with a limited overseas presence. National Provincial's nominal foreign 
involvement was through a link with Rothschild (the forerunner to 
Rothschild Intercontinental Bank) and Westminster Foreign Bank which 
engaged in money market operations. From this base the bank has made 
strenuous efforts to expand its international network. Its main operating 
subsidiary is International Westminster which has become a force in the 
eurocurrency markets and has branches in France (6), Belgium (3), 
Germany (1) and the Bahamas (1). 
Its independent strategy has been the most varied of the clearing 
banks. Firstly, it gained quotes on the bourses of Paris, Amsterdam and 
West Germany. Secondly, it has concentrated on extending representation 
by creating its own representative offices and branches and also by the 
acquisition of local interests. By 1974, branches were established in 
Greece, Japan, Singapore and the US; representative offices in Australia, 
Bahrain, Canada, Hongkong, Spain and the USSR; and an agency in San 
Francisco. 
In 1973 acquisitions figured predominantly and reflected a European 
bias. Apart from a 31% holding in Banca Milanese di Credito, re-styled 
Creditwest SpA, the bank owned 25% of RoyWest Banking based in Nassau. 
During that year National Westminster acquired 25% of the holding company 
which controls the Dutch banking firm of F van Lanschot, the seventh 
largest commercial bank in Holland. In France, agreement was reached 
with Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (Paribas) where National Westminster 
acquired 20% of the share capital of Union Bancaire which itself virtually 
controlled the two leading private sector French banks of Credit de Nord 
et de L'Union Paristenne. 
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The result of the European expansion prompted the following 
comment in the 1974 Annual Report and Accounts: 
"These investments, together with the Group's existing 
branches in Belgium, France and Germany, provide the most 
comprehensive branch and service coverage in Western 
Europe of any financial institution, and give the Group very 
substantial financial strength. " 
Despite the European coverage, the clearing bank lacks a substantial 
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presence in North America, where it has so far concentrated on carrying 
out mainly wholesale banking business through a limited number of branches. 
Two interesting features appear from the three clearing banks' 
independent expansion overseas. First the retention of a global retail 
deposit base which emphasises the need for a stable source of funds in 
foreign currencies. Secondly, the creation of deposit bases in countries 
where customers operated. These factors were summarised by the then chief 
executive of Orion Multinational Services in 1971: 
"The backbone of financing in any given country is 
obviously going to be in the currency of the country 
itself. Eurocurrencies present an important alternative, 
certainly. But they are no substitute. " 
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Finally, as an indication of the importance of international 
banking to the clearing banks - an analysis of trading profits 
(before tax and exceptional items) is as follows: 
(£m) 1973 1974 
total 184.5 120.3 
Nat. West. international 13.1 21.7 
% international 7% 18% 
total 173.0 158.1 
Barclays international 46.4 58.2 
% international 27% 37% 
Source: Annual Reports and Accounts 
Note: Lloyds do not give a breakdown 
b) British Overseas Bank experience 
The geographical and functional focus of the independent overseas 
banks has undergone an perhaps even more fundamental change. Some of 
the moves were forced by the political vagaries of the third world, but 
the most significant changes have been deliberate acts of policy. The 
most important development has been the move towards international 
eurocurrency and merchant banking. The growth in currency deposits with 
overseas banks from 1966-73 was such that they were second only to the US 
banks in the eurocurrency markets. From 1966 to 1971, National and Grindlays 
reported that 57% of its group profits and over / of total deposits were 
derived from London operations. The growing weight of London activities 
reflected that international wholesale banking did not require widespread 
profit centres. 
- . 
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A decision to tap European markets followed the mergers and re- 
organisations in this sector, discussed in Chapter three. National and 
Grindlays, for example, acquired the European branches of the Ottoman Bank; 
and Standard Chartered chose branch formation to give "a wider base 
for their increasingly important European operations. " 
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The links with 
US commercial banks on the other hand, gave an impetus to expansion into 
the US : B. O. L. S. A's link with Mellon Bank which was taken over by 
Lloyds Bank in 1973; Citibank's stake in National and Grindlays; and 
Chase's holding of 11.9% of Standard Chartered's equity (disposed of in 
1974/75) are all examples. 
In addition to their own concentration on merchant banking, 
National and Grindlays now has full ownership of Wm. Brandts, while 
Standard Chartered has a 9% trade investment in Arbuthnot Latham, owns 
49% of Tozer Standard and Chartered and has merchant banking interests 
in Africa and the Far East. 
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5.3.1.3 : Merchant Banking 
In parallel with the growth of commercial banking business - 
centred on the eurocurrency credit markets - there has been an expansion 
of other banking services, equally geared to the multinational corporation 
and foreign provincial and national governments. These services, co]. l. ectively 
known as investment or merchant banking, are founded on a bank's expertise 
and the reputation which it has earned in the market, rather than financial 
muscle. They include the issue and trading of bonds, private placements 
and other corporate financial advice, particularly in connection with 
mergers and acquisitions. Indigenous merchant banks have traditionally 
dominated the domestic markets for merchant banking services, but the 
internationalisation of banking has brought U. K. accepting houses into 
competition with foreign investment banking houses, notably those from 
the U. S., West Germany and Switzerland, and more recently with certain 
consortium banks. Few U. K. merchant banks retained their position as 
leading 'new issue' banks, and with the notable exception of Warburgs, 
the lead management of international capital debt became dominated by 
Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse White Weld (CSWW), Morgan Stanley, Wood Grundy 
and Westdeutsche Landesbank among other American and European banks. 
The growth strategy of U. K. merchant banks in face of such 
competition has been inhibited by the small size of their deposit and 
capital bases. Their contribution to international banking has nonetheless 
been significant. It has emanted from the management of investment 
banking business, notably eurobond issues and corporate advice. 
Their international orientation, has also resulted in representation and 
acquisitions throughout Europe; this is reproduced in tabular form in 
Appendix 9. 
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One can also discern less tangible signs. In December, 1971, 
Singer & Friedlander, using the experience of the UK companies register. 
it had operated since 1968, joined with a number of European and US 
companies to set up a similar register on an international scale. 
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Its main aim was to arrange mergers between medium-sized companies in 
different countries in Europe and North America, and advise on other 
joint business ventures and licensing arrangements. _ 
A more significant event followed the Bank of England's relaxation 
in November, 1972 of rules governing the acquisition of accepting houses. 
In March 1973, a close relationship was established between Warburgs 
and Paribas. The latter took a 25% stake in Warburgs and, in exchange, 
Warburgs acquired 50% of a new company, Paribas-Warburgs SA which was 
formed and jointly owned by Warburgs and Compagnie Financiere de Paris 
et des Pays Bas. The new bank owns 25% of Banque de Paris et des Pays 
Bas SA in France, and 20% each of the bank's branches (under the same name) 
in the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland. In the US, the business 
of SG Warburg Inc and Paribas Corporation were combined as Warburg-Paribas 
Inc (equally owned by the parents). A further merger was also agreed 
with AG Becker, another US investment bank. 
Two more recent moves confirm the contemporary importance of 
international banking to the UK merchant banks. In June 1976 it was 
announced that N. M. Rothschild were examining the possibilities of forging 
closer links with the Continental Rothschilds. The planned moves may 
be interpreted as a means to expand international activity. Secondly, 
the list of appointments to senior positions in Guinness Mahon, after 
the departure of Sir Charles Villiers, were also reported as having an 
'international flavour'; Mr. Donald Robson from International Commercial 
Sank was brought in as chairman and a French executive from Lloyds Bank 
International joined the board. 
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The moves described above, in common with tr`je activities of the 
clearing and overseas banks, have involved independent initiative, in 
the sense that they have excluded participations in formal groupings 
or consortia. The amalgam of retail deposits and money market deposits 
for wholesale banking remains a necessity for the overseas banks; for the 
clearing banks, the acquisition of existing banks with developed branch 
networks appears to have been the most convenient way of extending coverage; 
as expected, the merchant banks have displayed a variety of strategies. 
5.3.2 Co-operation (I) Banking Clubs 
If the independent action of British banks began to assume a 
European slant, the advent of alliances between banks has involved 
European banks exclusively. The timing of the establishment of the 
European Banking Clubs indicates that the EEC, and in particular British 
entry, prompted their formation, and UK bank participation. 
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There are four such banking groups, three of which involve U. K. 
deposit banks. They are listed in Table 5.8. 
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Table 5. £3 . 'European Banking Clubs 
ERIC (1971) 
Participants Country Nat World 
Posn. Posn. 
Amro Bank Neth. 3 48 
Banca Commerciale Ital. It. 2 24 
Creditanstalt Bankverein Aus. 1 109 
Deutsche Bank WG 1 6 
Midland Bank UK 3 27 
Societe Generale Fr. 4 8 
Societe General de Banque Bel. 1 67 
ABECOR (1971) 
Participants Country 
Nat World 
Posn. Posn. 
Algenrene Bank Nederland Neth. 1 42 
Banca Naz. del Lavoro it. 1 20 
Banque de Bruxelles Bel. 3 81 
Banque Nationale de Paris Fr. 2 5 
Bayerische Hypo-und Wechsel WG 7 51 
Dresdner Bank WG 2 14 
Barclays Bank UK 1 9 
INTER-ALPHA (1972) 
Participants Country 
Nat World 
Posn. Posn. 
Banco Ambrosiano it. 18 200 
Berliner Handel-Frankfurter WG 28 273 
Credit Commercial de France Fr. 7 122 
Krediethank Bel. 4 91 
Nederlande Middenstandbank Neth. 4 104 
Privatbanken A/S Den. 3 254 
Williams & Glyn's* UK 7 102 
*(part of National & Commerci al Banking Group) 
EUROPARTNERS (1970) also call ed CCB 
Participants Country Nat World 
Posn. Posn. 
Banco di Roma it. 3 40 
Credit Lyonnais pr. 3 7 
Commerzbank WG 4 26 
Note: National and world rankings are from The Banker, June 1976 
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Group banking dates back to the early 1960s when NM Rothschild developed 
a close relationship with other European banks in the so-called Five Arrows 
Group (joining merchant banks and banques d'affaires, comprising Banque 
Lambert-Belgium-, Banque Privee-Switzerland-, PHP -Holland-, Banque 
Rothschild -France-, and the English Rothschilds). It was from this group 
that Rothschild Inter-continental Bank (R. I. B. ) evolved. 
It is evident that British bankers saw not only the need for a wider 
spread of banking facilities for international business; they also saw 
the difficulties inherent in independent geographical expansion. As a 
result, external expansion was favoured by some British banks and to 
ameliorate the problems posed by financial and managerial requirements, 
they often chose to pool resources through the setting-up of joint operations. 
With hindsight, one can now distinguish between the different kinds 
of cross-frontier banking co-operation. In the course of the present 
and next section it should become apparent that the emergence of co-operation, 
formal and informal, has been the most recent and important feature of 
international banking development. The distinction between these groupings 
and the specialist consortia (5.33) can best be seen by comparing the 
rationale of their establishment and their mode of operation. 
5.3.2.1 : Rationale and Motivation 
The original motivation behind the international banking groups 
was basically defensive and intended to counter the challenge of the rapid 
overseas expansion of the US banks. The club concept is very much a 
European one, and has attracted eight of Europe's largest banks, and the 
largest banks from Austria, West Germany, the UK, Holland, Italy and Belgium. 
However, the appeal has been specialised involving, with a few exceptions, 
those banks lacking substantive overseas representation. Thus, while 
Lloyds concentrated on rationalizing and integrating its overseas organisation, 
Midland (with virtually no overseas branch network) was attracted by the 
alternative of transnational European groupings. It did not involve the 
considerable expenditure and time associated with the independent 
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acquisition or organic expansion of a branch network, yet it assured access 
to local deposits and economised on staff and capital costs. Similar 
considerations applied to the three members of Europartners (the so-called 
'quasi-merger') and to the seven smaller banks which formed Inter-Alpha. 
Because this European creation is a recent phenomenon, all four clubs 
have been formed since 1970, and is considered to be "a continuing feature 
of international group banking", 
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an objective judgement of progress to 
1973, is not feasible. One is limited to assessing their place in the 
developing structure of international banking and to analyse some of their 
claimed qualities. 
While the original motivation was perhaps defensive, this force 
seems to have affected timing rather than intention. Barclays' recent 
involvement in the expansion and reconstitution of ABECOR, marked a change 
in their approach to international banking. One suspects that this was 
solely for the EEC group of countries having taken the view that co-operation 
with local banks is essential to achieve effective penetration in the 
demarcated national banking markets of Europe. In this respect it 
parallels the approach adopted by Midland. 
The objective of the groups has been to develop co-operation within 
Europe with a steering committee and a common secretariat to guide future 
plans. In this, they are contrasted with the very often specific aims of the 
consortium bank. Beyond such intangibles, an indication of 'success' would 
be the generation of more business for each other than other, less formal, 
bank relationships would have produced. The announcement that both EBIC 
and CCB were introducing systems to facilitate the supply of funds for 
corporate customers, from partner banks in their countries of operation, 
for example, EBICREDIT was not as novel as might be expected. The international 
connections of UX merchant banks have in the past provided an equivalent 
service. Moreover, the relationships developing between shareholder banks 
of consortia add a further question mark to the club concept. In retrospect, 
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perhaps the competitive disadvantage of the participating banks was the 
main cause of their involvement. The advantages of wide membership and 
extensive geographical coverage may be moderated by accentuated problems 
of cohesion and control. In the long-term, success, as measured by the 
generation of new business, will hinge on efficient integration of the banks' 
international departments. CCB has perhaps achieved the greatest progress 
in this respect. In contrast, structural problems have prevented Midland 
and its co-members from unification. Ironically the most visible forms 
of co-operation to the outside observer, are the joint-ventures which are 
off-shoots of the clubs. Arrangements made for mutual participation in the 
capital of finance companies and financing institutions have frequently 
assumed the guise of consortium banks - with which the clubs were earlier 
contrasted. 
5.3.2.2 : European Banking Clubs 
The rationale, progress and problems mentioned above are illustrated 
in the following sketches of the four clubs. Less attention is devoted to 
CCB because it contains no British participation. 
EBIC 
The group involving Midland Bank had its origins in the agreement 
between Midland, Amsterdamsche Bank (now Amro), Societe Generale de Belgique 
and Deutsche Bank. In 1963 they set up the European Advisory Committee, 
whose aim was to hold regular consultations and to create a joint basis 
for particular business projects especially large scale international 
financing. The European Banks International Company (EBIC) subsequently 
evolved, the four member banks being joined by Creditanstalt Bankverein 
and Societe Generale, and in 1973, by Banca Commerciale Italiana. 
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For several of the participants, EBIC represents the only means of 
transacting foreign business. Furthermore, in the attempt to promote 
international business, it has established banking enterprises in overseas 
territories: for example, European Asian Bank, Euro-Pacific Finance 
Corporation and European Arab Bank. Perhaps the most notable of EBIC's 
joint ventures are European-American Bank (ranking among the largest 25 
banks in the US), Banque Europeene de Credit a Moyen Terme (BEC) which is 
based in Brussels and provides, as the name implies, medium term lending 
facilities for European customers. More recently, European Banking Company 
(EBC) has been established in London operating in the field of international 
merchant and investment banking. 
This represents, on the surface, an extensive and complementary 
system of international coverage. However, when examining these developments 
in context, a number of anomalies appear. For instance, the EBIC partners 
channel their co-mmrcial banking business in the US through European- 
American Bank, but with regard to investment banking there is a split: 
INVESTMENT BANK 
Societe Generale de Banque 
Amro Bank 
Sogen Swiss International 
Deutsche Bank Union Bank of Switzerland 
Second, Midland Bank's domestic acquisitions of merchant banks, 
Samuel Montagu and Drayton Corporation parallelled the formation of EBC 
in London. The increasing emphasis on international merchant banking has 
meant that to some extent Midland would be competing with a new joint 
venture with which it was also involved. The complicated web of inter- 
relationships may militate against the complementary operation of the two 
subsidiaries. In principle, the organisation would be: 
-- 176 -- 
Montagu-Drä ton 
-sterling domestic merch ; nt 
banking - bullion, foreign 
exchange 
-through Guyerzeller Zurmont, 
international representation 
(in Zurich) 
EI3C 
-international operation in 
eurocurrency markets 
-international merchant banking 
-capital issues; medium-term 
lending; international mergers 
Thirdly, the attempt to adhere to a code of club conduct has tended 
to break down. Member banks were not expected to establish direct 
representation in their co-partners' country of origin. However, Societe 
Generale de Banque's subsidiary, Banque Belge, and Societe Generale's 
(Paris) merchant bank Societe Generale (France) are both in London and also 
overlap with Samuel Montagu. In 1975, Deutsche Bank announced its intention 
to open a branch in the City of London, and has now achieved a listing on 
the London Stock Exchange. Similarly, Midland, despite its very limited 
presence abroad has representative offices in Brussels and Frankfurt. 
Fourthly, a perhaps unforeseen and temporary problem, arose following 
Midland's takeover of the Drayton Group. Drayton had been involved with 
Banque de Bruxelles in a consortium - Banque de Bruxelles Drayton. The 
liaison thus connected Midland with a member of the ABECOR group. 
ABECOR 
Associated Banks of Europe Corporation, is an example of a banking 
club developing from a consortium. It was started initially by four share- 
holders of Societe Financier Europeene (SFE), Dresd. er Bank, Algemene 
Bank Nederland, Banque de Bruxelles and Bayerische Hypotheken-und Wechsel 
Bank. A close relationship was maintained between ABECOR and a number of 
other SFE shareholders, notably Barlcays, BNP and Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro, and in April 1974 they were also admitted to the club together 
with two associated members, Banque Internationale a Luxembourg and 
Oesterreichische Landesbank. Two of the new members, Barclays and BNP had 
already made attempts to build up their own branch networks; their decision 
to join ABECOR provides some confirmation that overseas branches are not an 
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adequate means of affording a full banking service, and that European 
coverage might be best achieved through co-operation among existing national 
banks. Barclays' involvement, in particular, was a clear departure from 
their previous strategy of professed independence and was to mark the first 
of several moves to co-operate with other banks. 
With the entry of the new members, a perceptible change in ABECOR's 
objectives occurred; orientation became to a far greater extent European. 
However, the 'loose' co-operation between the members permitted only general 
forms of agreement rather than specific joint banking ventures and has 
included syndicated loans and international cash management. Again, the 
greates potential appears to lie with the SFE link. As individuals, 
the ABECOR partners control some 75% of the consortium (Bank of America 
and Sumitomo Bank own 12.6% each) and reports suggested that a closer link 
will be emphasised. 
INTER-ALPHA 
The rationale underlying the third European banking group is more 
straightforward and derives its strength from the lack of the members' 
overseas networks. Subsidiaries also form an important part of strategy 
for example, Inter-Alpha Asia (a Luxembourg subsidiary) was formed with 
the intention of opening a branch in Hongkong; the members also currently 
own 40% of the London-based consortium bank, Brown Harriman and International 
Banks, which specialises in international corporate finance and eurobond 
underwriting. In addition Privatbanken and William & Glyn's still control 
20% of a competing consortium bank, United International Bank, which also 
emphasises corporate finance and eurobond activities among its objectives. 
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EUROPARTNERS (, --CB) 
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Perhaps the most cohesive p grouping remains t dilly one without- 
British participation. Described as a 'quasi-mergt>r` it has advertised 
its joint image extensively. A reciprocal credit laci. lity has been developed 
and a 'co-operation passport' enables personal customers to withdraw money 
when abroad, beyond the limits imposed by the 'eurocheque' system. Of 
more signficance, considerable co-operation has been achieved by the three 
banks in the area of bond issues. By mid-1973, CCB had managed or co- 
managed 35 bond issues. Similarly, in the field of medium-term credit 
syndications, the close ties were demonstrated in a $300 million loan to Denmark, 
in September 1974 when Commerzbank and Banco di Roma each subscribed $50 
million and Credit Lyonnais $72 million. 
However, in line with other groupings, there has been a need to 
establish subsidiary operations. A joint Dutch bank was opened in Amsterdam 
at the and of 1973 (the majority being owned by Commerzbank); and the 
following year saw the merger of the French and German banks' operations in 
the Saar into Commerz-Kredit-Bank. Their links with consortia remain 
restricted to a joint 34% interest in International Commercial Bank which 
leaves no well-established investment bank under their control. 
One can see from Table 5.8 that the majority of Europe's largest 
commercial banks are involved in banking clubs. The fact that the 
establishment of the clubs was concentrated in a few years suggests a 
defensive rationale. They had the specific aims of protecting members 
against exchange rate upheavals and of overcomoing the costs of retail 
banking abroad. They were designed, moreover to counter the influence of 
the U. S. banks in Europe. The groups now all offer reciprocal credit 
facilities and ways of harmonizing and speeding transfers between banks, 
but their joint ventures and subsidiaries, perhaps indicate the need for 
an integrated unit to organise operations in the eurocurrency credit and 
bond markets. This focuses attention on the consortium bank and international 
wholesale operations. 
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On the retail and commercial side, parallel developments have already 
made obsolete the co-operation achieved. The eurocheque system and, in 
the field of money transfer, the Society for World Wide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT) which was due to start in 1976, are wider in 
scope and potentially more significant. 
Finally, if these clubs are a preparation for full banking mergers, 
is Europe any nearer to reaching that stage? There has been little progress 
towards financial harmonization which leaves gulfs between national legal 
and fiscal structures. Clearly such a development must await the further 
harmonization of banking rules, if not the convergence of national 
operating policies. The growth of the euromarkets questions the necessity 
of full mergers. The establishment of consortia, arguably the most 
significant development achieved to date, is a clear realisation of the 
importance of euromarket banking. While bank syndicates continue to co- 
operate across national frontiers in international money markets, it seems 
unlikely that there will be pressures towards full-scale banking mergers. 
The closer business relationships which have developed between the share- 
holders of consortium banks despite the lack of formal institutionalisation 
challenges still further the need for formal links. 
5.3.3 : Co-operation (II) Consortium Banks 
5.3.3.1 : Growth/Rationale/Operation 
The developments noted above were principally a response to the needs 
of large multinational companies and occurred in anticipation of UK 
entry into the EEC. Although not in complete contrast, the advent of the 
consortium bank is directly linked to the growth of the eurocurrency 
markets in the 1960s and the subsequent expansion of the eurobond capital 
market. Consortia share a common attribute with other forms of international 
banking organisations in that they were originally established to service 
the needs of the multinational companies which have been noted earlier. 
Where they differ is partly in the source of their funds and partly in 
their motivation. 
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Unlike the defensive motives attributed to banking clubs and to 
independent external. growth, consortium banks represent a positive approach 
to banking opportunities - they were aimed at building up new business, 
rather than defending established positions. Indeed while they have been 
a response to the US banks' dominance in the London eurocurrency markets, 
they have also been the method adopted by many US banks to gain entry to 
London. Consortia depend almost exclusively on the inter-bank market and 
wholesale eurocurrency markets for their funds. It is essential to 
comprehend the difference in kind as well as in degree, between eurocurrency 
financing and national currency operations. This difference is perhaps best 
understood by comparing the sophistication of the borrowing and lending 
machinery and the organisation of intermediaries of the eurocurrency era, 
and the lack thereof in the provision of sterling at its peak. 
The precedent set by the exponential growth of the money markets 
to 1973, was paralleled by the exceptional importance in terms of size, 
power and influence of the multinational corporation. The latter indirectly 
gave rise to an ever-increasing demand for capital; more recent political 
and economic events have emphasised these requirements, for example, 
project financing and North Sea oil development. These demands for capital 
investment funds exceeded the capacity of a single bank. The inability 
of individual banks to concentrate large proportions of their resources, and 
the availability of a huge supply of funds, emphasised the need for size, 
and, of more relevance, encouraged co-operation, merger and consortia. 
The eurocurrency markets operate across frontiers and this gave a further 
impetus to multinational co-operation. In essence then, the capital 
requirements of large international borrowers such as corporations and 
governments were the main stimulii to the growth of consortia which was 
accentuated by the ability to tap the expanding eurocurrency markets. 
Furthermore a consortium's ability to seek international sources of funds 
was enhanced by the wide geographical base of its shareholders. 
- 181 - 
The consortia are the most important phenomenon in contemporary 
international banking. Indeed their success is essential for the future 
development of multinational banking because the consortia popularized 
the idea of permanent syndicates and thus obviated the need for a lead bank 
seeking out participants for an ad hoc syndicate. The consortium's share- 
holders, it is claimed, provide a ready-made syndicate: 
The ideas noted above were summarised in an Investors Chronicle 
Supplement in 1973: 
"In order to appreciate the real value of the consortium 
bank to potential large-scale borrowers, who require finance 
of such complexity that they can only be served by an 
international finance group, it must first be realised that 
a basic reason for the creation of a consortium bank is its 
ability to tap a sufficiently large source of funds in 
international centres to be able to satisfy the financial 
requirements of the potential borrower. " 
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The Bank of England now defines a consortium bank as one owned by 
other banks but in which no one bank has more than 50% ownership, and in 
which at least one shareholder is an overseas bank. 
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A number of consortium 
banks offer both commercial and investment banking services. The best- 
documented is the commercial banking side, involving mdeium-term euro- 
currency lending; the second involves various aspects of investment banking 
notably eurobond business in the primary and secondary markets; international 
merger and acquisition negotiations; and project financing. The latter 
was mainly connected originally with the US banks' merchant banking subsidiaries 
which increasingly became a feature of US banking in London. The majority 
of these merchant banks are now wholly-owned by their US parents and do not 
therefore comply with the Bank's definition; they have in the past, however 
involved UK merchant banks: Bank of America achieved 100% ownership of its 
hitherto majority owned subsidiary, Bank of America International Limited. 
with the purchase in 1975, from Kleinwort Benson and Paribas , of their 22.5% staket 
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N. M. Rothschild retained its 10% holding in Manufacturers Hanover Ltd., 
but lost its interest in R. I. B., when the consortium was taken over and re- 
styled as Amex Bank, the merchant banking arm of American Express. 
The main raison d'etre of the original consortia was the syndication 
. of medium-term loans. In the first four years of this decade their 
growth rate matched the expansion in the eurocurrency markets. 
Table 5.9 : The Growth of London-based Consortium Banking 1966-74 
No. Existing New 
1966 1 1 
1967 2 1 
1968 3 3 
1969 6 2 
1970 8 5 
1971 13 2 
1972 15 4 
1973 19 4 
1974 23 2 
Note: Orion Bank was formed in 1970, and consisted of 2 main parts, 
Orion Bank and Orion Termbank. The latter was formally merged 
with the former in 1974 together with Orion Pacific and Orion 
Multinational Services. The figure for 1970 contains a single 
entry for Orion. 
The major expansion in the numbers of consortia occurred after 1970 
since when 15 of the 22 consortia established from 1966-73 were created 
equivalent to 68% of the total. Indeed the rate of growth prompted the 
Bank of England to give official recognition to the phenomenon in 1972 - 
separate classification in the Bank's statistics. It was stated in the 
Quarterly Bulletin that: 
" ... this group consists of some 15 banks, some of them very 
recent in origin, which are considered to be sufficiently 
homogeneous to be worth showing on their own. " 
47 
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More significant however, is that the shareholders of these 
consortia and those based elsewhere have included the largest banks 
in the world. Thus 'quasi merger' activity on an international scale 
mirrored domestic merger activity in that it involved large financial 
institutions. This emphasises three trends, noted previously: 
first, the premium of size in international banking; second, the 
importance of international banking to the world's biggest banks; 
and third, the need for banks to act in unison in order to combine 
different national bases to supply the demand for capital investment 
which the rapid growth in international trade and technological 
innovation had caused. 
Appendices 10 and 11 contain lists of the consortia involving 
UK and US membership. In this and the following section the analysis 
is confined to the participation of British banks and should serve 
as a comparison with other methods of international participation 
attempted by British banks. 
The high volume of medium term eurocurrency lending has 
been dependent upon the liquidity of the eurocurrency markets48 
providing a plentiful supply of funds*. 
49 
Since the consortia who. 
have been granting these loans derive their funds from the money 
markets, they have been able to structure their credits in several 
forms at fixed or variable interest rates, in dollar or multicurrency 
denominations, syndicated or single bank supplied. As reported earlier, 
the most popular technique has been a syndication of lenders, organised 
by a bank or group of banks. Similarly, the application of these 
funds can be categorised. One can identify three main uses of medium- 
term funds: first, for expansion by acquisition; second for project 
financing, and third as a method of evening out a company's debt structure. 
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The only effective barrier to entering international wholesale 
banking is large size. If a bank does not have adequate resources 
(deposits) or capital., the consortium organisation has obvious advantages - 
for it represents a means of breaking down that barrier, and moreover, 
does not preclude small banks from joining. Indeed the costs of entry by 
establishing a branch, especially in London have proved prohibitive in 
a number of cases; for smaller banks this consideration alone has dictated 
a joint venture. Hence the pooling of capital and thus the sharing of 
risk was an original rationale of consortia. 
Once established, a number of consortia earned considerable profits. 
An indication is given in Table 5,10 which compares the rate of return 
on shareholders' funds earned in 1972/73 by consortia who are separated 
according to year of formation: 
Table 5.10 : Average Rate of Return ` Consortium Banks Year of 
formation 50 
Year of Formation Ave. Rate of Return 
(1972/73 %) 
1966 12 
1967 36 
1968 12 
1969 10 
1970 10 
1971 5 
1972 3 
These profits attracted other shareholders to form banks, which in the form 
of consortia, entered the market (see Table 5.9). However the demand for 
medium term eurocurrency loans stagnated in mid-197251 and furthermore 
the number of suitable borrowers52 also appeared limited. The increasing 
nunber of banks and the limited demand, increased competition and consequently 
reduced margins or caused medium term loans to be extended from the 
traditional period of five years to sometimes ten years and more, 
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Coinciding with this, the Japanese banks armed with a mass of surplus 
foreign exchange funds, accumulated as a consequence of successive years 
of balance of payments surpluses, were able to offer competitive rates 
of interest and thus further reduced margins. 
The response by new consortium ventures, while varied in form, had 
a common theme. They were seeking to offer more than mere financial strength, 
by either specialising in a particular industrial or geographical area, or 
by diversifying their services; the latter approach was also adopted 
by the existing consortia who sought to spread their risks beyond the confines 
of medium-term syndications. Hence, the consortium rationale of pooling 
of resources and spreading shareholders' risks, assumed a third aspects 
new and specialised forms of business required particular expertise which in 
turn implies the need for banks to develop new skills and techniques. Personnel 
were required to assess a firm's financial position not only by examining 
$s accounts (credit analysis) but also by analysing the likely profitability 
of particular projects in geographical locations or industrial sectors. 
The greater the extent of lending for any one activity, the more will banks 
find it worthwhile to have their own experts; clearly specialist subsidiaries 
could perform an essential function in this respect. The extent of this 
specialisation among the newer consortia vis-a-vis those established 
before 1970 is represented in Table 5.11. 
Of the 12 consortium banks established from 1971 to 1974, ten were 
specialised and all but one of them concentrated on 'geography', either 
by owndership or by direction of aims; there was a single example of 
'industrial' specialisation - International Energy Bank created to provide 
finance for the exploitation of energy resources, especially North Sea oil. 
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Table 5.11 S, )ecialisation among London-based Consortia 1964-"74 
Ypar of Consortium Specialisation 
Formation 
1964 MAIBL 
1966 United Bk. of Kuwait Geog (ME) 
1967 Intl. Commercial Bk. 
1968 Western American Bk. 
Rothschild Intercontinental Bk. 
Brown Harriman & Intl. Banks 
1969 Atlantic Intl. Bk. 
Scandinavian Bk. Geog (Scan) 
1970 Orion Bk. 
London Multinational Bk. 
United International Bk, 
Japan International Bk. Geog (Jap) 
Associated Japanese Bk. Geog (Jap) 
1971 London Interstate Bk. 
Nordic Bk. Geog (Scan) 
1972 UBAF Geog (ME) 
Italian International Bk. Geog (Eur) 
Libra. Geog (LA) 
Eurobraz. Geog (LA) 
1973 EBC 
Anglo-Romanian Bk. Geog (Eur) 
International Energy Bk. Indl (Energy) 
Iran Overseas Investment Bk. Geog (ME) 
1974 Eulabank Geog (LA) 
International Mexican Bk. Geog (LA) 
Note: Where no specialisation is shown the bank concentrated on medium-term 
credits and international merchant banking. 
ME = Middle East 
Scan = Scandinavia 
Jap = Japan 
Eur = Europe 
LA = Latin America 
The established consortia also took steps to specialise. 
Orion's shareholders, for example, joined with the Swiss Bank Corporation 
and Banco Esperito Santo e Comercial de Lisboa, to form Libra Bank, to 
specialise in international financing in Latin America. More often though 
they chose to diversify their objectives by supplementing their commercial 
banking operations with investment banking and other activities. Indeed 
the necessity to diversify earning has resulted in the establishment of 
departments handling leasing, consumer finance, venture capital, property 
and insurance. This strategy is exemplified by measures taken at Orion Bank 
in recent years. In 1974, Orion was fragmented into four parts: 
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Orion Bank - investment banking 
Orion Termbank - commercial banking (an extension of the 
shareholders' capabilities, providing 
medium and long term loans) 
Orion Pacific 
Orion Leasing 
The new chairman, Mr. David Montagu intended to integrate the investment 
and commercial banking functions and build a successful investment banking. 
operation to complement the commercial banking division which remains 
the main profit centre. As a pre-requisite, Orion Bank and Orion Termbank 
were merged in December, 1974 and the whole of Orion Leasing and majority 
of Orion Pacific acquired by 1976. Orion's main interest lies in the 
building up of its fee-paying business, that is its investment banking side. 
Montagu also emphasises the international character of this expansion: 
"We are not going into the retail business ... we're not 
going to do retail corporate finance work. 
I want us to be viewed as a multinational investment bank. " 
53 
5.3.3.2: British Banking Participation 
The matrix presented in Table 5.12 summarises the shares taken by 
British financial intermediaries in world-wide consortia and the American 
merchant banking subsidiaries in London. In 1973/74, British banks 
held 42 stakes in consortia, based both in London and abroad, varying 
from 4% to 50%. In addition, non bank financial intermediaries held 5 
stakes. The geographical spread is shown in Table 5.13 below: 
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Table 5.13: Geographical Spread of UK Banks' Sharcholdings 
in Consortium Banks 1974 
Centre/Countr 
Bank 
Type 
London Aust/NZ Europe America Other* Total 
Clearing 13 1 3 1- 18 
Merchant 5 11 2 -4 22 
Overseas 1 - - 1. 2 
Non-bank 2 3 - -- 5 
Total 21 15 5 15 47 
Note: *Includes London based US merchant bank subsidiaries 
The clearing banks had 18 shareholdings, only 5 of which were outside 
London. In contrast, the merchant banks had only 5 stakes in London consortia 
but 17 of their interests were in banks centred outside London or in London- 
based US merchant banking subsidiaries: 11 of these were in Australasia. 
Indeed some 15 of those consortia not based in London were in that continent. 
This was in response to the Australian mineral boom and the resulting 
demand for credit and the bond markets, which presented opportunities 
especially for the innovative merchant banks to apply their expertise to the 
development of these markets which would complement the Far Eastern financial 
markets located in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Analysis of the data illustrates a number of points: 
1. London merchant bankers were amongst those who vehemently 
criticised the concept of consortium banking. Their lack 
of participation in London consortia, reflects that philosophy. 
It stems partly from their pride of ancestry and long- 
established position at the centre of the U. K. financial 
system which was challenged by the recently established 
and powerfully-backed consortia; it also stems from a conflict 
of interests with the aims of some of the consortia; as the 
consortium banks began to develop their investment banking departments 
it brought them into competition with the UK merchant banks in the 
management of the international capital issues and in the syndication 
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Table, 5.12 Notes 
Where no centre is specified, the bank is located in London 
1: US merchant banking subsidiary - now wholly owned by 
Bank of America 
2: T)S merchant banking subsidiary 
3: Jointly-Owned subsidiary of US brokerage firm, Merril Lynch. 
In 1976, Brown Shipley's share was reduced to 5%. Merril 
increased its shareholding to 95%. 
a: Through ABECOR; not specified 
b: With other shareholders of Orion; not specified 
c: Through EBIC; 14% 
d: Through EBIC; 13% 
e: Through EBIC; not specified 
f: Through EBIC; not specified 
g: Through Inter-Alpha; 40% 
h: With members of the Five Arrows Group; 45% 
Changes in Consortium Shareholdings 
In 1975, Hambros sold its 10% stake in Western American Bank (WAB), 
it had originally held 28%, but reduced its interest to 10% in 1973. 
The remaining shareholders, Security Bank (US), Bank of Tokyo, 
National Bank of Detroit and Wells Fargo Bank, now each own 25%. 
In 1975, Rothschild Intercontinental Bank (RIB) was bought by 
American Express. The new bank, Amex became a merchant banking 
subsidiary in the pattern of Bank of America International limited. 
In 1976, Charterhouse Japhet disposed of its holding in Atlantic 
International. 
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of loans. It was this conflict that was said to have prompted 
the sale of R. I. B. The consortium was formed primarily to 
conduct medium-term lending for N. M. Rothschild. As the 
increasing demand for wide-spread services induced 
diversification, R. I. B. came into direct competition with the 
London and Paris Rothschilds. The sale by Hambros of its share 
in W. A. B. after being forced, together with the other shareholders, 
to assist the subsidiary in the problem years of 1974/7554 has 
left just three merchant banks with stakes in London-based consortia. 
Their pre-occupation with consortia based elsewhere, also 
gives an indication of their widespread international bank-interests. 
2. Clearing bank interests in consortia are no less revealing 
of their philosophy and overseas connections. Midland Bank 
(lacking an overseas network), has 9 shareholdings either in its 
own name or through EBIC. Lloyds has no involvement at all; 
and following its acquisition of First Western in California 
it hastened to dispose of the latter's 16% share in London 
Interstate Bank. Also manifest of the bank's policy, is Barclays' 
consortium shareholdings. Apart from the long-standing stake in SFE 
in Paris, its management has emphatically pronounced in favour of 
independent action, while being " ... ready to participate in joint- 
ventures of a specific and limited nature where opportunites arise. " 
55 
The four stakes held by Barclays demonstrate its pragmatism, providing 
examples of specialised operations which require the consortium 
approach. Anglo-Romanian Bank and Iran-Overseas Investment Bank 
aim to promote trade and investment respectively with and in the 
countries named; International Energy Bank concentrates on North 
Sea oil, exploration and development; and Euro-Latinamerican Bank 
(Eulabank), one of several banks concentrating on Latin America, 
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was established by Barclays and its co-members in ABECOR, 
together with Banco Central of Madrid and several. South American 
banks. 
It is now apparent that consortia have brought UK and European banks 
into formal association with US banks with whom they are also competing. 
The demands of the multinational corporations created the need for the syndication 
of large, medium term loans and specialised expertise. This requirement was 
reinforced by the ever-increasing complexity of modern technology, the 
appearance of high credit risk projects and the continued dependence of industry 
on bank-raised finance. Such pressures have laid emphasis on inter-bank co- 
operation both in the forming of consortia and in other forms of cross- frontier 
collaboration. Nevertheless full international bank mergers still seem to 
be a distant phenomenon. However, according to the Banker's list, some 70% 
of the world's top 50 banks are involved in international co-operation - 
the notable exception being Citibank whose continued philosophy of self- 
reliance reflects its size and spread, and intention of "going it" alone. 
Praiseworthy as the concept of internationalisation is in theory, 
implementation of close co-oeration across international boundaries, 
involving cultural, legal, fiscal and language barriers, has inevitably 
brought attendant problems. These would be most apparent where questions 
of conflict between parents and subsidiary arise. This infers the need for a 
strong basic agreement between parent banks rather than ad hoc arrangements. 
Indicative of the recognition of the desirability of parental harmonization 
are the reports of greater co-operation between consortia shareholders. 
56 
-193- 
Evidence must be specific however. One example, is the alliance between 
Morrill Lynch (US) and Brown Shipley (UK) . The relationship which developed 
kbeýtween the US parent and the London-based consortium, Merrill Lynch-Brown 
Shipley is an indication of the close links between the institutions. In 
July 1975, it was announced that the Americans' Paris-based eurobond 
underwriting business would be merged into the consortium; there followed 
reports that several other of Merrill's international operations would also 
be undertaken by the bank. 
57 
While this does indicate the relationship 
between the two intermediaries, and the prominence of the consortium in 
plans for further expansion, the increased shares gained by Merrill Lynch 
through the injection of new capital reduced the British interest to just 5% 
in 1976; the London operation will apparently become the international 
merchant banking arm for the US firm, thus mirroring the moves made by 
Bank of America and Amex Bank. There seems to be no pattern to the growth 
of international banking teams. Neither British nor American involvement 
has followed a pattern - and as a result a bewildering array of minority and 
majority shareholdings have emerged. 
Consortia still represent an effective means of entry for smaller 
banks into wholesale and merchant banking. Unfortunately even casual observatiori 
uncovers a confusing web of shareholding links. Some of these have led to 
disinvestments by British banks; the appearance of banking clubs have had little 
rationalising impact to date: in the case of ABECOR they have added to the 
confusion - for while Bayerische Hypotheken-und-Wechselbank is a shareholder 
of United International Bank, the other six members jointly own with Bank 
of America and Sumitomo Bank the rival S. F. E. The emergence of fewer and 
more rationalised groupings must still be anticipated and would be expected 
to follow a sustained up-turn in international banking business following 
the nadir of 1974/75. 
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One generalization is possible. Although the major consortia 
differ considerably in size, form and operation, they are increasingly 
becoming dedicated to the provision of a complete international merchant 
banking service to complement existing commercial banking facilities. 
To reiterate, this is the major growth area of contemporary multinational 
banking and one would envisage for the future a greater involvement 
in the following aspects of investment banking: eurobond issues and placements; 
corporate finance services for multinational companies and governments; 
and advice on international mergers and acquisitions. 
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British clearing banks. " (The Banker, June 1972, p. 797). 
51 : For details see The Banker, June 1972, p. 797 
52 : 'Suitable' is gauged in terms of size and risk. In a recent 
journal article, D. Montagu (Chairman of Orion Bank) remarked on the 
need to be "quality conscious", qualifying this remark as follows, 
"We like to feel we are doing blue chip triple-A business all the time" 
(Euromoney, May, 1976) 
53 : Euromoney, may, 1976, p. 53; see also Chapter eight 
54: At 31 Jan 1974 assets were down to £565 million (£661 million); 
pre-tax profits to £906,000 (E3.3 million); problems were 
accentuated by its losses in the secondary eurobond (trading) market; 
in September, 5 executive directors 'left'; deposits were re-called 
and the parent banks supported the consortium by taking over its 
portfolio of long-term bonds. 
55 : R. Dyson, Chairman Barclays International, quoted from The Banker, 
August, 1974, p. 925 
56 : For example, The Banker, August, 1973, pp. 903-905 
57 : See The Times, July 17,1975 
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It is now more than twenty years since the phenomenon of the takeover 
bid first emerged in earnest. In the formative period of the 1950s, when 
takeover techniques were being fashioned, a number of personalities gained 
reputations as skilful practitioners and were constantly in the public eye. 
Several of the original exponents - Sir Charles Clore, Sir Isaac Wolfson 
and Sir Hugh Fraser - also figured prominently in the more pronounced merger 
activity of the last decade. 
In the 1960s, long periods of 'bull' markets on the stock exchange 
gave market leaders greatly enhanced ability to absorb other companies 
through share exchange deals, and inspired the growth of those companies 
which had developed the appropriate expertiese - Sears Holdings (Clore), 
House of Fraser (Fraser) and G. U. S. (Wolfson). The process spiralled with 
the tax reforms announced in 1965 which simultaneously deterred new share 
issues and made shareholders prefer 'paper' to cash which was subject to 
capital gains; the culmination was the 'merger boom' of 1967-68. 
During those two years nearly 70% of the U. K. 's top 100 firms were 
involved, 10% of privately-owned manufacturing, financial, distribution and 
property assets were the subject of some form of achieved or intended take- 
over and a quarter of all British firms worth more than £10 million were 
acquired. 
1 
Four years later these peaks were surpassed, as an expansionist 
monetary policy, continuing economic growth and a sharp rise in share prices 
contributed to the total value of acquisitions exceeding £3 billion. 
In the course of twenty years, the takeover bid in general, and the 
contested takeover battle, in particular, have become regarded as being 
peculiarly British. 
2 
In part) the high levels of merger activity in the U. K. can 
be attributed to the vague, ambivalent and neutral public policy on mergers 
and monopoly. Equally important has been the existence within the City of 
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adequate market sophistication3 and a laissez-faire regulatory system of 
control4 which has encouraged on the one hand, freedom and flexibility, 
but on the other abuses of the spirit of 'gentlemanly conduct' which it 
was intended to engender. In consequence, considerable merger expertise 
was built up within certain industrial sectors and within the City; it was 
manifest in a number of developments. First) the desire and ability to 
exploit 'asset situations'5 - the so-called cult of asset stripping was 
responsible for the rise to prominence of several entrepreneurs: Jim Slater, 
Oliver Jessel and James Hanson, for example. Secondly, established City 
institutions were developing facilities to accommodate the burgeoning 
growth area of corporate finance. Thirdly, as acquisitions have become more 
numerous they have become marked by increasing asperity between the contesting 
parties, and by increasing sophistication in the techniques for acquiring 
control. The City's financial institutions, and especially the merchant banks, 
which have been largely responsible for the conduct of acquisition plans and 
negotiations, have felt a need to control the financial dealings 
with which they are concerned. This feeling has been heightened by a desire 
to retain their independence in the supervision of their business and has 
prompted them to act jointly in this regulatory function. 
in the two chapters which form this section, the second and third 
aspects noted above, which together constitute the City's role in merger 
activity, are examined in more detail. Chapter six reviews the role of merchant 
banks and other institutions in the merger process and considers the wider 
implications for the 'market for merger'; a case study is also included as 
a practical illustration of the inter-relating parts played by the various 
institutions. In chapter seven the ramifications of these issues are discussed; 
-- 19 7 -- 
in particular, as intimated above, despite the level and extent of merger 
activity, takeover bids for the control of companies still take place 
in a virtually unregulated market place. This inevitably raises questions 
as to the virtues of the self-regulation of merger tactics. Moreover, 
it is during the course of merger negotiations that the propriety and ethics 
of the institutions and financial advisers are most visible and therefore most. 
frequently challenged. Indeed irresponsibility and unethical conduct on the 
part of merchant banks and other financial advisers have been blamed for 
abuses of the 'shareholders' interest', and were instrumental in the initial 
implementation of the City Code to monitor tactics. Significantly, subsequent 
altercations have been the trigger to a wider examination of the City's 
traditional freedom from control. In view of the recently renewed attack 
on financial institutions and the City's modus operandi6 it is particularly 
appropriate to examine the voluntary control of mergers in the broader context 
of self-government, which despite the attentions of the Left, seems likely 
to prevail. 
7 
I 
NOTES 
1: G. D. Newbould, Management and Merger Activity, (Guthstead, 1971), p. 18 
2: S. McLachlan, 'Takeover and Merger Administration Today', Professional 
Administration, September 1972, p. 21 
3: D. Kuehn and R. Marris, 'New light on takeovers', The Banker, July 1973: 
"In present conditions, the stock exchange is much more realistically 
seen as a market for control than as a market for new capital". p. 758 
4: The British system of self-regulation involves the Bank of England, 
the Stock Exchange and the Takeover Panel; statutory regulation is 
implemented by the Department of Trade. 
5: 'Asset situations' are those where companies, whose assets are considered 
under-utilised, are acquired for the purpose of increasing earnings and 
assets per share by improving internal efficiency, and releasing substantial 
sums for investment elsewhere. 
6 See especially, Labour Party National Executive Statement, 'Banking and 
Finance', 1976, which demanded nationalization of the banks and insurance 
companies; the Stock Exchange enquiry into Scottish and Universal Invest- 
ments, 1976; and the Department of Trade Inspectors' Report on Roadships 
(formerly Ralph Hilton Transport Services), 1976 
7: Statement by the Secretary of State, Department of Trade, October 21,1976, 
reported in the press October, 22,1976 
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Financial Institutions and Corporate Morqer Activity 
The role played by City institutions in merger activity has probably 
attracted more headlines and comment than any other activity carried out by 
financial institutions. However, the literature on this subject has hitherto 
been restricted to the official reports of the Takeover Panel and the 
Department of Trade Inspectors, and to articles in the financial press. 
No systematic attempt has been made to analyse the interaction of the institutions 
in the mechanics of a takeover bid. The main objective of this chapter therefore, 
is to provide a factual and informative account of the role of financial companies 
in the merger process. Collectively, financial intermediaries have the power, 
whether as merger engineers or as major shareholders of equity capital, to 
control, or at least exert an influence over, the management of public quoted 
companies. This analysis concentrates on one source of long-term finance - 
mergers and acquisitions - which presents the institutions with the opportunity 
to exercise that power. In particular, it focuses on two aspects : firstly, 
the technical and strategic details of a takeover bid with which merchant 
banks as financial advisers and public relations (P. R. ) consultancies are 
intimately connected; secondly, the part played by institutional investors 
(pension funds and life assurance companies) during the ensuing public negotia- 
tions. 
6.1 : Merchant Banks/Financial Advisers 
6.1.1 Introduction and History 
The accumulation of acquisition expertise within industrial sectors 
was mirrored during the 1950s by the independent U. K. merchant banks. 
The general high level of merger activity provided the incentive for the banks 
to apply their entrepreneurial talent to the modification of their new issue 
departments which were developed into corporate finance departments and 
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staffed with trained solicitors and accountants, systematically recruited 
frcm leading City firms. 
' 
It was one event in particular, however, 
that heralded the introduction of merchant banks to the arrangement and 
negotiation of acquisitions - the so called Aluminium War of 1957-58.2 
It began with substantial buying of shares in British Aluminium under nominee 
names by the Reynolds Metals-Tube Investments partnership. It developed into 
a bitter fight, with Warburgs - then a parvenu in City merchant banking circles - 
ranged with Tubes and Reynolds against British Aluminium with its alternative 
proposals for a link with Alcoa and the support of Lazards and Hambros at the 
head of a powerful group of City interests. Apart from exposing hostilities 
within the City (particularly between the 'old Guard' and the newcomers), 
it brought out the major issue which has run through contested takeover 
battles ever since - tactics which leave shareholders in a company without a 
clear choice between opposing proposals and without the information on which 
they might base a rational decision. 
This episode marked a turning point for the City. Henceforth the 
merchant banks elaborated their professional skill in the conduct of takeover 
situations; and the main City institutions under the leadership of the Bank 
of England felt compelled to issue the Notes on Amalgamations3 which were 
the forerunner of the City Code. The effects were described by a director 
of Warburgs as follows: 
"After the war there was very little in the way of opposed 
takeovers. The Aluminium War created a situation which had 
not previously arisen in the City: a clear division of all the 
leading merchant banks. After that, merchant banks ... began to realise the importance of specialist departments to deal with 
these special situations. " 4 
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As a result independent lawyers and accountants were displaced as the 
creative force in acquisition and merger negotiations. Moreover, merchant 
banks extended their earnings from takeover advice. In the 1950s, acquisitions 
were listed as 'sundry fees'; during the last decade and the early years of this, 
rates prevailing for handling large takeovers have varied from £50,000 to 
£iOO, 000; 
5 
contested takeovers also command higher fees - although the charge 
is for success, and merchant banks have waived fees from established 
customers or reduced them to a minimum if a deal fails. 
The merchant banks' focal position in the financial system has also 
permitted them to dominate the provision of other sources of long-term 
finance. In particular, the members of the Accepting Houses Committee, 
itself contained within the Issuing Houses Association, along with other merchant 
banks and specialist issuing houses (without banking business), are well- 
placed to conduct new issue business because their contacts in the City enable 
them to organise underwriting syndicates. 
6 
Consequently they have become 
associated with the organisation and arrangement of new capital issues and 
public flotations. Furthermore, these activities require a similar financial 
appraisal to that undertaken by merchant banks in merger proposals, and are 
similarly conducted within the corporate finance department. Although the 
degree of dependence upon a merchant bank as a source of finance varies 
enormously from company to company, there has been a trend towards retaining 
merchant banks for advice on all aspects of financial affairs, instead of 
employing them for a specific service (for example, takeover advice). 
7 
This would be expected to reinforce the influence through their less formal, 
yet pervasive links with industry - through the directorships held by their 
own board members. 
8 
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6.1.2 : Function 
Table 6.1 gives an indication of the prominence of merchant banks in 
the merger market. The two years selected for illustration represent 
a contrast in the levels of recorded merger activity. As noted, in 1972 
business confidence was. very high and stock market conditions favourable 
for acquisitions financed by the issue of securities. In 1973, expectations 
were less optimistic, and, especially in the last quarter of the year, 
merger activity receded sharply. In spite of the differences in magnitude, 
however, merchant banking involvement is clearly considerable and consistent. 
Table 6.1 : Mergers and Acquisiticns arranged by members of the 
Issuing Houses Association (I. H. A. ), 1972-73 
Total expenditure on acquisitions Value of acquisitions arranged 
by I. H. A. 
Acting for 
acquiring 
company 
(£m) (£m) % 
1972 2938 2882 (98) 
1973 1742 1697 (97) 
Acting for 
acquired 
company 
(Em) % (Em) 
2590 (88) 5472 
1596 (72) 3293 
Source: Derived from Business Monitor M7 (expenditure on acquisitions by 
industrial and commercial companies); Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin (expenditure on acquisitions by financial companies); 
Times 1000,1975, Table 17 (acquisitions and mergers arranged by 
members of the Issuing Houses Association). 
Notes: 
In 1972-73 there were 18 members of the Accepting Houses Committee, 
and these accounted on average for 74% of the mergers and acquisitions 
arranged by the members of the I. H. A. 
These statistics summarise the extent of merchant banking intervention 
in merger activity and reveal the monopoly they have secured in the conduct 
of merger negotiations. In turn, this provides some indication of their 
importance. It is not possible, however, to establish from statistics, 
the nature of their involvement in the merger market. Their role may be 
solely that of an intermediary - providing a forum for unemotional argument 
and thereby facilitating speed and flexibility in achieving conclusions. 
Alternatively, the banks may do more than merely fuel the market mechanism: 
through their formal and covert links with industry, they may actually influence 
- 202 
decision-making and instigate acquisition plans. If this is the case, the 
implications are serious, for it suggests that mergers and acquisitions may 
be undertaken for reasons which have less to do with long-term industrial 
strategy than the private financial aspirations of merchant bankers. 
Several strands of evidence suggest that this possibility should not 
be ruled out. Firstly, it has been intimated above that the merchant banks 
earn high rewards if an acquisition is brought to fruiticn. Indeed it has been 
reported that the merchant banks' largest profits in the ] 60s derived from 
fee income earned in respect of takeover advice. 
9 
Secondly, Newbould (1971) 
discovered that in half of his sample, " ... the whole procedure of analysis 
(financial, economic and strategic) and preliminary negotiation with the 
victim firm and/or merchant bankers took eight weeks or less. "10 This was 
interpreted to infer that little serious analysis of merger proposals was 
typical11 and that tactics rather than financial considerations were most 
important in deciding the outcome of bids. 
12 
Thirdly, Kitching (1974) reported 
on the outcome of 145 British acquisitions and discovered a failure rate 
of 30% implying a waste of over £1000 million of shareholders' funds in 1972 
and underlining "the hcost of a 
13 
g huge poor acquisition strategy. " 
These data should be regarded as cautionary rather than defamatory; 
it is very difficult to assess the influence of merchant banks in this area, 
and virtually impossible to reach any definitive conclusions. It is neither 
feasible, nor desirable to generalise; instead, the analysis can offer some 
general principles and suggest some reasons for the dependence of companies 
involved in mergers or acquisitions, on merchant banks. 
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Where a merchant bank is retained as a company's financial adviser, 
its involvement in a particular acquisition is likely to be preceded by its 
interest and assistance in the preparation of its clients' corporate plan 
and the place of acquisitions in the overall framework. In contrast, 
merchant banks may be employed on an ad hoc basis, by companies which receive 
takeover inquiries or become the subject of a takeover bid, or alternatively 
by companies which are planning an acquisition. Irrespective of the stage 
at which the banks is initially introduced, as the figures in Table 6.1 
suggest, merchant banking counsel is sought when a bid is actually made and 
during the ensuing negotiations. 
In practice, the role of the merchant bank will vary according to 
whether it is employed by the acquiring or victim firm. However, the role 
they play can be considered generally in two unequal parts: the public stage, 
that is during the period of the outstanding offer; and the preceding background 
research and analysis in which the technical details of the bid are formulated, 
and strategy and tactics discussed. The bank will probably be involved at 
both stages when working for the acquirer; its role when defending the victim 
firm may be restricted to the later public stage however - this is discussed 
later. Both parts are extremely important, though for very different reasons. 
Over time, the preparation of bid documents has become increasingly 
sophisticated and the technical aspects accordingly more complicated. 
The form of the consideration (cash, shares, convertible stock, warrants, 
debt or some combination) may have a significant impact on the financial 
outcome of a proposal and in particular on its acceptability to the 
shareholders of both companies. 
14 
The terms, decided upon in the initial 
analysis are therefcre crucial. on the other hand, the argument, drama 
and intrigue, by which takeover bids are known to the public occur within 
the regulated period of the outstanding offer. If takeover proposals falter 
at this stage, those responsible for the acquisitions plan have borne the brunt 
of the criticism. 
is 
In essence, the merchant bank's reputation, conduct 
and expertise are publicly tried and tested - and arguably this is the most 
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significant stage for the bank. 
16 
Financial advice, now apparently synonymous with the services of a 
merchant bank, is required in takeover situations by statute and the City Code.. 
The specific duty imposed by the latter upon the financial adviser is to 
report on and corroborate profit forecasts and asset valuations made by his 
clients in the course of a bid. 
17 
In addition, the City Code suggests that 
a company " ... which receives an offer or is approached with a view to 
an offer being made should in the interests of its shareholders seek 
competent independence advice. '! 
18 
The function of the merchant bank, as 
articulated in law, is indicated by the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) 
Act 1958, which requires that any document concerned with the acquiring, 
disposing of, subscribing for or underwriting securities must be approved 
in advance by the Board of Trade (now the Department of Trade) unless it is 
issued by an authorised person (i. e. a licensed or an exempt dealer). 
19 
In the circumstances of most takeovers, it would be impracticable for a 
company to issue its own documents and obtain the necessary official approval; 
whereas merchant banks, as issuing houses, are invariably exempt dealers 
and are therefore able to issue documents on their own authority. It is 
within this framework that the merchant bank performs its role. 
Irrespective of the form of the consideration, the circular containing 
details of the offer must comply with certain procedural rules, and include 
certain information. 
20 
In this connection, the Code draws particular 
attention to "profit forecasts and asset valuations"21 which, as noted, are 
the adviser's province. In. effect then, the merchant bank is entrusted with 
the circulation of the offer document and, to a large extent, with its contents. 
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Acquisitions differ from normal purchases and sales in that the timing is 
not dictated by the shareholder who is forced in a bid situation to make a 
decision on what may be inadequate or insufficient information. The merchant 
bank, whose main consideration is to promote its clients interests, also has 
the implict responsibility of providing shareholders with sufficient 
information for them to examine the rationale of the offer and the terms 
that are suggested. Moreover the merchant bank should ensure that the rationale 
is clearly defined and that the financial content is presented in a 
comprehensible form. 
22 
In this connection, their responsibility has wider implications. As 
intermediaries and agents, merchant banks represent a potential imperfection 
in the merger market which emerges if they fail in their duties of furnishing 
information to all shareholders, 
23 
or if they abuse the information to which 
they are granted privileged access by creating a false market in the shares 
of either the offeror or offeree company. 
24 
When considered in the wider 
context of other features of the market, notably the highly skewed size 
distribution of acquiring and acquired firms, the presence of institutional 
investors and the pervasive influence of private managerial aspirations, 
25: 
the bank's role in the dissemination of information becomes more important. 
Imprudent conduct therefore threatens not only the reputation and integrity 
of the merchant bank in question and hence their prospective business, but 
also the interests of the private and institutional shareholder and the managers 
and employees of the companies involved. 
Nevertheless, the bank's primary responsibility is to its client. It 
is appropriate therefore to sketch briefly the contrasting functions performed 
when representing the acquiring firm and the victim firn. In both instances, 
the most valuable contribution by the adviser is probably made during the 
regulated period of negotiation which must last initially for 21 days and at 
rast for 60 days after the offer is first posted, 
26 
It is during this time 
that public attention is focused on events: stock market rumours cause wild 
fluctuations in share prices, and the arguments and counter-arguments are 
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threshed out, usually with-the close attendance and comment of the financial 
press. Furthermore with the advent of the Takeover Code and establishment 
of the Takeover Panel the conduct of bids has come under searching scrutiny; 
the insistence by the Stock Exchange for more detailed information has 
imposed greater reliance upon financial advisers, and in general their 
integrity during takeover negotiations is now more closely examined. 
During the period of the bid, the merchant bank acting for each party, 
will advise on and often actually conduct the strategy and tactics to be adopted. 
For the bidder, the bank's specific function is to present the requisite 
information having verified the authenticity of the financial statements. 
Thus, advice will include the exact timing of the bid itself; the level and 
nature of the initial offer; the drafting of the offer document to ensure the 
best possible presentation of the client's offer in accordance with applicable 
law and the City Code; the revision of the initial offer if that appears to 
become desirable; and the timing of the ultimate declaration that the offer 
has become unconditional. 
In contrast, the merchant bank acting for those who receive or expect 
to receive a bid, will advise. on the "defences" available, whether for inducing 
shareholders to reject an offer altogether, for increasing the initial consider- 
ation offered or for attracting a counter bid from a third party, either for 
its own merits or as a means of improving the original offer. Once again 
the advisers' main concern will be the contents of the offer document and 
in particular the details of profit forecasts, 
27 
and the formulation of 
strategy. 
28 
By their nature, acquisitions rarely proceed smoothly: they involve,, 
quite often, clashes of personality between principals and advisers (especially 
in contested bids); in particular, the negotiations tend to be centred on 
forecasts of the respective companies future prospects in respect of growth, 
profitability and dividends. This emphasis on financial aspects has inevitably 
focused attention on the corporate financier. The monopoly of takeover advice 
enjoyed by the merchant banks has not endowed them with a monopoly of skilled 
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financiers however. Indeed financial and legal experts are as likely to be 
found in the treasury department of an industrial corporation as in the 
corporate finance department of a merchant bank. Thus the technical details 
of a bid may have been completed before merchant banking counsel is 
first sought. No general rules can be established on this point - but there 
is the suggestion that the successful merchant bank owes its prowess, at least 
in part, to its ability and skill in securing a higher price for the victim 
company by contesting the bid shrewdly; or alternatively, when acting for 
the acquirer, paying as low a consideration as conditions permit. 
29 
Merchant banks, by virtue of their attempts to specialise in the 
provision of corporate financial services, have apparently gained the experience 
and expertise to make a unique contribution. While they are pre-eminently 
qualified to give independent advice they possess the additional, essential 
30 
advantage of being at the centre of the financial system. and are therefore 
acquainted with the City's specialised modus operandi. Their contacts, 
developed over many years, enable them today, to use the services of a stock- 
broker to place shares31 or to petition institutional support when deemed 
necessary. 
32 
Collectively these factors have equipped the banks with the ability 
to guide companies through the myriad of statutory and self-imposed obstacles 
which impede the passage of bids.. In particular, their knowledge of the 
intricacies of the Takeover Code has enabled them to ensure that directors, 
unused to the procedure and complexities, act within accepted bounds in such 
matters as their duty to provide the same information, with equal promptness 
to requests from all bona fide potential offerors. 
33 
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of monitoring takeover tactics, the inception of the Takeover Code and 
Takeover Panel appears to have created the need to rely upon the merchant 
banks. The Code was essentially designed by four 'takeover experts', drawn 
from City merchant banks - Rothschilds (Mr. Michael Bucks), Hill Samuel 
(Sir Robert Clark), Morgan Grenfell (Mr. Ken Barrington) and Minster Trust 
(Mr. Peter Cannon). Furthermore, the Panel's four Director. Generals have 
included three merchant bankers - Mr. Ian Fraser, seconded from Warburgs . 
and now of Lazards (1968-72) and Mr. John Hull, seconded from Schroder 
Wagg (1972-74) were the first two. In 1976, Mr. David Macdonald, director 
in charge of corporate finance at Hill Samuel, was chosen to succeed 
Mr. Martin Harris an accountant from Price Waterhouse and the only previous 
non-merchant banker to hold the post. The general point has been put most 
strongly by Franks (1970) 
34 
who criticised the Panel for having no legal 
basic, for failing to operate in the real interests of shareholders or with 
a proper understanding of the duties of a board of directors, and significantly, 
for greatly enhancing the status and power of merchant banks. Subsequent 
events have confirmed the view. 
Nevertheless, the merchant banks' capacity to seize the initiative 
has also undoubtedly contributed to their elevated position. The ability 
to provide financial advice seems to owe much to " ... the existence" 
within the banks "of individual skills of separate units which could join 
forces on an ad hoc basis". 
35 
In this respect, it should be stressed that 
the overriding impression is that merchant banking and corporate finance 
are very personalised businesses: provision of financial advice utilises skills 
which are unique to the personnel of the advising institution and are 
tailored to the needs and situation of each client. Illustrative of the 
importance of individual skills in corporate finance is the career of 
Mr. Charles Ball, who whilst vice-chairman of Kleinwort Benson, gained a 
reputation as one of the City's leading tacticians in the defence of 
companies subjected to unwanted bids. His accomplishments since he first 
acted on behalf of Telephone Rentals in their successful defence against 
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G. E. C. are indeed remarkable. For example, he helped prevent Waddingtons 
being acquired by Mardon International and played a leading part in Debenhams' 
fight to remain independent of U. D. S. He managed to extract an extra £7 
million from Reed International in its acquisition of I. P. C. in 1970, and 
perhaps most notably, secured an additional 35p a share for Shipping & 
Industrial Holdings' shareholders when the bidding Vlasov-Capitalfin consortium 
already held 61% control. More recently, he won a higher price on behalf of 
Fenchurch Insurance against Kleinwort's rival merchant banking group 
Guinness Peat. 
The extent of Ball's expertise is perhaps best indicated by the furore 
and comments that was prompted by his appointment as chairman of the re-named 
Barclays Merchant Bank (B. M. B. ) in 1976. It seems peculiar that the 
recruitment of one man should be heralded as the beginning of a new-style era 
for the clearing banks in their competition for the business which has 
traditionally been the exclusive preserve of the independent merchant banks. 
Yet, the financial press were, for once, unanimous in their prognosis. 
The Times, for example, proclaimed that: 
"Barclays' aim, plainly, is to prevent its customers turning 
automatically to other merchant banks when they need 
sophisticated skills, for instance in arranging mergers ... " 36 
The Financial Times reported: 
"... it seems to highlight just how well regarded are those 
special few merchant bankers who rate as the top corporate 
finance experts. " 37 
Having gained a reputation as a defence strategist, Ball also displayed 
willingness to act for the predator, when B. M. B., acting in concert with Kleinwort: 
on behalf of Tate and Lyle negotiated for the acquisition of Manbre a Garton 
in a much discussed battle during the summer of 1976. In the absence of 
Ball, it is clearly unlikely that B. M. B. would have attracted the attentions 
of Tate & Lyle; indeed, B. M. B. would probably still attract the common 
allegation of the clearers' merchant banks that they lack the flexibility and 
the competitive edge of their independent rivals due to their institutionalised 
nature and uninspired staffing policies. 
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6.2 : Public Relations Consultants 
6.2.1 : Introduction and History 
The increased sophistication of the technical aspects of takeover bids, 
especially the financial content of offer documents, and the asperity 
characterising contested bids, have given rise to a number of further 
developments in the merger market. Notwithstanding the expertise of the 
merchant bank's corporate finance department, the basic point at issue in 
takeover negotiations is whether or not a company's shareholders can be 
persuaded, coerced or merely 'informed' into accepting or rejecting a merger 
proposal. Despite the growing domination of institutional equity holdings, 
the ownership of industrial private enterprise is still widely varied. Thus 
the small, private shareholder cannot be dismissed as unimportant in 
takeover situations. The assertion by Mr. Nicholas Stacey38 that "the ordinary 
shareholder is desperately innumerate"39 is therefore potentially serious 
If Stacey is correct, then, by implication, a number (perhaps a majority in 
some cases) of shareholders during a bid cannot understand the printed documents 
that are circulated and hence the merchant banks are failing in their implicit 
duty to inform all shareholders with equal promptness of the relevant factors, 
in a comprehensible manner. 
The recognition, during the late 1960s, of the need for more positive 
forms of communication with investors40 whilst endorsing this point emphasised, 
in addition, the need for greater disclosure of information. This was also 
the consequence of the publicity that the unprecedented merger activity had 
provoked which in turn had focused attention on the integrity of merchant 
banks during takeover deals. The banks have been among that stoutest 
defenders of the self-regulatory framework within the City and have feared 
that concern at their methods and integrity would be interpreted to infer that 
the traditional restraints of City behaviour which have been dependent upon 
the values of personal and collective honesty were not a satisfactory alternative 
to detailed legislation. 41 Thus-anxieties developed within the merchant banking 
community and in consequence the gradual process of self-revelation evolved. 
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Both the accountability of merchant banking activities and the need for 
greater disclosure in takeover situations are linked by a common denominator - 
the attentions of the financial press, which have become an important force 
in contemporary merger activity. Attracted initially by the recurrence of 
contested bids and the apparent inviolability of merchant banks, financial 
journalists have since made a number of positive contributions. They served 
to make the City more accountable in the sense that more was revealed of its 
activities by, and through, the press. Furthermore, by their efforts to add 
comment and opinion to the reporting of events, journalists have encouraged 
the City to disclose more information of its own accord. It is doubtful, 
for example, whether the Takeover Panel would have been established when 
it 
was had it not been for the bitter outcries of the press. Moreover, 
during 
the P&0 bid for Bovis, in 1972, which is analysed at the end of this chapter, 
small shareholders were apparently influenced more by press comment than by 
the advice of stockbrokers and other financial consultants. 
42 
These separate, yet inter-related developments, created a situation for 
the merchant banks which they were ill-equipped to handle. In effect they 
were being asked to retain their professional status and yet inform effectively 
all denominations of shareholder; and to be accountable to the public and 
shareholders while observing a strict code of'conduct which stresses, inter alia, 
43 
secrecy and integrity with respect to "price-sensitive information". 
The growth of the financial public relations industry in the late 1960s 
Was a direct result of these developments and the merchant banks' quandry. 
This is explained by the chief executive of one of the most successful public 
relations (P. R. ) consultancies, John Addey Associates, who described his role 
as: 
" ... on a par with other City advisers - solicitors, 
bankers, 
accountants and stockbrokers - aiming at filling what seemed 
to be a basic gap in the range of services being provided. " 44 
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At the outset, P. R. consultants were contracted by merchant bankers with 
responsibility to present to the public and shareholders the relevant 
arguments in a form that could be readily understood; to intermediate between 
the bank and the press, controlling the timing and contents of press 
releases; and in general to promote and conduct the publicity campaign. 
Most. City consultancies were offshoots from advertising agencies. 
These had developed from solicitors' offices when ißt became necessary to 
translate certain undertakings given to the Stock Exchange, prospectus documents, 
for example, into a form suitable for advertising and the press. As 'disclosure' 
grew into a subject of topical debate, 
45 
pressures on merchant banks increased 
and attention was focused on the specialised P. R. profession conducted by 
consultants with similar training and the ability to match their contemporaries 
in the banks' corporate finance departments. 
Their responsibility for the shareholders' and public's view of a company 
varies according to the situation: in an unopposed takeover bid, for instance, 
the function of the P. R. consultant is merely to assist in the presentation 
of the arguments in a readable and comprehensive form. In this respect 
the task is: " ... not to interpret information but to crystallise it. 
"46 
The violent resistance to unwelcome takeovers which was particularly noticeable 
in the merger euphoria of the late 1960s and early 197O*, brought about more 
desperate defence measures and prompted P. R. campaigns of greater sophistication 
and wider scope. 
As contested bids became more prominent in this period, the P. R. 
function assumed increased significance. It was recognised as an integral 
part of the initial team formed before. every major acquisition proposal 
was made, or defended. The role of the P. R. consultant has been complementary 
to that of the merchant banking adviser whose principal task is to 
concentrate on the 'financial' and 'technical' aspects of a bid proposal 
or defence. The role of the P. R. consultant, in contrast, is to attempt 
to-exploit the 'psychological' aspects of merger negotiations, in particular 
the expectations of shareholders who are the ultimate owners of the companies 
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which are being bought and sold. Their influence, whilst originating 
from the number of contested bids which arose, has owed much to the 
interest taken by the financial press in the subject of acquisitions and 
mergers. As soon as journalists started to examine matters in detail, 
and had an influence over shareholders by taking a view, their existence 
became important to financial advisers. 
P. R. consultants, as intermediaries between the two, therefore 
occupied a key position, in which they determined the presentation of 
information (style and medium) to shareholders and the methods by which 
defensive advisers should harry the aggressor or create doubts in the 
minds of their opponents - both advisers and shareholders. In performing 
this function the P. R. consultants have had an important impact on the 
merger market. The implications of their involvement stems from a trans- 
formation of their role vis a vis the merchant banker. Firsts . 
the 
emphasis in bids has shifted from financial detail to daily narrative 
of bid and counter-bid, laced with personalities and related not so 
much as a technical duel between two merchant banking advisers, as a 
psychological battle between public relations men. Secondly, as a result, 
the dissemination and the quality of information has improved= the 
presentation of offer documents has changed radically, with colour and 
logos replacing financial and legal. detail. In consequence, private 
shareholders, often the recipients of masses of paper in a bid, find the 
documents easier to consult and to comprehend. 
A third implication concerns a change in the methods employed to 
communicate with shareholders. Particularly during contested bids, there 
has been a substantial increase in the use being made of press, radio and 
television for the advancement of rival views. 
47 
Arguably press relations 
have always been highly developed within the City48 which makes the 
financial press an attractive and expedient means of communication and 
advertising. The other media are as yet relatively unused. Although 
warnings of their potential were sounded by the Takeover Panel in 197249 
and welcomed by Stacey who considers that in the future takeover statements 
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will appear on television as paid advertisements: 
"It is possible to consider ... when chairmen of large public 
companies will give a five-minute summary of their companies' 
achievements on commercial television. " 50 
The growing use of public relations has taken a number of further 
forms and is displayed by two examples during 1972. Both campaigns were 
prompted by the large number of small shareholders of the companies involved., 
In the bid by Grand Metropolitan Hotels (G. M. H. ) for Watney Mann, the 29,000 
individual shareholders of Watneys were urged to give public proof of their 
loyalty by displaying stickers on their cars bearing the legend "Keep 
Watneys Watneys"; beer mats conveyed the same message. The propoganda 
potential in thousands of public houses was exploited by the P. R. campaign 
in an attempt to gain the support of the private shareholder. Despite 
Watneys' exhortation, G. M. H. won control of the brewers when a large 
institutional shareholder, Prudential Assurance, voted in favour of 
the acquisition. 
Perhaps furthest from the City's approved method of communicating 
bids and lobbying support51 was that chosen by Debenhams in their successful 
opposition to the bid by United Drapery Stores (U. D. S. ). The tactics 
adopted by Debenhams and their advisers (Kleinwort Benson, Morgan Grenfell, 
Greenwells, John Addey and Charles Barker) were similarly influenced 
by the composition of Debenhams' shareholding. Some 70% of the equity 
was held by the 46,000 small shareholders folding less than £1,000 worth 
of stock), most of whom, it was considered would be customers as well. 
The decision was taken therefore to conduct an emotional ("psychological") 
battle rather than a purely financial one. Staff and customers - whether 
shareholders or not - were involved in the defence which exploited an 
easily identifiable image, with the aid of posters, car stickers and badges 
worn by staff appealing to shareholders to remain independent, in order 
to mobilise the support of small shareholders. The hallmark of the defence 
was the attempt to employ an unprecedented mode of direct communication 
with shareholders. The main example, was entirely-the result of the P. R. 
approach and featured a "personal message" from the Chairman, 
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Sir Anthony Burney, in the form of a three-minute gramaphone record 
dispatched to shareholders with the offer documents. The importance of 
this approach lay in its originality; it represented a unique method 
of achieving effective and wide coverage in a company's attempt to inform 
shareholders of the reasons for resisting the bid. Moreover, it proved 
relatively inexpensive: costing some £1,000 as opposed to £200,000 to 
convey a similar message on television. 
52 
From here, it seemed a logical 
next step to use the broadcasting media. 
53 
The course of events in the U. D. S. /Debenhams battle, from February 
to May 1972, are important in a wider sense as well. In particular they 
illustrate how a successful campaign can be waged with the emphasis on 
public relations rather than technical/financial detail. 
Debenhams' strategy was formulated by a co-ordinated team of 
financial and Public relations advisers, and the Chairman, 
Sir Anthony Burney, who remained prominent throughout. The events are 
chronicled, in order to present a composite picture of the outcome and how 
if was effected. Of greater explanatory value, and of some general applicability 
however, are the motives behind some of the occurrences. Thus in Table 6.2, 
each significant event is classified with respect to the three broad types 
of strategy listed below which form an overall framework to be employed in 
most takeover defences: 
A. DEFENCE IN DEPTH - being prepared to force the bidder to raise his 
price at least once. 
B. SHAREHOLDER SUPPORT - tactics should vary within the overall strategy, 
according to the composition of the shareholding. 
C. 'PSYCHOLOGY' - combining psychological aspects of the defence with 
technical support; aimed at harrying the bidder into 
mistakes and wresting the initiative, with the intention 
of achieving B. above. 
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in brief, the background to the takeover bid was as follows: 
U. D. S. : Chairman - Bernard Lyons 
: Merchant Bank - Hill Samuel 
Debenhams : Chairman - Sir Anthony Burney 
: Merchant Bank(s) - Kleinwort Benson 
Morgan Grenfell 
March 1972 : U. D. S. bid 3O5p a share for Debenhams, worth a total consideration 
of £116 million; offer open until April 17. 
: Rationale - a) Debenhams' under-utilisation of assets, especially 
property 
b) Poor management 
The defence mounted by Debenhams shows how, in an imperfect market, 
tactics can be as decisive as the relative strengths of the opponents' 
technical cases. The defence exploited the clearly defined public image 
which Debenhams enjoyed (and U. D. S. lacked) and was characterised by the 
personal interest of the chairman and the background position occupied 
by the merchant banking advisers, Kleinwort Benson and Morgan Grenfell. 
In contrast, Hill Samuel, advisers to U. D. S., were to the fore during the 
negotiations. The extent of Debenhams' private shareholding favoured the 
former approach, and in particular Burney's recorded contribution proved 
significant as a means of reaching small shareholders and rallying their 
support, whilst provoking an untimely and badly-received response. from U. D. S. 
Moreover, the conduct of the campaign apparently convinced the institutions 
that the newly-constituted Debenhams management team deserved the chance to 
prove themselves. With Debenhams' final share price at a 44p discount on 
the offer price, it would indeed seem that the credit was owed to "the 
public relations tour de force". 
54 
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The focus in this connection is on the P. R. consultant and on his 
ability, in particular, to exploit incomprehension and indifference which 
are common characteristics of some private shareholders. Skilfully 
deployed public relations which highlights personalities and concentrates 
on the method of presenting information can in such circumstances, supercede 
financial considerations - the price being offered for the shares, and 
sophisticated technical arguments. 
In any takeover bid, shareholders require some guidance. The 
complexity of the documentation in modern acquisitions alone means that it 
is no longer sufficient merely to communicate with investors. Rather, 
their exacting and very different needs have imposed upon the P. R. consultant 
an interpretative role whereby he selects the relevant information and 
presents it in a succinct form. Offer and rejection documents must appeal 
to the broadest strata of the shareholding. Thus the first judgement that 
the advising team relies on the P. R. consultant for, is to ensure that the 
issues being presented are understood; and this means that the contents 
will vary according to the shareholders. Following from this, it is possible 
to discern the second important quality - flexibility. In the U. D. S. / 
Debenhams example, the shareholding remained uniform. During the G. M. H. bid 
for Watneys, however, the shareholding changed considerably. Towards the 
end of the protracted defence only the institutions were left, a fact 
suitably reflected in the presentation of the offer documentation. A 
third essential function is to control the timing of communications - 
deciding which material will have the maximum impact and when, and via 
which media it should be delivered. It should be added that although the 
P. R. consultants have increased in importance in the merger market, their 
task has also become more exacting. In particular the financial press pose 
a problem; for whilst providing the most convenient means of communicating 
and achieving publicity, they are also the most critical of methods and 
tactics. With so many reputations hinging on the successful outcome of 
takeover negotiations, the need for careful, but effective, use of the press 
becomes essential. 
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6.3 : The Voice of the Institutions 
6.3.1 : The Emergence of Latent Power 
A third institutional force in the mechanics of takeover bids arises 
from the voting power conferred by the investment resources which are 
controlled and owned from within the City. These resources have increased 
in recent years both absolutely and proportionately. Between 1963 and 1973 
individual shareholdings as a proportion of total shareholding fell from 
59% to 42%. The holdings by institutional investors (pension funds, insurance 
companies, investment trust companies and unit trusts) showed a corresponding 
increase from 25% to 41%. 
55 
Moreover the trend is apparently increasing. 
Analysis of purchases of U. K. equities reveals that in the first 9 months 
of 1975, net new investments by the institutions amounted to £1.5 billion, 
whilst individuals disposed of £1.1 billion net. In percentages, the 
institutions increased their end-1973 stock of £15 billion by 10%, whereas 
individuals reduced their investments of £17 billion by 15:. 
56 
More 
specifically, the pension funds have assumed a more powerful position. 
In the 10-year period to 1973, they increased their proportionate shareholding 
from 7% to 12%, and from January-September 1975 accounted for 60% of all 
institutional equity investment. Furthermore, the unprecedented merger 
activity in the U. K. since the early 1960s has concentrated still more 
power in their hands, as merged companies pool their pension funds. 
Unless the institutions choose to exercise this power, it remains 
potential. Indeed until the late 1960s 'latent' was a very appropriate 
description of their ascendancy. For many years, the institutions avoided 
displaying their strength. They considered themselves to be investors 
and their expertise to be money-management. They showed no wish to involve 
themselves in the administration of the companies which they partly owned, 
complaining that they lacked the time and knowledge to act as industry's 
nursemaids or indeed its conscience. 
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A number of developments have militated against a continuation of 
this passivity however. First, the option of 'selling out' has declined 
as institutional investors have acquired greater control of British industry. 
The possession of such large equity holdings as now exist effectively 
-prevents the possibility of disposal because of the resultant effect on 
the share price. Secondly, and as a consequence, City institutions appear 
to have realised that the only real sanction they have against poor management 
is essentially to persuade another company to undertake an acquisition. 
Thirdly, fund management has become generally more competititive, particularly 
since the diversification of merchant banks into the area and this has 
increased the pressure to apply force on company managements 
6.3.2 : The Emergence of Real Power : Takeover Bids 
Apart from these specific pressures, it appears that a gradual realisation 
of responsibility to their own shareholders has induced the institutions to 
show more direct interest in industrial performance. Thus the emergence of 
their role as an important force in bid and merger situations is part of 
the much wider interest shown by institutional investors in British industry. 
57 
In contrast to other changes in attitude, however, their intervention in 
the market for merger and acquisition promised a more immediate impact on 
the management of the companies involved. 
When existing co-operation arrangements for investment protection among 
the associations representing the four main groups of institutions were 
formalised there were hopes for effective intervention. Although mergers 
and takeovers were ostensibly outside the terms of reference of the 
Institutional Shareholders Committee (I. S. C. ) which was formed in 1973, it 
had an approach which, in spirit, could lend assistance to any institution 
finding it necessary to become'embroiled in a public contest, as Kidgely 
points out: 
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" ... with the 
formation in 1973 of the Institutional Shareholders 
Committee, which represents upwards of one-third of all ordinary 
shares, the institutions have the potential to exercise control 
over most of the large companies, if they choose to do so. 
Furthermore, as in the case of previous use of power by 
individual investors or the separate investment protection 
committees, the new joint committee intends to work discreetly 
and without publicity, the approach considered to offer the 
" best prospect of co-operation with company management. " 58 
The creation of the ginger-group appears to have been in response to 
the Green Paper to the proposed Companies Reform Bill (1973) and was seemingly 
as interested in freeing institutional investors from becoming 'locked-in' 
to their equity holdings as in improving City/industry relationships. 
Indeed it also reflected concern that the institutional investors were 
threatening the operation of 'competitive' securities markets. 
Whatever the rationale, the need for a monitoring body appeared 
necessary, in view of the haphazard pattern of intervention which had prevailed 
hitherto. A former director of Keyser Ullmann, John Hoffmann, formed an 
advisory service for institutional investors to instruct them on how best 
59 
to persuade the boards of companies to improve their performance. His 
motives originated from what he describes as the institutions' " ... duty 
as a representative of an above-average shareholding ... to take the initiative 
and associate with each other to force action on inadequate management", 
60 
and reflected the decisive and unpredictable influence that the institutions 
have had on the future direction of a company. 
Since the acquisition by G. E. C. and A. E. I. in 1967,61 which was an 
important landmark in the development of institutional power, the institutions 
have taken considerably more interest in intervening in takeover bids. As 
implied, however, their intervention has often been quite unpredictable, 
and caused industrial and financial companies to become deflected from their 
expansion and diversification plans. The Rank Organisation was prevented 
from acquiring Watney Mann for example, although one institution in particular 
was instrumental in the takeover of Watneys by G. M. H. Similarly, Hill Samuel's 
plan to merge with metropolitan and Estates Property Company (M. E. P. C. ) to 
create a merchant bank/ property holding company was thwarted due partly to 
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institutional conservatism within the insurance industry. Ironically, 
Hill Samuel's principal opponent, Prudential Assurance, acquired a 20% stake 
in Keyser Ullmann and then backed the merchant bank's takeover of Cental 
and District Properties in 1972. Institutional intervention also affected 
the outomce of Burmah Oil's planned merger with Laporte, Imperial Tobacco's 
bid for Courage and the P&O/Bovis takeover battle which is discussed in the 
next section. It should also be noted that the institutional shareholders 
of Vickers, led by the Prudential and Kleinwort Benson, and encouraged by 
Hill Samuel did act in unison to replace its top management in 1970; 
and in 1973 insurance companies and merchant banks brought sufficient 
pressure on Distillers for them to improve their compensation to the 
thalidomide children. 
In summary, when the latent power has emerged it has often done so 
in an unpredictable fashion and with consequently varied results. Although 
the over-riding motive for intervention in bid situations might be expected 
to be price, the different needs of the various institutions are not conducive 
to consistent intervention. Institutional investors are clearly not an 
homogeneous group. Pension funds, for example, because of their tax structure, 
would prefer an acquiring firm (even if it is offering a slightly lower 
consideration) which is committed to a policy of cash dividends, to-an 
acquirer which intends to distribute shares in lieu of dividend. Furthermore, 
even within a group of similarly based institutions, variations can arise in 
needs which become translated into different actions and decisions. In 1974, 
for example, it was reported that the Imperial Group pension fund had "a 
distinct penchant for cash offers where takeovers affect its portfolio. "62 
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6.3.3 : Concentration of Power 
The examples of institutional intervention are as yet few and far between. 
However, the proportionate rise in their equity holdings and the growing 
support for their active interest in British industry (both from within and 
without the City) 
63 
suggest that, in the future, the institutions will become 
an important force. Thus it is important to consider not only how far the 
institutions are disposed to wield their power, but also who it is that izakes 
the decisions to intervene. Two separate developments are relevant in 
this connection, both of which stem from the analysis in Chapter four. 
On the one hand, there has been a tendency for investment decision-making 
to be concentrated into fewer units. Investment trusts, unit trusts and 
insurance companies have all undergone a period of consolidation in which 
mergers and acquisitions have reduced the number and increased the size of 
individual units. Moreover, there has been a tendency for insurance 
companies, in particular, to develop a managed fund investment service for 
medium and large pension funds. While constituted as insurance companies, 
managed funds are effectively run as unit trusts and are open to tax-exempt 
pension funds. As such they represent competition to self-invested funds 
managed by merchant banks. The extent of their growth is indicated by 
figures for the total value of 'managed funds'; in 1973 it was £320 million; 
in 1976, £840 million, and before the end of 1977 it is expected to exceed 
£1,000 million. In March, 1976,17 insurance companies were offering this 
service in the form of 35 different units, 33 of which have been established 
since 1971.64 
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The second development is more disturbing for it raises a fundamental 
question of the merchant bank's role in mergers and acquisitions, and has 
wider implications for the competitive efficiency of London's capital markets. 
65 
Specifically, it concerns the increasing incursion by merchant banks (and 
other financial institutions) into fund management. All the large merchant 
banks manage outside investment portfolios (as well as th r own), although 
the emphasis placed by each bank on this activity varies ccoýnsiderably. 
For example, Robert Fleming has long specialised in portfolio management 
and holds a 26% share in Save & Prosper, Britain's largest unit trust management 
company, controlling assets of about £700 million; Baring Brothers holds 
a similar stake in the group. 
66 Whereas Hambros has recently achieved a public 
flotation for its life assurance subsidiary, Hambro Life. There are many other 
examples, which are detailed in chapter four. 
It is seldom possible to make any quantitative assessment of the 
influence that merchant banks exercise in this way. With few exceptions, 
merchant banks prefer not to be associated with industrial companies as 
holders of the latter's equity capital. The cases where links of this 
sort are seen publicly to exist tend to be in the nature of small companies 
which merchant banks have colonized with the intention of promoting sufficient 
growth for a public flotation. 
67 
Their power in this respect may be attributed 
to the position they occupy as the focal point of the City's power nexus - 
whereby they are the centre-point for mustering support among the institutions, 
as occurred in the Vickers incident. Concern at their involvement with the 
institutions and investment management, however has arisen because of the 
possibility of a conflict of interest which occurs because of. their prominence 
as corporate financial advisers. This concern is summarised by the Panel 
on Takeovers and Mergers which was induced by critical newspaper comment, 
to study the situation in 1970: 
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"All the Merchant Banks and others concerned were involved in the 
possibility of some conflict of interest or of professional 
propriety in that they were all, to a greater or lesser extent, in 
possession of confidential information about the position of the 
particular companies to which they acted as corporate advisers, 
or on whose Boards some members of the firm might sit, whilst 
they were also engaged as investment advisers to pension or other 
funds or to individual clients whose investment portfolios they 
managed. In all cases, therefore, the theoretical or indeed actual 
possibility existed that information gained in the one capacity, 
as for instance about an impending takeover transaction or about 
some alteration in a company's affairs or profitability, could 
be used with advantage in the other capacity in advising a sale 
or purchase of securities. 68 
6.4 : Case study - The proposed merger of P&O and Bovis, 1972 
The roles of and interactions between merchant banks, P. R. consultants 
and institutional investors are illustrated in the abortive merger proposal 
between P&O and Bovis in the Summer of 1972. The shortcomings of case study 
analysis are well-known, and it would indeed be misleading to draw any 
general conclusions from this example. However, the history of the financial 
sector, the development of its institutions and changes in its self-regulatory 
system of government have been influenced and tested by specific events 
such as this. 
The merger proposal was launched at a time when the stock market was 
reaching its peak and large acquisitions were very much in vogue. The 
important events in the background and public stages of the bid are chronicled 
in Table 6.3; the following serves as a brief introduction. P&O were 
suffering from an out-dated management structure and were achieving a return 
on assets of'less than 5%. Their chairman, Ford Geddes was a close associate 
of Lord Poole, a non-executive director and chairman of Lazards and welcomed 
his proposal to merge with Bovis, a fast growing construction company. 
The bid was extremely complicated and was expressed as a merger rather than 
an acquisition despite the disparity in the companies' sizes, owing to 
expectations of Bovis' future results. Initial terms valued Bovis at 
between £120 million and £137 million but negotiations centred on the proposed 
management structure rather than price, with Frank Sanderson, a proven 
property entrepreneur and chairman of Bovis being the chairman-elect of 
the new company. 
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Table 6.3 
I'W/IIOVTS : CIIRO\OWrY Of THR! RT. INT F: V TS 
Event 
First plane le- the merger evolve. Theyware the design of the chairman of 
rcrchan; bank, Lazards, Lord Poole, who was also a non-executive director 
of : eth rio and Bovis. The intention was to accommodate Davis' expansion 
plans witr-in a large Croup and sinultancously to eradicate PiO's out-dated 
eraraCce-cr, t s'-uctu-e, partly by installing Frank Sanderson (Bovis chairman) 
as c'rrtitaan of the enlarged group. 
Initial auecctitier: s : nplicd merr r rather than acquisition. la: ards proposed 
an equity split of SV-43, - but thr. y were unable to specify which company's 
shareholders si, ould rrcc; vo the majority share of the enlarged group. 
V4CIs inde7cricnt examination of the companies, relative strengths indicated 
that PLO should assu: ic 6d1 cer, trol. Warburgs, on the basis of Bovis' 1972 
profit foreccr. t of f. 13 mm pre-tax, and a considerable discount prevailing in 
the market. required a much higher price for Boves, such that Davis would 
receive 60%. of the combined equity. 
Sanderson suggested a new formula whereby Davis would receive 49% of the 
new group with 35p of convertible stock (exercisable from 1976); PLO would 
receive a scrip issue of the same cennertioie stock but with warrants 
attached, entitling them to buy more steck from 1977 owards at 325P a share, 
some S0; ' above their previous trigl. This implied that MIS sha eholde-r3 
would have to raise some £37 cam in cash to bcaefit from the deal -a sum in 
excess of Davis' book assets. 
Bid became public, apparently with the agreement of all parties concerned 
lard inchcape makes public his objection to the bid, revealing a board room 
division within PLO and implying that the votes of non-executive directors 
(both directors of lasards) swung the consensus. 
Comm nt 
La: ards' motives impugned because 
of their dual board representation. 
Their intention was to withdraw from 
Povis, being replaced by Warburgs; and 
to be assisted independently by Williams, 
Glyn (WG) as advisers to LW. 
This was prompted by Oovis' forecast 
future performance. la: ards made no allowance 
for P&O's £100 mm unutilised tax credits 
Apparent financial dead-lock. Neither side 
considered the deal acceptable 
The deal was accepted be respective chairmen, 
and merchant banks, and implicitly agreed by 
PLO board. In fact Lord Inchcape objected and 
so (silently) did five other non-executive dir- 
ectors. Geddes assumed conformity to majority 
decision. 
Press release and attributable interview in 
Sunday Times, handled by P. R. fire. See asses- 
sment an3 Appendix. 
Q! convened by Geddes in response to the opposition to the bid. Inchcape This time 
lapse very important because it gave 
isolated and bid apparently set to proceed. But bid documents delayed and P&O 
dissenting directors the opportunity to harden 
do not appear for a further 21 days. In all some 9 weeks elapsed before the in their disenchantment. Financial press and ind- 
formal cffcr doc+: rents approved. ependent commentators 
keep bid at fore of attention. 
Morgan Grenfell ('. ^, ) announced in a press release, that it proposed to contact Independent 
intervention of merchant bank unpre- 
 a9or shareholders in P&0 cu its own behalf, to examine jain: lv the merger cedented - provoked rumours that MG acting 
for mys- 
proposals. MGrs rationale - £1 en of their managed funds were invested in PLO. tery 
bidder for PLO. Timing of intervention critical 
(ea; ineered by P. R. cons-'ltants John Addey Associates) 
Press conference at which La: ards stated that the merchant bank had valued for it was made on eve of PLO board meeting to auth- P40Ss ships on the basis of earnings power, -irrespective of their Balance ri: c formal offer document - but 2 executive directors Sheet value. This refuted the contention that stock market price reflected refused to con'ly. 
the earnings capacity of the assets; the arnouncenens considered by P&C 
fi i l ff d i 3rd executive director announced opposition to bid as nanc sta en a grating. 
MG organised institutional shareholders' meeting; the participants collectively 
owned 25 of P&O equity. P&O were petitioned for more information, and an 
independent report of the shipping industry was cor.. nissiored with particular 
attention to PLO (undertaken by James Morrel & Associates). MC, as spokesman for independent shareholders sought answers to a number of questions relating 
to the absence of a profit forecast from NO, and the failure of Boris' fore- 
cast to specify the profitability of its wide-ranging operations and to extend 
beyond 1972. MC also sought adjournment of P&O's FZP4, convened for Oct 12 to 
gain Board support for the merger, so that full consideraticn could be given 
to the proposal. 
KO and Laxards refused MG's request. MG put formal request to the Executive rapucations 
for development of Takeover Code particularly 
of the Takeover Panel that it should seek postponement of the EQi; this also with respect to Rule 15 and 
General Principle 3 re. pos. _ 
felled and an appeal vas Bade to the Full Panel when the case was once again session and dissemination of 
information. See Appendix 
rejected. 4Ors reaction - letter to P&Ors shareholders urging rejection of the bid chapter 7. 
Against bac. ground of argument re. release of PO's profit forecast which P60 
board dissidents were prevented from undertaking, Lord Incheapes as cbaixsan 
of Inchcape Croup, backed by N. anbros Bank (and with the prömise of f60 m 
In finance), made a reverse takeover bid for P&O, which valued the group at 
t'. 410 on. This bid equivalent to 22L times the value placed on PLO in previous 
Sovis merger discussions. 
Nastily-arranged merti. ý b6tween the 3 merchant bankirar advisers, interrupting 
PLO board meeting. A new proposal arose and was presented to the PLO board. 
By the new proposal, the ultimate PLO stake in the new company was raised from 
50?; to 6' ; Bovis was valued at 475p a share. laxards tried to abandon 
the merger, but this was rejected by PLO and Boris. Another alteration in 
the proposals resulted with Bovis' value increased to 510p a share. Notwith- 
standing Wir continued opposition, it was agreed to proceed. Final S71 fixed 
tier Nov 17. 
Interview with Sir Donald Anderson (ex-chairman of PLO and Geddes* predecessor) 
published in Daily Telegraph, in which Anderson made clear his opposition to 
the bid and announced his intention to vote against the proposal. 
At final FLN, proxies voted 5-2 against the merger proposal. Geddes resigned as chairman of PLO; l. urd Poole resigned as chairman of Latards who waived fee. 
See assessment; Inchcapets bid was recognised as bona tjd. 
bid by Takeover Panel, cf. HG's intervention as institnt. 
ional shareholder rather than bidder. PAO forced to reR&X 
more info. (profit forecast) and rearrange schedule 
The final and damaging intervention to the PIPO5. nts 
of the bid. 
The institutional shareholders were split equally. 
Thus private shareholders' votes had been decisive 
in defeating the bid. 
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The abortive merger between P&O and Bovis is important for several 
reasons. First) because it highlights the role and influence of the 
financial advisers and investors which are intimately involved in the mechanics 
of mergers. Secondly, because of its implications - for it prompted several. 
developments which affect the conduct of intermediaries in takeover bids 
and the whole process of merger negotiations. 
A number of fundamental questions, for example, were raised of the 
merchant bank's role in takeover bids. These were prompted by doubts 
about Lazards' motives in engineering the merger at the outset, and their 
later interpretation of financial data and analysis of the companies' 
respective markets which proved to be inaccurate. There were two notable 
shortcomings in the bank's calculations. One concerned the timing of the 
bid which was planned at the nadir of P&O's stock market and profit cycle 
without due allowance of the companies' relative valuations. More 
disconcerting was the inaccuracy of the profit forecasts upon which the terms 
were partly decided. Furthermore, the projections were believed by some 
members of the P&O board to be wrong; the majority of the directors, however, 
implicitly accepted the advice they received from their merchant banking 
ac; isers. Such reliance is a testimony to the high regard in which merchant 
bakers were held. Rather than justifying their right to such an elevated 
stati. s, hcwever, the outcome merely demonstrated their fallability. This 
was particularly significant, for the merchant banks claimed privileged 
access to information from which they asserted that the terms agreed were 
substantiated by the companies' relative prospects. The publicly revealed 
failure by a merchant bank to interpret correctly the material it was not 
required to release but to which it had a unique right, prejudiced the 
remainder of the merchant banking community and highlighted a basic injustice 
in respect of the availability of information. Changes in the Takeover Code, 
detailed in Chapter seven, have subsequently ameliorated the situation. 
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A second important development relates to the role of the institutional 
investor in bid situations. In this instance, the issues underlying Morgan 
Gr. enfell's unsolicited intervention on behalf of, but without the explicit 
support of, large institutional investors in P&O related to what extent 
major shareholders should become involved in takeover negotiations and what 
should be their status be if they choose to intervene. It is now clear that. 
before 1972 these were questions to which the City establishment had not 
addressed itself. The response was an attempt to formalise a mechanism 
for institutional intervention in takeover bids through the establishment 
of the Institutional Shareholders' Committee. With hindsight, the initiative 
of the Governor of the Bank of England might be considered an implicit 
criticism of those very institutions represented by Morgan Grenfell, for 
allowing the negotiations to develop in the way in which they did and for 
failing to notify P&O's advisers of their reservations to the proposal. 
This seems paradoxical however, because effective institutional 
intervention was constrained by the Takeover Code which only recognised 
the importance of third parties where they represented potential counter 
bidders. Thus Morgan Grenfell's appeal to the Full Panel for more information 
and more time in which to consider it, was rejected. This indicated that 
a strict interpretation of the Codwas of little use in the unprecedented 
situation which their intervention represented - that is where a third party 
wanted to open up new areas of debate. The distinction between third parties 
was highlighted by Inchcape & Co's bid for P&O. This was recognised an a 
bona fide acquisition proposal and forced the P5O board to reveal the profit 
forecast to which Morgan Grenfell and shareholders had not been granted access. 
The bid by Inchcape & Co followed the split among P50 directors over 
the original terms of the bid. This was in fact first revealed by Lord Inchcape, 
the chairman of Inchcape & Co, but also a non-executive director of P5O. 
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Before the counter bid, it was apparent that the P&O board majority was able 
to exercise great control over how and when information should be released 
and presented to shareholders thereby making any opposition to the bid more 
difficult. The division within the board room of a bidding company was 
itself extraordinary and unprecedented. Apart from signalling more general 
opposition to the bid, it illustrated the role played by the P. R. consultants 
in engineering, not only Morgan Grenfell's intervention, but also the release 
of information regarding the opposition, for maximum effect. Press releases 
were timed just before significant events during the negotiations, particularly 
P&O board meetings, and attributable interviews with P&O executives were 
similarly scheduled. 
The problems involved also illustrate some unresolved issues which 
are of general importance because they represent gross imperfections in 
the market for corporate control, 
69 
and the contribution of the P. R. 
consultants in helping to overcome them. The problems centred around how 
dissidents can receive or present information when the initiative rests with 
others who have opposing sentiments. The continual refusal of the P&O 
board to release information or to submit to audit the 1972-73 budget 
forecast, hampered not only the dissidents but also left shareholders 
with insufficient, indeed often inaccurate, details upon which to make a 
judgement. 
The solution, tacitly endorsed by the Takeover Panel, was to allow 
constant use to be made of the press by the dissidents leaking information 
of divided board opinion, and by the proponents emphasising that profit 
forecasts had been calculated by P&O's merchant banking advisers and were 
therefore reliable. 
70 
A survey of small shareholders' opinions conducted 
by J. Walter Thompson, revealed the importance of press comment showing that 
the press was a more significant influence than stockbrokers and other 
investment advisers. 
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To summarise, the P&O/Bovis takeover battle, ostensibly one of the 
events which obliged the City to re-examine its Code of self-regulation, 
also had a wider significance. First, it marked some hardening in governmental. 
attitudes towards the merger phenomenon71; secondly, it illustrated the 
need for a more efficient exchange of information between hoard and shareholder. 
This is one major imperfection of the merger market -a market characterised 
by imcomplete information and strongly influenced by the power of investing 
institutions and the aspirations of financial advisers and company directors. 
NOTES 
1A number of prominent merchant bankers originated from the legal 
profession: for example, Sir Robert Clark (Hill Samuel); Henry Fisher 
(Schroder Wagg); Stanley Berwin (Rothschild); Philip Sherbourne 
(Drayton Corporation and now Draymont Securities) 
2 An account of the Aluminium War is contained in J. Wechsberg, 
The Merchant Bankers, (Pocket Books, 1968), pp 157-162. 
3: Issuing Houses Association, Notes on the Amalgamation of British 
Businesses, (London, 1959); see chapter seven 
4: Mr. F. Smith, quoted from R. Spiegelberg, The City - Power without 
Accountability, (Quartet, 1973), p. 70 
5 The fees charged by merchant banks for acquisition advice are a matter 
for separate agreement between banker and client on each occasion; 
depending on size, a fee of between ý% and 1% of the consideration is 
not unusual. It was reported that Hill Samuel received £250,000 for 
the G. E. C. takeover of A. E. I. (H. McRae & F. Cairncross, Capital City 
/Eyre Methuen, 19737, p. 59) 
6: Merchant banks may raise finance from their own funds; but are more 
likely to join a consortium of other financial institutions to provide 
the money, or to arrange for other banks to provide all of it. 
7: It was estimated by Spiegelberg that the 400 directors of the Accepting 
Houses Committee held 2,000 other directorships; and that 36 of the 
U. K's largest 100 companies had a merchant banker on its board, 
Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. 65. Quite often the links that are forged in 
this way make it virtually impossible for the client to change his 
merchant bank without good cause. The recent economic stringency has, 
however, caused a number of industrial companies to abandon this sort 
of relationship for an ad hoc use of the merchant bank as financial 
adviser. 
8: See note 7 
9: McRae & Cairncross, op. cit., p. 59 
10 : G. D. Newbould, Management and Merger Activity, (Guthstead, 1971), 
p. 115 
11 : ibid., pp 115-116 
12 : ibid., p 85 
13 : J. Kitching, "Why acquisitions are abortive", Management Today, 
November, 1974, p 82 
14 : See Sn 6.3 
15 : Many examples are cited in Spiegelberg, op. cit., pp 167-202 
(ii) 
16 : The extent to which merchant banks believe their reputations depend 
on the successful outcome of takeover bids (or the successful issue of 
shares) is reflected in the exhaustive investigations carried out 
beforehand; see R. J. Briston, The Stock Exchange and Investment Analysis, 
(Allen and Unwin, 1968) 
17 : City Takeover Code, Rule 16; see also General Principle 12 
18 : ibid., General Principle 6; see also rule 4 
19 : 1958 Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, Sn 14,15,16. It does not 
apply to a prospectus issued under Sn 38 of the 1948 Companies Act 
20 : City Takeover Code, Rule 15: "The offeror will normally be expected 
to cover the following points in the offer document ... 
(1) its intentions regarding the continuation of the business 
of the offeree company; 
(2) its intentions regarding any major changes to be introduced in 
the business, including any re-deployment of the fixed assets 
of the offeree company; 
(3) the long-term commercial justification for the proposed offer; and 
(4) its intentions with regard to the continued employment of 
the employees of the offeree company. " 
21 : ibid., Rule 16 
22 : This is particularly the function of the P. R. consultant; see Sn 6.2 
23 : City Takeover Code, General Principle 10 
24 : City Takeover Code, General Principle 5 
25 : Newbould discovered that directors of a victim firm who do not oppose 
a takeover bid may act for reasons of personal security. Despite 
this, relatively higher considerations were paid where there was some 
form of opposition from the directors. Thus it seems that managers 
did not always seek to secure the best texas for their shareholders 
(Newbould, op. cit., p. 59). 
26 : City Takeover Code, Rule 22 
27 : See D. Phillips, "Merger motives and profit's bait", Business 
Administration, July 1972; and G. Whittington, The Prediction of 
Profitability, (C. U. P. 1971) 
28 : See Sn 6.2 
29 : According to Newbould: " ... on average the terms obtained by the 
shareholders in a victim firm when the directors of the firm did 
not oppose the bid are inferior to those obtained by shareholders 
whose directors were opposed to the bid in question" (Newbould, 
op. cit., pp 83-84). 
- (iii) - 
30 : This stems from the traditions of the old-established accepting houses; 
see C. J. J. Clay & B. S. Wheble, Modern Merchant Banking, (Woodhead- 
Faulkner, 1976), pp 3-6. 
31 : See "Bankers as Brokers", The Economist, June 10,1967 
32 : See Sns 6.3 and 6.4 
33 : City Takeover Code, Rule 12 
34 J. A. Franks, "The Takeover Panel and the Securities Exchange 
Commission", The Solicitors' Journal, November 27,1970, pp 875-877 
35 Angus Grossart, Chairman Noble Grossart, quoted in Sunday Times, 
April, 18,1976 
36 : The Times, April 9,1976 
37 Financial Times, April 9,1976 
38 : Managing director, Chesham Amalgamations (merger brokers) 
39 Quoted in E. Bacot, "Business Duels -A New Blood Sport? ", 
Business Administration, August, 1972, p. 20 
40 See Spiegelberg, op. cit., pp 22-23, for example 
41 See M. Blanden, 'The City Regulations on Mergers and Takeovers' 
in J. M. Samuels (ed), Readings on Mergers and Takeovers, (Elek, 1972) 
42 : Survey undertaken by J. Walter Thompson; see Sn 6.4 
43 See The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Report on the Year ended 
31st March, 1970, Appendix 1, 'The use of confidential price- 
sensitive information'. 
44 : Interview with the author, November, 1974 
45 : The complex jargon of modern'financial techniques tends to give the 
impression that the City has a mystique which puts it apart from the 
everyday world. The need to simplify the jargon, explain the 
complexities and insist on an understanding developed in line with 
the calls for more public accountability for City professions. In 
recognition of the importance of the broadcasting media, the first 
positive moves were taken in late 1976 to establish a 'City Communications 
Centre' as a liaison between non-specialistjournalists and broadcasters 
and City personnel; see B. Sharpe, "The City's Screen Test", 
Bankers' Magazine, October 1976 
46 : J. Addey, quoted in E. Bacot. op. cit., p. 21 
47 : See The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Report of the Year ended 
31st March, 1972, pp 8-9 
- (iv) - 
48 Financial journalism has stood in an uneasy relationship with the City. 
This is particularly apparent when ownership of the press is considered. 
Despite a section in the 1965 Mergers legislation devoted to the 
acquisition of newspapers (1965 Monopolies and Mergers Act, sn 8), 
S. Pearson owns the Financial Times, the Banker, the Investors' 
Chronicle and a substantial portion of the Economist. It also 
owns Lazards, the accepting house. Moreover, the company which publishes 
the Times and Sunday Times has included among its directors, 
Sir Kenneth Keith, of Hill Samuel and Sir Eric Roll of Warburgs; 
similarly Evelyn de Rothschild has been chairman of the Economist. 
49 : The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Report of the Year ended 31st March, 1972 
"The case for radio and televesion as media for discussion is very 
much less good (than that for the financial press), both on account 
of the haphazard coverage and because of the lack of written record 
easily available to the public. Company directors and their advisers 
are therefore recommended to exercise great caution before accepting 
invitations to participate in such programmes. " (pp 8-9). 
50 : Quoted in Bacot, op. cit., p. 20. 
51 : The City Takeover Panel have made it very clear what it considers as 
the first and most important forum for discussion of takeover bids: 
The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Report of the Year ended 31st 
March, 1972: "The circular (addressed to registered shareholders) 
alone can ensure total and, as near as the postal services will permit, 
simultaneous coverage of the shareholding body. The circular has 
the additional advantages that it can be comprehensive, it can be 
read. and (if not fully understood on first reading) re-read, it can 
be discussed with professional advisers and, finally, it is a document 
which unequivocally engages the responsbility of its authors and 
thus is capable of being used as the foundation of any later court 
proceedings. " (p. 8). 
52 : The Times, April 28, '1972 
53 : Daily Mail, May 4,1972 
54 : Financial Times, May 6,1972 
55 : Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth (Mond Report), 
Cmnd 6172 (H. M. S. O. 1975), Table 10 
56 : Data from Financial Times, February 19,1976 and Diamond Report , Table 9 
57 This is also evident from changes in the methods of industrial finance. 
In particular the trend towards increasing bank finance (with a move 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Control. of the Merger Market 
"The world will always be governed by self-interest, 
We should not try to stop this; we should try to 
make the self-interest of cads a little more 
coincident with that of decent people. " 
H. F. Jones (ed), Notebooks of Samuel. Butler, (1919), p. 12 
7.1 : Protection of Shareholders' Interests 
In its submission to the Bullock Committee1 the Stock Exchange 
made the following point: 
"The shareholders of a company bear the ultimate risk 
so far as the capital of the company is concerned and 
it is only just that they should retain the ultimate 
legal control of the company. To deprive them of full 
legal control while their capital in the company remains 
a full risk would be a serious erosion of their 
proprietorial rights. "2 
Although this submission was made in a quite different context, its 
implications are extremely relevant to the question in hand. 
Subject to the provisions of company law, the shareholder is 
regarded as being able to look after his own interests. Bullock's 
rejection of the views expressed above suggests that what legal rights 
the shareholder does possess will be curbed. Only in very restricted 
circumstances would it be possible for shareholders to propose resolutions 
at meetings. They would retain their right to veto proposals put to 
them by their board, as at present, but the entitlement of shareholders, 
controlling 10% or more of a company's equity to call for a meeting and 
put up proposals in a number of crucial areas would be removed. 
3 
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In takeover and bid situations, the shareholder has been arguably 
at his most exposed and least protected. It is quite clear for example 
that U. K. merger policy is not specifically concerned with the protection 
of shareholders. As Sir Geoffrey Howe, the first Conservative Secretary 
of State for Trade and Consumer Affairs said: 
"This may be a matter for company law. The City Code, 
also, is designed to ensure that bids preserve equity 
between one shareholder and another, that all 
relevant information is made public, and so on. 
But the fact that a bid may seem to offer a rather 
poor deal for the owners of the company taken over, 
4 
or that the benefits may seem somewhat inequitably 
distributed, is not really relevant to the question 
whether the case should go to the Monopolies Commission"5 
Moreover there is now little credence in the argument that the 
takeover market mechanism itself provides a form of discipline on 
management by punishing a poor performance with a low share price, 
thereby attracting potential bidders. That management discretion still 
prevails may be witnessed by the ineffectiveness of this mechanism in 
that companies can continue with persistently poor performance for a 
number of years without attracting a bid. 
6 
Furthermore, the major 
limited factor on management discretion is the degree of competition. 
Effective competition may be in the interest of shareholders, but 
management may seek mergers to move towards increased control of the market 
and to initiate fast defensive moves to preserve existing market and 
industrial positions. As Newbould has noted: 
" ... managers bring about mergers, because, basically, 
mergers are advantageous to managers. The increased 
control and safety inherent in a larger share of the 
market and in a larger firm is the advantage that has 
re-occurred ... "ý 
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The characteristics of this market also constitute a strong case 
for some kind of regulation. If there were no rules aimed at shareholders 
receiving equal treatment, then the bidder would escalate his bid so that 
the shares that took him over 51% control commanded a very high price. 
Since all shareholders would try to offer the shares that carried control, 
bids would get hopelessly "bogged down". There is also a case for extending 
protection to shareholders who either have an effective choice of being 
left in a minority or selling out and/or are unsophisticated in their 
dealing and have to rely on poor quality professional advice. In view 
of the doubts raised in Chapter 6, it is not feasible to consider that 
each individual is free to decide whether to buy or sell shares, and 
if he is not aware of the true value of his investment then he deserves 
no protection from the misfortunes of his ignorance. 
7.2 : The Administration of the Regulation of Market Behaviour 
The most convincing rationale for regulation of behaviour in the 
market has, not surprisingly therefore, come in the field of takeovers. 
As implied above, the free enterprise economy presents opportunities 
for the exercise of private entrepreneurial initiative; it also provides 
opportunities for exploitation and mismanagement, however. Thus it is 
expedient, for some form of supervision to ensure that individuals do not 
take unfair advantage of the freedom they have in controlling their own 
and possibly other peoples' economic interests. 
7.2.1 : Background to the Code 
It is not necessary for the purpose of the discussion to examine in, 
detail the events which preceded and influenced the present Takeover Panel 
and Code. It is, however, illuminating, to consider briefly the nature 
of the problems which the system has been designed to solve and the 
circumstances which formed the background to current thinking. 
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The first: general point is that it was a very long time before the 
City felt the need to establish any kind of organised and active control 
over takeover tactics. In London, the Stock Exchange had established 
a long tradition of supervising the market and using its influence over 
the companies which required a market quotation for their shares to press 
for an even greater degree of disclosure of information to shareholders. 
For a long time it has been able to boast that in this respect, control 
of the securities raarket has been in advance of the law. But it was not 
until the late 1960s, that the City felt it necessary to begin the 
creation of rules to govern its own activities in the context 
specifically of takeover bids, and recognised the need for specific rules 
to control its own members. 
The reasons for this long delay and the eventual form which the 
regulation took lie deep in the psychology of the City's establishment. 
At its extreme, this took the form of firm resistance to any interference 
in the activities of the City, the resentment of any publicity given to its 
operations, and the conviction that what the City does is its business 
and its business alone. This attitude has by now largely disappeared, 
and even the most traditional merchant banks, for example, have accepted 
the need to create and maintain good relations with the press and other 
outsiders. More rationally, however, the traditions of the City encouraged 
the belief that within the gentlemanly traditions of the City establishment, 
no regulation apart from self-regulation could be needed. Beyond providing 
the minimum of protection against fraud and against the unavoidable 
mishaps which were bound to happen in a competitive climate, the City's 
professional ethics should leave no room for the kind of sharp dealing 
which would require strict control. Against this background it has taken 
a long time to understand that the problem, not of honesty but of protecting 
outsiders (specifically shareholders) against the effects of the City's 
own activities, was an issue of quite a different nature - one which would 
require its institutions to subject themselves to a strictly enforced 
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The second main point, is that it has been only a very small number 
of major cases which have brought the issue to a head. Perhaps half a 
dozen prominent takeover battles, contested in public, established the 
need for requlation. Out of all the merger and takeover activity 
witnessed in recent years, only in these few cases did the scandal reach 
proportions which attracted public attention. In these major arguments, 
the issues became too clear to be ignored. They were sufficient to make 
the City realise, in the first instance, that some kind of rules would 
be necessary to govern its conduct in bid situations, and secondly, 
to reassure the Labour Government that confidence in the City required 
not merely a set of rules, but in spite of the City's traditions, somebody 
to enforce them and enough power to ensure they were observed. 
Finally, from this experience it is possible to identify the 
nature of the problem which the present system is designed to cope with. 
It is this background - and the general experience of the merchant bankers 
who have taken the main responsibility for writing and enforcing the 
code of conduct - which has determined the nature of the Code and the 
form of the operation of the Takeover Panel. 
Acquisition and merger activity is of course only a microcosm 
of the nation's commercial life. Nonetheless the issues involved and 
the fact that takeovers provide eminently readable copy for the financial 
press have recently given this field of study greater currency and more far 
reaching implications than could hitherto have been considered possible. 
Thus, the problem of the securities market is not confined to the control 
of takeover bids. But it is in the context of contested and protracted 
battles, where large amounts of money and many personal reputations are at 
stake, that the issues are raised in their starkest form. Winning and 
losing become as important as the merits of the offer; decisions which 
may vitally affect the outcome are taken on the spur of the moment. 
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In the outstanding cases, the issue appeared largely as one of 
tactics - manoeuvres adopted in takeover situations which could win or 
lose a battle without reference to the merits or shortcomings of a particular 
proposal. The arguments highlighted two equally undesirable characteristics 
of the merger market in the late 1950s. One stemmed from the merchant banks' 
free interpretation of the traditional lack of restraint. They allowed 
themselves to deviate from implicitly accepted standards of conduct by 
entering into public quarrels where professional disagreement gave way to 
open belligerence. The second, arose partly because of the actions of 
the merchant banks which not only offended a general sense of fair play, 
but also led to decisions being taken without reference to the main body 
of shareholders. This erosion of shareholders' rights was well illustrated 
in the so-called Aluminium War of 1958, one of the principal events which 
brought the property and ethics of the City into question. The technique 
pioneered in the British Aluminium case, was that of a company frustrating 
an unwelcome bidder simply by issuing new shares to a favoured third party. 
This example provided the simplest form of this manoeuvre, where, without 
the prior knowledge of shareholders, the Board was able to propose the 
issue of enough shares to give Alcoa a one-third interest and block a 
joint bid from Reynolds Metals and Tube Investments. 
Following the resolution of the Aluminium War, the questioning of 
City behaviour prompted the Governor of the Bank of England to summon 
the representative bodies of the merchant banks, investment trusts, 
insurance companies and London clearing banks, together with the Stock 
Exchange to form a working party. What resulted were the first guidelines - 
issued in 1959 - on how to behave in takeover bids - the so-called 
"Notes on Amalgamations". 
8 
The key principle was quite clear, "that 
boards must at all times bear in mind the interest of all the holders 
of all the respective classes of share and loan capital of the companies, 
according to their respective rights. " They were vague in expression, 
reflecting a determination not to interfere with the freedom of the market; 
there were no detailed points of procedure, no machinery to ensure that 
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principles were observed and, above all, no sanctions against those who 
infringed the principles. Nevertheless, they marked for the first time 
the recognition that takeover tactics required guidance and that shareholders 
had a right to justice. 
Another major theme apparent in recent arguments - that all 
shareholders should be treated alike - was also brought out early in 
the Richard Thomas and Baldwin bid for Whitehead Iron and Steel in 1963. 
R. T. B., advised by Rothschilds, assured its success against a rival 
bidder, Stewart and Lloyds through a market operation which guaranteed 
institutional investors the full value of R. T. B's subsequent bid, but 
left the minor shareholders to their own devices. This led directly 
to a revision of the Notes which for the first time established the 
evolving principle that a bidder who buys shares in the market or through 
a deal with a large holder is bound to offer similar terms to all 
shareholders. 
9 
The main procedural point introduced in the revision was 
that a board should conduct its attack or defence in the best interests 
and full knowledge of shareholders. 
A new wave of discontent was sparked off in 1967, when, in the course 
of two takeover battles, the rules were ignored. -In one case, 
Aberdare Holdings had already established control of Metal Industries, (MI) 
with the help of 19% of the latter's equity purchased from Morgan Grenfell 
who had been buying in the market; but this control was destroyed by 
M. I's agreement to buy a subsidiary of Thorn Electrical in exchange 
for a substantial share issue - and the deal, conditional on the success 
of a Thorn bid for M. I. was evidently only a paper transaction. The other 
bid was between Courtaulds and Rodo Investment Trust for control of 
Wilkinsord Riddell in which Courtaulds paid more than 4 times the 
final bid price for shares on the market for the shares which guaranteed 
them control. 
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7.2.2 : The Takeover Panel and Code 1968-76 - Development 
By 1968 the City's battles had become so conspicuous as to attract 
the attention of the Prime Minister as well as City authorities themselves. 
Thus, under threat of legislation a meeting of City institutions 
produced a new Code of conduct in 196810 with the backing of the Bank 
of England and involving the establishment of the Takeover Panel, to 
supervise its operation and administer its rules. Since its inception 
the Code has been revised four times, and now contains 14 general 
principles, 39 detailed rules and 9 practice notes. 
11 
There is little 
point in detailing the Code - it provides the basic guidance needed for 
all participants in takeover situations, the companies, their advisers, 
the stockbrokers concerned directly or indirectly, and the associates 
of all of these. Its revisions have reflected changes in market behaviour 
and difficulties in the interpretation of rules. 
The objective of this section is to assess the efficacy of the 
Code and the authority of the Panel. This is perhaps best achieved 
by examining briefly the particular problems that have arisen and how 
effectively they have been dealt with. As an introduction, it should be 
stressed that the Code is not a binding document in the legal sense. 
It was created by a group of merchant bankers whose experience in takeover 
negotiations contributed to the drafting. It is designed not merely to 
cover the market tactics of companies and their advisers during bid 
situations, but to cover all aspects of their dealings with shareholders. 
It includes, for example, detailed provisions to govern the techniques of 
profits forecasts - an aspect of the takeover problem which had not been 
conspicuous in the particular battles culminating in regulation - but 
which had repeatedly caused retrospective trouble through the over- 
enthusiasm of company boards in the course of numerous unreported battles. 
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Its success must he determined by its acceptance as a fair and reasonable 
code of conduct by those who know how they ought to behave anyway. The 
nature of the Code has been a compromise between, on the one hand, the 
desire for freedom and flexibility, and, on the other, the need to 
ensure that the ethics and reputation of the City as a whole are seen 
to be questioned. Its approach is perhaps best indicated by the 
important first general principle, which enjoins all participants in 
bids to observe the "spirit", as well as the "letter", of the principles 
and rules. The City which created the Code for the City, should understand 
that tenet quite clearly. 
7.2.2.1 : 1968-69 Problems 
At the outset, the Panel were faced with a clear pattern of 
problems which, with variations, lay behind the public scandals of 
1958-67 and behind those too which followed during its experimental first 
year. In general, simply by existing, the Code was designed to reduce 
the acrimony between competing companies which it had been shown could 
arise in bid situations - and which, to the City's concern, could be 
carried over to their merchant bank advisers and destroy the carefully 
cultivated image of the City's civilised aristocracy. It had been seen 
in the first battle, for British Aluminium. It reached its peak after 
the new Code in 1968 with the outburst of Sir Frank (now Lord) Kearton 
at several of the leading City institutions in particular, and the press. 
His complaint arose directly out of the first public efforts made by 
the Panel, which criticised Courtaulds and its advisers Hill Samuel 
for its conduct in the battle for control of international Paints. 
Three specific issues figured repeatedly in takeover situations during 
this early period. The most conspicuous was perhaps the technique of a 
company frustrating an unwelcome bidder simply by issuing new shares to 
a favoured third party. Some examples of this practice have already been 
cited but the one which completed the demise of the City's first attempt 
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at creating a workable system of control was that featuring the successful. 
attempt by the News of the World to defeat an unwelcome bid, from Pergamon 
Press. 
The second issue, also unforseen in early attempts at control, 
is the fundamental question of equal treatment for all shareholders, and 
covers both the now outlawed practice of paying special terms to gain 
control of large single blocks of shares and the question of the price 
paid for normal purchases through the market. It was at the centre of 
the Whitehead Iron case (1963), arose in the Courtaulds - Wilkinson and 
Riddell incident (1968) and figured in the American Tobacco partial bid 
for Gallaher, also in 1968. American Tobacco had offered for half the 
Gallaher capital; its acquisition of shares was noted because institutional 
holders were able to sell the whole of their holdings at the bid price 
whereas other shareholders could only sell half. The incident resulted 
in public criticism of the merchant bankers and the brokers involved, 
Morgan Grenfell and Cazenove, by the Panel. It also brought direct 
intervention by the Governor of the Bank of England. But neither of the 
City participants suffered any punishment. 
Finally, there was the issue which is central to the problem 
of control in the wider context of the securities market as well as 
takeovers, which is still exercising the Panel and which perhaps will 
never be brought under complete control; the problems associated with 
market dealings during a Ibid. By leaving the market deliberately 
unfettered, the. Rules leave the way open to activities which are the 
most difficult to subject to control. In the News of the World case, 
by the time the Panel stopped dealings, enough votes had been secured to 
ensure success. 
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In summary, it is apparent that on a few occasions, the system 
was found to be lacking in the sense of being unable to control powerful 
City and industrial interests. This was perhaps for two reasons. 
First, the constitution of the Panel was weak because it was given 
no "sanctions" - no power to punish transgressors. Secondly, even after 
the City had accepted the need for a Code of Conduct, it still basically 
rejected the idea of its activities being controlled in this way. 
The Panel was weak, because its position was weak. 
This made it possible for the Panel's decisions to be openly 
questioned and its authority to be put in doubt during the Gallaher 
affair. The Panel used its main weapon of public censure, on Morgan 
Grenfell and Cazenove, over their handling of the American Tobacco 
purchases of Gallaher shares which clinched the bid.. But these two 
institutions stated in public that they disagreed with the Panel, and 
neither the Stock Exchange nor the Issuing House Association, the two 
professional bodies concerned, showed complete conviction in their support 
of the Panel. 
7.2.2.2 : Revision of City Code and Reconstitution of Panel 1969 
The incidents cited above were the major causes of changes 
instituted in early 1969. These removed, it seems, the weaknesses 
which afflicted the City's first attempt at policing takeovers through 
the Panel. The main developments fell into three groups. First there 
was the revision of the Code itself. This was limited to strengthened 
control over profit forecasts in bid situations. By restricting to one 
year, the period for which forecasts could be made, it was intended that 
a main defensive weapon could be retained, without the problems arising 
from long-term enthusiastic forecasting. Furthermore, the accounting 
profession, in its manifestation as company auditors, and merchant banks, 
as financial advisers, were persuaded to put their names to the bases 
on which forecasts were prepared by the companies concerned. 
- 242 - 
Secondly, there were changes made to the constitution and methods 
of the Panel. Day-to-day administration of the Code passed to a newly 
established full-time Director General reporting directly to the Chairman, 
and an appeals procedure was instituted. With this change the full Panel 
adopted a supervisory function. Its röle was to consider progress reports 
and questions of policy at routine quarterly meetings, and to hear, 
usually at ad hoc meetings, appeals against rulings of the Director General, 
disciplinary cases and cases of "exceptional importance". The appointment 
of a full time official was extremely important because it enabled the 
Panel to build a reputation for dealing quickly with enquiries, and for 
acting rapidly and decisively to avert an impending problem. In effect 
the Panel became able to match the merchant banks themselves in speed 
of decision and action, and in tenacity. The personalities chosen as 
Director General have since been important as well - three of the four 
have been experienced merchant bankers, presumably familiar with all 
the details of merger negotiations and the available tactical manoeuvres. 
Thirdly, changes were made in the relationship between the Panel 
and its sponsoring bodies, the City institutions. Thus for the first 
time, the Panel was able to use against any offending bank, broker or 
other institution whatever disciplinary powers were available to the 
appropriate professional bodies and the Board of Trade. While providing 
sanctions to deal with opposed and apparently irreconcilable points of view, 
it also required for the first time a public commitment to the principles 
of the Code by the whole of the City, including the institutional investors, 
and in effect by the whole of industry and commerce. 
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These changes apparently strengthened the authority of the Panel 
and two events in 1969-70 reinforced its position as the chief arbiter 
of City takeover tactics. The first, the Leasco bid for Pergamon, in 
particular, established the authority of the new Panel and its executive. 
It was the first instance in which the Panel was called on to ajudicate 
an issue which attracted constant publicity and which involved well- 
known personalities as well as utterly opposed interests. 
12 
Terms 
were agreed, but with Leasco having purchased in the market some 38% of 
Pergamon's shares, mainly from investment trusts managed by Robert Fleming, 
13 
the bidder retracted. This was because of Pergamon's unrealistic profit 
forecast and their reticence in releasing more detailed financial information. 
The Panel, faced with technical breaches of the Code, attempted to 
arrange a conciliation, and set up through the Board of Trade, an 
investigation to discover the precise state of Perjamon, part of the 
problem which was outside its own area of responsibility. 
Despite the acrimony, the Panel's reputation was strengthened by 
the dispute. Most importantly it showed that it represented a tenable 
framework for conduct and quasi-law in the City. The Leasco-Pergamon 
battle was not, of course, a typical problem and was less important for 
the development of the Code and the philosophy of the Panel than the 
numerous other less publicised cases in which it was involved. However, 
it was also significant for its implications. First it highlighted the 
incidence of insider trading and focussed attention on the merchant bank 
which acted as investment manager on the one hand, and corporate financial 
adviser on the other. 
14 
Secondly, it made the accountancy profession 
realise that reform of their standards was needed. 
is 
-244 - 
Perhaps more indicative of the change in the atmosphere in the 
City as a result of the Panel's constitution, was the case involving 
Kleinwort Benson acting on behalf of Trafalgar House in the battle 
with Bovis for control of Cementation. This was a straightforward 
problem of interpretation of one aspect of the Code - which provided 
a contrast with the experience of the Panel in 1968 when it was put in 
the position öf having to criticise a merchant bank. The problem arose 
out of Kleinwort's purchase for cash of a block of shares in Cementation 
which had been built up in the market by Samuel Montagu, acting for 
Bovis. When Bovis withdrew its offer, Kleinwort acquired Montagu's 
shareholding on behalf of Trafalgar House. The Panel executive ruled 
that the purchases made by Montagu through the market (when the opportunity 
to sell was available to all holders of Cementation shares) was quite 
different to buying a single critical block from a single holder, 
as Kleinwort had done. Under General Principle 8 of the Code the 
executive ruled that Kleinwort should make a similar cash offer to the 
rest of the Cementation shareholders. Kleinwort disagreed and appealed 
to the full Panel against this ruling. The Panel supported the executive, 
and, in contrast to the arguments which had followed the Panel's 
censure of Morgan Grenfell in 1968 - Kleinwort accepted the decision. 
7.2.2.3 : 1970-1976 
The problems which greeted the first panel in 1968, the subsequent 
changes, effected in 1969 and the authority which resulted were the 
major elements in the formative stages of this system of self-regulation. 
That voluntarism has prevailed ever since owes much to these early 
developments which, together with the threat of legislation, have 
established a high regard for the Panel's self- governance. The 
revisions in the Code, in 1972,1974 and 1976 were made because of 
particular difficulties in the interpretation of the rules in previous 
editions. 
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a. 1.971-72 
Two new rules were introduced in order to deal with two types of 
transaction which did not appear to be specifically, or even by implication, 
covered by the Code as it then existed. The first made it obligatory 
for an offeror with a paper offer outstanding to provide a cash alternative 
in cases where his offer is accompanied or preceded by large cash 
purchases; the second, brought within the scope of the Code any series of 
purchases (or other acquisitions) of shares, however gradual, which causes 
a change of effective control. 
There followed a general revision of the entire Code in February 
1972 which represented the experience of the principal City bodies as 
well as that of the Panel gained in the three-year period following the 
publication of the previous edition. Few fundamental changes were in 
fact instigated. Particular problems presented themselves, however, 
in respect of so-called "shut-out" bids - those transactions which are 
only announced after the controlling shareholders of the target company 
have already committed themselves to the transaction. Thus, controlling 
shareholders (quite probably company directors) may effectively commit their 
company to a bid from an offeror of their choice. 
16 
The re-statement of 
Rule 11 required controlling directors to obtain the consent of the 
Panel executive regarding shut-out transactions, and expressed the concern 
of the Panel that public shareholders' legitimate interests could be 
subordinated to the convenience of controlling directors, which could 
in some cases lead to a choice being made by them which is not purely 
related to their capacity as shareholders. 
17 
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b. 1972-1974 
As new techniques evolved, further revisions of the Code became 
necessary. Several. cases before the Panel in this period exposed 
a number of difficulties of interpretation of the 1972 edition of the 
rules. Thus, an amended version of the Code was published with effect 
from June, 1974. 
The most important amendment (embodied in Rule 34) was: 
"to require that a general offer should be made when 
a person (together with persons acting in concert) 
acquires shares carrying 30 per cent of the voting rights of a 
company or when such persons, already holding between 
30 per cent and 50 per cent of the voting rights, increase 
their percentage of the voting rights by more than 1 per cent 
in any period of twelve months. " 18 
The offer was to be in cash and conditional upon the receipt of acceptances 
resulting in more than 50% control of the company. The principal and 
beneficial effect of this new ruling was two-fold; first) it eliminated 
the problems arising from the distinction between purchases from 
selected sellers and general market purchases, and secondly, it 
established 30% of the voting rights of a company as effective control 
for Code purposes in virtually all circumstances. 
Another amendment in the form of Rule 35 sought to prevent 
companies being under prolonged or permanent siege. In essence it 
provided that an unsuccessful offeror must not purchase shares during 
the twelve months following the close of its offer if it would 
thereby become obliged to make an offer under Rule 34. 
The final significant amendment reflected the hardening of 
political attitudes to mergers and acquisitions during the period. 
A specific condition is now required in cases falling within the 
statutory provisions for possible reference to the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission that the offer will be withdrawn if the case is 
referred to the Commission. 
19 
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c. 1974-1976 : The Present State of Takeover Control 
At the time of writing, the control over the merger market 
exercised by the City is represented in the City Code which was revised in 
April, 1976.20 Overall, very few fundamental changes were instituted, 
indicating the satisfactory working on the 1974 Code in a period of 
very little takeover activity. Most of the changes in the latest edition 
have the effect of making the rules rather less restrictive, which, 
in the light of some recent developments may be regretted. 
The most important changes relate to the easing of conditions for 
launching partial bids which recognise how common such offers are in 
other markets, particularly in the United States21; and the removal 
from the purview of the Panel, offers for companies not resident in 
the U. K. even if the shares are listed on the British Stock Exchange. 
22 
Elsewhere, the rule which banned shut-out deals between directors and 
a prospective bidder without the Panel's consent was amended so that this 
type of sale (triggering an obligation for the buyer to bid for the 
balance and effectively ruling out an alternative offer) no longer needs 
the Panel 's consent. Instead, new safeguards were implemented requiring 
arrangements between directors and the bidder to be disclosed. Another 
specific change relates to additions to large stakes (Rule 34). 
Increases df 2% rather than 1% may now be made to existing large share 
stakes (in excess of 30%) without the holder having to make a bid for 
the rest of the shares. 
23 
Finally, and in response to the P&O/Bovis 
battle. the views of the dissenting directors must now be given to 
shareholders if a board is split on an offer. 
The remaining alterations concern insider dealings and the 
imposition of greater reliance on merchant banking advisers. In respect 
of the former, the ban on stock market dealings by insiders is explicitly 
extended to close relatives of company directors, staffs and other 
people concerned. In the context of a Code dependent upon Voluntarism, 
it was considered that this could be best achieved by more detailed 
secrecy guidelines listed in Rule 30. Regarding the merchant banks as 
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advisers, it was made obligatory for boards to seek independent advice 
on all takeover offers, and, furthermore, new emphasis was imposed on 
bidding companies to make certain first that the necessary finance 
is available. The obligation was extended to the merchant banks advising 
them. 
The last amendment, in common with some of the earlier changes 
to the Code, referred directly to a case in hand. This was the protracted 
struggle for control of Ashbourne Investments. From the saga which lasted 
more than two years, clear guidelines for merchant banks emerged from 
the Panel's published report and were included in the revised edition of 
the Code (Rule 18). Although releasing Ashbourne's advisers, Brandts, 
from any obligation to observe its original agreement to finance part of 
the offer, it was made apparent that financial advisers entering into 
similar arrangements would find themselves under such an obligation. 
In its report, the Panel stressed that merchant banks are under "a 
very high and strict duty" if they give assurances as to their client's 
financial capacity to complete a takeover offer. 
24 
7.2.3 : The Operation of the Panel - Assessment 
This section focuses on the performance of the Panel and the evolution 
of the Code to date, and concentrates on those aspects which seem important 
to the future development of a voluntary system of control. First, its 
method of operation. Even cursory observation of the Panel's Reports 
reveals that it was in the context of the very large number of less 
conspicuous bids involving a mass of mundane work, that the Panel's 
authority was established and its views became respected. 
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Table 7.1 gives an indication of the volume of business handled 
by the Panel executive. 
Table 7.1 : Takeover Bids with which the Panel 
Executive was concerned 
Successful bids 
Unsuccessful bids 
Proposals withdrawn 
before issue of 
documents 
Minorities/ 
Preference Issues 
1969-70 % 1970-71 % 1971-72 % 1972-73 % 1973-74 % 
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37 
61 
9 
184 
47 
56 
14 
231 
60 
54 
14 
214 
36 
55 
9 
163 
36 
57 
13 
29 7 35 10 43 10 32 8 20 7 
87 23 65 20 93 22 106 28 67 23 
Total 392 100 331 100 427 100 388 100 286 loo 
Source: The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Annual Reports, 1970-74. 
In the 1970 Report, it was further revealed that, in one way or another, 
some 80% of the total number of bid proposals were the subject of 
consultations or Panel enquiries. The majority of these activities 
involved minor points and would have meant a telephone call or perhaps a 
short meeting at the Panel's offices. However, while subsequent reports 
contain no reference to the proportion of cases involving the Panel, 
the point is clearly represented by the 1969-70 period in which the 
Panel was consulted in a high percentage of bid activity, and it was in 
this way that its presence was most strongly felt. As a result of these 
operations, the principle was firmly established that the Panel 
executive should be asked in advance whenever a company or its advisers 
were in any doubt about their plans. 
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O;; the one hand, : Lt has become accepted to approach the Panel 
infýirmaliy; on the other, the Executive, for its part, has used its own 
initiative to intervene in cases where if foresees problems. Its members 
have gained experience of the likely difficulties, and the circumstances 
which can be presumed to give rise to them. In effect then the Panel 
has attciipted to work by prevention - acting in the early stager. of bid 
situations to anticipate trouble. It would be hypothetical and thus 
invalid to compare the situation with and without a Panel (or indeed to 
contrast self-regulation with some form of legally enforced administration), 
hog., *ever, the fact that between 50% and 60% of takeovers have proceeded 
smoothly may be attributed at least in part to the Panel. 
Second, the need for quick and irrevocable decisions was facilitated 
by the operation, constitution and philosophy of the Panel. Flexibility 
is an essential pre-requisite and one promoted by service of the kind 
given by the Panel with the emphasis, not of creating a precedent, but 
of regarding each case uninhibitedly on its merits. Flexibility also 
allowed the Panel to. adopt a heuristic approach - seeking to reflect 
contemporary standards of acceptable behaviour. Thus the principles 
detailed in the Code have been continuously developed as a result of the 
Panel's experience in interpreting those principles in relation to actual 
situations. 
To summarise, the Takeover Code and Panel were born of a need to 
bring order to the negotiation of acquisition and to "legislate" so as 
to preserve a sense of equity for all involved. In the eight years since 
inception, the Code has been subjected to many changes to achieve its 
purpose. Its main contribution which, in turn, has been dependent upon 
the flexibility and method of operation adopted, has been to produce a more 
just system of arrangements for the conduct of takeover negotiations. 
In the process of evolution, the Code and the Panel have been the topic 
of criticism from a number of sources: from those who feel that a gap 
in the Code's provisions has affected them adversely; from observers 
w 
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who consider they have the answer to the Code's apparent failings; 
and from those whose political suasion dictates that they should reject 
a system of self-government which the takeover regulations represent. 
Referring specifically to failings and weaknesses in respect 
of takeover administration, the most serious criticisms are levelled 
at the sanctions which the Panel can impose. These stem from its 
quasi-judicial status and the voluntary nature of the system from which 
its advantages also arise. It should be impressed that its authority 
depends on the retention of confidence in the nature of the system and 
in the operation of the Panel within it. Thus its success ultimately 
requires the support of industry and commerce as well as just that of the 
City. In particular, though the ability to exercise its authority - 
that is to punish transgressors - depends upon the general acceptance 
by City institutions and their representatives of the body set up to 
monitor the code of conduct which they helped to create. It works 
best through prevention; the sanctions may represent a useful stick 
to wield but when they have to be invoked then the Panel can consider 
itself to have failed. 
Nevertheless, sanctions have been imposed, and it is these which 
have attracted criticism, together with the more general concern that 
the Panel has no legal authority and therefore no "teeth". Of the 
first of its two main sanctions, that of public censure, critics might 
refer to the "gentlemanly nonsense" of public reprobation. This argument 
is best countereed by the first director-general of the Takeover Panel, 
Mr. Ian Fraser, who, in 1972, crystallised the delicate nature of 
merger and acquisition business:. 
"A public censure, in a community concerned largely 
with the intangibles of credit-worthiness, reputation 
and goodwill, results in an immediate diminution of 
this class of asset. The public censure will only 
cease to be effective when members of the financial 
community are no longer concerned about their intangible 
assets. " 25 
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Other criticisms are better founded and more serious. They are 
best understood in relation to the main initial purpose of the Code 
the protection of the interests of shareholders. There are two aspects 
to the issue. Firstly, suspension of the shares of a company involved 
in a takeover situation may harm the very group whose interests it is 
trying to protect. Secondly, in those cases where the Panel. was forced 
to report, shareholders have apparently not fared well. In the Leasco- 
Pergamon case, the compromise solutions evolved by the Panel with the two 
parties concerned quickly vanished. In spite of the Panel's efforts, 
which earned it much praise, shareholders were left with a share quote 
suspended for months and their hopes of eventually receiving a bid 
dependent on the outcome of lengthy negotiations. Similarly, in the recent 
Ashbourne report, the Panel's statement while giving a clear guide-line 
to merchant banks was of little practical importance for the long-suffering 
Ashbourne shareholders. Both instances relate back to the earlier general 
criticism regarding the weakness of a panel that attempts to operate 
without statutory backing. 
Finally with respect to sanctions, a well founded criticism 
concerns the scope of deterrents available to the Panel. The most 
serious omission appears to be the use of fines for fraudulent misconduct. 
This effectively leaves a gap between severe censure or in its most 
extreme form a request for the expulsion of an offending firm from 
its professional association, and a warning not to sin again. In this 
connection civil penalties for misconduct might be instituted'(along 
with fines) to prevent the fraudulent from exercising functions which put 
them in a position of trust in charge of other people's resources. 
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The implications of this suggestion, introduce a different, yet 
relevant aspect of concern. To grant merchant bankers and other financial 
advisers the almost unimpaired right to continue in practice, albeit with 
rather more care, singles out the City community as special, different 
and above the law. Thus it effectively creates one standard of morality 
for its members and another for those outside. Moreover it provides 
general criticism of the whole concept of self-policing of the securities 
markets -a system which can apparently show a party to be guilty, condemn- 
it and then effectively grant an unconditional reprieve. This-line of 
criticism gathers strength when one considers the personalities involved 
on either side of the quasi-legal fence. It has been claimed that merchant 
bankers are in the best position to judge the conduct of other merchant 
bankers because from experience, they understand the pressures and 
devious tactics available to the aggressor and defender. 
26 
Yet a sense 
of injustice inevitably persists. Why should poachers turn gamekeepers? 
Is the Takeover Code a charter for merchant bankers? 
On practical grounds, the acknowledged expertise in the conduct of 
takeover negotiations is necessary but hardly sufficient to qualify 
merchant bankers for a role in which they are required to act as judge and jury. 
On moral grounds, the City is answerable'to itself for its behaviour. 
But while one element is attempting to maximise the efficiency of the funds 
at its disposal, the other is attempting to safeguard the interests of 
shareholders who may be reduced to pawns in the process. 
A final point which arises indirectly concerns the piecemeal approach 
to the revision of the Code, which has been substantially changed on four 
occasions in just eight years. This has been praised as showing appreciation 
of the need for flexibility and readiness to respond to changes in market 
behaviour. However, merchant bankers have been credited with ingenuity, 
adaptability and foresight. Is it likely therefore, that they would be 
so surprised by unanticipated behaviour that amendments to the rules were 
thought necessary? Could it not be that by effecting changes to improve 
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interpretation of the Code they were in fact doing no more than was 
absolutely necessary at the time? This would achieve two important aims - 
firstly, it would display a visible interest in the form and suitability 
of the controls, while secondly, it would not obviously offend those whose 
activities they were designed to curb. 
7.2.4 : The Need for Legislation? 
The principal objective of any regulatory authority in this field 
must be to maintain a securities market in which shareholders and potential 
shareholders have confidence that when they deal with their investments 
they will receive equal treatment. Equity between shareholders must 
exist and be seen to exist and it must be possible to carry out transactions 
with speed and certainty. Since a takeover bid is a special situation for 
the securities of a listed company, it is essential that the highest 
ethical standards of conduct be maintained by those engaged in such 
transactions. Moreover, since the law regards a company as belonging to the 
shareholders, control must be primarily concerned with the protection of 
the interests of the shareholders. 
In consequence, it may be postulated that the emphasis in a system 
of control will be on three principles: 
1. That there shall be equity between all shareholders 
of-the same class 
2. That 'control' of a company has a value in itself and the 
'control premium' should be shared by all shareholders - and 
that, therefore, control should not be acquired by "stealth" 
or by discriminatory purchases 
3. That all shareholders shall have sufficient information and 
sufficient time to arrive at a decision on the merits of an 
offer and that nothing should be done meanwhile by directors 
of the offeree company (or by others with a com®ercial interest 
in the outcome of the offer) to frustrate the offer. 
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Historically, restraints on City behaviour have essentially 
rested on what is implicit than what is explicit. The values of personal 
and collective integrity and honesty have been promoted as satisfactory 
alternatives to detailed regulation. Any rules, so far as they have been 
explicit have tended to be de minimis. The desire of the authors and 
the executors of this system of quasi-law has been to retain flexibility 
and yet ensure equality of treatment, and to steer a middle course between 
laissez-faire and institutionalised capitalism. 
Of course, City institutions have to operate within the broad 
framework laid down by legislation - the Comppnies Acts, the Prevention 
of Fraud Act and a number of other laws which impinge, in varying degrees, 
on the conduct of the financial community. The object of the voluntary 
system, however, is to extend beyond this - to enforce a higher standard 
of conduct in takeover transactions than is required by the various statutory 
provisions. Thus it has an underlying philosophy that in merger negotiations, 
good business standards and ethics impose wider duties and responsibilites 
on directors, financial advisers and shareholders than are imposed by the 
general corporate law; and indeed which the law, because of the myriad 
situations arising in takeover transactions, would find it impossible 
adequately to define and impose. 
The role of the Panel, is, therefore to supervise and enforce 
through the Takeover Code, a pattern of behaviour in takeover bids which ' 
keeps to a minimum the opportunities to abuse access to priviliged information. 
No set of rules, however extensive, could cover all the various circumstances 
arising in the transactions and, accordingly all parties to a deal are 
enjoined to observe the "spirit" of the Code -a spirit which insists. 
on fair dealing and equity as between shareholders. The Code is not 
written as if it were a statute, and, therein lies one of its major 
advantages - flexibility. This enables the deserving case to be treated 
as an exception without the fear of creating a precedent, and permits 
the introduction of alterations to counter chancing circumstances as 
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new techniques are evolved. Furthermore, the constitution of the Panel 
and, in particular, the accessibility of the executive, while helping 
to engender confidence, also allow speed of decision-making which, in 
turn, has enabled preventive action to be taken. 
The extensive merger activity of the last decade raised many 
questions over the advantages of takeovers and the methods by which they 
were effected. In spite of the inevitable strain imposed on the Code, 
the Panel has emerged as a body which is widely considered to work well. 
Its achievements have depended on the acceptance of its authority by all 
those engaged in acquisitions and the solid, voluntary support of all 
the major institutions - support which should be guaranteed by an ultimate 
sanction of the loss of self-regulation. 
Inevitably, the Panel, and the system öf control it represents 
have attracted criticism. The central issues to be considered are the 
philosophy of self-control and how effective it has been. If moral issues 
were discarded, the questioning of the self-policing principle will 
concentrate on whether self-regulation is possibly compatible with 
equity of treatment and fairness of decision. Paradoxically, while 
the virtues of the system emanate from its voluntary status, so do 
its drawbacks. 
Inevitably, certain parts of the Code are unworkable. Profit 
forecasts, for example, and dealings during a bid have remained a constant 
source of trouble and represent elements of the Code where rules have been 
subject to constant change and refinement. It is not in the Code, however, 
that the real problems are to be found. Weaknesses can be gradually 
eliminated or at least reduced, and the Panel has already succeeded in 
refining the Code as a result of experience in enforcing the rules. 
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It is in the character of the system itself that more fundamental 
shortcomings are to be discovered. The Panel has no standing except 
in relation to the goodwill of the City. It depends for its effectiveness 
on retaining that goodwill and, above all, on the personal contacts of 
its executive within the City. Owing to the difficulty of devising 
formal rules to cover all the variations which arise in takeover operations', 
the Code has conferred on the executive of the Panel considerable 
discretion in its application. Thus while it remains effective, the 
voluntary system concentrates a great deal of power in the hands of a 
small number of men. This is considered acceptable in the City and has 
indeed secured general acceptance and the full support of the major City 
institutional bodies. Whether the authority of the Panel is based on 
agreement of its view of what is right and proper conduct or whether it is 
because the alternative is understood to be direct intervention by 
government (and legal sanctions) is not clear. It is evidence though that 
its success must depend on those men on the Executive and their successors 
in keeping the confidence of the City and the public at large. 
This, in turn introduces two more pressing problems. The 
measures to control takeover transactions cover only one aspect of the 
securities. market - but the Panel is the most recent and conspicuous body 
dealing with the market, and it is concerned with that aspect of share 
dealings which has been the most prominent in recent years and which 
has caused the most trouble. But the problems which have appeared in the 
context of takeovers are only the symptoms of a much deeper malaise. 
27 
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Secondly, the problem faced by any system which depends on honouring 
the spirit of ä code rather than the letter of a law is how to make its 
workings clearly visible. In other words, the Panel must fulfil two 
conditions. It is sufficient to police the market; it is necessary 
to be seen doing so. To the unacquainted observer the workings of the 
securities market must appear so complex that the market cannot be 
conceived of doing this on its own. It needs either a seal of approval 
from politicians of standing, which it patently cannot rely on, a 
supervisory umbrella that has public confidence, or sufficient and satisfactory 
publicity to ensure that its achievements receive wider currency. In 
all respects the City must admit failure. However well it has policed 
itself, the securities market, of which the Takeover Panel is an integral 
part, is still open to criticism. 
28 
The model most frequently suggested as a panacea to these drawbacks 
is that of a Companies Commission based on the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (S. E. C. ) which has been in force in the U. S. with legal 
sanctions since 1934. Two questions are critical to the acceptance 
of a statutory body. First, would this form of control prevent some of 
the abuses, which the proponents of self-regulation readily admit have 
occurred - insider trading and warehousing? It is by no means clear 
that the situation would be improved if the Code was turned to law; 
a statutory system of control would be much less able to adapt its principles 
to changing circumstances and to cope with the continuing development of 
City practice. 
29 
Replacing flexible rules with rigid laws would hardly 
constitute an improvement. 
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Secondly, statutory methods of control, whether of takeover 
tactics jr. general or of specific issues such as the merchant banks and 
their conflict of interest between corporate financial advice and investment 
advisory business, has two major drawbacks. They are far slower in 
operation than the voluntary system - imposing long delays on the operations 
of the capital market which may greatly hinder its effective operation. 
And they are less flexible; on one hand, setting out rigid rules simply 
invites people to discover and exploit loop-holes; on the other, it would 
be impossible in a statutory system to carry out the kind of development 
and extension of thinking about takeover tactics which has been a feature 
of the Panel's operations in London. 
It is perhaps most appropriate to summarise the undeniable 
advantages of a self-regulatory system by citing some of the incontrovertible 
evidence contained in the Inquiry of the Department of Trade, July 1974: 
"Provided that the organisations and the general body 
of individuals in any field are aiming at a high standard 
of conduct (as they are in the area with which the Panel is 
concerned), control can be imposed more simply, more effectively 
and much more speedily. by self-regulation than under any 
other system. Rulings by the Panel executive are usually 
given within a matter of hours and a meeting of the 
full Panel can normally be summoned within forty-eight hours. 
If an abuse is suspected or is being organised, the self- 
regulating body can at once impose 48 necessary restrictions. 
For example, the City Working Party, on the advice of 
the Panel, required disclosure in takeover situations of 
certain types of warehousing before they appeared in any 
significant form. A statutory body may be reluctant to act 
in the absence of specific evidence of abuse that can make 
its action publicLy defensible. " 31 
The. fact that the abuses and inequities occurrdd before the 
formation of the Panel (exemplified in such cases as Thorn/Metal Industries 
and Courtaulds/Wilkinsc. n Riddell), but no longer occur is a testimony to 
the Effectiveness of the Panel in achieving, to a large degree, the objectives 
laid down at the beginning of this section. Notwithstanding its success, 
which suggests that commercial standards can for the most part be maintained 
without codification in statute law, as practice evolved, certain matters 
dealt with by the Panel wouId clearly be more conveniently and expeditiously 
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handled by statute. Insider trading and warehousing are probably the 
best examples. 
Unfortunately issues always seem to create a choice between 
extremes - either legal backing or flexible voluntarism. Moreover, political 
expediency, rather than economic criteria, tends to be decisive in the 
introduction and execution of policy32; the City is currently a matter 
for distrust and political debate, yet the Government has rejected the 
notion of a body based on the S. E. C. to control the securities market. 
33 
Thus the suggestions which follow should be considered not only in the 
context of political uncertainty and inconsistency, but also and more importantly 
in a climate of opinion characterised to date by an apparently insatiable 
appetite for official intervention. 
The suggestions are based on two notions: firstly, that abuses 
are the exception rather than the rule; 
34 
secondly, that malpractice, 
when it does arise is serious, both in itself and in its implications 
and should be eradicated swiftly. They would require the retention of 
voluntarism and the infusion of others to the executive of the Panel, 
from outside the City, to give a wider basis for interpretation and more 
importantly to induce confidence in the public at large. 
Of course insider dealing and warehousing would still fall beyond 
the scope of a voluntary Code, or indeed a system enforced by an S. E. C. 
and should be incorporated into law. However, the question of achieving 
disclosure of information through a system which emphasises adherence to 
the spirit of a code rather than unyielding interpretation of the law, 
is contentious and calls for a radical revision of the structure of control. 
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7.3 : Control_of the Securities Market/Role of Legislation 
In this final section, the notions and concepts developed earlier. 
are presented in suggestions for controlling the merger market, which 
aim at rationality and fairness, but above all at devising a workable 
framework for supervision. The objectives and practicalities of this 
system would be three-fold: 
1. To secure greater dissemination of information 
2. To make insider dealing and warehousing criminal offences - 
3. To retain a voluntary system of regulation, monitored 
under a single body with responsibility for the supervision 
'of all aspects of the securities market 
The structure which is developed below should be considered in a 
wider context; it should, in particular, be understood in the light of a 
debate which encompasses the whole of the securities market and, indeed 
the meaning of capitalism in Britain. Thus, calls for legislative control 
of the merger market, arise not specifically because of the nature of the 
Code and the Panel as applied to takeover transactions. But, rather 
because this covers only one aspect of a more far-reaching problem 
which is only now being grasped; and which has been accentuated and 
publicised recently through the collapse of Slater Walker Securities, 
the report on Scottish and Universal Investments (S. U. I. T. S. ), the 
revelations of misconduct in Lonrho and the Lowson empire, and the 
more general collapse of the fringe banking sector. Such episodes 
support the critics of the City35 and strengthen the demand for bank 
and insurance nationalisation. The debate on the securities market was 
inevitable. The 1960s and early 19709 saw rapid growth in the financial 
service industries and the ever increasing use of an exposure to the media. 
As the social and political climate altered the excesses of those financial 
entrepreneurs dealing in "paper" became inextricably associated with the 
activities of the City establishment. 
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The actions of the Takeover Panel have served to highlight this 
more general problem. Furthermore, there have been equally important 
debates proceeding about other parts of the financial services sector - 
the regulation of banks, insurance companies and accountants for 
example. However, given the way that politicians (and indeed the public) 
still tend to equate the financial sector with the City, and the City with 
the Stock Exchange (and Takeover PanelT, any scandal in, or debate on 
the securities market has tended to implicate the financial services 
industry as a whole. 
Restrictions of space preclude any more than a brief discussion 
of the wider question of the securities market. Indeed the topic 
calls for more attention than it can receive in a study principally 
concerned with merger activity. The remainder of this section concentrates 
on devising a framework to regulate the latter. 
The pre-requisites of this system are that investors' interests 
are safeguarded and that attempts to ensure efficient supervision gain 
government and public support as well as that of the City's institutions. 
The scheme of existing arrangements exhibits two main weaknesses. One 
concerns the scope of the Companies Acts and the structure of merger 
legislation. A second concerns the thoroughness with which the self- 
regulatory authorities perform their responsibilities. Under the 
present system of self-government, there will remain doubts whether 
or not the casual approach or lapses on the part of some City institutions, 
which enjoy special privileges, and whose activities have cost shareholders 
large sums of money, have too often escaped unpunished, apart from the 
damage to their reputations. 
On this basis, a number of measures are suggested to provide a 
flexible, stringent and efficient system for protecting the investor. 
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(a) Disclosure of Information 
As long ago as 1933, Berle and Means, crystallised the sölution 
to the problem, which they suggested lies ... 
"not in prohibitions upon the directors but in imposing 
rules requiring general disclosure by the corporation 
of all material facts tending to change open-market 
appraisals. As the standards of disclosure of 
corporate affairs become more exacting, the problem 
of directors and managers in the market will become 
increasingly less important. " 36 
Moreover, the availability to shareholders of adequate information 
concerning their company's financial affairs constitutes the greatest 
source of protection against the misuse of private information on the part 
both of takeover bidders and of directors of the offeree companies. In 
this context, the reasons why adequate, up-to-date and accurate information 
is so important are three-fold: 
1. To attract a takeover bid - the shareholders' ultimate 
protection against inefficient management - where the 
assets of the company are not being utilised to best 
effect 
37 
2. To ehible shareholders to appraise a bid 
3. To prevent unfair "insider trading", by narrowing 
the range of extra information available to directors 
and associates38 
In the case of a quoted company, every member of the public is 
a potential shareholder so that, in principle, the same information 
should be made available to the public as to shareholders: buyers of 
shares are entitled to be given as much information as sellers. 
Indeed the Takeover Panel has recognised this, and, in rejecting the 
argument that it should be concerned only with disclosure in the offer 
document or in any reply by the offeree company, it stated: 
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"One of the main objects of the Panel is to 
secure fair treatment for the investing public. 
The object can be seen plainly to run through 
the City Code. Information given at the time of 
a bid cannot be wholly divorced from pre-bid information 
which the shareholder has been given or ought to have 
been given. " 39 
The Jenkins Committee pointed out that a statutory requirement on 
a bidder to disclose his intentions and/or disseminate information would 
frequently be ineffective in securing useful information. 
40 
Notwithstanding 
the efforts of the Panel regarding disclosures of information, 
41 
it has 
become evident that the Panel executive cannot fulfil its role unless 
directors and advisers, as well as others are prepared to disclose, 
on request, full details of all *transactions that are made. Moreover, 
the Executive limits its request for disclosure to the minimum necessary 
to enable it to have an understanding of the issues, and is for consideration 
by the members of the executive alone. The Panel stresses: 
" ... that confidential information obtained from 
one party in this manner is not available to another 
for publication or in order to secure an unfair 
advantage. " 42 
Herein lies a fundamental contradiction of aims] on the one hand, 
it is stressed that absolute secrecy should be maintained so as to 
minimise the incidence of leaks; on the other, "third parties" are 
denied access to information which financial advisers are granted privileged 
rights to. 
43 
It would, of course, be naive to imagine that equality 
of information could be ensured. Quite apart from officers in the companies 
themselves, there is a whole network of people within the City - stock- 
brokers, bankers, financial journalists - who, through experience, 
are in a very much better position to know when to buy and when to sell 
in a takeover bid than the ordinary private shareholder. The best that 
can be aimed at is the provision of information which is accurate and speedily 
distributed. 
- 265- 
In some respects these aims have been partly fulfilled. Dissemination 
and presentation of information have been greatly improved by the intervention 
of P. R. consultants. Moreover, steps have been taken to enhance the 
quality of information. as well. Regarding profit forecasts and asset 
valuation, potentially the most crucial and contentious financial data 
in takeover situations, specific objectives are now stated in the Code. 
These require the endoresement by independent auditors and advisers of the 
accounting bases and calculations made by directors, and the publication 
of the commercial assumptions upon which forecasts and valuations are made. 
Such advances are indeed important. The treatment of intangible 
assets, particularly goodwill, is a critical factor in takeover negotiations 
where the book value of a company's assets is greatly exceeded by the 
market valuation. If, in addition, the consideration represents a premium 
over market price, the goodwill element becomes more important to the 
acquiring company because of its deleterious affect on tangible net worth 
and hence capital structure, gearing ratios and attractiveness to investors 
and creditors. Similarly profit forecasts and cash flow projections are 
often integral parts of a company's case for, or defence against, 
acquisition for they are the bases upon which future prospects and dividend 
policy are decided. However, projections and asset valuation remain in 
part matters of judgement and functions of the experience, ability and 
policy of directors. Thus it should be recognised that even if more 
information were available it would not necessarily be dependable - 
while this is regrettable, it does not detract from the maxim that more 
information is greatly preferable to less. 
One method of securing this would be to impose the burden of 
proof onto firms initiating acquisition proposals, thereby making them 
reveal the full assumptions and expectations of their proposed 
amalgamation. This information would also provide the market with 
considerably more detail than is usually the case in takeover negotiations 
or published in bid documents. 
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While this approach to public merger policy constitutes a 
radical revision of the existing structure of control, it has precedents 
in other areas of public policy towards industry - namely restrictive 
practices legislation. The need for control. over merger activity, to 
protect the "public interest", is as apparent as that for a code to 
supervise the market in which acquisitions are effected, and to protect 
"shareholders' interests". The primary rationale for government intervention, 
that the likely public (social) and private benfits accruing from a merger 
may not be necessarily coincident, may be explored through the theory of 
economic welfare. It is patently obvious that the economic values 
sustained in the City do not coincide with those which reflect the interests 
of society as a whole. Furthermore the Panel does not concern itself 
with the merits of an offer - that is for investors and company directors 
to decide. The Panel's concern is that shareholders should not be 
hurried or blackmailed into making a decision or forced to make a decision 
without adequate information. While the Rules of the Code go some way 
to securing reasonably full information for investors, the ultimate 
protection of shareholders and the public at large must lie in the improvement 
of the general standard of information to which all interested parties 
are entitled. 
Legislation which considers all mergers to be considered contrary 
to the public interest unless important counter-balancing increases in 
industrial efficiency or other acceptable effects on competition 
can be demonstrated would represent a significant step towards the desired 
aim; it presumes, inter alia, the existence of a less than perfect market 
for merger; a market characterised by incomplete information, by the 
skewed size distributions of bidding and acquired firms, and by the 
considerable influence of management objectives and preferences, and 
corporate financial advice, on shareholders' decisions; a market wherein 
countervailing control and objective supervision is politically and 
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and economically necessary for the maintenance and promotion of the 
wider Public Interest. In addition this approach obviates a number of 
the weaknesses evident in existing merger legislation; one concerns the 
very limited applicability of micro economic theory in enabling economists 
to allocate products to particular markets; a second arises from traditional 
interpretations of the paradigm of industrial economics which attributes 
a causal role to structural characteristics in the determination of a firm's 
conduct and performance. Moreover, increased information would make the 
merger market more 'perfect' than is now the case. 
Briefly, if such an approach were adopted, all mergers would be 
against the public interest unless it could be shown that a particular 
proposal was likely to satisfy a number of criteria which are presented 
below, in the form of "gateways". The machinery of legislation might 
be considered to be an effective approach to the supervision and control 
of, merger activity. For such purposes three Basic Gateways are distinguished 
within which increasingly more operative criteria are established - the 
intention being that a merger can only be approved if some parts of more 
than one of the Basic Gateways are satisfied. In detail, a proposed 
merger would be deemed contrary to the public interest unless a Mergers 
Commission is satisfied that it complies with at least one of the minor 
gateways (shown by number) of at least two of the Basic ones (shown by 
letter). 
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(b) Insider. Dealing/Criminal Law 
The City has always preferred self-regulation in most matters 
for a number of sound reasons. Essentially, it has been effective 
in dealing with changing circumstances. More important, whatever is not 
specifically forbidden by law is in effect permitted; the looser rules 
of self-discipline are in fact more demanding since any conduct which 
damages trust on which City relationships must be based brings its own 
heavy penalties. 
"Insider dealing" is an offence of a different kind, because 
many of those involved are company officials and advisers who are beyond 
the reach of the City's internal sanctions; 
44 
and because the law 
provides no effective remedy at present, civil or criminal. In essence, 
insider dealing is fraudulent and the only way to attack it effectively, 
in the long-term, is by legislation with a precise definition of the 
transaction. Neither the Panel nor the Stock Exchange, in spite of their 
efforts, have been able to extirpate the practice and indeed in a statement 
issued in February 1973 concluded that criminal sanctions were the only 
solution which would be effective and satisfactory to the commuftity. 
A similar conclusion was reached more recently by the City Company Law 
Committee which recommended the extension of the Companies Act to make 
insider dealing in securities a criminal offence. 
45 
Although no definitive version of what constitutes insider 
dealing presently exists, it might be defined as the conversion to 
private gain, by way of stock exchange transactions, of valuable 
information obtained about a quoted company by a person whose relationship 
with that company (or its associate) is of a fiduciary or confidential 
nature. Severe penalties for offenders, including fines and prison 
sentences, have been envisaged; but, in addition, if it were a criminal 
offence, this abuse of trust and confidence would no longer be tolerated 
by employers. Further, the fact that a criminal act would almost certainly 
- 270- 
invalidate a contract of employment would be an additional deterrent, 
and, for the sake of equity would prevent bankers, financiers and agents, 
who were proven guilty, of continuing in a position where they could 
control the resources of others. 
"Warehousing" is perhaps best described as wholesale insider 
transactions. The Panel understands it as: 
" ... the practice whereby a person or company (or group 
of persons and/or companies) accumulates, without public 
disclosure, a substantial block of shares in a company 
with a view either to making a takeover bid or to selling 
the block to someone else Who then makes a bid. " 46 
Warehousing has been particularly noted as a pursuit of Slater, 
Walker Securities, among others and has been especially difficult to 
establish. The Takeover Panel, while holding the view that the practice 
should be prevented by law sought to limit its occurrence in takeover 
situations, by requiring bidders to expose details of those with 
whom they were acting in concert. 
47 
Effectively, however, the Panel 
were, without any other jurisdiction, attempting to remedy a weakness 
in the law - the 1967 Companies Act - which required that holders of a 
significant holding in a company must declare themselves when they own 10%. 
The weakness is that a holding of 9.9% need not be declared - and thus 
four persons "acting'in concert" could effectively acquire control of 
a company without a report being made. 
The 1976 Companies Act has made amendments which should remedy 
a proportion of these practices. New rules on the notification of 
interests in shares came into force in April 1977. The threshhold for 
disclosure of any class of voting shares is reduced from 10% to 5%, and 
the period for notification from fourteen to five days. Moreover, listed 
companies are empowered to inquire into nominee shareholdings - that is 
the names of'the beneficial owners of shares held under nominee names. 
48 
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It. should always be accepted that as practice evolved, certain 
matters dealt with by the voluntary system would preferably be covered 
by statutory law. Insider dealing and warehousing, are good examples 
of this. The boundary between self-regulation and statutory control 
must be flexible. Furthermore, much can be dealt with by statute 
law and still leave a large-field for self-regulation. The final 
part of this section examines some of the improvements that might be 
made in respect of the latter. 
(a) Retention of Self-Regulation 
The intervention of criminal law was an inevitable response to 
changing social attitudes and the development, in extent and nature, 
of a limited, yet particularly serious field of activity. That insider 
dealing is only now being contemplated as illegal, is not itself a 
criticism of the system of self-regulation in general. The "lawlessness" 
generally attributed to the City is true only to the extent that its 
power seems largely impervious to outside control. Insider dealing, 
specifically, is a suitable subject for criminal legislation, despite 
the considerable difficulties involved; these difficulties represent 
in themselves, however, an effective argument against wider legislative 
control of security dealing. 
49 
Indeed a note of warning to the proponents of a U. S. -type 
S. E. C. to "police" the City was recently sounded. Professor Benston 
had introduced a strong counter-argument to the claim that the City Code 
has been aimed at the interests of London's merchant banking by asserting 
that the multitude of rules and regulations, court cases and articles 
generated by the S. E. C. has benefitted investors only slightly, if at 
all while greatly enhancing the "bar". 
so 
A final indictment is more 
important. On the question of fraud in U. S. public companies, Benston 
simply quotes the remark of a former S. E. C. and Justice Department lawyer: 
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"I must admit, the principal difference between now 
and the late 1920s is that you need the help of a lawyer 
to commit a successful fraud. But it is still good 
business. These people are almost never caught. 
If caught they're almost never indicted. If indicted, 
they are rarely found guilty. If found guilty, they 
almost never are fined much or sent to jail. If sent 
to jail, they get out on parole in a few months or 
" years at most and then are welcomed back to their 
country club in Westchester. " 51 
In rejecting this approach in the U. K., 
52 
it is realised that 
a number of improvements can still be made in the measures to 
supervise the securities market. Although thi, once again, extends 
beyond the strict boundary area of takeover regulation, the Takeover 
Panel is the nearest approach Britain has to a body whose main aim is to 
protect shareholders and to ensure that the stock market is efficient. 
Whilst its brief is limited and concerned essentially with a peculiar 
aspect of stock market operations, many of its decisions have far wider 
implications. The real failing of the Panel, and of the whole City 
has been their inability to display to the public and Government, that 
they are dealing with abuses as they occur. 
A probable cause of the weakness has been the nature of the 
composition of the City and, in particular, of the disparate bodies which 
regulate the securities market. None of these bodies (the Stock Exchange, 
the Takeover Panel, the Bank of England and the Department of Trade) is in 
a position to take an overall view of the situation. If the securities 
market is to continue to regulate itself it must be under the surveillance 
of a body with greater public standing and a body which would be able 
to view the broader issues from a more objective standpoint. 
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There remains the question of the nature of the organising body. 
The status of the Bank of England, for example, remains a mystery to the 
public at large; and more recently, its role has become a subject of 
increasing debate. 
53 
A preferable suggestion is that the Takeover Panel, 
" which brings together different parts of the securities industry including 
the clearing banks, accepting houses, pension funds and insurance companies 
54 
"could be a model for working together in a wider supervisory role. " 
The proposed review body would have a number of functions. Firsts 
to cover the occasional cases of unethical conduct which are not within 
the jurisdiction of any particular body and thus escape formal condemnation. 
Secondly, to possess the legal powers discussed earlier and to represent 
the body to which its delegates would be publicly accountable. Thirdly, 
to close the existing gap between the City and government - by allaying 
the latter's fears through the second function, and by publicising the 
role of the bodies which answer to it. The removal of genuine distrust 
in official circles, which partly stems from ignorance, would be the 
removal of the greatest threat which those responsible for the administration 
of voluntary control face. 
55 
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obstacle in the way of fair, whorkable competition. A company 
can now feel that its position is more secure, and that if it is 
acquired by another company the acquisition will be the result 
of a contest in which it has had a reasonable opportunity to defend 
itself, 
53 :A clearer definition of the role of the Bank may have to await 
the outcome of the Wilson Committee inquiry; see Chapter 8, 
Sn 8.32 
54 : Suggested by Mr. Nicholas Goodison, Chairman, the Stock Exchange, 
at the Bankers and Merchants Dinner, Mansion House, October 21,1976; 
the notion gained further support from Lord Shawcross in The Panel 
on Takeovers and Mergers, Report on the Year ended 31st March, 1976, 
55 : See I. Wriggleworth, "Without the city walls", Bankers' Magazine, 
September, 1976 
PART FOUR: CONCLUSIONS 
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Concluding Remarks and Implications 
8.1 : Summary 
In this dissertation, I have attempted to present an analysis of 
the role of financial institutions in merger activity. It was prompted 
by the huge increase in the acquisition activity of financial companies in 
the period 1966-1973 which had remained largely unresearched. In this 
period, mergers and acquisitions by financial companies increased by 943% 
in value and 184% in number. In the first two years of the period the 
number of firms acquired and the expenditure on acquisitions were quite 
small; thus from 1968 to 1973 there was a significant boom in financial 
sector merger activity. 
This study collected data on every acquisition by financial companies 
that took place in the U. K. and was reported by the Bank of England, 
regardless of the sizes or industrial types of firms acquired. A sum in 
excess of £2.4 billion was offered for the equity of the victim firms. 
Since the assets acquired were transferred to companies already in control 
of other assets, the acquisitions contributed to an underlying trend in 
the U. K. economy towards increasing concentration in the control of assets. 
Moreover, the largest financial institutions participated; each of the ten 
largest banks and insurance companies undertook acquisitions or were involved 
in mergers. 
Concern at increases in seller concentration arises from economic or 
political doubts. From the economic viewpoint, increasing asset concentration 
increases the likelihood of a firm using its ability to divert resources 
to coerce its competitors. Politically, some are worried about the power 
of the managements of very large firms which may not be sufficiently 
responsive to the public interest. 
The merger activity in the financial sector from 1966 to 1f)7'1 would 
appear to be important to those people concerned with such increases in 
concentration. An investigation showed that nearly 60% of the expenditure 
on acquisitions was accounted for by companies whose main activity was banking 
or insurance. Furthermore, their acquisitions became larger and were 
indreasingly diversified. 
The summary above is based upon data and analyses which were necessary 
at the introductory stage to characterize the merger activity of financial 
companies from 1966 to 1973. Subsequent data and analyses departed from 
the discussion of asset and seller concentration, but were linked to the 
various aspects of the relationship of financial institutions with merger 
activity. 
One a4 sis revealed that external growth was also an important 
LTI 
feature of U. K. banks' international expansion. Mergers and acquisitions 
amongst British overseas banks and the clearing banks' overseas subsidiaries 
facilitated rationalisation and helped to create institutions of sufficient 
size to compete with US and continental wholesale banks. Growth by 
acquisition was also the method most readily employed by British banks in 
establishing or extending overseas branch networks. In addition to 
many examples of formal acquisition activity, various other forms of 
co-operation emerged within the financial system. Informal. ad hoc 
syndicates arose to meet the increasing demand for medium term funds of 
increasing proportions. The concept of co-operation was then extended 
and resulted in the growth of the consortium banks. 
The analysis to this stage concentrated on the involvement of 
financial companies and particularly banks as acquiring and: victim firms. 
The underlying theme was that the environment within which the institutions 
competed governed the extent and direction of their expansion. Changes 
in that environment were caused by a number of different factors. Structural 
changes for example resulted from the entry of foreign banks into London; 
the consequent growth of the eurocurrency markets heightened rivalry 
for wholesale commercial and investment banking business. Institutional 
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changes, such as those resulting from the new credit controls of 1971, 
also affected the competitive environment of financial companies. 
Changes in the Bank of England's official attitude to amalgamations had 
similar effects. The responses which were evoked were varied. There was 
a common theme to the institutions' reaction, however. In general, their 
responses to the shift in emphasis in favour of international wholesale 
banking business, were characterized by co-operation and invariably merger. 
Further analysis revealed that the role of financial companies in 
mergers extended beyond these preliminary findings. Merchant banks in 
particular, but specialist consultancies and institutional investors as well, 
have played an influential role in the corporate merger market. Accepting 
houses were consulted in over 90% of mergers and acquisitions which came to 
fruition in 1973 and 1974; P. R. consultants became increasingly important 
with the increased incidence of contested takeover bids during the late 
" 1960s and early 1970s. The role of both these financial advisers is to 
determine the pecuniary merits of a bid and to conduct the ensuing 
negotiations. The over-riding impression from the analysis was that the 
choice of strategy and tactics during a takeover could be as important 
as the price being paid for the target company. With the growing concentration 
of share ownership into fewer institutional funds and the increasing 
involvement of merchant banks in fund management, the latent power and 
influence of financial institutions appeared to be far in excess of 
the strength of their financial statements. 
This impression of their influence was supported by examining the 
role of financial institutions in regulating behaviour in the same market. 
hok- It seemed that "poacher 
IV 
'turned gamekeeper". Prominent merchant bankers 
were involved in the evolution of the Takeover Code and the development 
of the Takeover Panel. Mdreover, the method of controlling the market, 
which has relied upon self-restraint, has been attacked on the emotional 
grounds that the City was behaving like an elite 'club' and on other 
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as explicit policing backed by statute. In the analysis, evidence was 
offered to refute these misapprehensions: the city is not a compact League 
of. Gentlemen but a unique collection of sophisticated financial markets 
which deserve special attention and require a flexible system of control. 
The evidence led to another view. This was that the corporate merger 
market is characterised by several imperfections which include the dominance 
of large firms, the aspirations of managers and financial advisers, and 
the paucity and quality of information available to the public and 
shareholders. These imperfections are accentuated by the nature of existing 
public mergers policy which is based on unsound economic theory and employs 
empirically unworkable criteria. The final analysis in the study attempted 
to remedy the faults with public policy and the imperfections in the merger 
market by suggesting a new approach to the regulation of firms engaged in 
takeover bids which would require acquiring firms to demonstrate that a 
proposed acquisition was in the public interest. 
Throughout the analysis, emphasis was placed on the causal relationship 
between changes in financial companies' competitive environments and changes 
in their behaviour. During the period from 1966 to 1973, many such changes 
occurred. Whilst these were extremely varied in nature, decision-taking 
must have been influenced by the general climate of opinion which seemed 
to prevail during that era. It was characterised by rapid expansion 
which was created by a unique mixture of factors: real economic growth, 
changes in official and institutional ideologies, the evolution of competitive 
international market structures in the financial system and a self- 
perpetuating optimism which diffused through financial and commercial markets 
alike. The extent of the resulting structural change in the financial 
system was such that central banks and their regulatory climate were 
superceded. When in these circumstances, a number of specific dangers 
were added, it was inevitable that several banks would suffer difficulties. 
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crisis 
8.2.1 : Origins 
The current era is quite different from that studied earlier in 
the dissertation. The events of the last three and a half years have 
radically altered the environment in which financial institutions compete. 
The remainder of this final chapter is concerned with analysing the nature 
of these events, their direct consequences and their implications. For 
much of the current period the world's financial markets have been digesting 
the ramifications of a crisis of confidence which affected both domestic 
and international banking systems. These crises which became apparent in 
1974 had their origins in the earlier formative period of expansion. 
The main feature of the domestic and international credit booms of the early 
1970s was the substantial development of the parallel money markets. 
The easy availability of commercial funds in a period of rapid monetary 
expansion made possible the growth of the secondary banks. It also 
enabled the finance houses, which had previously been dependent upon the 
clearing banks for their funds, to reduce their reliance on this method 
of financing and to expand their activities outside instalment credit. 
The larger finance houses were also induced to seek full banking status 
which required them to maintain a reserve asset ratio of 12/% but which 
also gave them access to an extra source of deposits in the inter-bank 
market thus compensating them for the 'locking-up' of an extra 2ý% of 
resources in low yielding reserve assets. 
These developments occurred against the sudden increase in British 
money supply, an inflow of surplus cash to finance houses from industry 
and'commerce seeking the highest obtainable rates, and an upward spiralling 
property boom. The latter featured a rapid rise in property prices from 
1971 to 1973, and a proliferation of developers and organizations concerned 
with property. The key to this growth, however, was the ready availability 
of finance. Although some of this was soundly-based in the form of long- 
term institutional demand from pension funds and insurance companies, most 
of the finance comprised short-or medium-term bank money. 
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Hank lending to property companies quadrupled in three years to reach 
£2.8 billion in November, 1974. Most of the increase was due to the increased 
exposure of the secondary banks and finance houses. In the year ended 
November 1974, their advances to the property sector increased by 29% 
compared with an 8% increase in clearing bank advances. At the end of 
the year, secondary banks accounted for 64% of the banking sector's total 
exposure to property companies. Part of this expansion may be attributed to 
the rapid growth of the money supply and the consequences of the policy 
of Competition and Credit Control. The main motivation for the increased 
flow of funds from secondary banks to the property sector, however, was 
the belief that the rise in property values would be both general and 
continuous. 
There were several distinct characteristics of bank lending in the 
period of rapidly rising property values. Firsts such was the rush to 
find an apparently profitable destination for the funds which were being 
amassed that security for the loans was often insufficiently checked. 
Sometimes, for example, the price paid for the property was taken as 
evidence of its value. In other cases, a high proportion of 'value' 
was advanced. Thus many loans were essentially without security. In 
addition, loans were invariably made against property that produced no 
income at all, or yielded only 3-4% while the interest on loans could have 
been as high as 18%. Borrowers were expecting to service loans from capital 
profits rather than cash flow generated from income; in the meantime, the 
interest was added to the outstanding debt ('rolled up'). 
This was the scenario when property prices began to reverse their 
upward trend in late 1973. From the bankers' perspective it is now 
apparent that a number of prudent practices were not observed. There is 
little doubt, that despite variations in the relative levels of exposure,. 
the banking sector as a whole was over-committed to property lending. The 
secondary banking sector was especially over-committed in this respect. 
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In tdovembe. r", 1974, property' advances accounted for more than 13.5% o` the'i r 
portfolio to U. K. residents'as compared with approximately 5% in the case 
of clearing banks. Moreover, in the euphoria, several essential rules were 
ignored. For example, information as to the eventual ownership of properties 
was often not known or sought, furthermore bank lending tended to exceed 
institutional demand. In effect, bankers were frequently providing, under 
the guise of loans, what was essentially risk capital - with the disadvantages 
of equity financing, but without the advantages. Finally, it has also 
become evident that a large proportion of the lending especially from 
secondary banks was against poorer quality schemes or development sites 
which the institutions would not have considered anyway. The situation 
was accentuated especially in the instance of finance houses, by imbalanced 
funding of loans. Liabilities were attracted as short-term deposits in the 
money markets, whereas they were employed as medium-term advances with 
collateral in the form of illiquid property investment. 
The problems experienced in international banking markets had their 
roots in the same period. Indeed the distinction between the origins of 
the international crisis and that effecting domestic banking business in 
the U. K. was one of degree not kind. Notable features were the rapidly 
growing world money supply and the easy availability of funds in the 
eurocurrency markets. The latter in particular attracted banks of all 
sizes and nationalities to compete for business which may be seen now to 
have been potentially unprofitable and risky. In the more restricted 
climate which has prevailed since 1974, these activities have been exposed 
and smaller international banks have found it difficult to fund their lending. 
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`ic origins of these pressures may be attributed to a lack of prudence2 
on the part of those banks affected, the interdependence which characterises 
the infrastructure of international banking markets and, with hindsight, 
excessive expansion in certain types of activity. Several contemporaneous 
factors were the precursors of the eventual problems which became manifest 
in 1974. The advent of generalised floating in 1973 signalled large 
movements in currency values and the transfer of risks formerly borne 
by central banks to the commercial banking sector. This coincided with 
considerable publicity for the large profits made by a number of banks 
particularly from foreign exchange dealings. The prospect of new opportunities 
in exchange market operations encouraged the setting of unrealistic profit 
targets for foreign exchange departments at a time when the balance of 
risk shifted against them. 
In addition the unconditional growth of the world's money supply 
encouraged the creation of new institutions (the consortia or 'euro-banks') 
and attempts to cover overheads quickly. The result was a commitment to 
lending operations of longer maturities and smaller lending spreads than 
had hitherto been considered and which have subsequently proved ill-advised. 
The example of property advances made by U. K. indigenous banks, was followed 
in the U. S. with the expansion of the Real Estate Investment Trusts (R. E. I. T. S. ) 
and in Europe where property 'booms' were experienced, especially in France, 
Belgium and Holland, between 1971 and 1973. A similar over-exposure of loan 
portfolios has been in respect of advances to shipowners to finance the 
purchase and servicing of supertankers. 
A third factor, the oil-price rise, which aggravated the problems 
of the shipping industry, also raised doubts as to the capacity of 
commercial banks to recycle the resultant oil revenues. By the summer of 
1974, the limits of private recycling were reached as banks' capital bases 
began to prove inadequate for the deposits they were 'being forced to 
accommodate'. 
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Filially in 1973-1974 there was a sharp decline of wur. Ld s; eeuriLy 
markets, which effectively prevented banks from raising new capital to 
restore prudent capital-liabilities ratios. Furthermore, it meant that 
financial institutions suffered large book losses on their own investments. 
8.2.2. : Evidence of Crisis 
The extent of the U. K. banking sector's over-commitment in property 
advances became apparent following a rapid rise in interest rates in July 
1973 when Bank Rate (now Minimum Lending Rate) rose from 7/% to 11%. 
An increase in the industrial demand for funds fuelled the upward trend. 
To finance their lending commitments, the commercial banks were forced 
to rely upon the money markets for deposits thus forcing fringe banks to 
pay even more to compete. As a result, one month inter-bank rate (LIBOR) 
rose from 12% in November, 1973 to 16% in December at which level it remained 
until April, 1974. A corollary was a mortgage famine as building society 
investors sought the higher rates they could earn elsewhere. The reprecussions 
on the property and construction sectors were severe. Builders were unable 
to sell houses and land values began to fall. Hence, developers who had 
been dependent for funds on secondary banks were caught in a liquidity 
squeeze caused by the rise in interest rates and simultaneous fall in 
unmarketable investments. 
In November 1973, London and County Securities, one of the biggest 
and most aggressive fringe banks collapsed, triggering off a crisis of 
confidence which accentuated the fall in property values, spread uncertainty 
and was accompanied by revelations which involved the largest finance 
houses and implicated even the more respectable accepting houses and commercial 
banks. 
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banks and finance houses from relying on the money markets as a source of 
funds. The once plentiful supply of 'short-term money disappeared as 
corporate lenders, other financial institutions and the general public 
either withdrew funds or refused to 'roll over' existing deposits, and 
in any case, did not offer new commitments. The decline in the flow of 
new money and signs that bankers were considering the recall of their 
property loans removed the key prop to the 'boom' and signalled the decline 
in property values. The artificially buoyant market became almost equally 
artificially depressed. 
The implications for the banking sector were two-fold. First; 
many loans against property became undersecured. Secondly the stagnation of 
property sales, with the substantial fall in property prices meant that 
revenue generation from these sales became minimal causing cash flow 
problems for the property companies. This combination of severe illiquidity 
and falling asset values, left bankers with the choice of foreclosing on 
security (and thereby risking a further depression of property prices 
and undermining of the security of other loans that were still covered) 
or 'rolling up' the interest charges. 
The general unwillingness to 'dump' property induced some finance 
houses, such as UDT and Mercantile Credit, to make provisions against such 
possible loan losses. Indeed the finance houses were perhaps the 
institutions to suffer most from the events of 1974. The rise in interest 
rates in particular adversely affected their performance. The mismatching 
of liabilities and assets was apparent in respect of their property 
advances but in addition much of their instalment credit business was 
traditionally on a fixed interest rate basis. Thus loans for up to 
ten years arranged before 1973 when rates were much lower, were still 
being funded after 1973 with short term deposits, for which they were 
forced to pay much higher rates. As a rsult, profit margins were either 
eroded or losses incurred. 
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At the end of 1973 it became clear that the problem which at first 
seemed no more than a temporary shortage of confidence and liquidity among 
the secondary banks was far more serious. In consequence, whilst. London 
and County Securities was being supported by First. National Finance 
Corporation (FNFC), Keyser Ullmann and National Westminster, the Bank of 
England launched the 'lifeboat' support group of clearing banks to 
provide the necessary funds for the beleaguered finance houses and secondary 
banks. 
The Bank of England's move to avert a complete collapse of the 
secondary banking system was, however, aggravated by events abroad. The 
effects of the international banking crisis also manifested themselves in 
a loss of depositors' confidence. A specific cause, indeed the outstanding 
single cause of losses among banks in 1974, lay in the foreign exchange 
markets. A series of substantial foreign exchange losses were experienced 
by a number of banks which differed markedly in character, size and location. 
Union Bank of Switzerland, for example, sustained an estimated loss of 
$150 million; Westdeutsche Landesbank disclosed foreign exchange losses 
of £108 million and Franklin National Bank $46 million, whilst Lloyds Bank 
suffered losses of $77 million from foreign exchange dealings at Lloyds 
Bank International's Lugano branch. Most damaging perhaps, was the collapse 
of Bankhaus I. D. Herstatt in July 1974 with a possible foreign exchange 
deficit of $160 million but u ith far wider implications. The closure of 
Herstatt by the German Federal Authorities while New York was still trading, 
left a number of spot foreign exchange transactions uncompleted. 
This particularly affected Morgan Guaranty, Seattle First National Bank 
and Hill Samuel who were involved in the deals. The latter has since 
written off $10 million which represents 50% of the uncompleted deals. 
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8.2.3" 
. Results 
Although the causes of the problems experienced throughout the bank. iny 
industry can be conveniently considered in terms of 'domestic' and 
'international' events, the consequent changes in the competitive environment 
and in the structure of the banking markets should be discussed together. 
Sumnarising, the main features of the problems experienced by banks, 
appear to fall into three categories. First, a number of banks were 
caught in a 'liquidity squeeze' caused by the rise in interest rates and 
simultaneous fall in values of unmarketable investments. Such was the fate 
of many U. K. fringe banks and of Hessische Landesbank which incurred 
losses as a result of its majority shareholding in Inves ions und 
Handelsbank. Secondly, several large banks incurred foreign exchange 
losses. Particularly disturbing are those instances where losses were 
directly attributed to an individual dealer exceeding his authority as 
was the case of Lloyds Bank's losses in Lugano. Thirdly, there were those 
banks whose collapse was precipitated by fraud and deliberate misapplication 
of funds. In some cases fraud has been proved and the guilty parties have 
been prosecuted. It is certain however, that many more remain unpunished. 
Several banks also suffered directly as a result of the decline in 
confidence itself. The developed infrastructure of the U. K. financial 
system, which incorporates both domestic and international markets, might 
be considered as a major cause of the so-called 'domino' effect where a 
crisis of confidence, sparked off by one bank, quickly affects a number 
of others. This was particularly evident in the U. K. sterling money market 
where finance houses were confronted with indiscriminate withdrawals of 
short-term deposits. 
In international markets similarly the implicit assumption that 
inter. -bank loans to al L market parLicip, ants were vii Luai ly riskle:,:; 
disappeared. The reaction of major lenders in the inter-bank market 
was the reduction or severance of dealing lines to smaller and newer banks, 
and was characterised also by the indiscriminate treatment of banks 
of a particular category - the newly established consortia, for example. 
In the wake of Herstatt and the collapse of London and County Securities, 
there was a danger that the prophecy would be self-fulfilling in that banks woaldl 
unable to meet obligations because of the desire on the part of lending 
banks, to reduce their exposure to presumably weaker institutions. 
8.3 : The changed competitive environment 1974-77 and the importance of 
size in contemporary wholesale banking 
The response of individual banks to the climate of ebbing confidence 
which confronted them in 1974 was inevitably varied. Nevertheless, from 
an examination of aggregate behavioural trends several common traits have 
emerged which given an indication of the philosophy of different types of 
bank, and permit some speculation as to likely future developments. The 
principal emerging trend has been the accelerating growth of international 
wholesale banking business. The large, American, European and Japanese 
commercial and investment banks have initiated this growth. During the 
crisis of 1974 and 1975, when indiscriminate treatment prevailed, large 
size became associated with security. Moreover, for technical reasons 
explained below, the role of the pure intermediary in the eurocurrency 
markets largely disappeared and underwriters of both syndicated credits. 
and bonds, have been forced to accept larger proportions of loans and 
issues. To support this, increased capital and resource bases became 
necessary which has further confirmed that substantial resources are 
essential to compete in contemporary banking markets. A further trend to 
emerge is a result of the continued breakdown of demarcation lines between 
various financial markets. This will be discussed in the context of a 
debate between the proponents of the 'specialist' and 'generalist functions 
in wholesale bankinq. 
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8.3.1 : Domestic Issues - 'Lifeboat' Sup cart O parat: i. on and Other 
Rescue Missions 
The 'lifeboat' support action was launched in December, 1973, to 
control the crisis of confidence precipitated by the collapse of London 
and County Securities. The machinery, established by the Hank of England 
with the help of the clearing banks, was intended to review the liquidity 
of fringe banks and to reinforce their liquidity when necessary. It was 
set up) in particular, because money market deposits with which the 
secondary banks funded their protracted lending commitments, ceased flowing 
to these banks as depositors sought more 'secure' outlets for their savings. 
The relative scarcity of new deposits made it difficult to sustain even 
existing volumes of business and in order to forestall the collapse of the 
entire secondary banking system, the Central Bank and the clearing banks 
made available funds although at a premium over usual borrowing rates. 
The aim of the Bank of England and the clearers was to secure eventual 
repayment of their loans with as little loss as possible. But this had 
to be achieved consistently with safeguarding confidence in U. K. Banking - 
the prime motive of the action. 
At the outset, approximately £1,300 million was committed to the 
rescue operation of which £1,200 million was contributed by the clearing 
banks with the remainder from the Bank of England. The funds originally 
supported more than 30 secondary banks and finance companies but the majority 
was ear-marked for a few relatively large groups which had previously 
been financed to a large extent with short term funds from the money market. 
With the exception of Keyser Ullmann, these were concerns with a traditional 
consumer credit business onto which had been grafted a banking business, 
often with considerable outstanding loans against property. The latter was 
also true of Keyser Ullmann whose bad loan provisions for the years 1974 
and 1975 were £30.6 million and £64 million respectively. These were 
necessitated principally as a result of property lending activities which 
accounted for about 80% of its total loan'portfolio and possibly over 
95% of the provisions. 
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The five largest companies which depended on tale ' 1. iteboat. ' and 
the extent of their support in 1974/1975 were: 
£ million 
U. D. T. 450 
F. N. F. C. 360 
Mercantile Credit 166 
Bowmaker 90 
Keyser Ullmann 37 
1103 
At the end of the Bank of England's last financial year (February 1976) 
the support operation had been reduced to approximately £800 million. All 
the surviving companies had significantly reduced their dependence and 
a number had dispensed with it altogether. The latest available information 
suggests that U. D. T. and F. N. F. C. are the only major groups in need of 
lifeboat funds but that they account for £650 million or 81% of the total. 
The lifeboat is notable for its success in averting the 'domino 
effect' which threatened to overtake the secondary banking system. It 
is also remarkable as an illustration of the nature of the City operations 
and for its wider implications. It reveals for example, the inter-dependence 
of the financial system and the Bank of England's reluctance to allow the 
demise of financial institutions which may upset the delicate infra- 
structure. More germane to this study is its function in over-ruling free 
market forces and its repercussions on banking structure. Those concerns 
which have continued trading and extricated themselves from the rescue 
mission have in common a relationship with a large financial group. 
In some cases this existed before 1974 but for the majority, major capital 
restrucrng or full acqusition by a strong group proved to be the only way 
in which they could attract deposits in the market, and the only long-term 
alternative to liquidation. 
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There, are several examples of acquisitions undertaken to eliminate 
lifeboat assistance. The largest of these was the E36 million takeover 
by Barclays Bank of Mercantile Credit announced in August, 1975. The 
immediate effect was the finance housed ability to dispense with lifeboat 
support. By becoming part of a clearing bank group, Mercantile Credit 
became totally reliant upon Barclays for its funds. 
In those cases where major restructuring took place the clearing 
banks were also often involved. Cannon Street Investments, for instance 
were supported by National Westminster which acquired 63.6% of its capital 
and took over Cannon Street Acceptances. At Keyser Ullmann, the deputy 
chairman of Barclays, Mr. Derek Wilde became chairman in March 1975, and 
the merchant bank's managing directors and chairman resigned. Within 
seventeen months Keyser Ullmann was able to rebuild deposits from normal 
market sources and to repay its lifeboat borrowings of £65 million. In 
contrast, Bowmaker, the credit finance and leasing subsidiary of C. T. Bowring 
extricated itself with the help of a £20 million syndicated loan from the 
clearing banks arranged by Lloyds Bank and a £5 million three year credit 
facility from the Bank of England. 
The point of these illustrations is to give an indication of the 
importance attached to a secure capital base and intangible assets 
such as goodwill and reputation in times of tension and declining confidence. 
Practical support for this view is available from the experiences of the 
independent finance houses which suffered indiscriminately from the 
withdrawal of, and failure to roll-over, deposits. It appears that they 
suffered equally, irrespective of their investment and loan portfolios. 
Thus Bowmaker, a wholly-owned subsidiary of a prominent insurance broking 
group and without property lending in its outstanding portfolio, was 
forced to rely upon lifeboat assistance. In so doing, Bowmaker and other 
assisted concerns were forced to pay a premium of some A to 2% over the 
rates at which the bank-controlled financed houses were able to borrow. 
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Tnevi t. ihly, therefore Lombard North Central (National Westminster Bank) , 
Forward Trust (Midland Bank), Hodge Group (acquired by Standard and 
Chartered Bank in December, 1973) and Lloyds and Scottish (Lloyds Bank 
and Royal Bank of Scotland) fared relatively well. 
In the restrictive climate of the post-credit boom era, the 
importance of size and the reputation attached to a large resource base 
became very apparent. In the case of smaller secondary banks and non- 
members of the Accepting Houses Committee there has been a clear trend 
towards acquisitions mainly by stronger, but certainly by larger, groups. 
Not all the acquired companies were dependent upon lifeboat assistance, 
indeed in several instances acquisition obviated the necessity. The major 
takeovers of this kind are tabulated below; unless specified the acquisition 
was 100%. 
8.3.2 : International Issues: Infections of Capital - U. K. Banks 
The secondary banking crisis did not adversely affect the fringe 
banks and independent finance houses alone. The dominance of the big 
banks extended beyond the limited area of consumer finance to embrace most 
kinds of banking activity. Sheer weight of resources has unquestionably 
become of increasing importance in developing new banking business 
particularly in international markets. Furthermore, the capacity to 
meet growing international financial requirements tends to be concentrated 
in a limited number of banks. 
A major reason for the premium put on the ability to raise very large 
amounts of money is simply the growing scale of the finance required, 
particularly for major international projects. In the past, the innovative 
U. K. merchant banks could accommodate international financing deals - 
eurocurrencv credit syndications or the management of bond issues - by 
fulfilling a specialist intermediary role. As managers or co-managers 
they were able to arrange a syndicate for large credit demands by 
petitioning other banks to provide the funds, leaving their own resources 
intact. Thus their revenue was derived from fee income earned as managers 
, rather than 
from interest rate spreads. 
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Table 8.1 : Rescue acquisitions in the U. K. banking industry 1972-1-977 
Date Concern 
Dec. 1973 Hodge Group 
Jan. 1974 Western Credit 
Holdings (now 
Philadelphia 
Credit Holdings) 
Jan. 1974 Bovis (including 
Twentieth Century 
Banking) 
Sept. 1974 British Bank of 
Commerce 
Dec. 1974 Hawtin & Partners 
(subsidiary of 
Hawtin) 
Feb. 1975 Burston & Texas 
Commerce Bank 
Feb. 1975 Cripps Warburg 
March 1975 Anglo-Portuguese 
Bank 
March 1975 Northern Commercial 
Bank 
Aug. 1975 Mercantile Credit 
Dec. 1976 Wallace Brothers 
Acquirer 
Standard & Chartered 
Banking Group 
Philadelphia National 
Bank (U. S. A. ) 
P&0 
National & Grindlays Bank £3.3mm 
Gulf and Western Inds (USA)N. K. 
Texas Commerce Bank (USA) £2.2mm 
Williams & Glyns Bank 
Norwich Union Insurance 
Group 
Algemene Bank Nederland 
(Nederlands) 
Barclays Bank 
Standard Chartered Bank 
Consideration 
£34.7mm 
£1.5mm 
(majority stake) 
£25mm 
Nominal 
£12mm 
£2.5 mm 
£36mm 
*Deferred cash bass 
Note: *Up to a maximum of £lmm to be related to net worth calculated 
in 1982 
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Events in domesti. e and international bank. i. ncq in the past few yenrr, 
however, have to a marked extent increased the need for the individual 
bank to put up a significant proportion of the funds raised itself. There 
are several reasons for this, the first of which is a result of the post-1973 
financial environment. The aftermath of the Herstatt collapse and other 
problems brought a renewed conservatism amont despositors of large funds, 
including the international banks themselves, which meant that for a period 
at least the biggest - and therefore presumably the safest - banks were 
able to dominate the markets. 
Their domination was manifest in the decline of the specialist 
intermediary function - as represented by the merchant banks which in the 
past had been able to underwrite loans of perhaps $100 million with 
confidence in their ability to 'sell out' a high percentage to other banks 
in the euromarkets. The key to their success was 'placing power'. The 
market for participation is now dominated by the major North American and 
European Banks which have matched the merchant banks in expertise but have 
the advantage of also being able to employ their own enormous resources. 
As a result of market forces reacting to uncertainty and conservatism, 
a bank without tied-placing power is now able to 'sell down' approximately 
30-40% of its allotment as compared with 70-80% two or three years ago. 
In addition, competition to lend eurocurrencies has become 
extremely fierce with spreads forced down to about 1% or below for first 
class borrowers. The edge in the rivalry to receive a syndication mandate 
lies with those banks which can offer large amounts. During 1976 the crucial 
underwriting commitment level required to obtain a co-managership (and 
thereby earn fee income of Is-7%) has risen from $10-20 million to $20-30 million. 
By implication, therefore, an underwriter may have to commit itself for 
approximately $25 million and with a sell-down of 40% would have to accommodate 
up to $15 million in its own loan portfolio. For the merchant banks, the 
economics of loan syndications have inevitably deteriorated an4 hampered by 
their relatively small deposit base and the decline of their pure intermediary 
function, their presence has tended to diminish. 
L. ). ) 
A final reason stems from the deep world-wide recession of 1974-75 
which caused severe strains on the financial structure of corporations, 
project financing, the shipping industry and developing countries (LDCs) - 
all borrowing customers of the euromarkets. The consequences were 
bankruptcies, foreclosures and debt rescheduling, all of which call for 
sensitive negotiations and flexible interpretation of agreements. This is 
particularly difficult to achieve when there are several lenders, few 
of which are in direct contact with the defaulting borrower and each with 
their own interests to protect. This poses technical. problems for international 
bankers in preparing placement memoranda, in obtaining warranties from 
borrowers as to the accuracy of information and representations and in 
incorporating, in loan documentation, covenants of absolution from 
participating banks. The solutions seem to be changes in the arrangement 
of loans, which will be increasingly subscribed by small groups of large 
banks. This structure would allow each bank to take a major participation 
as a co-manager, sharing full responsibility for the credit and sharing 
equally in the front-end fees. 
The increasing stress on international banking business has also 
brought out the importance of size in making it possible for a bank 
to achieve extensive coverage abroad. The big U. S. banks and increasingly 
the U. K. clearing banks are in a position to develop branch and representative 
networks spreading acrosss the world. Even the largest independent merchant 
banks cannot compete on equal terms with the big commercial banks; indeed, 
the volatile money markets have proved to be an imperfect substitute for 
branches in providing cheap, reliable deposits. Proof of this contention 
may be obtained from an examination of the accepting houses' relative 
decline since 1973, as measured by the fall in their share of currency 
deposits. Following the oil crisis and the financial instability of 1974-1975, 
the large inflow of petro-dollars went to the larger commercial banks. If 
they had maintained their share of deposits they would have stood at £11 billion 
at the end of 1976 instead of £6.3 billion. Thus, the agqreaate deposits 
of the accepting houses as a proportion of total deposits held by banks have 
declined from 5.8% in 1973 to 3.1% at the end of 1976. 
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Following the lead of Sir Kenneth Keith of Hill. Samuel, a growincl 
number of merchant banks are now apparently reconciled to the need for 
financial backing from, if not ownership by, external groups. Two of the 
reasons for this stem directly from the arguments developed above. First 
the merchant banks require the funds to compete effectively for euromarket 
business; and secondly the funds have been essential to achieve much 
greater size quickly in order to facilitate the development of more 
effective international coverage. The third reason is also a product of 
the recent adverse climate, in which a shift of power took place between 
the merchant banks and the clearing banks. This is developed in the next 
section but it should be noted at this stage, that coincidental with the 
difficulties encountered in syndicating international loans was increasing 
competition from the clearing banks and international investment banks for 
corporate finance services which the merchant banks had previously dominated. 
Moreover, with the economic recession and decline in share prices the 
relatively brief period of hectic merger and acquisition activity ended and 
the flow of capital issue business virtually halted. The loss of fee 
income from these sources at a time when it was particularly needed and 
the consideration, that their 'monopoly' in corporate finance expertise was 
endangered, confirmed the need for increased resource backing. 
The size problem has been tackled in different ways by the 
accepting houses. Some banks, anticipating the need for growth, undertook 
a series of inter-merchant bank mergers or received injections of capital 
from international financial groups. The latter has been most acceptable 
recently, for with depressed stock market valuations and the reluctance 
of family interests (which still control a number of merchant banks) to sell 
out, minority interests achieve the desired effect of increasing capital 
funds without unduly diluting existing shareholders' equity. There have 
been several examples of merchant banks seeking external support most of 
which has come from overseas. A parallel development involving three of the 
largest accepting houses has been the divestiture of interests in associated 
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banks (actually London-based consortia) to foreign banks. The measures 
taken to restructure and increase capital bases are collated 
in Table 8.2. 
Table 8.2 : Changes in Coital structuzc/minori. ty sharcholdi s 
in U. E. merchant. banks ]''-4-1977 
Merchant Bank Minority Shareholder Details Comments 
'1975 Leopold Joseph 
. Bayerische 
Landesbank) 
Bremer Landesbank ) Acquisition of 26% equity stake 
!: 9i5 Edward Dates First Arabian Acquisition of 25% equity stake, Partial rescue operation - Rates Corporation with option to purchase further incurred loss of £15 ::. 3 in year 15% within three years ending March 1975 due to loss on 
sale of Welfare Insurance an-4 prop 
erty loan provisions. June 1076, 
Bank of England provided standby 
facilities because of probable 
losses in property and shipping loaa 
portfolios and suspension of shares. 
1975 Hambros Prudential Insurance Market purchase of 9.5% of Proceeds of loan utilised for (U. S. A. ) equity; alz, o injection of $25 mm b sub ibi expansion of overseas au: turo- y scr rg for subordinated loan stock issue currency 
banking business 
75 
Grindlays 
(parent of Brandts) Citibank Injection of £S mm equity finance Necessitated by bad loan provisions raising its stake from 40% to 49% of Brandts, amounting to £26 = for 
and increasinrn Grindlaysl share 18 months to June 1975 almost wholly ý capital by 17z%. Lloyds Bank also against property ad%arces. May 1975, arranged two 5-year subordinated Brandts obliged to leave Accepting loans to raise further £27.5 an Houses Committee; Grindlays assumed 
closer management control and to 
reflect this, subsidiary re-named 
Orindlay Brandts 
1976 Fraser Ansbacher Lissauer Group Injection of £4 mm divided between Funds intended to provide base for new equity (£1.8 mm), convertible international expansion loan stock (£1.2 mm) and £1 mm 
additional long-term investment. 
Liesaueris equity stake - 25% 
977 Arbuthnot Latham Banca Nazionale del Each invited to take equity stakes 
Iavoro; 
Agnelli Family (Fiat); 
Bronfman Family(Seagrams 
Whisky) 
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The trend towards close relationships with large financial groups 
is especially pronounced in the case of members of the Accepting Houses 
Committee. Since 1973, when the Bank of England relaxed its restrictive 
ownership regulations, the majority of houses have undergone far-reaching 
changes in the structure of their control. An indication of the resulting 
pattern of ownership is detailed in Table 8.3. This lists those banks 
which are now part of an independent financial group and those parents 
have received finance from external minority shareholders. The number of 
totally independent gropps has now been reduced to seven. From among 
these, a few can be expected to forge new links over the next few years. 
It seems likely that this process will accelerate if share prices rise 
substantially and families which have extensive interests in the banks, 
become more willing to sell. 
I. 
Table 8.3 : Major shareholders of the Accepting 
uses 
House Quoted Nature of 
Parent 
Independent Group Holding Company Unquoted Company 
Latham Arbuthnot Latham 
Fbldings 
hause Japhet 
Gibbs 
S Mahon 
Bank 
Oharterhouse Group 
Antony Gibbs Holdings 
Hambr+os 
Aiimess Peat 
Brothers 
! bntagu 
i Grenfell 
T& Friedlander 
Warburg 
S. Pearson & Son 
Midland Bank 
Mrgan Grenfell 
Holdings 
C. T. Bowring 
Mercury Securities 
(7St) 
Major External Shareholders 
I. C. F. C. (10.91); Camp 
(Netherlands) (6.61); Phil- 
adelphia International Inv- 
estment Corporation (4.5%); 
Toronto Dominion Bank (3. S%) 
Prudential Assurance (8%) 
Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank (40%) 
P udential Insurance Co. of 
America (11.7%) 
J. P. Morgan (33%); Willis 
Faber (22%) 
Covaknie Financier. de Pails 
(2S% of S. G. Warburg) 
Except where stated, the parent company owns 100% of the accepting house; 
Of the 7 other members of the Accepting Houses Committee. Hill Samuel, Kleinwort Henson and J. Henry Schroder won 
all belong to large financial groups with diverse interests and an independent stock exchange quotation. The same is true of Brown Shipley and Rea Brothers, although these banks are auch smaller and their parent companies less diversified. Baring Brothers and N. M. Rothschild are umquoted private companies. In each of the 7 cases, banking contributes the greatest proportion of total disclosed profits, and family or directors have extensive interests in the ownership of the 
parent. 
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wholesale banking markets 
The development of London as a leading financial centre has been 
based on the multiplicity and specialisation of financial intermediaries. 
However, the structural, technological and environmental changes in the 
financial service industries have pointed recently towards the concentration 
of financial business in a smaller number of larger multi-product financial 
institutions. Acquisitions such as that by Barclays Bank of Mercantile 
Credit and the minority stakes taken by foreign groups in the accepting 
houses tend to confirm this trend. Recent pressures have indeed favoured the 
view that the future of the City lies in the Continental concept of 'universal 
banking' in which a wide range of services is provided by a single large 
institution. There is certainly evidence that, on an international scale, 
the functions of the specialists are increasingly being taken over by the 
big banks which have the large resources needed to support lending activities. 
The events of the past couple of years seem to have accelerated this trend. 
Depositors' caution has meant that funds have been attracted to the larger 
(and therefore 'safe') institutions of the expense of smaller organisations. 
The efforts of the large commercial banks - particularly from 
North America and the Continent - are having a significant impact on the 
intermediary activities traditionally undertaken by specialised merchant 
and investment banks. The indications are, moreover, that foreign 
commercial banks are increasingly determined to extend their presence. 
This has been particularly evident in the case of the U. S. commercial banks, 
several of which have developed international merchant banking subsidiaries 
and have taken shareholdings in consortium banks. 
The merchant banks' market power in the provision of domestic corporate 
financial services has also been eroded recently. Is has long been recognised 
that this power stemmed from an inter-dependent mixture of expertise and 
reputation which in turn relied heavily on the calibre of staff employed and 
the maintenance of an environment conducive to flexibility, initiative 
and entrepreneurial flair. The major entry barrier to merchant banking 
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. from the. point of view of the clearing banks was the latter's own large 
and stratified organisations which, it was argued, would not easily 
accommodate a merchant banking facility. The merchant banks' predominance 
owed a great deal to their innovative behaviour in first encouraging the 
expansion of the euromarkets and the domestic markets for various corporate 
. financial advisory services and then adopting or developing the expertise 
to exploit them. The decline in the level of merger and acquisition 
activity and the virtual disappearance of new issues during 1974-1975 
compounded the difficulties experienced in international eurocurrency 
markets. At the same time, the U. K. clearing banks, in their different 
ways, have been actively developing merchant banking activities. With 
the exception of Lloyds Bank, each of the London clearing banks has 
wholly-owned merchant banking subsidiaries, Barclays and National Westminster 
which developed in-house facilities - Barclays Merchant Bank and County 
Bank respectively - recruiting staff from the independent merchant banks. 
Midland Bank's acquisition of Montagu Trust and the Drayton Corporation, 
in contrast, provided a well-established merchant banking vehicle with which 
to enter the market. There seems little doubt that the clearing banks will 
in time, make extensive use of the close contacts they enjoy with corporate 
customers and will encroach on areas of activity such as corporate finance 
advice which the accepting houses have dominated 
This conclusion has inevitably been disputed-in the City by the 
merchant banks which consider that their role as financial entrepreneurs 
cannot be effectively assumed by the institutionalised organisations of 
the big banks. The qualities of flexibility and adaptability are still 
recognised in the financial sector as essential to its further development 
and continued importance. Thus a strongly entrenched tradition of specialist 
financial organisations serving individual needs persists. The Bank of 
England, in particular, has taken a protective view of the elite merchant 
banks which form the Accepting Houses Committee. The examples shown in 
Table 8.3 indicate that it no longer objects to the ownership of accepting 
houses lying within large financial groups. But the Bank has continued to 
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insi Gt. on the i ndenenclence of merchant banking activities even if accommocht-. °d 
within a big group. Membership of the Committee is a carefully guarded 
privilege and is achieved only with the agreement of the existing members 
and the Bank of England's blessing. In return the members are afforded 
a special status. This is tangible in the sense that bills drawn on 
accepting houses command the finest rates of discount in the open market; 
it is also intangible in that a close relationship exists between the 
Central Bank and the Committee which affords members a special position 
in the banking hierarchy. This is evident from the unusually close 
relationships with the Bank, and, because of their status, a tacit 
understanding that they would not be allowed to fail in any way which would 
damage the interests and confidence of depositors. Thus when depositors 
were primarily concerned with ensuring the safety of their funds, as they 
were from 1974 to 1975, the senior merchant banks largely avoided the 
indiscriminate withdrawal of deposits experienced by other secondary banks. 
The Accepting Houses Committee is a unique feature of the financial 
system and clearly a very important one both in practical terms for its 
members and in illustrative terms for observers. Its significance seems 
likely to preserve for the seventeen merchant banks which it contains a 
future role, albeit a diminished one, in the structure of banking markets. 
In order to retain its influence, however, its members must be seen to 
operate with appropriate prudence for they are cushioned from exhaustive 
analyses of their financial performance by their priviliged ability not to 
reveal true profits by undisclosed allocations to hidden reserves. 
Confidence, the all important element in banking, threatened to desert 
even the accepting houses during the recent crisis. The high premium put 
on the prudent operation of banks preferably with the ability to absorb 
losses if they are made, tested the merchant banks in spite of their status. 
The implication is that banks which threaten to lower the standard of the 
exclusive club and thereby reduce its influence should be expelled. 
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which required £14 million of provisions in 1974-1975, represented just 
such a contravention. The implicit recognition of this fact led Brandts 
to resign its . 
membership though - for appearances - the reason givvn was 
that Grindlays had to strengthen management control on account of the 
property exposure. 
Thus the probability is that certain functions of the merchant 
bank, particularly those not utilising capital, will continue to be 
reflected in the activities of the City's specialists as well as in the 
development of the big commercial banks. This appears to relegate the 
independent merchant banks to the role of specialist consultancies 
exclusively offering advisory services. Recent evidence suggests that this 
is indeed the case for those banks which cling on to their independence. 
The most clearly established trend of the last three years has been the 
gradual absorption of merchant banking functions into larger organisations 
or, alternatively the forging of links by merchant banks with other 
financial groups. 
A total transformation in the character of the U. K. banking system 
towards a greatly increased international involvement of banks of a 
'generalist' nature has been prevented by the recent development of the 
consortium banks. Most of the consortium operations were established chiefly 
to provide a participation in the eurocurrency markets for their shareholders. 
In the past couple of years, however, several of the consortia have managed 
to diversify away from their original role as vehicles for medium-term 
lending, by developing individual styles and specialisations. 
A number of trends that have emerged in the recent development of 
the consortium banks are likely to have a bearing on the future structure 
of financial markets. This is largely because they illustrate a viable 
alternative to the apparently inexorable demise of the specialist intermediary. 
The'increasing importance of the consortium banks is based on the recognition 
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of threr' fractorn: first, that in the massivo recent oxpansion of h,, nkinq 
in general, the growth of international banking has been predominant; 
secondly, that a bank's capacity to participate in the eurocurrency markets 
is greatly enhanced by its own size or by the financial strength of its 
shareholders; and thirdly, that in the expansion of lending activities 
which reduced the ratio of equity/total assets to their lowest prudent level., 
a source of income derived independently of the capital base, was essential 
to improve profitability. 
The prominent consortium banks have apparently recognised 
each of these factors and have developed into a full international investment 
and merchant banking role. Instead of acting as participants in large-scale 
medium-term international lending operations, a number of the consortium 
banks have deliberately set out to increase the proportion of their profits 
which are gained from fee income. This arises from activities in managing 
and arranging the loans and bond issues, and in offering corporate financial 
advice to their corporate and foreign government clients. 
In so doing, the consortia have almost totally displaced the 
traditional U. K. merchant bank in the international market place. One 
consequence has been a tendency for the merchant banks to reduce their 
involvement in consortium operations. They have seen these associates 
developing into direct competitors for precisely the kind of services 
which have traditionally been the preserve of the London merchant banks. 
The consortia have been able to retain small, flexible and innovative 
executive staffs yet have substantial resource backing to support large- 
scale lending and underwriting activities. Such resources, as noted, are 
available to the commercial banking participants in international groups 
on a scale not generally possible for the merchant banks. Thus, Hambros, 
Kleinwort Benson, Brown Shipley and Charterhouse Japhet have all drastically 
reduced or completely relinquished their investments in London based consortia. 
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consortia's business has been coincident, and indeed dependent upon, the 
rapid expansion of the eurobond market. Since the early 1960's this market 
has been the focal point for international issues. As the accompanying 
Figure shows, its growth was subject to a fluctuating pattern until after 
1974. In 1975, and 1976, however, the eurobond market expanded sharply 
with issues in all currencies aggregating $8.6 billion and $4.1 billion 
respectively. Expansion continued into 1977 with 175 issues in the first 
half of the year totalling $8.2 billion. 
Figure 8.1 : Eurobond Issues 1966-1976 
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Company, have consciously planned to develop into leading international 
investment or merchant banks. Orion's achievement in the field of 
eurobond issues during 1976 and the first half of 1977 is evidence of 
its success. During 1976 Orion managed eight public issues of S$325 million, 
and private placements of $310 million. The aggregate of issues and placements 
which were managed or co-managed by Orion totalled 46 raising $1.4 billion. 
This compares with a total of $1.5 billion, over the previous five years. 
The performance in 1976 confirms the bank as among the leading US and 
Continental issuing houses active in the international markets. 
The success of Orion which was nearly matched by that of European 
Banking Company, has been based on the building-up of a placing power 
capability, which stems originally from success in the private placement field. 
It is important to note that the expertise necessary for this is developed 
independently of the financial backing of shareholders. It also reveals 
that placing power (roughly defined as the ability to place at least 
$500,000 of a new issue with investors) has become of greater importance 
than connections which allow banks to bring customers to the market. 
Thus the traditional accepting houses which undoubtedly have extensive and 
entrenched relationships with corporate clients have, with the notable 
exception of S. G. Warburg, been superceded by a new breed of investment/ 
merchant banks which have considerable international marketing expertise. 
Some of these are Continental banks, such as Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse- 
White Weld and Krediethank; others are the well established, US investment 
banks, Kuhn Loeb, Morgan Stanley, and Lehman Brothers for example. 
The others are being developed within the London consortium banks, notably 
Orion and European Banking Company which have the ultimate backing of 
powerful commercial banking groups. S. G. Warburg is the only U. K. merchant 
bank which became and has remained a pre-eminent force in the euromarkets. 
Despite competition from commercial banks and its refusal to contribute 
its own funds to the syndicated credits which it manages, Warburgs is very 
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success is owed to an early devotion to the euromarkets which dates back 
to 1963, when the firm was the lead -manager of probably the first eurobond 
issue. This concentration has helped Warburgs to create confidence that 
their issues are well-placed; ultimately, however, this confidence is 
based on its substantial and expanding placing capability. 
Notwithstanding the breadth of services offered by merchant and 
investment banks, underwriting international bond issues has become a 
particularly important aspect of corporate finance work and has made a 
significant contribution to fee-earning business. Moreover, the connections 
established through a presence in this market add considerable weight to 
the banks' entry into allied international, fee-earning corporate finance 
business. There has been scope for instance, in the market for advice 
in relation to cross-frontier mergers and acquisitions, and capital 
reconstructions. Relationships with Middle Eastern states, developed 
through the eurobond markets, have been of assistance for example, in 
securing a foothold in a market which has been dominated by traditional 
merchant banks. There are several notable examples where a consortium 
bank has acted for a party undertaking an acquisition. In 1975, Orion Bank 
negotiated the sale of Babcock and Wilcox's 25% interest in Deutsche 
Babcock to Iran for E31 million. A similar case involving Middle Eastern 
investment was the sale of the Dorchester Hotel, also arranged by Orion, 
to undisclosed Arab interests. Orion was also appointed by Chase Manhattan 
(a major shareholder) to sell its shareholding in Standard Chartered Bank. 
l 
These examples, whilst interesting in their own right, also clearly 
illustrate a significant change in the nature of the financial system. 
It seems that in the future development of the international financial 
system, there will be a continuing role for the 'specialist' in competition 
with the 'generalist'. These 'specialists', however are a different breed 
from their conventional merchant banking predecessors. The latter were 
small, close-knit organisations depending to a large extent on fee income 
earned from advice given to old-established corporate clients. In the 
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contemporary financial markets, the advantages of flexibi] ity and f; nla. Il 
size have been superceded by the need for a strong capital and deposit base, 
the achievement of which has continually eluded the majority of U. K. 
merchant banks. The new international merchant and investment h, -Inks can 
combine the necessary qualities of flexibility and expertise with the ability 
to overcome the shortcomings of the traditional accepting houses. 
Whilst the emphasis remains on professional, high calibre and often 
entrepreneurial executive staff, their parentage and structure are new 
and reflect the changed nature of international financial markets in 
which lending capacity and placing power, rather than links with industrial 
companies, are of paramount importance. To an extent, the consortium banks 
resemble the continental 'banques d'affaires'. Yet they are unlike them in 
that they are able to complement their managerial talent with a vast 
supply of funds provided by powerful shareholding banks. These will not 
only provide equity capital but can also act as a ready-made syndicate for 
loans or eurobond issues which are lead managed by their subsidiaries. 
8.4 : Regulations 
The principles governing the control of modern multinational 
banking operations do not differ essentially from those that have 
traditionally guided domestic banks. However, the world' financial markets, 
particularly those in London, have become so complex in the past twenty 
years that it is not always easy to judge how these principles should be 
applied. 
Four different reasons for wishing to control bank operations can 
be distinguished. The oldest and most fundamental of these is to protect 
depositors, and at one remove shareholders, against the unscrupulous or 
injudicious use of their funds, which might result in a run on the bank 
and perhaps ultimately its failure. Underlying general banking prudence 
is the fiduciary relationship with the customer, in which he entrusts his 
money to the bank and the bank must both look after it and make good use 
of it. In recent times central banks have reinforced this banking prudence 
with their own arrangements for control, inspection or supervision. 
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In so doing, they have sought not only to protect the depositors in indivi(Iii i1 
banks but also to prevent loss of confidence and disruption spreading 
through the whole system. History has many cautionary tales of spectacular 
runs and failures. Those of 1974 are only the latest example. 
The second reason for bank control is the desire of national 
authorities to influence the volume of credit and money in circulation, 
usually by restraining its increase. 
The third reason is related to encouraging competition and discouraging 
monopoly or controls. The fear is that a strongly established cartel 
will prevent new entry into banking and that the lack of competition will 
lead to the exploitation of customers and misallocation of resources. 
In the U. K. the emphasis of this type of intervention by the authorities 
has increased as banking units have grown larger. The Bank of England's 
Competition and Credit Control regulations of 1971 for example, brought 
together a number of steps to encourage competition. 
One of the forces maintaining competition in modern banking is the 
internationalization which brings large foreign banks into an increasing 
number of financial centres. This is especially apparent in London where 
foreign banks now hold 17% of sterling deposits and 75% of deposits in other 
currencies. Banks tend to be diversified across a number of markets and 
whilst controls may persist in specific markets or market segments, the 
structures of certain other international markets are not oligopolistic. 
In the markets for syndicated medium-term banks loans and international 
bond issues, for example, competition is extremely fierce and tends to 
be between the world's largest and most powerful banks. 
The final reason for external control of banking is the desire on 
the part of governments and other sections of the community to curb the 
power that banks exercise, consciously or unconsciously, over large 
sectors of their economies. This often leads to demands for 
nationalization which have recently been apparent in the U. K. 
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of regulatory control of banks. It will be more useful to outline the 
conventional methods, to discuss the ways in which these have been 
superceded by contemporary banking business and to examine the recent U. K. 
proposals for banking supervision. 
Possibly the most important form-of prudential control is that imposed 
by certain restraints on a bank's balance sheet. There are two types of banking 
ratios to which banks are usually required to pay particular attention. 
The first is its liquidity ratio, most naturally expressed as a relationship 
between liquid assets (or reserve assets) and total deposit liabilities. 
Its purpose is to guard against the effects of a run on the bank or a sudden 
change in the availability of deposits, and to guarantee that the bank is 
able to meet its obligations in the short term. In 1971, the Bank of England 
introduced a reserve ratio of 12ý% for all banks which was intended primarily 
to serve as a means of regulatory control for purposes of monetary policy. 
In practice, the prudential ratio being observed by the clearing banks is 
nearer 20%. 
Two features of the modern banking scene have complicated the 
question of liquidity ratios. One is the very large and widespread 
increase in the marketable debt of public authorities which tends to 
provide the banking. system with more assets of that description than 
they would ideally wish to hold. Where this debt is longer than two years, 
such assets, even though they may be readily realisable in a continuously 
active market, can carry a considerable risk of capital loss. In these 
circumstances their value as readily realisable liquid assets has a 
distinct nualification. 
- 308 - 
'J'hc other_ ctuvi, 'J-iication . 
is the rap. icf (levelojnneºit (. )I the infej7-b, '. I)k 
market where most funds have a longer nominal maturity than the retail 
deposits acquired by the commercial banks, which can in theory be withdrawn 
at sight or at very short notice. However., these retail deposits have 
proved to be remarkably stable overall, whilst inter-bank funds have 
to be rolled over at fluctuating rates of interest and are very sensitive 
to short-term flows and official monetary measures. Banks which become 
heavily dependent upon the inter-bank markets for their funds need to be - 
especially careful of the reliability of the repayment on maturity of 
their matched assets or to carry a higher ratio of truly liquid assets. 
The second banking ratio is that which emphasises a bank's capital 
adequacy and highlights the management of the assets side of the balance 
sheet. Several problems of definition hinder the universal application 
of these ratios. The most important of these concerns whether or not 
capital should include loan stock as well as equity. The former has 
recently become a favoured way for U. K. banks to increase their capital 
resources and in several instances. funded debt has taken the form of 
floating rate notes (F. R. N. s) which have been issued on the international 
canital market. 
Just as some central banks have develoned sophisticated linuidity 
ratios. the Federal Reserve Board in the United States has established 
differing capital ratios for various tvves of assets ranaina from nil 
for cash through 10% for loans to 100% for losses. But these, and any 
other, formulae are no substitute for a qualitative analysis of risk 
on major loans accompanied by realistic loan provisions. Over-commitment 
to a single borrower or category of borrowers represents a very real 
threat and the best way to bear risk is to spread it. In the U. K. 
secondary banking sector, this lesson was unfortunately learned at 
considerable cost. 
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Roth liquidity ratios and capital ratios involve relati_nc1 solected 
items on one side of the balance sheet with a larger aggregate on the 
other side. Another approach is to make a detailed comparison of a 
bank's liabilities with the whole of its assets. This process, known 
as matching, can take three forms, maturity matching, interest rate matching 
and currency matching. Matching has been of particular importance in 
wholesale money markets, in the eurocurrency markets and in the foreign 
exchange markets. 
To summarise, mismatching may be seen as part of the transformation 
by which the banking system collects short-term deposits and eventually 
makes loans of several years' maturity. From the individual bank's 
point of view, each bank must see that it is not left with too larqe a 
share of the transformation process, and the other prudential criteria 
must be needed where matching is, as it often must be, departed from to 
some carefully controlled extent. 
Besides such trends as increasing government intervention and the 
increase in inflation, the most important comolicatinq development is 
the trend towards increasing internationalization. In addition to the 
obvious problems of expanded structure and lengthened hhains of command, 
internationalization has affected bank control and supervision in a 
number of ways. Thus it is necessary to consider what kind of supervision 
is appropriate for international banking. What kind of authorities can 
control contemporary markets in which loans are of much greater size 
and longer maturity and are composed of many currencies. Uncertainty as 
to whether foreign bank offshoots were subject to control by the authorities 
of the parent country or by those of the host country was highlighted by 
the failure of the Israel British Bank in London in 1974. As a result, 
the Bank of England obtained the so-called 'letters of comfort' from 
parents of foreign bank offshoots in the City, including joint parents 
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Thus tI main central banks publicly accepted the obligation to act 
as Lenders of last resort to the forciqn networks of parent banks under 
their jurisdiction. There has also been a measure of agreement between 
central banks on sharing the task of supervision in such a way that the 
central. bank in the parent country takes a general view of the parent bank, 
including its foreign branches and subsidiaries, while leaving day-to- 
day supervision and regulation to the central banks of host countries. 
The growth and operation of U. K. banks, including London-based 
subsidiaries of foreign-owned banks, has consequently been greatly affected 
by the attitude of the Bank of England. Almost alone among central banks 
however, the Bank of England has sought to regulate banks under its 
supervision as little as possible. Some of the consequences of its 
insistence on controlling by suasion rather than by statute have been 
examined in previous chapters. The implications of the recent developments 
in banking markets can be examined in the context of the Bank's future 
control not only of banks' operations, but also of the entire U. K. financial 
system. It is clear that any supervision will be operating against a wider 
background than simply the problems of the British fringe banks which 
provided the main impetus for tightening control over the system. The 
problems faced are international in character and the approach to supervision 
cannot be parochial. This is obviously recognised by the Bank: frequent 
discussion and liaison take place between the U. K. central bank and its 
opposite numbers in the E. E. C., and in the wider forum of the monthly 
central bankers' meeting in Basle. The world-wide character of the 
problems involved, highlighted by the difficulties in the international 
banking markets which ran parallel with the U. K. 's own crisis in 1974 and 1975, 
has been acknowledged in the establishment of a permanent international 
committee to keep a continuing watch on developments. 
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in the development of closer harmonisation of banking supervisory practice 
within the community. The proposed legislation on the licensing and 
supervision of deposit-taking institutions, set out in the 1976 white paper, 
2 
will enable the U. K. to meet this obligation, and will represent a major 
innovation in practice. Yet the proposals retain a peculiarly British 
character. In common with the flexible and informal approach towards the 
supervision of the securities markets, the preference of the Bank is quite 
clearly against creating an excessively formal structure of supervision 
and against the establishment of rigid criteria for judging the solvency 
of banks. Its approach retains much of its traditional scope for exercising 
judgement on an individual bank-by-bank basis. Thus the prudential criteria 
which are laid down should be described as yardsticks or guidelines rather 
than categorical imperatives. 
The British proposals draw on the practice of a number of other 
countries. U. S. experience, for example has provided the model for certain 
aspects of the considerably tighter supervision which is already being 
exercised by the Bank of England. The Bank, as a result of its efforts in 
the past few years, is now receiving much more detailed and more frequent 
information from the banks and deposit-taking institutions within its 
jurisdiction and has greatly expanded the range of relationships which it 
examines. They include various aspects of a bank's profit and loss 
account and a considerable number of ratios relating to capital, deposits, 
loans, liquid assets, undrawn commitments and standby facilities. The Bank 
has also been developing analysis which follows a system used in New York 
assessing, on a points basis, the deviation of the various ratios from a model. 
The U. S. system provides the example for the deposit protection fund, 
which is planned to be part of the new legislation, with the established 
operation there of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (F. D. I. C. )ý. 
The main requirement of the European Community though, is to establish a 
form of prior authorisation of deposit-taking institutions. It is 
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from traditional British practice. The new system will establish for the 
first time a clear definition of a 'bank'; it will be sharply differentiated 
from other 'deposit-taking institutions' and will enjoy several privileges. 
In particular, only institutions classified as banks will be exempt from 
licensing and will be permitted to use the world 'bank' and its derivatives 
in their titles and advertising. 
Until now the control exercised by the Bank has grown by natural 
evolution rather than by statute. Indeed as the White Paper makes clear, 
the Bank had no statutory authority to ensure, that any institution observed 
prudent practices in its banking business; it exercised its supervision only 
with the consent of the supervised. Although the Bank's authority over 
the banking system has not been in question, the fringe bank crisis associated 
with the collapse of property prices and the weaknesses of the parallel 
money markets - both domestic and international - revealed several gaps 
in the system. The problems lay partly in the ease of entry into banking 
markets and partly in the diffusion of supervisory activities among a number 
of authorities of which the Bank was only one. A shortage of manpower, 
a dearth of statistics and structural deficiencies in the Bank's supervisory 
department similarly contributed to the failure to identify the hazards at 
an early stage. 
The new system will give the Bank of England responsibility over 
the wole sector and thus parallels the suggestions made in the previous 
chapter regarding the supervision of behaviour in the merger market. 
The main features, the two-tier system of recognitions and the planned 
deposit protection fund, have also caused the greatest argument. 
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The criteria for selecting the 'banks' will take into account 
factors such as the level of capital, the range of business and the 
reputation and status of the company concerned. It appears that this 
category will, in the event, be virtually synonymous with the list of banks 
which already quite clearly have banking status. 
3 
These are the banks which 
have traditionally had a close relationship with the Bank of England and it 
seems that the character of the supervision to which they are subjected will 
change very little. For the other institutions, however, the position 
will be different. Whilst the same flexible and discretionary system of 
supervision will apply to the 'non-banks', the implication of the division 
is that these other deposit-takers will be classed as second class 
institutions thus reducing the possibility of progression to higher degrees 
of banking status, which has been one of the characteristics of the past 
systems particularly favoured by the Bank. The proposed mode of recognition 
also appears to discriminate against new entrants and the minimum capital 
requirements which are yet to be defined and established may represent 
an effective barrier to entry to new institutions which have obviously 
not had the time to build up reserves from retained earnings. On these 
grounds a gradual approach to licensing, recognising new entrants as 
special cases, could be advocated. 
The deposit protection fund has been the main topic of controversy 
among the banks, and particularly the clearing banks. It is inevitable 
that these will provide the greatest part of any funds involved. Their 
complaints that they would be contributing funds to a rescue fund which they 
themselves would not need seem, with some qualification, to be justified. 
Certainly such a requirement might be considered to be merely formalizing 
their existing contribution to the 'lifeboat' support operations which the 
Bank of England and the clearing banks are determined to wind down. 
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prudent which were necessarily levied to support the excesses of the fringe 
banks on ai t-term basis, would be paying for the follies and proven 
dishonesty of some of these institutions permanently. However, such a 
view fails to take into account the inter-dependence of the banking system. 
As the lifeboat operation illustrated, a crisis of confidence affecting even 
a single bank can quickly encompass many others irrespective of their own 
policies and management. As Revell correctly asserts, the justification 
of deposit insurance is: 
it ... that it serves to prevent the event that 
it is insured 
against: if all deposits are insured, there is no incentive 
for anybody to start a 'run on the bank' at the first sign 
of trouble, and the troubles of one bank need not spread 
around the whole banking system and cause a general loss of 
confidence. " 4 
The size of each bank's contribution remains to be decided, although a 
flat premium for all deposits is envisaged, in line with the practice of 
the F. D. I. C. This suffers from the shortcoming that it takes some time for 
the fund to reach a suitable level although this could be overcome by lump 
sum payments. Such an approach is less palatable to the banks, however, 
because it would have an immediate impact on their profitability. 
There are a number of other important issues which will have to 
be resolved before the legislation is finalised. They include the critical 
level of the minimum capital requirement for deposit-taking institutions 
and the definitions of capital to be used; and the exact powers which will 
be given to the Bank to exercise sanctions over the institutions under its 
purview. Inevitably, the new system will impose a greater degree of 
formality into the U. K. banking supervision arrangements. But the Bank's 
aim remains to operate as informally as possible within the system. With 
the recognised banks at least, it seems certain to try to retain the 
personal nature of its interest, placing importance on knowledge of who 
is running the bank as well as on a flow of information about how it is 
being run. To a considerable extent, therefore, the U. K. will retain the 
special character of its self-regulatory supervisory arrangements which 
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It remains to assess the role of the Bank of England as ovorsver in 
the context of the wider subject of informal and flexible self-regulation 
of the City's activities. Flexibility remains the keynote of the envisaged 
supervision. An immediate reaction is that this accords closely with the 
evolution of the banking system; informality has characterised many aspects 
of the development of banks' operations. This is well illustrated by 
the position in respect of mergers and acquisitions by banks. In the past, 
the Bank's unwritten policy has often been detected only when a change in 
philosophy is announced; this was particularly the case regarding the control 
of ownership of the accepting houses which was relaxed in 1973. There is 
no indication that this method of regulation will change and it appears 
that the Bank will make its assessment on the merits of a particular 
amalgamation on a similar basis to that employed in conducting its general 
supervisory functions. That is on a mixture of financial information and 
its view of a bank's management. It will continue to make informal suggestions - 
"nods and winks" - which banks will continue to implement. 
The link between the Bank's control over the operation of the banking 
system and that exercised over the behaviour of those institutions (including 
banks) which are involved in the securities markets lies most clearly in 
the similar philosophy which underpins both their operations. The Bank's 
role, however, is often confused, principally because it is ill-explained 
and poorly understood. The Bank is of course in an invidious position 
For on the one hand it must regulate the institutions in the private sector; 
whilst on the other, it must act as their spokesman. Its 
knowledge and experience of City markets puts it in a position to understand 
and advise on the consequences of official action as they affect the 
operations of the City and international confidence. There must remain 
doubts, however, as to whether the Bank could act as the authority under 
which the supervision of all aspects of the City's activities is assembled. 
For not only is the status of the Bank one of continuing mystery to the 
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debate in the financial and political arenas. A clearer definition ei' 
the role of the Bank may have to await the Report: of the Wilson Committee's 
inquiry and perhaps, any further debate as to how Parliament and Government 
should manage the money supply in future. 
It must also be true that the question of credibility will not be 
effectively resolved until the second strand in the debate, namely that 
on the role and organization of the securities market (including the 
activities of the Takeover Panel) is carried nearer a conclusion. This 
seems certain to have an important bearing on Wilson's recommendations 
regarding 'the changes required in existing arrangements for the supervision 
of financial institutions'. 
Several questions remain at issue. One concerns the part that the 
securities market has to play in the economy and the extent to which it is 
considered desirable for the state to direct the community's savings. 
The resolution of this will in turn be affected by the change in the 
composition of share ownership. Imperfections in the structure of the 
securities market are highlighted by the steady but gradual shift in share 
ownership towards institutional investors. This concentration has been 
the result of inflationary pressures which have forced individuals to 
liquidate capitaland a change in attitudes towards profit, risk, and leisure 
which has led individuals to invest through professionally-managed funds. 
This is only one aspect of the discussion however. 
This decade has seen the establishment of London as a major international 
financial centre. It has also seen however, the rise and fall of the 
entire domestic secondary banking sector. The collapse required a major 
rescue operation, co-ordinated by the Bank of England. The Bank still finds 
itself caught in the uneasy balance between being a conventional central 
bank and the traditional spokesman of the private financial sector. 
- 317 - 
There h. i: he; n iiLt. le serious discussion about tho w. ry . 
iii w1iI h tIn iwww 
operation should change the way in which the affairs of the City are 
conducted. More is a growing body questioning the traditional, self- 
administered, non-statutory basis on which the City has always been govorned. 
It is to questions such as these that future research should be addressed. 
NOTES 
L This information was derived from discussion with executives of 
Orion Bank Limited 
2 "The Licensing and Supervision of Deposit Taking Institutions", 
Cmnd. 6584, H. M. S. O., August 1976 
3. Those already holding authorised status under the Exchange Control 
Act, those with exemption from certain requirements of the Protection 
of Depositors' Act and those which have permission under Schedule 8 
to maintain hidden reserves. 
4 Jack Revell, "Reforming U. K. bank supervision", The Banker, 
September, 1976, p. 1023. 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
Acquisitions by Banks 1966 - 1973 
Acquiring Bank Acquired Company Consideration 
mm 
1966 Bank of Ireland & National 
Commercial Bank of Scotland National Bank 16.950 
Lloyds Bank National Bank of 
New Zealand 8.900 
1967 Bank of London and South 
America Linway Trust 1.288 
Lloyds Bank Lewis's Bank 1.500 
1968 National & Commercial 
Banking Group Royal Bank of Scotland/ 
National Commercial 
Bank of Scotland 48.720 
Hill Samuel Lambert Brothers 10.500 
Keyser Ullmann Hocroft Trust 2.142 
National Westminster Bank National Provincial Bank/ 
Westminster Bank 177.499 
Barclays Bank Martins Bank 105.300 
1969 Hill Samuel Noble Lowndes Annuities 13.000 
Australia & New Zealand Australia & New Zealand 
Banking Group Bank/English Scottish & 
Australian Bank 22.649 
Bank of Scotland British Linen Bank 19.415 
Kleinwort Benson European Market Investment 
Trust . 3.730 
Hambros Bank Hereditaments 6.669 
Arbuthnot Latham Cullodon Investment Trust 1.650 
Kleinwort Benson Gow, Wilson & Stanton 1.200" 
Schroder Wagg Whittaker Ellis 1.266 
1970 Standard & Chartered Banking Chartered Bank/Standard 
Group Bank 36.708 
National Westminster Bank Lombard Banking 42.000 
Bank of London & South 
America Bank of London & Montreal 6.750 
Hambros Bank British Empire Investment 
Trust 8.715 
Samuel Montagu Stronghold Insurance 1.444 
Keyser Ullmann R. S. Coll 1.000 
1971 Bank of London & South America Lloyds Bank Europe 36.237 
1972 Mercantile Credit Camden Group 1.398 
. Hill Samuel 
L. Hammond 7.187 
Keyser Ullmann Central & District Properties62.766 
Guinness Mahon Sceptre Investment Trust 3.509 
Wallace Bros. 
- 
E. D. Sassoon 2.407 
Midland Bank Thos. Cook & Son 17.618 
Keyser Ullmann Dalton Barton Securities 27.257 
National & Grindlays Gillespie Bros. 2.000 
Wm. Brandts Spey Investments 2.300 
1973 Edward Bates Welfare Insurance 5.534 
Standard & Chartered Banking Mocatta & Goldsmid 2.300 
Arbuttnot Latham A. J. Collins & Sons 1.250 
Arbuttnot Latham East & West Investment Trust 1.327 
Midland Bank Montagu Trust 93.384 
Bankers Trust International Skipton Automation 4.700 
-2- 
1972 
Standard & Chartered 
Banking Group 
Schroder Wagg 
Brown Shipley 
Keyser Ullmann 
Hodge Group 37.980 
Dominion Lincoln Assurance 2.350 
R. H. Manson 2.510 
International Life Insurance 1.800 
APPENDIX 2 
Acquisitions by Insurance Companies 1966 - 1973 
Acquiring 
Insurance Company 
1966 Robert Bradford 
Allied Insurance Brokers 
Staplegreen Insurance Holdings 
Staplegreen Insurance Holdings 
Fenchurch Insurance Holdings 
Eagle Star 
Alexander Howden Underwriting 
Alexander Howden Underwriting 
1967 Robert Bradford 
Minster Insurance 
Amore Holdings 
Provident Life 
Fenchurch Insurance Holdings 
General Accident 
London & Edinburgh 
1968 Sun Alliance 
Commercial Union 
Prudential 
Acquired 
Company 
Fred Fishwick 
M. Ranson Witt 
Gardner Mountain 
Hogg Robinson - Caple Cure 
B. Wigmore 
i-bme & Overseas Insurance 
L. C. J. Davies 
F. A. North 
Consideration) 
Arthur Edwards 
Fenchurch Insurance Holdings 
General Surety & Guarantee Co. 
Vehicle & General 
Vehicle & General 
Insurance & Securities 
General Accident 
Guardian Royal Exchange 
1969 C. T. Bowrinq 
Sedgwick Collins 
Indemnity Guarantee Assurance 
1970 Provident Life 
Stenhouse Holdings 
Leslie & Godwin 
Sedgwick Collins 
Fenchurch, Insurance Holdings 
Excess Holdings 
1971 C. T. Bowring 
Commercial Union 
Guardian Royal Exchange 
Wesleyan General 
1972 Sun Alliance 
C. T. Bowring 
Alexander Howden 
C. T. Bowring 
Brentnall Beard 
Commercial Union 
Commercial Union 
Alexander Howden 
Minet Holdings 
Matthew Wrightson 
C. T. Bowring 
Im 
0.068 
0.015 
0.431 
0.210 
0.028 
0.256 
0.025 
0.060 
National Motor & Accident 0.578 
National Motor & Accident Ins. 1.920 
lander Trust 
United Standard Insurance 
J. D. Martin & Co. 
Yorkshire Insurance 
Stewart Smith & Co. 
Plant Assurance 
Northern & Employers 
Mercantile & General Rein- 
1.943 
0.105 
0.008 
36.050 
11.495 
1.175 
28.687 
surance 0.380 
Motor Insurance Centre 0.050 
Burton Rome & Viner 0.602 
Liverpool & Manchester Invest- 
ment Trust 0.034 
World Auxiliary 2.061 
Pioneer Life 2.208 
Manhattan Fire & Marine 5.000 
Yorkshire Insurance 0.136 
Guardian/Royal Exchange 63.892 
Bowater 44.919 
Jones Davis 0.042 
Vaibre Holdings 0.350 
Vigilant Assurance 0.438 
John Wallace 6.425 
Robert Bradford 2.500 
Copeley-Williams Walpole 0.165 
Crane Insurance Broking 0.065 
Excess Insurance 11.125 
Singer & Friedlander 27.658 
Holloway Sackville Properties 20.415 
Metropolitan Railway Estates 5.298 
Salvation Army Assurance 30.000 
Household & General 1.240 
Mattinson Williams & Partners 0.041 
Viking Phoenix 1 0.410 
L. W. Hughes & Partners 0.473 
J. H. Weller 0.410 
West Bar (Leeds) Estate Co. 0.325 
Scientific & Electronics 
Industries Trust 3.659 
Drake Insurance 3.551 
PCW Underwriting Agencies 2.000 
Mercury Insurance 5.544 
Keith Shipton 4.869 
-L - 
Sedgwick Forbes Sedgwick Collins/Price 
Forbes 36.858 
1973 Commercial Union Weatherall Property 2.211 
Guardian Royal Exchange Tanway Properties 7.345 
Frizzel Group Shawlands Securities 0.710 
Gramgas Lary, Hancox & Carter 0.425 
Legal and General Victory Insurance 3.163 
Prudential Assurance Beaver Trust 3.792 
Prudential Assurance Edgar Investments 24.559 
Minet Holdings Anderson, Finch, Villiers 0.396 
Brentnall Beard I. Macgregor 0.080 
Minet'Holdings B. W. Nobes 0.524 
Christopher Moran Harman, Hedley Agencies 0.200 
C. T. Bowring Investment Intelligence 0.139 
Herrington Austin Lary, Hancox & Carter 0.325 
Leslie & Godwin World Marine & General 0.440 
Leslie & Godwin G&J. Miller 0.235 
Leslie & Godwin Fred Cullen 04073 
Halford Shead W. E. Found 0.171 
Royal Insurance Sterling Estates 13.137 
Legal and General Cavendish Land 45.112 
Guardian Royal Exchange Metropolitan Trust 40.978 
Stenhouse Holdings Dominion Buildings 11.400 
APPENDIX 3 
Links of U. K. Banks with insurance undertakings 1973/1974 
Bank Insurance Participations uit Interest 
Arbuthnot Latham Arbuthnot Insurance Services 67% 
A. J. Collins & Co. 100% 
Barclays Bank Barclays Life Assurance 100% 
Edward Bates Edward Bates Insurance Brokers 100% 
Grindlay Brandts Brandts Insurance Holdings 100% 
A. L. Sturge 331/3% 
Brown Shipley Crawford, Beck & Amos 100% 
Charterhouse Group Glanvill Enthoven & Co. 65% 
Sun Life Charterhouse Unit Assurance 100% 
Charterhouse Japhet Life Assurance 100% 
Fraser Ansbacher C. E. Heath & Co. 20% 
Anthony Gibbs Holdings Antony Gibbs & Sons (Ins) 100% 
Antony Gibbs Insurance Co. 100% 
Guiness Peat Group Fenchurch Insurance 100% 
Hambros Berkeley (Ins. ) 100% 
Hambros Life Assurance 55% 
Unitholders Provident Assurance 55% 
Hill Samuel Hill Samuel Insurance & Shipping Holdings 100% 
Hill Samuel Life Assurance 100% 
Lowndes Lambert Group 100% 
Keyser Ullmann Cannon Assurance 57% 
Kleinwort Benson Kleinwort Sons & Co. 100% 
Lloyds Bank 
International F. E. Wright & Co. 94% 
Midland Bank Bland Payne Holdings 100% 
National Westminster 
Bank Commercial Union Assurance S. 4% 
Commercial Union Assurance (Unit Trusts) 20% 
Welfare Insurance Co. 49% 
Rea Bros. Rea Bros. (Ins) 100% 
Rea Bros. (Life Loans and Pensions) 100% 
Rea. Bros (Underwriting Agencies) 100% 
Schroders Schroder Life Group 100% 
Singer & Friedlander C. T. Bowring N. A. 
Standard & Chartered Hodge Life Assurance 100% 
Banking Group Hodge General & Mercantile 100% 
Standard & Chartered Insurance Brokers 50% 
S. G. Warburg Matthews Wrighton Holdings 27.1% 
APPENDIX 4 
Banks or Bank-Connected Companies Authorised to carry on one or more 
classes of insurance business in Great Britain. End - 1973 
* Antony Gibbs Insurance 
* Barclays Life Assurance Charterhouse Japhet Life Insurance 
* Citibank Assurance 
Hambro Life Assurance 
Hill Samuel Life Assurance 
Hodge General & Mercantile Insurance 
Hodge Life Assurance 
* Pearl Montagu Assurance 
Schröder Assurance 
Schroder Equity Assurance 
Schroder Life Assurance 
Schroder Pensions 
Slater, Walker Insurance 
Sun Life Charterhouse Unit Assurance 
TSB Unit Trust Managers 
*Added to list since end-1970. 
Notes: (1) All authorised to carry out ordinary long-term insurance 
except Hodge General & Mercantile Insurance; this company, together with 
Slater, Walker Insurance, authorised to carry on a wide range of other 
business. 
(2) The total number of authorised insurers at end-1973 was 785, thF 
number authorised to write ordinary long-term insurance was 262. 
Source: Department of Trade., Insurance Business, Annual Report, 1973. 
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APPENDIX 6 
Insurance companies' interest in investment trusts 
Insurance company Investment Trust % held 
Commercial Union Montagu Boston 11.9 
Eagle Star Philip Hill 19.2 
Drayton CoiTmercial 11.0 
Equity and Law Winterbottom 17.5 
Guardian Royal Exchange London Trust 14.7 
Legal and General Westpool 11.9 
Pearl Assurance Electric and General 12.1 
City and International 13.4 
London and Holyrood 14.5 
Charter 15.0 
Roney 11.3 
Trans-Oceanic 30.2 
Prudential Assurance English and Caledonian 10.1 
London and Lomond 12.5 
Bishopsgate 18.3 
. City and International 11.9 Throgmorton 16.5 
Great Northern 12.4 
Rormley 9.3 
Broadstone 24.6 
Westpool 31.9 
CLRP 13.3 
Royal Insurance CLRP 10.0 
Sun Alliance London and Holyrood 10.4 
Standard Life English and Caledonian 13.9 
London and Lomond 10.1 
London and Holyrood 10.2 
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APPENDIX 8 
Clearing Banks' International Representation : Direct Links 
National Westminster 
Through: 
International Westminster Bank (100%) 
Main branch - London 
Belgium -3 
France -6 
Germany -1 
Nassau -1 
International wholesale banking 
RoyWest Banking Corporation (40%) 
Nassau 
Banking and trustee services 
Van Lanschot's Beleggings-Compagnie BV (25%) 
Netherlands Owns F van Lanschot the 7th 
largest commercial bank in Holland 
(1973) 
Union Financiere Bancaire SA (20%) 
France Holding company controlling Credit 
du Nord et Union Parisienne, 
Paribas Group and Banque Worms (1973) 
Credit du Nord et Union Parisienne (5%) 
France Commercial banking (1973) J 
Creditwest SpA (31%) 
Italy 
Handelsbank in Zurich (55%) 
Switzerland 
Re-styled Banco Milanese di Credito 
conmºercial banking; 5 branches in Milan 
(1972 from Credito Italiano) 
Privately-owned; commercial 
banking and investment banking (1975 
from Nestle Alimentana SA). 
LLOYDS 
Through: 
Lloyds Bank International (100%) I 
Europe - 43 offices 
Latin America - 124 
Bahamas -1 
US -2 
Asia -2 
International banking 
Lloyds First Western Corporation (99.9%) 
Also finance companies in Cyprus, Malta, Jamaica, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Trinidad & Tobago, Leeward & Windward Islands, Cayman Islands, 
Miscellaneous: Barclays National Merchant Bank; Barclays Insurance 
Brokers South Africa; Barclays Overseas Development Corp. Banco Popular 
California (US) - 94 
National Bank of New Zealand (100%) 
New Zealand - 203 
National and Grindlays Holdings (41%) 
N&G Holdings own 51% of National 
and Grindlays Bank 
BARCLAYS 
Acquired First Western Bank & Trust 
Co. (1974) which was re-named Lloyds 
Bank California. 
Retail Banking (1966) 
British Overseas Bank 
At 30th September 1974 the offices of Barclays International and its 
subsidiaries numbered some 1700 in nearly 70 countries, thus: - 
Barclays National Bank (84.89%) and Barclays Bank of Swaziland (60%) 
Southern Africa - 880+ branches Swaziland - 16 
Barclays Bank of Nigeria, Barclays Bank of Ghana, Barclays Bank of Sierra Leone 
(51.67%) X160 Sam' 
West Africa - 90 - 54 - 14 
Barclays Bank of Uganda, Barclays Bank of Zambia, Barclays Bank SZARL 
(51%) 1 0%) (100%) 
Central and East Africa 
-5 -43 -2 
1 
Barclays Bank of Jamaica (100%) and Barclay s Bank of Trinidad & Tobago 
Caribbean - 50+ - 33 (73.33%) 
Barclays Bank of California (100%) and Barclays Bank of New York (99.8) 
USA-40 -25 
Barclays Discotort Bank (100%) 
Israel - SO 
Barclays Bank SA 
France -22 
Notes: In addition comercial banking: Banca Barclays Castellini SpA 
(Italy); Barclays Kot & Co. NV (Holland) also stockbroking; Societe 
Bancaire Barclays (Suisse); Intercredit SA (Belgium); 
t 
3- 
Antiliaiio W. Barclays Canada; Tozer Kemsley & Milbourn Holdings. 
APPENDIX 9 
Merchant Banks' International Representation : 
Direct Links 
Arbuthnot Latham 
Through its shareholders, Philadelphia National Bank, Chartered 
Bank and Toronto Dominion Bank. 
Also Directly 
Luxembourg : Concord International S. A. (25%) 
Singapore : Chartered Merchant Bankers (45%) 
: Chartered Unit Trust Management (28%) 
Malaysia : Chartered Merchant Bankers Malaysia Berhad (18%) 
Thailand : Multicredit Corporation of Thailand (10%) 
Hong Kong : Arbuthnot Securities (Hong Kong) Ltd. (100%) 
Australia : Arbuthnot Latham Australia Property Ltd. (100%) 
Kenya : East African Acceptances (22%) 
Middle East : Oryx Investments (21%) 
Baring Brothers 
France : Baring Bros S. A. (100%) 
Switzerland : LOBARCO S. A. (50%) 
Canada : Dominion Securities Corp. Harris & Partners (10%) 
Argentine : Industrias Reconquista S. A. (n/a) 
Brazil : Banco Finesa de Investimento S. A. (n/a) 
Australia : Outwich (Australia) Property Ltd. (100%) 
South Africa : Outwich Ltd. (50%) 
Lebanon : Outwich S. A. (50%) 
Charterhouse Japhet 
.0 
Through branch office and subsidiaries and associated companies of 
Charterhouse Group : Paris; Geneva; Dusseldorf; Johannesburg; Sydney; 
Toronto; New York; Houston. 
Guinness Mahon 
Overseas subsidiaries and affiliates : 
Switzerland : Guinness Mahon (Zurich) A. G. 
Singapore : Lewis & Peat, Merchant Bank 
Bermuda : Lewis & Peat (Bermuda) Ltd. 
Cayman Islands : Guinness-Mahon Cayman Trust 
Ireland : Guinness & Mahon 
EEC : Finacor S. A. (50%) 
11 
Hambros -2- 
Overseas subsidiaries and affiliates : 
Bahamas : Bahamas International Trust Co. (14%) 
Bermuda : International Trust Co. of Bermuda (10%) 
Brazil : Cia Metropolitans de Credito 
Financiamento e Investimentos (20%) 
Canada : Hambro Canada (1972) Ltd. (48%) 
Cayman Islands : Cayman International Trust Co. (14%) 
Cyprus : Hambro (Cyprus) (52%) 
Dubai : Dubai Bank (10%) 
Hongkong : Pembros (30%) 
: Hambro Pacific (90%) 
Lebanon : Investment and Financial Bank S. A. L. (8%) 
Malta : Investment Bank of Malta (40%) 
Netherlands : Ship Mortgage International N. V. (25%) 
: Hambro Occidental (97%) 
Norway : Bohn & Co. (20%) 
Sierra Leone : Bentworth Finance (30%) 
Switzerland : Bank Ruegg (30%) 
: Hambros Investment Co. A. G. (100%) 
Hill Samuel 
Germany : Hill Samuel & Co. O. H. G. 
Spain : Banco de Financiacion Industrial 
Switzerland : Bank von Ernst '& Cie. 
U. S. A. : Hill Samuel Inc. 
Brazil : Banco Uniao de Investimento S. A. 
Bahamas : Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co. 
South Africa : Hill Samuel Group S. A. (77%) 
Rhodesia : Merchant Bank of Central Africa 
Nigeria : Nigerian Acceptances 
Australia : Hill Samuel Australia (83%) 
Kleinwort Benson 
Overseas subsidiaries and affiliates : 
Belgium : Kleinwort Benson (Europe) 
Austria : Centrofin (14%) 
Switzerland : Kleinwort Benson (Geneva) (92%) 
U. S. A. : Kleinwort Benson Inc. 
Sharps, Pixley Inc. 
'Cayman Islands : Arawak Trust Co. (20%) 
South Africa : J. L. Clark & Co. (33%) 
Hongkong : Kleinwort Benson 
Asia-& Euro-American Capital Corp (11%) 
Singapore : Asian & Euro-American Merchant Bank (11%) 
Lazard Bros 
Relationship (no shareholding links) 
Lazard Freres & Co. (New York); Mediobanca 
& Development Bank (Iran) 
i 
with Lazard Freres & Cie (Paris); 
. (Italy); Iran Industrial Mining 
-3- 
Morgan Grenfell 
Associated with : 
1 
U. S. A. : Morgan Guaranty 
France : Campagnie Financiere de Suez 
Canada : Dominion Securities Corp. Harris & Partners (10%) 
Ireland : Investment Bank of Ireland 
Netherlands : Bank Mees en Hope 
Hongkong : Indo-Suez & Morgan Grenfell (Singapore) 
U. K. : Arab & Morgan Grenfell Finance Co. 
MWP Incentives 
Tokai Kyowa Morgan Grenfell 
Rea Bros 
Netherlands : Amsterdamse Crediet-en Handelsbank N. V. 
N. M. Rothschild 
Cayman Islands : J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp. 
France : Banque Rothschild 
Luxembourg : Bank Oppenheim Pierson International S. A. 
Switzerland : Rothschild Bank A. G. 
U. S. A. : New York Securities Corp. 
Hongkong : N. M. Rothschild & Sons (HK) 
Malaysia : Buuniputra Merchant Bankers Berhad 
Rhodesia : Merchant Bank of Central Africa 
Samuel Montagu 
Switzerland : Guyerzeller Zurmont Bank A. G. 
Ireland : Northern Bank Finance Corp. 
Schroder Wagg 
France : Societee Privee de Gestion Financiere S. A. (14%) 
Switzerland : J. Henry Schroder Bank A. G. (100%) 
Spain : Corporacion Espanola de Financiacion Internacional 
S. A. (25%) 
U. S. A. : Schroders Inc. (100%) 
J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp (100%) 
Schroder Trust (99.6%) 
Schroder Noess & Thomas Division (100%) 
Schroder Capital Corp. (100%) 
Schroder Real Estate 
Canada : J. Henry Schroder & Co. (1001) 
Bermuda : Schroders (Bermuda) (100%) 
Merchants Finance (100%) 
: Property Holdings International . 
(50%) 
Schroder International Trust (40%) 
Australia : Darling & Co. (50%) 
Brazil : J. Henry Schroder do Brasil (Consultores) S/C (50%) 
Schroder Monteiro Aronha Distribuidora de Titulos 
e Valores Mobiliarios S. A. (25%) 
Bahamas : J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp. 
-4- 
Singer & Friedlander 
Malta : Singer & Friedlander (Malta) 
Switzerland : Singer & Friedlander A. G. 
Iran : Interfinance & Investment Corp (49%) 
S. G. Warburg 
France : Paribas * 
Germany : Effectenbank-Warburg A. G. (29%) 
: M. M. Warburg-Brinckmann Wirtz 
Switzerland : Banque de Gestion Financiere (99%) 
: Banque de Paris et des Pays-bas (Suisse) 
U. S. A. : Warburg Paribas Becker Inc. 
Belgium : Banque de Paris et des Pays-bas Belgique S. A. 
Netherlands : Banque de Paris et des Pays-bas N. V. * 
* Through Paribas-Warburg S. A. 
A 
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APPENDIX 10, 
U. K. Banks' shareholdings in consortium banks 
ANGLO-ROMANIAN BANK LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade 50 Romania 
Barclays Bank 30 U. K. 
Manufacturers Hanover International 20 U. S. A. 
ATLANTIC INTERNATIONAL BANK LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Banco di Napoli 12.5 Italy 
Banque de Neuflize, Schlumberger, Mallet 12.5 France 
Charterhouse Japhet 12.5 U. K. 
First Pennsylvania Banking Trust Co. 12.5 U. S. A. 
F van Lanschot Bankers 12.5 Netherlands 
Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit 12.5 U. S. A. 
National Shawmut Bank of Boston 12.5 U. S. A. 
United California Bank 12.5 U. S. A. 
Principal areas of business 
Medium and short-term eurocurrency and sterling financing. Corporate Finance. 
AUSTRALIAN FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CO. LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage 
Banque Worms et Cie 5 
Central Merchant Bank of South Africa 20 
Hambros Bank Ltd. 40 
Philadelphia National Bank 20 
Subsidiaries and affiliates 
AFIC Acceptances Pty Ltd. 
AFIC Investment Services Ltd. 
AFIC Nominees Pty Ltd. 
Australian Finance and Securities Ltd. Group 
Arinyah Holdings Pty Ltd. 
Arinyah Properties Pty Ltd. 
Cagoda Pty Ltd. 
Peerless Investments Ltd. 
A 
Country 
France 
South Africa 
U. K. 
U. S. A. 
Principal areas of business 
Comprehensive range of merchant banking services including property finance 
negotiations; capital raising; mergers and acquisitions; industrial research 
and investigation; and term loans and leasing. 
-2- 
AUSTRALIAN UNITED CORPORATION LTD 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Bank of New South Wales 11.6 Australia 
European Australian Associates 10.6 U. K. and 
Germany 
Industrial Bank of Japan 4 Japan 
JP Morgan (Morgan Guaranty) 21 U. S. A. 
Morgan Grenfell 10.6 U. K. 
Others 
Principal areas of business 
Merchant Banking. 
BANQUE DE LA SOCIETE FINANCIERE EUROPEENINNE 
Shareholders Percentage Count 
Algemene Bank Nederland 12.6 Netherlands 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 12.6 Italy 
Bank of America 12.6 U. S. A. 
Banque de Bruxelles 12.6 Belgium 
Barclays Bank Ltd. 12.6 U. K. 
Dresdner Bank 
. 
12.6 Germany 
Groupe BNP 12.6 France 
Sumitomo Bank 12.6 Japan 
BANQUE EUROPEENNE DE CREDIT 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Amsterdamsche-Rotterdamsche Bank N. V. 13.12 Netherlands 
Banca Commerciale Italiana 13.12 Italy 
Creditanstalt-Bankverein 13.12 Austria 
Deutsche Bank A. G. 13.12 Germany 
Midland Bank Ltd. 13.12 U. K. 
Samuel Montagu & Co. Ltd. 8.14 U. K. 
Societe Generale 13.12 France 
Societe Generale de Banque S. A. 13.12 Belgium 
Principal areas of business 
Medium and short term eurocurrency financing. 
BROWN HARRIMAN AND INTERNATIONAL BANKS LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Brown Bros Harriman & Co. 22 U. S. A. 
First National Bank of Minneapolis 10 U. S. A. 
Pittsburgh National Bank 10 U. S. A. 
Prudential Assurance 18 U. K. 
The Inter-Alpha Group of European Banks: 40 
Banco Ambrosiano Italy 
Berliner Handelsgesellschaft-Frankfurter Bank Germany 
Credit Commercial de France France 
Kredietbank Belgium 
Nederlandsche Middenstandsbank Netherlands 
Williams and Glyn's U. K. 
Principal Areas of business 
Loans, deposits and foreign exchange, short and medium term credits, 
rnrwºrate finanrp Rnrnhnnri market _ 
international 
-3- 
CCKERCIAL CONTINENTAL LTD. 
Shareholders 
Commercial Banking Company of Sydney Ltd. 
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. 
of Chicago 
Credit Commercial de France S. A. 
Crown Agents of Overseas Governments & Administrations 
Mutual Life and Citizens Assurance Co. Ltd. 
Sanwa Bank Ltd. 
Subsidiary 
Lease Industrial Finance Ltd. 
Affiliate 
Commercial Continental (Securities) Ltd. 
Principal areas of business 
Percentage Country 
33 Australia 
19.26 U. S. A. 
5.48 France 
S U. K. 
18 Australia 
19.26 Japan 
Medium-term finance; trade and accomiodation bill facilities; corporate 
advice. 
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Bank of Adelaide 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
Commercial Banking Company of Sydney Ltd. 
Cie Lambert pour l'Industrie et la Finance S. A. 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Ltd. 
Hill Samuel & Co. Ltd. 
Manufacturers Hanover International Finance Corporation 
Normura Securities Co. Ltd. 
Subsidiaries 
Australian Fixed Trusts Group of Companies 
Canada Australia Investment Co. Ltd. 
Delfin Corporate Services Ltd. 
Delfin Discount Co. Ltd. 
Delfin Industrial Finance Ltd. 
Delfin Investment Services Ltd. 
DFC (International) Ltd. 
Development Finance Corporation (Underwriting) Ltd. 
n/a Australia 
n/a Canada 
n/a Australia 
n/a Belgium 
n/a Japan 
n/a U. K. 
n/a U. S. A. 
n/a Japan 
I 
11 
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EURO-PACIFIC FINANCE CORPORATION LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Amsterdamsche-Rotterdamsche Bank N. V. 8 Netherlands 
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd. 25 Australia 
Deutsche Bank A. G. 8 Germany 
Fuji Bank Ltd. 15 Japan 
Midland Bank Ltd. 15.5 U. C. 
Societe Generale de Banque S. A. 8 Belgium 
Societe Generale (France) 8 France 
United California Bank 12.5 U. S. A. 
Principal areas of business 
Merchant Banking. 
EUROPAISCH ASIATISCHE BANK AG-EUROPEAN ASIAN BANK 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Amsterdamsche-Rotterdamsche Bank N. V. n/a Netherlands 
Banca Commerciale Italiana n/a Italy 
Creditanstalt-Bankverein n/a Austria 
Deutsche Bank A. G. n/a Germany 
Midland Bank Ltd. n/a U. K. 
Societe Generale S. A. n/a France 
Societe Generale de Banque S. A. n/a Belgium 
EUROPEAN-AMERICAN BANKING CORPORATION, 
EUROPEAN-AMERICAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY. 
Subsidiary 
European-American Finance (Bermuda) Ltd. 
Shareholders 
Amsterdamsche-Rotterdamsche Bank N. V. 
Creditanstalt-Bankverein 
Deutsche Bank A. G. 
Midland Bank Ltd. 
Societe Generale S. A. 
Societe Generale de Banque 
Principal areas of business 
European-American Banking Corporation specialises in international banking 
and finance while European-American Bank and Trust Co. is a full service 
commercial bank specialising in financial services for American and European 
customers. 
Percentage 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
Country 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Germany 
U. K. 
France 
Belgium 
I 
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EUROPEAN BANKING CO. LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Amsterdamsche-Rotterdamsche Bank 14.3 Netherlands 
Banca Commerciale Italiana 14.3 Italy 
Creditanstalt Bankverein 14.3 Austria 
Deutsche Bank 14.3 Germany 
Midland Bank 14.3 U. K. 
Societe Generale de Banque 14.3 Belgium 
Societe Generale 14.3 France 
EUROPEAN BRAZILIAN BANK LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Banco do Brasil 35 Brazil 
Bank of America Ltd. 17.5 U. K. 
Banque Ameribas S. A. 17.5 Luxembourg 
Deutsche Bank A. G. 15 Germany 
Union Bank of Switzerland 15 Switzerland 
Principal areas of business 
Merchant banking dealing in eurocurrency, comanagement and underwriting, and 
placing of Latin American securities issues and other normal banking services. 
FIRST NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Bank of New Zealand 40 
New Zealand Insurance Co. Ltd. 20 
Development Finance Corporation Ltd. 25 
Morgan Grenfell and Co. Ltd. 5 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York 5 
S. G. Warburg & Co. Ltd. 5 
Affiliates and subsidiaries 
Delfin Discount Co. (NZ) Ltd. 
Dominion Units Ltd. 
First New Zealand Deposits Ltd. 
First New Zealand Nominees Ltd. 
First New Zealand RDC Ltd. 
Security Units Ltd. 
Tasman Development Corporation Ltd. 
Principal area of business 
Merchant banking. 
New Zealand 
New Zealand 
Australia 
U. K. 
U. S. A. 
U. K. 
h 
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INTERNATIONAL ENERGY BANK 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Bank of Scotland 15 U. K. 
Banque Worms 10 France 
Barclays Bank International 15 U. K. 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 15 Canada 
Republic National Bank of Dallas 15 U. S. A. 
Societe Financiere Europeenne 30 France 
INTERNATIONAL PACIFIC CORPORATION LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Charter Consolidated Ltd. 27.3 Australia 
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd. 11.8 Australia 
Hordern, Utz and Bode 24.5 Australia 
N. M. Rothschild and Sons Ltd. 27.3 U. K. 
The other 9.1% is held by the management. 
Subsidiaries 
International Pacific Property Management Pty Ltd. 
Syngenetic Management Pty Ltd. 
Syngenetic Mining Pty Ltd. 
Westralian Rutile Pty Ltd. 
Principal areas of business 
Banking services - acceptance credits, advances, loans, money market operations. 
Corporate finance services - all aspects including underwriting, mergers, 
acquisitions. Investment management services - investment of funds of 
institutions, pension funds, businesses and individuals. 
INrERUNION-BANQUE 
Shareholders 
Banque Belge pour 1'Industrie 
Banque Commerciale de Bale 
Banque de Bruxelles 
Percentage 
4.82 
2.63 
9.70 
Comtry 
Banque de l'Union Europeenne Industrielle et Financiere* 
Bayerische Vereinsbank 
Centrale Finanziaria Generale 
Compagnie Financiere de 1'Union Europeenne* 
Hambros Bank 
Marine Midlands Banks Inc. 
Royal Bank of Canada International Ltd. 
Societe Financiere Desmarais pour l'Industrie et le 
Ccumerce 
Tokai Bank Ltd. 
* They hold 19.52% together. 
Subsidiaries and affiliates 
Interunion Antilles N. V. ' 
9.70 
4.73 
4.84 
19.40 
9.70 
9.70 
5.26 
Belgium 
Switzerland 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
France 
U. K. 
U. S. A. 
Nassau 
France 
Japan 
90 controlled Curacao 
Principal areas of business 
Eurocurrency short, medium and long-term lending. Foreign exchange and trading 
in deposits, eurobond issue department. 
-7- 
IRAN OVERSEAS INVESTMENT BANK LTD. 
Shareholders 
Bank Melii Iran 
Bank of America 
Bank of Tokyo 
Barclays Bank International 
Deutsche Bank 
Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran 
Industrial Bank of Japan 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust 
Midland Bank Ltd. 
Societe Generale 
LIBRA BANK 
Shareholders 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
National Westminster Bank 
Royal Bank of Canada 
Credito Italiano 
Mitsubishi Bank 
Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Swiss Bank Corporation 
Banco Espirito Santo e Comercial de Lisboa 
Principal areas of business 
International financing in Latin American markets. The bank engages in 
short, medium and long-term eurocurrency loan transactions; management; 
underwriting and placement of debt and equity securities for clients; 
syndication of major loan transactions; transacting business in the short- ` 
tens eurocurrency deposit markets; financial counselling. 
IANDON INTERSTATE BANK LTD. 
Shareholders 
First National Bank of Atlanta 
First Western Bank and Trust Co. 
Indiana National Bank 
Keyser Ullmann 
Maryland National Bank 
Mercantile Trust Company NA, St. Louis 
Principal area of business 
Percentage Cow 
10 Iran 
10 U. S. A. 
10 Japan 
10 U. K. 
10 Germany 
10 Iran 
10 Japan 
10 U. S. A. 
10 U. K. 
10 France 
Percentage Country 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
U. S. A. 
U. K. 
Canada 
Italy 
Japan 
Germany 
Switzerland 
Portugal 
Percentage Country 
16.13 U. S. A. 
16.13 U. S. A. 
16.13 U. S. A. 
16.13 U. K. 
16.13 U. S. A. 
16.13 U. S. A. 
Conducts an international banking business providing finance fqr the short 
and medium-term in sterling and foreign currencies for commercial and 
industrial companies, financial institutions, governments, government 
agencies and corporations. 
11 
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LONDON MULTINATIONAL BANK LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Cotmtry 
Baring Brothers Ltd. 20 U. K. 
Chemical Bank 30 U. S. A. 
Credit Suisse 30 Switzerland 
Northern Trust Company Chicago 20 U. S. A. 
Principal area of business 
Multinational merchant banking. 
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Count 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust 75 U. S. A. 
N. M. Rothschild and Sons 10 U. K. 
Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta 10 Italy 
Long Term Credit Bank of Japan 5 Japan 
Principal areas of business 
Principal business is the arranging of medium and long-term finance for 
governments, government agencies and major international corporations, in 
the eurocurrency markets and through the management, underwriting and 
distribution of issues in the international capital market and the private 
placement of securities with investors. It also provides : financial 
advisory services to international companies and governmental agencies in 
the examination, implementation and financing of major projects; arranges 
finance for shipping; acts as advisers to clients in the timing, methods 
and amounts of financing in different countries and currencies; participates 
in the underwriting and distribution of issues in the international 
capital market managed by others; manages fixed interest portfolios which 
also involves the purchase, sale and custody of securities; and makes loans 
and places funds for its own account. 
MARTIN CORPORATION GR(XJP LTD. 
Shareholders 
Baring Brothers and Co. Ltd. 
United Dominions Trust Ltd. 
Wells Fargo Bank NA 
Subsidiaries and affiliates 
Percentage Country 
20 U. K. 
40 U. K. 
40 U. S. A. 
Martin Corporation Ltd. 
Martin Nominees Ltd. 
Principal areas of business 
%% 
Merchant banking (complete range of facilities) and mc1ey market operations. 
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MBC INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Count 
Bank of America 25 U. S. A. 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Ltd. 10 Japan 
Antony Gibbs and Sons Ltd. 26.8 U. K. 
Kleinwort Benson Ltd. 26.8 U. K. 
Rothmans 11.4 Australia 
Subsidiaries and affiliates 
NBC Investments Ltd. 
NBC Nominees Proprietary Ltd. 
Principal area of business 
Merchant banking. 
MERRILL LYNCH-BROWN SHIPLEY BANK LTD (NOW MERRILL LYNCH INTERNATIONAL) 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Brown Shipley Holdings 5 U. K. 
Merrill Lynch Holdings 95 U. S. A. 
MIDLAND AND INTERNATIONAL BANKS LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Midland Bank Ltd. 45 U. K. 
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd. 10 Australia 
Standard Bank Ltd. 19 U. K. 
Toronto Dominion Bank 26 Canada 
Principal areas of business 
Formed in 1964 to undertake international financial business. Most business 
is within the medium-term field. Active in medium-term eurocurrency market 
and issues negotiable certificate of deposit in both dollars and sterling. 
ORION BANK LIMITED 
Shareholders 
Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp. 
Credito Italiano SpA 
Mitsubishi Bank Ltd. 
National Westminster Bank Ltd. 
Royal Bank of Canada 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 
Subsidiaries and affiliates 
Orion Multinational Services Ltd. 
Orion Termbank Ltd. 
Orion Leasing Holdings Ltd. 
Percentage Count 
20 U. S. A. 
10 Italy 
10 Japan 
20 U. K. 
20 i Canada 
20 Germany 
Principal areas of business 
An international investment and issue bank. 
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ORION MULTINATIONAL SERVICES LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp. 16.66 U. S. A. 
Credito Italiano SpA 16.66 Italy 
Mitsubishi Bank Ltd. 16.66 Japan 
National Westminster Bank Ltd. 16.66 U. K. 
Royal Bank of Canada 16.66 Canada 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 16.66 Germany 
Subsidiaries and affiliates 
Orion Termbank Ltd. 
Orion Bank Ltd. 
Orion Leasing Holdings Ltd. 
Principal areas of business 
A planning and marketing coordination organisation for the Orion Banking Group. 
PHILIPS-FIRST CITY-BRANDT'S LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
First National City Bank 20 U. S. A. 
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner and Smith 20 U. S. A. 
William Brandt's Sons and Co. Ltd. 10 U. K. 
National Mutual Life 20 Australia 
Philips, Kitchen and Co. 20 Australia 
Wallace H. Smith and Co. 10 Australia 
Subsidiaries and affiliates 
PFCB Management Pty Ltd. 
PFCB Nominees Pty Ltd. 
Springbridge Pty Ltd. 
Principal areas of business 
Merchant banking, underwriting, corporate finance advice and investment 
management. 
S(HRODERS AND CHARTERED LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Chartered Bank 40 U. K. 
Sir Elly Kadoorie Continuation Ltd. 20 Hong Kong 
J. Henry Schroder Wagg and Co. 40 U. K. 
Principal areas of business 
Management of new issues, underwriting of local and internationäl issues, capital 
reorganisations, capital raising through rights issues, placings and quotations, introductions and underwriting of issues of foreign corporations, mergers 
and acquisitions, investment and management of institutional funds, primary distributors and underwriters of eurobonds and Asian dollar bonds, loan 
syndication, general financial advice. 
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SOCIETE FINANCIERE EUROPEENNE 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Algemene Bank Nederland N. V. 12.5 Netherlands 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro n/a Italy 
Bank of America NT and SA n/a U. S. A. 
Banque de Bruxelles SA n/a Belgium 
Banque Nationale de Paris n/a France 
Barclays Bank International Ltd. n/a U. K. 
Dresdner Bank AG n/a Germany 
Sumitomo Bank Ltd. n/a Japan 
BANQUE DE LA SOCIETE FINANCIERE EURQPEENNE 
Societe Financiere Europeenne, Luxembourg, has a 52% participation and each 
of its participants own 6% of Societe Financiere Europeenne, Paris. 
Principal areas of business 
Mediun and long-term loans; mergers and acquisitions; equity participations; 
underwriting. 
TRICONTINENFAL CORPORATION LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Gillett Bros Discount Co. Ltd. 9.17 U. K. 
Incentive AB * 3.83 Sweden 
Mitsui Bank Ltd. 12.00 Japan 
Security Pacific National Bank 24.00 U. S. A. 
* Associated with Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken. J 
The Ian Potter Foundation, Australian United Investment Co. Ltd., Commercial 
Union Assurance Co. of Australia Ltd., and Consolidated Press Holdings 
Ltd. and Sir Ian Potter are also major shareholders in a total of 570 
shareholders. 
Subsidiaries 
Inverary Pty Ltd. (investment company) 
Milfay Pty Ltd. (leasing company) 
Portview Management Pty Ltd. (portfolio managers) 
Portview Nominees Pty Ltd. (nominee company) 
Tricontinental Leasing Ltd. (leasing company) 
Vite Pty Ltd. (investment company) 
Principal areas of business 
Corporate finance; leasing - money market operations; investments - portfolio 
management. 
-1 
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UBAF LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Cow 
Union de Banques Arabes et Francaises 50 France 
Midland Bank Ltd. 2S U. K. 
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank 25 Libya 
Subsidiaries and affiliates 
UBAE Luxembourg-Frankfurt 
UBAE Rome 
UBAN Hong Kong - Tokyo 
Principal area of business 
Medium-term eurocurrency finance. 
UNITED INTERNATIONAL BANK LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Banco de Bilbao n/a Spain 
Bank Mees and Hope n/a Netherlands 
Bank of Nova Scotia n/a Canada 
Banque Francaise du Commerce Exterieur n/a France 
Bayerische Hypotheken-und Wechselbank n/a Germany 
Credit du Nord n/a France 
Crocker National Bank n/a U. S. A. 
Privatbanken i Kjobenhavn n/a Denmark 
Sveriges Kreditbank n/a Sweden 
Williams and Glyn's n/a U. K. 
14 Principal areas of business 
The bank accepts deposits of substantial amounts for varying periods at market 
rates in both sterling and eurocurrencies. It also issues negotiable sterling 
and dollar certificate of deposit. The bank has granted loans in the interbank 
market and medium-term loans to major institutions throughout the world. It 
has developed an active foreign exchange dealing department. 
WESTERN AMERICAN BANK (EUROPE) LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage Country 
Bank of Tokyo Ltd. 22.5 Japan 
Hambros Bank Ltd. 10.0 U. K. 
National Bank of Detroit 22.5 U. S. A. 
Security Pacific National Bank 22.5 U. S. A. 
Wells Fargo Bank 22.5 U. S. A. 
i 
Subsidiaries and affiliates 
Western American Bank (Luxembourg) SA 
Western American Eurodeal Ltd., London 
Western American Eurodeal (Continental) AG, Zug. 
Principal area of business 
International merchant banking. 
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WESTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
Shareholders Percentage 
Alexanders Discount Co. Ltd. 4.2 
Commissioners of the Rural and Industries Bank of 
Western Australia 18.3 
Credit Lyonnais 20.0 
Crown Agents for Overseas Governments and Administrations 35.0 
Mutual Life and Citizens' Assurance Company Ltd. 18.3 
Wallace Brothers Sassoon Bank Ltd. 4.2 
Subsidiaries and affiliates 
Westint Nominees Pty Ltd. 
WIL Acceptances Pty Ltd. 
Principal area of business 
Merchant banking. 
s 
Cow 
U. K. 
Australia 
France 
U. K. 
Australia 
U. K. 
s 
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U. S. Banks' shareholding s in London consortium banks 
Shareholders (US) % London Consortium Bank 
Manufacturers Hanover (20) 
First P rm1vania Bk Tst (12.5) 
Manufers. NB of Detroit (12.5) 
Nat. Shawmut Bk. of Boston(12.5) 
United California Bank (12.5) 
Brown Bros. Harriman (22) 
Pittsburgh National Bank (10) 
First Nat. of Minneapolis (10) 
Bank of America Intl. Ltd. (17.5)* 
First' NB of Chicago (22) 
Irving Tst Co. (22) 
Republic NB of Dallas (15) 
Bank of America (10) 
Manufacturers Hanover (10) 
Chase Manhattan 
First NB of Atlanta 
First Western Bk & 
Tst Co. 
Indiana National Bank 
Maryland National Ban] 
Mercantile Tst Co. of 
(n/s) 
(16.13) 
(16.13)° 
(16.13) 
c (16.13) 
St Louis (16.13) 
Chemical Bank (30) 
Northern Trust Co. of Chicago (20) 
1 rrill Lynch (95) 
Chase Manhattan (20) 
Crocker National Bank (n/s) 
National Bank of Detroit (22.5)+ 
Security Pacific Nat. Bk (22.5)+ 
. Wells Fargo Bank (22.5)+ 
Bank of America Intl. Ltd. (n/s) 
Notes: 
Anglo-Romanian Bank 
Atlantic International Bank 
Brown Harriman & International 
Banks 
Eurobraz 
International Commercial Bank 
Intl. Energy Bank 
Iran Overseas Investment Bank 
Libra Bank 
London Interstate Bank 
I 
London Multinational Bank 
Merrill Lynch International 
Orion Bank 
United International Bank 
Western American Bank 
International Mexican Bank 
I 
* Bank of America Intl. Ltd. = Bank of America's London merchant banking 
subsidiary. 
o Acquired by Lloyds Bank and withdrawn from consortium 
+ Now increased to 25%, since withdrawal of Hambros. 
tharIes uker City Charles Barker City Limited. 20 Cannon Street. London EC4M 6XQ. telephone 01-236 3011. telegrams Chabarson Cent London, telex 883588 
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EMBARGO: NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 23,1972 
September 22,1972 
LORD INCHCAPE'S STATEMENT ON P&0- BOVIS SITUATION 
I have already stated my strong opposition to the proposal 
that P&0 should merge with Bovis. I believe that there 
is a better alternative. 
Since my original statement, Mr. A. B. Marshall and 
Mr. D, D, Brown have independently reached the conclusion 
that they cannot recommend the terms. They join with me 
in -issuing this statement. 
The proposed merger with Bovis is in my view not in 
the best interests of P&0 stockholders for two main 
reasons: 
1. the share of the P&0 equity it is proposed 
should be issued to Bovis shareholders is 
unfairly biased in Bovis's favour. 
2. the whole tenor and timing of the Offer do 
do not reflect the real potential within the 
P&0 Group. 
Under the proposed merger terms Bovis shareholders 
would ultimately receive just over 40% of the increased 
equity of P&0. In order to contain the interest of 
the Bovis shareholders in P&0 equity at this level, 
the existing P&O. shareholders will have to subscribe 
£36.7 million cash in respect of warrants to be issued 
under the proposed capitalisation scheme. (One may in 
passing question the rationale of the further cash 
injection into an already cash rich group. ) 
- more - 
LORD INCHCAPE'S STATEMENT -2 
But Bovis would contribute less than 20% of the new 
Group°s combined assets. * 
Although on the basis of 1972 forecast earnings Bovis 
would contribute about half± of the new Group's combined 
earnings we cannot believe that these earnings, taken 
together with P& 0's forecast earnings for the year 
to September 30,1972, represent a fair reflection of 
the relative earning capacity of the two businesses. 
The P&0 Board forecast on September 15 profits for 
the current year of 08 million, but with a further 
£2 million earned profit from earlier years to be added. 
During the year the company suffered a dock strike 
(il. 5 million estimated loss), a severe decline in the 
Northern Irish traffic, industrial troubles in Falmouth 
and major reorganisation costs. At a time of depression 
in international shipping I do not regard this result, which 
is substantially up on last year, as in any way discouraging. 
This is not the record of a company in decline. 
The new ship programme to the value of some £200 million 
is now beginning to bring in profits in increasing measure. 
These ships are designed for the growth markets of world 
trade throughout the 70s. 
Notes: * This would be the case even after assuming 
'a substantial surplus value for the Bovis 
land bank and Twentieth Century Banking 
Corporation. 
+ Assuming earnings for Bovis at £7.8 million 
for 1972 and assuming P&0 earnings for the 
year to September. 30,1972 to be of the 
order of £8.0 million. 
- more - 
LORD INCHCAPE'S STATEMENT -3 
P&0 has invested substantial resources in such 
joint ventures as O. C. L. Panocean, Oil exploration in 
the North Sea, and the transport and marketing of liquefied 
gas. The earnings to justify these joint venture 
investments are already beginning to flow and we are 
convinced that they will contribute increasingly over the 
years ahead to the profits available for P&0 stockholders. 
Over the past two years the P&0 staff have made great 
efforts and put through great changes. The benefits 
of this massive reorganisation are only now beginning to 
come through. 
From all I know of the Eastern trades, and of the 
Company's Five Year Plan for profit improvement and for 
expansion into new activities, both in and out of the 
maritime field, I am confident that P&0 is poised for a 
substantial profit recovery. Indeed in Mr. Geddes' letter 
he says "Your Directors believe that a more favourable view 
of the trend of profits in the next few years is justified. " 
This view by the Board as a whole is one with which I 
strongly concur. 
There is moreover a highly si gnificý 
Mr. Geddes' statement that "between 
of 1974 (tax) allowances unutilised 
of the P&0 Group alone are likely 
of £40 million". As this statement 
given profit estimates for 1973/74, 
told how this figure of £40 million 
ant implication in 
now and the end 
against profits 
to be of the order 
could only be made 
shareholders should be 
was arrived at. 
A significant part of P& 0's improving profitability 
will arise from the deployment, at acceptable returns, of 
the substantial cash flow which will accrue to P&0 
over the next few years with, in my view a relatively 
high degree of certainty. 
- more - 
LORD INCHCAPE'S STATEMENT -4 
Bovis's recent profit trend has benefited from factors, 
principally the recent and unprecendented rise in land values, 
which have been exceptionally favourable to their business, 
Their Directors have provided no information in the published 
documents to reassure me that Bovis's future profit trend 
is likely to be a significant justification for the merger 
proposals. 
With international shipping currently emerging from 
depressed conditions, it may well be that the proposed 
merger comes at a time when P&0 and Bovis are at 
diametrically opposite ends of their respective trading 
cycles. 
The relative contributions of assets by two Groups - which 
will provide the material for future profitability - 
demonstrate how drastically the terms are biased in Bovis's 
favour. The relevance of this point is, of course, 
emphasised by the proportion of P& 0's assets that is in 
the form of property or liquid assets. 
The foundations of success lie in assets and management. 
We have the former and, I believe, much more of the latter 
than the Offer Documents suggest. 
We need a Board confident in itself and its staff, and 
given appropriate leadership and direction, both of which 
I am confident will be forthcoming once the Bovis proposal 
has been rejected by the stockholders, I believe we have the 
necessary skills and abilities in the executive team on 
the shipping side. There is also plenty of talent of a 
high order to be found at all levels of staff and its 
potential must be released. 
-1 
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LORD INCHCAPE'S STATEMENT -5 
Of course, specific skills and qualifications must be 
sought elsewhere to meet urgent needs e. g. it is essential 
to bring into the company a property man of high calibre. 
Accordingly, we believe that the proposals put to 
stockholders to merge P&0 and Bovis are on terms which 
quite inadequately reflect the present value and great 
potential of the P&0 Group and should, therefore, in 
the best interests of P&0 stockholders be rejected. 
What is the alternative and what should stockholders 
do? 
P&0 stockholders should refuse to authorise the 
increase of capital called for to implement the prososed 
terms. The Board of P&0 should then determine to 
achieve. increased earnings per share which will reflect a 
more acceptable return on P& 0's assets currently 
estimated at some £300 million (500p per stock unit). 
In fulfilment of this objective the Board should: 
(i) Reaffirm the company's faith in its own future 
and restore staff confidence; 
(ii) press on with the exploitation of the 
company's recent investments in new and 
advanced ships totalling some £200 million. 
(iii)wherever possible raise the return earned on 
the Group properties now valued at home 
9110 million. 
'S 
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LORD INCHCAPE'S STATEMENT -6 
(iv) continue P& 0's diversification into non- 
shipping fields by acquisition and investment 
and thus balance the Group's economic base, 
making for this purpose maximum use of the 
Group's financial standing, its liquid resources, 
now amounting to some £40 million, the substantial 
annual cash flow of about £25 million, and the 
special fiscal advantages enjoyed by a shipping 
company; 
(v) cut out loss making subsidiary service and 
agency companies and dispose of low yielding 
investments in companies no longer required 
for the purposes of the Group's business. 
This course of action constitutes a far better resolution 
of the present position than a merger with Bovis on the 
terms proposed. 
The proposed terms do not do justice to P&0. They have 
never been and are not today the best opportunity open. 
We believe stockholders should vote against the merger 
Resolutions proposed for the meeting on October 12,1972. 
Lord"Inchcape, Mr. A. B. Marshall and Mr. D. D. Brown have 
considered all statements of fact and opinion contained 
herein and accept individually and collectively responsibility 
. 
therefor. 
September 22,1972 
Copies of this statement are available from Lord Inchcape's 
Office, 40 St. Mary Axe, EC3A 8EU 
END 
Issued by the Earl. of Inch. cape through Charles Barker City 
Limited tel: 01-236 3011 
Press enquiries: Lord Inchcape office: 01-283 4680 
home: Newport(079 982)212 
After hours & Mr. A. B. Marshall Woldin ham (905) 2299 
weekend. Mr. D. D. Brown Godalming (04868) 6635 
GP/AJR 
APPENDIX 13 
MORGAN GRENFELL & CO. LIMITED 
Questions relating to the merger between P&0 and Bovis 
1. The P&0 Board has given no indication of the likely range of 
P&0 profits over the next few years. Shareholders are told 
that there is a £200m. shipbuilding programme, yet the offer 
documents give no indication of what profit the Company is 
likely to derive from its shipping operations. P&0 has 
presumably made internal projections of profits at least up to 
the end of 1974 in order to arrive at the estimate of £40m. 
unutilisable capital allowances given in the letter to share- 
holders. Why haven't shareholders been told how the figure 
of £40m. was reached? 
The internal reorganisation post-McKinsey is apparently only 
now taking effect. Has this resulted in cost savings? What 
cost savings are likely to result in the future? 
2. The P&0 Board has given no real indication of the potential of 
the P&0 properties but says that many of the properties are 
needed by the Group for the conduct of its business. Conversely, 
the Chairman of Bovis says in his letter to Bovis shareholders 
that Bovis expertise can maximise returns on P&0 properties. 
What is the current valuation of those properties that are 
available for development? On what basis have they been 
valued? To what extent would it be practicable over a period 
for P& O's business to be moved to other premises without a 
material increase in costs, thus freeing more of the existing 
properties for redevelopment? 
3. The P&0 Board claim as one rationale for the merger a desire 
to spread the risk underlying the P&0 profit base. As far 
as properties are concerned, how can this be done other than 
by developing properties as fixed assets to be held for rental 
purposes, thus giving a certain rental income which increases 
with inflation. Is it intended that the development of the 
P&0 properties should be done with this end in view? 
... /2 
II 
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4. What steps has the P&0 Board taken to find experts capable of 
exploiting the potential of the P&0 properties? Has the 
Board explored any schemes for a joint venture or other 
association with a property company to maximise returns on the 
P&0 properties? 
5. The offer document incorporates a revaluation of the P&0 
properties yet nothing is said about the current value of the 
Group's other assets, in particular the value of its fleet. 
What is the current value of the P&0 fleet? If it is in fact 
below the book value, then: 
(a) why hasn't the book value been written down out 
of reserves? 
(b) why hasn't the depreciation charge been reduced 
with a consequent increase in profits? 
6. P&0 is known to have ships on order until 1975; further ships 
may have been ordered. What are the gross capital allowances 
on these ships? What is the present total of unutilised 
allowances? Why doesn't the estimate of unutilisable 
allowances of £40m. go beyond the end of 1974? Has the 
P&0 Board seriously considered schemes for the acceleration 
of the use of capital allowances? If not, why not? 
7. Has the P&0 Board explored the possibility of acquiring the 
other interests in profitable associated companies, the profits 
of which would then be offsettable against P& O's capital 
allowance and so become tax free in the hands of P&0? 
8. Why is P&0 proposing to issue warrants? There is no proper 
reason for doing so unless it is expected that they will be 
exercised. Why does the P&0 Board think that the Company 
will need the £36m, that the exercise of the warrants will 
produce, bearing in mind the existing liquid assets and "the 
considerable cash flow generated by P& 0" referred to by 
Mr. Sanderson. 
... /3 
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9. What is the detailed breakdown of the Bovis profit forecast so 
that P&0 shareholders may know the extent to which Bovis 
forecast profits are attributable to: - 
(a) Housebuilding, and in particular the extent to 
which housebuilding profits will be derived from 
profit on the sale of sites as opposed to con- 
struction activity? 
(b) Property dealing profit, including the sale of 
completed developments. 
(c) Rental income. 
(d) Contracting. 
(e) Banking. 
10. What is the estimated range of Bovis profits in 1973 and 1974 
and what proportions are likely to be derived from the 
separate sources listed in 9? 
11. What is the current value of the Bovis land bank and the surplus 
J 
over cost? Has the land bank been independently valued 
recently and if so, by whom? 
12. What is the current value of the Bovis fixed asset land and 
buildings? Have they been independently valued recently, and 
if so, by whom? 
13. What is the extent of additional costs resulting from the 
settlement of the building dispute which cannot be recovered 
under escalation clauses in existing contracts? 
14. Since Bovis first became involved in property development, in 
addition to contracting and housebuilding, in 1970, what profits 
have been derived from development activities and to what extent 
are they represented by (a) dealing profits and (b) rental 
income? 
... /4 
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15. What is the basis for the estimate of the "end value" of £l00m. 
for the Bovis development programme? How much of this is 
profit? Does Bovis intend to realise this profit, and if so 
to what extent and over what period? If not, what additional 
rental income is it estimated will accrue? It is noted that 
the assumption underlying the profit forecast of the property 
division for 1972 does not envisage any increase in rental 
income. Is this correct? 
i 
A 
i 
September 25,1972 
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3rd October, 1972. 
MORGAN GRENFELL & CO. LIMITED 
23 Great Winchester Street, 
London EC2P 2AX 
To: The holders of the Preferred and Deferred Stock of 
3rd October, 1972. 
The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company 
Dear Stockholder, 
PROPOSED MERGER WITH BOVIS 
As a stockholder of P&0 you will be aware that your Board has proposed a merger between 
your Company and Bovis and you will have received an explanatory letter from the Chairman of P&0 
together with a copy of the formal offer document dated 19th September, 1972. 
Following the announcement of the proposal, Morgan Grenfell, as investment advisers responsible 
to clients holding more than £400,000 Deferred Stock in P&0, examined the proposed terms and 
concluded that they might not be in the best interests of P&0 stockholders. Accordingly we contacted 
major stockholders and discovered that they too had reservations about the terms. 
We decided that Morgan Grenfell, which is independent of both P&0 and Bevis and has no 
advisory position with either company should make its views known publicly so that those who share 
our feeling of unease over the proposal and the manner in which it has been conceived might have their 
interests represented. 
You will have read that the Earl of Inchcape and two executive directors, Mr. A. B. Marshall and 
Mr. D. D. Brown dissented from the recommendation of the Board of P&0 as they did not accept that 
the prospects for P&0 stockholders were appreciably better from the combined group than from P&0 
alone. A fourth director, Mr. C. J. Nancarrow, has now withdrawn his recommendation. Morgan Grenfoll 
do not represent these directors, preferring to take a completely independent and objective position 
seeking to obtain the best outcome for the stockholders of P&0. 
Our first step, after having had an opportunity to study the documents carefully, was to hold a 
meeting of major stockholders, representing some 25 per cent. of the equity of P&0. at our offices on 
Monday, 25th September, 1972. We believed then that in his communications to his stockholders the 
Chairman of P&0 had not dealt with basic issues fundamental to a realistic assessment of the position, 
and that there was a seemingly totally unjustifiable attempt by the Board to belittle P&0 and cast doubt 
on its prospects even though this Board had been responsible for its management and policy for many 
years. This lack of proper information, and the apparent indecent haste with which the proposed merger 
had been arranged, raised a great number of questions. Those were discussed at the meeting and a list 
of questions (as set out in the Appendix I to this letter), designed to elicit the information in our opinion 
necessary to reach a rational, informed and unemotional decision, was submitted to P& 0's advisers. 
In order to give P&0 stockholders proper time to consider the answers we asked that they should be 
given to stockholders by the morning of Thursday, 28th September. We assumed that the answers could 
be given from information already available to P&0 and its advisers having been already considered 
by them in formulating the terms. 
The response to these questions was a further letter from the Chairman of P&0 
posted on Friday, 29th September giving certain information which In no way provides the 
full and frank answers we expected the Board should provide before stockholders could 
reasonably be expected to take what may be an irrevocable decision on the future of P&0. 
Owing to the lack of information concerning P&0 we felt it necessary to commission an indepen- 
dent report on the prospects of P&0 from James Morrell & Associates, specialists in business forecasting. 
A copy of this report may be inspected at our offices at the above address. 
In their opinion "in the year just ending we expect to see a small improvement in profit margins, 
which should produce, on unchanged gross revenues, the level of profits forecast by the Chairman. 
Taking into account the general sober outlook for freight rates and the cost position, we forecast a cyclical 
improvement in margins to 1974. Profits should also rise as capacity increases. Investment income is 
expected to rise as cash flow retentions are re-invested, but loan interest payments are likely to increase as 
outstanding facilities are taken up for the final instalments of the building programme. " 
"The rise in the level of operations in 1973 is expected to be well above average due to the good 
increase in world production and trade. This will entail increased operating costs, which in conjunction with 
the general rise in prices is expected to lead to a 15 per cent. rise in total costs. Thereafter benefits are 
likely to accrue from the rationalisation programme arising from the implementation of the McKinsey 
report recommendations. " 
"Our forecasts can be summarised as follows: - 
Year to Net income Available for Earnings per 
30th September before tax equity stock unit 
£m £m pence 
1971 Actual 5.2 3.1 5.2 
1972 10.9 8.9 16.3 
1973 15.5 13.5 23.2 
1974 19.2 17.1 29.3 
It is stressed that this forecast makes no allowance for any change in use or disposal of surplus assets. " 
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"In addition P&0 has property interests substantially in excess of its own operating requirements. 
The sale of surplus property would release capital for the acquisition of additional industrial equity income. 
Either surplus assets are re-invested to raise the level of equity earnings or the surplus cash and property 
assets can be disposed of. In either case we suggest that the additional earnings, or asset surplus, can be 
valued at £2 per stock unit. " 
"On this basis, our basic forecast of earnings per stock unit rising to 30p in 1974 plus the more 
effective use of assets indicate a potential price of £5 by 1974. " 
In the absence of contrary evidence from the Chairman of P&0 we can only reach our decision 
on the balance of advantages to P&0 in the light of independent estimates. 
We question whether a housebuilding, construction and property dealing company 
such as Bovis is the right company with which P&0 should merge. We do not believe that 
the record and potential of Bovis is such as to justify a merger on the terms currently 
proposed. In our opinion, on the evidence so far presented, the existing potential of P&0 
is such that this is the wrong time for P&0 stockholders to give away nearly 50 per cent. 
of their company. 
A more dynamic Board of Directors should be appointed. We believe that the Earl of 
Inchcape, as one of the senior directors, would be prepared to be appointed Chairman until 
a full time executive Chairman of the calibre required could be found. In this way, we 
believe that the existing potential of P&0 will be realised, the whole of which will go to 
P&0 stockholders. 
At a further meeting of major stockholders on Thursday, 28th September it was considered that 
there would no longer be sufficient time for the proper consideration of any new information given by 
P&0 and for serious comment on such information to reach stockholders before we were required to 
return our proxies in order to vote at the Extraordinary General Meeting convened for 12th October, 1972. 
Proxies must be returned by 3 p. m. on Tuesday, 10th October which means that many stockholders will 
need to post their proxies by Friday, 6th October. Accordingly, we were authorised as spokesmen of the 
meeting to seek an adjournment of the Extraordinary General Meeting. This request was refused by the 
Board of P&0. We then referred the matter to the Executive of the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers and 
when they ruled that in their view an adjournment was not necessary we appealed to the full Panel. At a 
meeting of the full Panel on Monday, 2nd October, the appeal was refused and the Executive ruling 
upheld. The position now is that stockholders have only three working days from the receipt of this 
letter to consider questions of vital consequence and to complete their proxy forms. 
We believe that stockholders cannot be expected to assent to these merger plans 
until the proper information has been made available, and proper time given for its consider- 
ation, and until stockholders have been given complete satisfaction by the Board of P&0. 
The consent of the stockholders of P&0 must be obtained for the alteration to the share capital of 
P&0 necessary to implement the merger with Bovis. Resolutions 2 and 3 to be proposed at the Extra- 
ordinary General Meeting convened for 12th October, 1972 are for this purpose. 
IF YOU SHARE OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE PROPOSED MERGER 
YOU SHOULD VOTE AGAINST RESOLUTIONS 2 AND 3 
Resolution 1 is a Special Resolution altering the voting structure of P&0 so as to give every 
stockholder one vote for every £1 nominal of stock held. This Resolution has no bearing on the proposed 
merger. The P&0 Board have recommended stockholders to implement this change in order to bring 
the voting structure into conformity with modern practice which we believe is a sensible proposal. 
WE SHALL ADVISE OUR CLIENTS TO VOTE FOR RESOLUTION 1 
A now proxy form is enclosed with this letter which, by being completed and returned 
to Morgan Grenfell not later than 12 noon on Tuesday, 10th October, 1972, can be used to 
replace any proxy form already submitted. In the event that this meeting is postponed and 
further information provided, you may always reverse this vote by sending In a new proxy 
form. 
IF YOU ARE IN ANY DOUBT AS TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS LETTER AND THE ACTION 
YOU SHOULD TAKE YOU SHOULD CONSULT YOUR BROKER, BANK MANAGER OR OTHER 
ADVISER IMMEDIATELY. 
Yours faithfully, 
4- For MORGAN GRENFELL & CO. LIMITED, 
CATTO, 
Director. 
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APPENDIX I 
QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE MERGER BETWEEN P&0 AND BOVIS 
1. The P&0 Board has given no indication of the likely range of P&0 profits over the next 
few years. Stockholders are told that there is a £200m. shipbuilding programme, yet the offer documents 
give no indication of what profit the Company is likely to derive from its shipping operations. P&0 has 
presumably made internal projections of profits at least up to the end of 1974 in order to arrive at the 
estimate of £40m. unutilisable capital allowances given in the letter to Stockholders. Why haven't 
Stockholders been told how the figure of £40m. was reached? 
The internal reorganisation post-McKinsey is apparently only now taking effect. Has this 
resulted in cost savings? What cost savings are likely to result in the future? 
2. The P&0 Board has given no real indication of the potential of the P&0 properties but 
says that many of the properties are needed by the Group for the conduct of its business. Conversely, 
the Chairman of Bovis says in his letter to Bevis Shareholders that Bovis expertise can maximise returns 
on P&0 properties. What is the current valuation of those properties that are available for development ? 
On what basis have they been valued? To what extent would it be practicable over a period for P& O's 
business to be moved to other premises without a material increase in costs, thus freeing more of the 
existing properties for redevelopment? 
3. The P&0 Board claim as one rationale for the merger a desire to spread the risk underlying 
the P&0 profit base. As far as properties are concerned, how can this be done other than by developing 
properties as fixed assets to be held for rental purposes, thus giving a certain rental income which increases 
with inflation. Is it intended that the development of the P&0 properties should be done with this end 
in view? 
4. What steps has the P&0 Board taken to find experts capable of exploiting the potential 
of the P&0 properties? Has the Board explored any schemes for a joint venture or other association 
with a property company to maximise returns on the P&0 properties? 
5. The offer document incorporates a revaluation of the P&0 properties yet nothing is said 
about the current value of the Group's other assets, in particular the value of its fleet. What is the current 
value of the P&0 fleet? If it is in fact below the book value, then: 
(a) why hasn't the book value been written down out of reserves? 
(b) why hasn't the depreciation charge been reduced with a consequent increase in profits? 
6. P&0 is known to have ships on order until 1975; further ships may have been ordered. 
What are the gross capital allowances on these ships? What is the present total of unutilised allowances? 
Why doesn't the estimate of unutilisable allowances of £40m. go beyond the end of 1974? Has the 
P&0 Board seriously considered schemes for the acceleration of the use of capital allowances? If not, 
why not? 
7. Has the P&0 Board explored the possibility of acquiring the other interests In profitable 
associated companies, the profits of which would then be offsettable against P& O's capital allowance 
and so become tax free in the hands of P&0? 
8. Why is P&0 proposing to issue warrants? There is no proper reason for doing so unless it 
is expected that they will be exercised. Why does the P&0 Board think that the Company will need 
the £36m. that the exercise of the warrants will produce, bearing in mind the existing liquid assets and 
"the considerable cash flow generated by P& 0" referred to by Mr. Sanderson. 
9. What is the detailed breakdown of the Bevis profit forecast so that P&0 shareholders may 
know the extent to which Bovis forecast profits are attributable to: - 
(a) Housebuilding, and in particular the extent to which housebuilding profits will be derived 
from profit on the sale of sites as opposed to construction activity? 
(b) Property dealing profit, including the sale of completed developments? 
(c) Rental income? 
(d) Contracting ? 
(e) Banking ? 
10. What is the estimated range of Bovis profits In 1973 and 1974 and what proportions are 
likely to be derived from the separate sources listed in 9? 
11. What is the current value of the Bovis land bank and the surplus over cost? Has the land 
bank been independently valued recently and if so, by whom? 
12. What is the current value of the Bovis fixed asset land and buildings? Have they been 
Independently valued recently, and if so, by whom? 
13. What is the extent of additional costs resulting from the settlement of the building dispute 
which cannot be recovered under escalation clauses in existing contracts? 
14. Since Bevis first became involved in property development, in addition to contracting and 
housebuilding, in 1970, what profits have been derived from development activities and to what extent 
are they represented by (a) dealing profits and (b) rental income? 
15. What is the basis for the estimate of the "end value" of £100m. for the Bovis development 
programme? How much of this is profit? Does Bovis intend to realise this profit, and If so to what extent 
and over what period? If not, what additional rental income is it estimated will accrue? It is noted that 
the assumption underlying the profit forecast of the property division for 1972 does not envisage any 
Increase in rental income. Is this correct? 
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STAY INDEPENDENT. 
CHOOSE THE BEST ALTERNATIVE, 
NOT THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE. 
You are being asked by the Board of P&0 to make "the most crucial 
vote in the history of your Company" for a merger with Bovis where: - 
1. INADEQUATE INFORMATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED. 
2. FOUR DIRECTORS HAVE DISSENTED FROM THE BOARD'S VIEWS. 
.i 
3. NEARLY 50 PER CENT. OF THE FUTURE GROWTH AND ASSETS OF 
P&0 ARE BEING GIVEN TO BOVIS SHAREHOLDERS IN RETURN FOR 
JUST OVER 50 PER CENT. OF BOVIS. 
4. P&0 AT £5 PER STOCK UNIT WOULD BE VALUED AT £300 MILLION. 
BEFORE THE OFFER BOVIS WAS VALUED AT £97 MILLION. 
5. THE NET ASSETS OF P &0, ARE £306 MILLION. 
THE NET ASSETS OF BOVIS ARE £27 MILLION. 
6. P&0 IS EFFECTIVELY BEING TAKEN OVER BY BOVIS. 
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APPENDIX II 
Assumptions made by James Morrell & Associates in arriving at their assessment dated 2nd 
October, 1972 of the prospects of P&0: - 
1. (a) Demand for shipping is determined by world industrial production which in turn 
influences world trade. 
(b) The world business cycle can be predicted with some exactitude for one or two years 
ahead and a fair approximation can be made for the complete cycle for four or five years. 
(c) The trends over the past decade in P& 0's operating ratios (revenue to assets and 
operating profits to revenue) viewed against the world background will bo maintained. 
2. P&0 will continue its present basic pattern of operation and its concentration in shipping. 
3. If unprofitable operations are to be continued steps will be taken to make them profitable. 
4. The Group is not likely to be liable for U. K. Corporation Tax in the foreseeable future and the 
planned changeover to an imputation system of Corporation Tax will have no material effect. Overseas Tax 
will rise to a moderate extent. 
5. The annual depreciation charges will remain at near the same percentage of the written down 
value of fixed assets. 
6. The balance of the capital programme will be financed by further shipbuilding loans at interest 
rates below the market level. 
7. The existing pattern of exchange rates will continue. 
S. No allowance has been made for any likely increase in the profitability of interests outside 
shipping. 
i 
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APPENDIX 15 
A guide to the City Code, Revised April 1976 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
1. Observe the spirit as well as the wording. 
2. Code impinges on the freedom of action of parties 
3. Shareholders entitled to adequate information and time to decide. 
4. Board of offeree company may not take action to deny shareholders 
the opportunity to decide outcome. 
S. A false market in shares must not be allowed. 
6. An offeree board should seek outside advice 
7. Rights of control must be exercised in good faith 
8. All offeree shareholders of the same class must be treated similarly. 
9. An offer to shareholders in general shall not be on less favourable 
terms than a prior offer to selected shareholders. 
10. Information shall not be made available to some but all shareholders. 
11. Directors must act in their capacity as directors and in the interests 
of the shareholders as a whole. 
12. Documents or advertisements to shareholders must be prepared with the 
same care as a prospectus. 
13. where control is effected by persons acting in concert, a general offer 
to all shareholders is required. 
14. Financial advisers should ensure that an offeror is, and will remain, 
in a position to implement its offer. 
RULES 
The Approach 
1. The offer should be put first to the offeree board or its advisers. 
2. The identity of the principal must be disclosed at the outset. 
3. The offeree board may seek assurances that the offeror has adequate 
resources. 
4. The offeree board must seek independent advice on any offer. 
Early Stages 
5. Shareholers must be informed immediately that a firm intention to make 
an offer is notified. 
6. An annoucement by both parties is preferable. 
7. There must be absolute secrecy before an annoucement 
'8. The identity of the offeror and its existing shareholding must be disclosed. 
Board Consideration of an Offer 
9. An offer will lapse if it is referred to the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission 
10. Offer documents should be hosted within 28 days of annoucement of the ai 
terms 
11. Where offeror buys shares from directors (and associates) of offeree 
company he must undertake to fulfil any commitment under Rule 34 
12. Information given to one bidder must be furnished equally to other suitors. 
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Formal Offers, Documents Supporting an Offer or Recommending the Acceptance 
or Reýecti. on of anOffer 
13. Agreements or share dealings between directors/associates of the 
offeror and offeree companies must be disclosed in offer documents. 14. Any document or advertisement should be drawn with the same care as 
a prospectus and approved by the whole board. Notices of dissent 
must also be included. 
1S. Shareholders must be given all the facts, in ample time to make an informed judgement on the merits. 
16. Profits forecasts require especial care from directors, and must be backed by a report on the bases by auditors and a report by financial 
advisers on the forecasts. Revaluation of assets require an independent 
professional report. 
17. Offeree shareholders must be given details of shareholdings in the 
two companies of the companies themselves and their directors, and be 
told whether the offeree directors intend to accept or reject the offer. 18. The availability of adequate cash to satisfy the offer must be 
independently confirmed. 
19. Details must be disclosed regarding directors' service contracts 
and emoluments. 
20. Copies of all documents and annoucements must be lodged with the Panel 
secretariat. 
Mechanics and the Formal Offer 
21. 
26. 
An offer which could confer voting control may not be declared unconditional 
unless voting control has been secured. 
The provisions of the following four rules must be specifically incorporated 
in the offer document: 
22. The offer must be open for at least 21 days and 14 days after revision 
terms. Unless the offer has become unconditional, an acceptor may 
withdraw his acceptance after 21 days from the original closing date 
and the offer must lapse after 60 days. 
23. After an offer has become unconditional, it must be left open for 
at least 14 days, unless shareholders were given 14 days' advance 
warning 
24. An extension of an offer must be annouced by 9.30 a. m. on the working 
day following the earlier expiry date. 
2S. The offeror must annouce detailed results of an offer the morning 
after its expiry date, failing which quotation may be suspended and the unconditional declaration will become void. 
27. Panel's consent is required for all partial bids 
28. Offers for various classes of shares must, for technical reasons relating to 
section 209 of the 1948 Companies Act, be worded as separate offers for 
each class. 
29. Suitable arrangements must be made to protect the interests of holders of 
securities, options or subscription rights convertible into equity capital for which an offer is made. 
Dealings 
30. No insider trading is allowed from the first stage of an approach. This 
applies to all those "privy" to the preliminary discussions and includes directors/employees of the companies involved, professional advisers, 
the spouse and close relatives and related trusts of such persons. 31. The Code does not generally seek to fetter dealings in the market but 
each morning disclosure must be made of details of shares of each company 
acquired or sold by the parties or their associates the previous day. 
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32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
If the offeror and/or its associate purchases shares in the market 
or otherwise during the offer period at a price higher than the bid price, 
the offeror shall offer a correspondingly higher price to all 
acceptors. 
If shares purchased by the offeror, within 12 months prior to the offer 
period carry 15% or more of the voting rights, then the offer will 
normally be in cash or accompanied by a cash alternative at not less 
than the highest price. 
If shares carrying more than 30% of the voting rights of a company 
are acquired, or if between 30% and 50% of voting rights are held 
and additional shares increasing the percentage by more than 2% 
are acquired, an offer must be extended for the remainder of the shares. 
If an offer does not become unconditional the offeror may not make 
an offer for the company within 12 months of the previous offer 
lapsing or acquire sufficient shares for an offer to be mandatory 
under Rule 34. 
Purchases and sales with some shareholders with special conditions 
are prohibited. 
Associates of the offeror or offeree should consult the Panel to 
ensure that their dealings do not unfairly affect the outcome of, 
or frustrate, a bid. 
Changes in the Situation of a co pang during a bid 
38. In a bid situation, the Board of the offeree company may not generally, 
without the permission of a general meeting, issue fresh shares or 
options, sell or acquire material assets or enter into contracts 
otherwise than in the ordinary course of business. 
Registration of Transfers 
39. Registration of transfers should take place promptly so that 
shareholders can freely exercise their voting rights; Articles 
which prescribe a qualification period for voting are undesirable 
PRACTICE NOTES 
1. Application to private companies, unquoted public companies and foreign 
companies 
2. Publication of information (General Principle 10) 
3. Profit Forecasts (Rule 16) 
4. Assumptions regarding profit forecast (Rule 16) 
5. Asset valuations (Rule 16) 
6. Directors' service contracts (Rule 19) 
7. Disclosure of dealings (Rule 31) 
8. Mandatory offers following acquisition or consolidation of control 
(Rule 34) 
9. Rulings and interpretations of general interest., 
APPENDIX 16 
A summary of the proposals for the supervision of deposit taking 
institutions 1976 
Recognition as a bank: 'Exacting criteria' covering minimum capital 
and reserves, type and range of banking services, reputation or status 
to be determined by the Bank in agreement with the Treasury and to be 
published, right of appeal to the Treasury against refusal or revocation 
of recognition, banks to be exempt from licensing. 
Licensed institutions: Licence required from the Bank for all deposit-taking 
institutions that are not banks or otherwise exempt. 'General conditions' 
to be laid down in legislation and published prudential criteria to be 
determined by the Bank with the agreement of the Treasury, consultations to 
be held about the nature of criteria to include minimum capital and reserves, 
'honest, trustworthy and suitably qualified' management and in the case 
of existing institutions, past performance. 
Relation: Bank to examine capital adequacy, liquidity, degree of 
risk attached to various assets, matching liabilities and assets in sterling 
and other currencies, deposits from and lending to connected organisations, 
lending distribution, provisions and profits. When granting or renewing 
licence Bank to be able to 'attach further conditions' covering appointment 
of directors or management, injection of extra capital, licence may be 
revoked or suspended if standards not met, with right to appeal to the 
Treasury. 
Banking names and advertisin : Recognised banks, but not licensed 
institutions, to use the word 'bank' in name, describe themselves as 
'banks' or in the business of banking'; the Treasury, in consultation with 
the Bank under proposed legislation, to issue regulations governing content 
and form of advertising for deposits. 
D2 posit Protection Fund: Government propose a 'mandatory deposit protection 
fund' for banks an icensed institutions, providing cover for sterling 
deposits up to £10,000 or first 110,000 of larger deposits, to be adminstered 
by the Bank. 
Branches of overseas deposit-taking institutions: To be licensed or 
recognise as a bank, prudential supervision, rimarily' by country of 
origin, no requirement of separate endowment capital in UK, if licensed 
in UK, and head office in EEC may be entitled to use banking names used 
in own country. 
Legislation: Moneylenders Act and s 123 of Companies Act to be repealed 
once alte provisions of Consumer Credit Act 1974 in operation; 
Protection of Depositors Act and s 127 of Companies Act 1967 to be repealed; 
Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 to be amended. Exchange Control Act 
1947 to remain; provisions of the Eighth Schedule of the Companies Act 
1948 to continue pending review. 
Accountability: Parliamentary scrutiny of supervision; criteria for licensing 
anrecognition evolved by Bank and Treasury to be put before Parliament in 
both original and, as necessary, modified form; Bank to report annually on 
exercise of supervisory responsibilities to Parliament, report available to 
Select Committee on Nationalised Industries; Bank to handle individual cases 
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about which Treasury ministers will not 
is an appeal. Appeals to be subject to 
in Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971. 
answer questions unless there 
statutory inquiry as defined 
